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ABSTRACT 
The Vi~iles were a fire bri~ade, carryicg out ni~htly patrols 
throughout the City of Rome. Orj_~inally ~.500 stron~, they were 
increased to 7,000. The scale of their fire patrols makes them 
unioue. Their eouiprnent was basic but effective. The aaueducts 
made their operations possible by crovidin~ adeauate supplies 
of water throu~hout the City. 
Rome had a very bad fire problem, accentuated by the 
occurrence of several fires at once. Au~ustus ap~lied the 
military techniaue of patrollin~ to the water resources already 
available. The conventional sizes of centuries and cohorts 
were appropriate for firefi~htin~, and the Vi~iles were or~anised 
as soldiers. But they were non-combative, and recruited largely 
from freedmen. 
The continutius ni~ht duty was arduous, and around 8% 
of the men resi~ned each year. In contrast with soldiers, 
vigiles served for a normal period of only 6 years. There were 
a few openin~s for promotion to nco or technician, but further 
opportunities on the operational side were rare. Nco's and 
technicians could serve for many years. The officers (centurions 
and tribunes) had a military back~round. Centurions could serve 
for many years; tribunes did not. The prefect had judicial 
functions in addition to overall responsibility for the Vifiiles, 
and was less concerned with active firefightin~. 
The two fields of ancient history and firefi~hting have 
been brou~ht to~ether. The evidence used to be under-utilised, 
but can be very informative. Probably the most ne~lected aspect 
was that of numbers. The two nominal rolls of the Fifth Cohort 
are key items, tellin~ us the total numbers of men and also 
providing us with clues as to the len~th of service and the 
nature of the career. Within this framework, we can fit the 
evidence into a coherent picture. 
With so many points at which the Vi~iles were notentially 
effective, they must be ranked amon~ the world's more effective 
fir~ bri~ades. 
THE VIGILES OF ROME 
by 
John S. Rainbird, M.A. (Cambridge) 
Van Mildert Colle~e, Durham 
Thesis Presented in candidacy for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Hay, 1976 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
d · f t" on deri,·ed his prior written consent an m orma I 
from it should be acknowledged. 
Abstract 
Title pa~e 
Contents 
(ii) 
CONTENTS 
Abbreviations, References, Biblio~raphy 
Dessau refereE~es of ind;.;riptions cited 
Index of fi~ures 
Acknowled~em2nts 
Part I. Introrluctory. 
Chapter 1. The problem of the Vi~iles. 
Chapter 2. The Problem of firefi~htin~. 
Part II. Historical. 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iv) 
(xvii) 
(xviii) 
(xxii) 
( 1 ) 
(10) 
Chapter ?. Analysis of VI. 1057, 1058 and 1056. (26) 
{3.~: numbers. 3.2: descriPtion of the lists. 3.3: 
nature of the analysis. 3.4: the men who recur. 
3.5: len~th ot service- 3.6~ recruits of A.D.205. 
3.?: survivors in the lists. 3.~: survival rate. 
3.9: year ~roups on 1057. ~.~0: year groups on 1058. 
3.11: analysis of 1056. 3.12: tables to summarise 
evidence and conclusions) 
Chapter 4. The basic evidence for eouinment, techniaues 
and O"!:erations 
(4.1: apnroach. 4.2: basic tect·diaues. 4. 3: numbers. 
4.4: Di!!:est. 4.5: inf'ltrur.H~ntum. 4.6: pumps. 4.?: 
buckets. 4.8: lack of hoses. 4.q~ axes. 4.10: unc(in)us. 
4. 11: 4.12: ballistae. 4.1): ladders. 4.14: small 
gear. 4.15: scoPae. 4.16: snnn~eR. 1+.17: ropes. 4.18: 
centones. 4.19. si~nallin~. 4. 20: horses. 4. 21: 3.cetum. 
4.22: formiones. 4.??: perticae. 4.?4~ firefi~hting 
specialists in Vi~iles. 4.25: specialist firefi~hting 
collcP;ia. 4.?6: clothin!r. 4.27: si~nificance of numbers. 
(iii) 
4.28: use of castra and excubitoria. 4.29: vexillation at 
Ostia and Po~tus. 4.~0: command structure. 4.~1: sebaciaria. 
4.~2: summary of conclusions) 
Chapter 5. Person!'lel (215) 
(5.1: introductory. 5.2.1: numbers •• 5.2.2: freedmen. 
5.2.3: civilian standing. 5.2.4: Junian Latins. 5.2.5: 
leng;th of seJ·vice. 5.2.6: veterans. 5.2.7: f.'a.y. 5.2.8: 
frumentum nublicum. 5.2.9: a~es and ori~ines. 5.2.10: 
si~nificance of survival rate. 5. 3: fmrlUnes and nrincipales. 
5.4: centurions. 5.5: tribunes. 5.6: sub-prefect. 
5.7: prefect. 5.8: summary) 
Chapter 6. The fire stations. (302) 
(6.1: introductory. 6.2.1-7: castra and excuhitorin i!'l 
Rome. 6.3: castra at Ostia. 6.4: castra at Portus. 6.5: 
dates. 6.6: antiauarian evi~ence. 6.7: castra vi~ilum as 
a type of buiiding) 
Chapter 7. The City of Rome. (34-6) 
(7.1: introdu~tory. 7.2: evidence for fires. 7.3: analysis 
of fires. 7.4: building construction. 7.5: n~mber of fires. 
7.6: buildin~ regulations. 7.7: prefect's jurisdictions and 
powers. 7.8! imperial interest. 7.9: precedents for 
firefi~hting. 7.10: distribution of firP stations. 7.~1: 
water sunply) 
Chapter 8. Assessment. (443) 
(8.1: function of the Vi~iles. 8.2: indications of 
effectiveness. 8.3: factors ~ontrihuting to success. 
8.4: understanding of fire. 8.5: conclusion) 
Appendix I. Extin~uishin~ fire. 
Appendix II. The end of the Vi~iles. 
Appendix III. Tables of survival rates and method 
of calculation 
(449) 
(453) 
( 457) 
Appendix IV. The value of archaeolo~ical evi~ence for fires. (464) 
Addendum. (470) 
Fis:wres 1 - 54. 
(iv) 
ABBREVIATIONS, REFERENCES, BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Inscriptions in Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (CIL) are cited by 
volume and number, e.g.VI.1058. Othe~ references are based on the 
list below. Citati~ns of classical texts do not usually involve 
textual problems, and standard texts hP.ve oeen used; where a 
particular edition has been used, this is indicated where the 
text is cited. 
For convenj_ence, cross references have been inserted. These 
refer to the sections into which the text is divided . 
• • • 
G.Albarelli, 1Q13 
'11 Titolo di S.Marcello in Via Lata e la scoperta d'un 
anticu battisterio'. Nuevo Bullettino di Archeologia 
Cristiana, xix, 1913, 109-129. 
T.Ashby, 1935 
The Aoueducts of Ancient Rome. 
K.C.Bailey, 1929 
The Elder Pliny's Chapters on Chemical Subjects. (Part 1, 
1929, Fart 2, 19~1). 
Ba = P.K.Baillie Reynolds, 1926 
The Vi~iles of Imperial Rome. 
B.C. = Bull.Com. 
Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale di Roma. 
G.P.Bellori, 1673 
Vestigia veteris Romae [edition of the Marble Plan]. 
E.Birley, 1941 
'The Ori~ins of L~~ionary Centurions'. Laureae Aquincenses 
2, 1941,47-62 =Roman Britain and the Roman Army (1953) 104-124. 
" 1965 
'Promotions and Transfers in the Roman Army, II: The Centurionate' 
Carnuntum Jshrbuch 1963/64 (1965) 21=33· 
" 1966 
'Al~e and Cohort~s Milliariae' Corolla Memoriae Erich 
Swoboda ~e~icata. R~m. Forsch. in Nieder~sterr. V (1966) 54-67. 
(v) 
E.Birley, 1967 
'Troops frorn the two Gerrnanies in Britain' Epigranhische 
Studien 4, 10;-107. 
" 1969 
'Septimius Severus and the Roman Army' Epi~raphische 
Studien 8, 6}-82. 
G.V.Blackstone, 195? 
A History of the B~;tish Fire Service. 
A.Bo~thius, 19;2 
'The Neronian "nova urbs" ' Corolla Ar~haeolo~ica 
(Acta Instituti Ro~ani Re~ni Sueciae, Series I, n.i1, 1932) 
84-97. 
" 1939 
'Vitrnvius and the Roman Architecture of his Au;e' Acta 
Instituti Romani Re~ni Sueciac, Series II, n.1, 1939,114-143. 
" 1960 
'The Golden House of Nero. Some Aspects of Roman Architecture' 
Jerome Lectures, fifth series (del.1953-54), 1960. 
R.C.Bosanauet, 1904 
'The Roman Camp at Housesteads' Archaeologia Aeliana, 
2nd ser., vol.xxv, 1904, 193-300. 
BR = Baillie Reynolds, 1926. 
James Braidwood, 1830 
On the Construction of Fire-En~ines and Apparatus, The 
Training of Firemen, and the Met~o~ of Proceedin~ in Caaes 
of Fire. 
" 1866 
Fire Prevention and Fire Extin~tion (with illustrations, 
me~oir and nortrait of the author). 
D.J.Breeze, 1970 
'The Immunes and Princinales of the Roman Army' Ph.D. thesis, 
Unive~·sity of Durham. 
.. 1971 
'Pay Grades and Ranks below the Centurionate' Journal of 
Roman Stu~ies, lxi, 1971, 130-135. 
P.A.Brunt, 1971 
Italian Mannower 225 B.C. -A.D. 14. 
~.Cagnat, 1908 
, • (I . .. ' ' 
'Les Deux Camps de la le~1on III Au~us~e a Lambese d'apres 
les fouilles r~centes' M~moires de l'Acartemie des Inscriptions 
et Belles-Lettres, tome xxxviii. 1• parti~, 1908, 219-277. 
(vi) 
G.Calza, 1941 
'Contributi alla storia della enilizia romana' Palladia 
V, 1941, 1-)3. 
M.E.Cannizzaro, 1901 
Not.Sc. 1901, 10-14. 
M.E.Cannizzaro and I.C.Gavini, 1902 
Not.sc. 1902, 270-273 + fi~.1. 
H.V.Canter, 19~2 
'Confl3~rations in Ancient Rome' Classical Journal, vol. 
xxvii, no.4 (Jan. 1932), 270-288. 
A.Capannari, 1886 
'Dei vi~ili sebaciari e delle sebaciaria da essi compiute' 
Bull.Com. 18~6, 251-269. 
F.Casta~noli, 1949-50 
'Documenti di Scavi E~ui~iti in Roma ne~li Anni 1860-70' 
Bull.Com.lxxiii (1949-50), 123-187. • 
C.Cichorius, 1R96-1900 
Die Reliefs der TraianssMule. 
A.M.Colin;i, 1944 
'Storia e Topo~rafia del Celio nell'Antichita' con Rilievi, 
Piante e Ricostruzioni di !.Gismondi. Atti della Pontificia 
Accademia Romana d'Archeolo~ia, serie III, Memorie, vol.VII, 
1944. 
A.M.Colini and L.Cozza, 1962 
Ludus Na~nus. 
J. A. Crook, 1967 
Law and Life of Rome. 
J. Curle , 1911 
A Roman Frontier Post and its People. The Fort of Newstead 
in the Parish of Melrose. 
D = ILS = H.Dessau 
Inscriptiones Lntinae Selectae, 1892-1916. 
R.W.Davies, 1971 
'The Roman Military Diet' Britannia vol.II,1971,122-142. 
F.Davis, 1896 
'Note on a Roman force-pumP found at Bolsena, Italy, now in 
the British Museum' Archaeolo~ia LV,1896, ?54-256. 
K.Davis, 1951 
The Population of India and Pakistan. . .. 
M. della Corte, 1924 
Iuventus. 
.. I owe this reference 
to Prof.L.Cozza. 
••r owe this 
reference to 
Dr.W.J.Macnherson. 
(vii) 
E. de Ma~istris, 1898 
La militia Vigilum della Roma imueriale. 
G.B. de Rossi, 1R52 
'Iscri~ioni onorarie latine' Bullettino dell'Instituto 
di Corrisnonden~a Archeolo~ica, 1R52, 177-184. 
" 1858 
'Le Stazioni nelle Sette Coorti dei Vi~ili nella Gitt~ rli 
Roma' Annali dell'Instituto di Corresponden~e Archeologica, 
1858, 265-297. 
" 1877 
LaHoma Sotterranea Cristiana, tomo III, 1877. 
" 1879 
Piante icno,q:rafiche e prospettiche di Roma anteriori al 
secolo XVI. 
E. de Ru12;giero 
Dizionario Eniq:rafico di Antichit~ Romane, 1895- (repr.1961-). 
Carra de Vaux, 1903 
Le livre des annareils pneumatiaues et desmachines hydrauliaues 
par Philon de Byzance, edit~ .•. nar Carra de Vaux. Notices 
et extraits des manuscrits de la biblioth~oue nationale, 
vo1.38, 1903, 27-237. 
B.Dobson, 1955 
'The Primipilares of the Roman Army' Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Durham. 
" 1966 
'The Praefectus Fabrum in the Early Principate' Britain and 
Rome, Essays presented to Eric Birley on his sixtieth birthday, 
1966, 61-84. 
II 1970 
" 
" 
'The Centurionate and Social Mobility during the Principate' 
Recherches sur les structures sociales dans l'Antiouit~ 
classique, 1970, 99-116. 
1972 
'Legionary centurion or eouestrian officer? A comparison of 
pay and nr9snects' Ancient Society 3, 1972, 193-207. 
1974 
'The Significance of the Centurion and 'Priminilaris' in the 
Roman Army and Administration'. Aufstie~ und Nieder~ang der 
R~mischen Welt, heraus. Ternnorini, 11.1, 1974, 392-434. 
(viii) 
B.Dobson and D.J.Breeze, 1969 
'The Rome Cohorts and the Le~ionary Centurionate' 
Epi~ranhische Studien 8, 1969, 100-124. 
A. von Domasz~wski, 1908 
'Die Ran~ordnun~ des rHmischen Heeres' Bonner JahrbUcher, 
Heft 117, 1908, 1-278. 
Domaszewski-Dobson 1967 
Damaszewski 'Die Ran~dpnun~ des rHmischen Heeres' rev. 
B.Dobson, Beihefte der Bonner JahrbUcher, Band 14, 1967. 
A.G.Drachmann, 1963 
'The Mechanical Technolo~y of Greek and Roman Antiauity. 
A Study of the Literary Sources' Acta Historica Scientiarum 
Naturalium et Merlicinalium, edidit Bibliotheca Universitas 
Hauniensis, 1963. 
II 1967 
Grosse Griechische Erfinder. 
Ch. Dubois, 1907 
'Pouzzoles antiaue' Biblioth~oue des ~coles francaiaes 
A 
d'Athenes et de Rome, xcviii, 1907. 
D. du Can~e, 1885 
D. du Fresne, D. du Can~e. Glossarium mediae et infimae 
Latinitatis, tom.5, 1885. 
L.Duchesne 
Le Liber Pontifi~alis - texte, introduction et commentaire, 
2 vola. 1886 and 1892 (New edn. 1957). 
A.M.Duff, 1928 
Freedmen in the early Roman Empire. (repr. 1958) 
G.C.Dunning, 1945 
'Two Fires of Roman London' Ant. Jo. 1945, 48-77. 
M.Durry, 1938 
Lea cohortes pr~toriennes. 
Fabretti, 1699 
Raphaelis Fabretti Gasparis f. Urbinatis Inscrintionum 
Antiauarum ouae in aerlibus paternis asservantur explicatio 
et additamentum. 
R.O.Fink, A.S.Hoey, W.F.Snyder, 1940 
'The Feriale Duranum' Yale Classical Studies VII, 1940,1-222. 
G.Fiorelli. 1876 
Not. Sc. 1876,25. 
P.M.Fraser, 1972 
Ptolemaic Alexannria. 
(ix) 
I.C.Gavini, 1902 
Bull.Com.1902,204-6. 
G.Gatti, 1902 
Not.Sc. 1902,357-8 
II 1934 
' "Saepta Tulia" e "Porticus Aernilia" nella "Forma Severiana" ' 
Bull.Corn.1934, 123-149. 
A. von Gerkan and F.Krischen, 1928 
'Thermen und Palaestren'. Milet, heraus. T.Wie~and, Band 
I, Heft 9. 
D.H.Gordon, 1953 
'Fire and the Sword: the Techniaue of Destruction' 
Antiquity xxvii, 1953, no.107, 149-152. 
Nathaniel Hadley 
Broadsheet advertisin~ pumps, period 1769-1790. Science 
Museum, London, inv. no. 1962-142. 
M.B.Hall, 1971 
Facsimile edition of Woodcraft's translation of Heron's 
Pneumatics, with addition of manuscript illustrations. 
G.Henzen, 1867 
'Iscrizioni Graffiti della Settima Coorte de' Vigili' 
Bullettino dell'Instituto di Correspondenze Archeologica, 
1867, 12-30. 
II 1874 
'Le Iscrizioni Graffite nell' Escubitorio della Settima 
Coorte de' Vi~ili' Annali dell'Instituto di Corr~spondenza 
Archeologica, 1874, 111-163. 
C.Herschel, 1899 
Frontinus and the Water Supnly of the City of Rome. 
H.M.Chief Inspector, 1973. 
Report of H.M's Chief Inspector of Fire Services (Counties 
and County Borou~hs, England and Wales and Greater London 
Council) for the year 1972. Publ. July 1973. 
H.C.Hoover and L.H.Hoover, 1950 
Geor~ius Avricola: De Re Metallica [1556]. Trans. and edn. 
with auoendices. 
W.H.St.John Houe and Georve E. Fox, 1896 
'Excavations on the site of the Roman city at Silchester, 
Hants, in 1895' Archaeolo~ia LV, 1R96, 215-253 + App. 
(x) 
K.Hopkins, 1966 
'On the Probable Age Structure of the Roman Population' 
Population Studies XX, 1966-67, 245-264. 
Ch. Huelsen, 1893 
" 
'I Saepta ed il Diribitorium• Bull.Com.1893, 119-143. 
1907 
'La Pianta di Roma dell'Anonimo Einsidlense' Dissertazioni 
della Pontificia Accademia Romana di Archeolo~ia, serie II, 
tomo IX, 1907, 377-420. 
" [HUlsen], 1909 
'The Burnin~ of Rome under Nero' American Journal of 
Archaeolo~y, ser.2, vol.xiii, 1909, 45-48. 
ILS = D = Dessau. 
H.F.Jolowicz, 1952 
Historical Introduction to the S~udy of Roman Law, ed.2. 
A.H.M.Jones, 1940 
The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian. 
II 1960 
'The Dediticii and the Constitutio Antoniniana' Studies in 
Roman Government and Law, 1960,127-140. 
II 1964 
The later Roman empire, 284-602: a social, economic and 
administrative survey. 
E.L.Jones, 1968 
'The Reduction of Fire Dama~e in Southern Britain, 1650-1850' 
Post-Medieval Archaeolo~y 2, 1968,140-149. 
O.Kellermann, 1835 
Vi~ilum Romanorum Latercula duo Coelimantana. 
R.M.KnutRen, 1963 
• Japanese Polarms. 
R.Krautheimer, W.Frankl, S.Corbett, 1959 
'S.Marcello al Corso' Corpus Basilicarum Christianorum 
Romae, vol.II, 1959, 205-215 (Monumenti di archeolo~ia 
cristiana oubblicati dal Pontificio Istituto di archeolo~ia 
cristiana, ser.II, II). 
R.Lancia~i, 1868 
'Ricerche Tono~rafiche sulla Citt~ di Porto• Annali dell' 
Institute di Corresnonrlenza Archeolo~ica, 1868, 144-195. 
0 1 owe this reference to Mr.W.Dodds. 
(xi) 
R.Lanciani,1876 
Bull.Com. 1876, 174 + Tav.XVIII. 
" 1880 
'I comentarii di Frontino intorno le acoue e ~li acquedotti' 
Atti della R. Accademia dei Lincei, anno CCLXXVII, 1879-80, 
ser.III Memorie della classe di scien~e morale, storiche 
e filolog:iche, vol.IV, 1880, 215-616. 
" 1888 
Ancient Rome in the Li~ht ~f Recent Discoveries. Esp. ch.VIII: 
The Police and Fire Department of Ancient Rome. 
II 1889 
Not.Sc.1889, 19,74ff. 
11 1897 
The Ruins and Excavations of Ancient Rome. 
J.H.W.Liebeschuetz, 1972 
Antioch: city and imnerial administration in the later 
:r. B LRom~ 'lempire. 
• ' 1<;3k""f0\l1, l'!i'€5. 
H.J.Loane, 1938 
'Industry and commerce of the city of Rome (50 B.C. - 200 
A. D.) I The John Hopkins University Studies in Historical 
and Political S~ience, ser.LVT, no.2, 1938. 
G.Mancini, 1912 
Not.Sc.1912, 337-343. 
Erna Mandowsky and Charles Mitchell, 1963 
'The drawin~s in MS XIII.B.? in the National Library in 
Naples, edited by •.• ' 
ed. G.Bin~, vol.28, 1963. 
J . C • Mann , 19 56 
Studies of the Warburg Institute, 
'The Settlement of Veterans in the Roman Empire' Ph.D. 
thesis, University of London. 
" 1972 
'The Development of Auxiliary and Fleet Diplomas' 
Epi~raphische Studien, 9,1972, 233-241. 
W.H.Mannin~, 1966 
'A Hoard of RomanooBritish irnnwork from Brampton, Cumberland' 
TransRctions of the Cumberland and Westmorland Antiouarian 
and Archaeolo~ical Society, lxvi (n.~. ), 1966, 1-)6. 
(Xi i. ) 
fianual 
ManuBl of Firemanshin - a ~urvey of the Scienc2 of 
Firefi~htin~. Hnm~ Office, l~nctnn (Fire Service Dept.) 
fJ.qrt 1 196"1 (ed. 2) 
Part 2 196') (erl. 1') 
PArt ~ ! C)", R (en. 'J) 
P11rt ' 19?1 (CJmenrled re0rint) '+ 
Part 5 1954 
Part 6A i971 (ed. 2) 
Part 6B 1952 (reprint of 19 1+5) 
Part 6c 1970 (eeL 2) 
Part ? ~964 
A.Manutius Of' Manuzio 
Ortho~raphiae ratio ab Aldo Manutio P~uli f. collecta. 
1561 (Venice), 1566 (Rome). 
G. Marini, 1785 
Iscrizinni antiche delle ville e de' palaz~i Albani raccolte 
e nuthlicate con note :iall' abate Gaetano Marini. 
E.W.Marsden, 1969 
Greek ann Roman Artillery: HiAtorical Development. 
" 1971 
Greek and Roman Artillery: Technical Treatises. 
V.A.Maxfield, 197? 
'The nona milit~riii of the Roman Army' 
University of Durha~. 
H. Mei(t.rs, 1960 
Roman 0Rtia. (N.B. new edition, 197~) 
Metz: Mus~e Arch~olo~iaue de Metz, 1964 
Ph . D . the R is , 
La Civtlisation Galla-Romaine dans la Cit~ des M~diomatriques. $ 
Th. Mommsen, 18R7-R 
R. Staatsrecht 1 ed.,. 
Mon. 1.nediti 
Monumenti inediti oubblicati dall'Instituto di Correspondenza 
Archenlogica, voi.R (1R64-68) 1868. [Tav.XLVIII is wron~ly 
numbered LX VII I I. J 
Archeoio~ia Glassica X, 1958,2~1-4. 
MorriA H.Mnr~an. 1A90 
(xiii) 
D.S.Neal, 1970 
'The Roman Villa at Boxmoor: interim renort' Britannia I, 
1970' 156-162. 
C.Nocella, 1887 
Le !Rcrizioni Graffite nell'Escubitorio della Settima Coorte 
dei Vi~~:ili 
A.Nordh, 1949 
'Libellus de re~ionibus urbis Romae' Acta Instituti Romani 
Re~ni Sueciae, series in 8°, III, 1949. 
N.S. = Not.Sc. 
Notizie de~li Scavi di Antichita 
-1911: comunicate alla R. Accademia dei Lincei 
1912-: Atti della R. Accademia dei Lincei. 
G. Origo, 1818 (18~3) 
'Ori11:ine della Guardia permanente centro ~~:l'incendj' 
Read 1818, publ: Atti dell'Accademia Romana d'Archeologia. 
Dissertazioni dell'Accademia Romana di Archeologia, tomo I, 
parte II, 1823. ~-21. 
James E. Packer, 1971 
'The insulae of Imperial Ostia' Memoirs of the American 
Academy in Rome, XXXI, 1971. 
U.Paoli, 1963 
Rome, Its Peonle, Life and Customs. Trans. R.D.Macnau~~:hten. 
Ori~inally publ. 1940. 
J.H.Parker, 1870 
British and American Archaeolo~~:ical Society Catalo11:ue of 
Photo~~:raphs (of exhibition held in Rome in 1870]. 
J.R.Partin~ton, 1951 
General and Inor~~:anic Chemistry (ed.2). 
A.Pellegrini, 1867 
'La settima coorte dei vi~ili, scavi di Roma' Bullettino 
dell'Instituto di Corresnondenza Archeolo~ica, 1867,8-12. 
H.G.Pflaum, 1950 
Les procurateurs ~ouestres sous le haut-empire remain. 
" 1961 
'Les carri~res orocuratoriennes ~ouestres sous le haut-emnire 
remain' Institut franc~is d'~rcheolo~ie de Beyrouth, 
J 
bibl. 3rcheolo~ioue et historioue, tome LVII, 1961. 
Piante 
A.P.Frutaz. 'Le Piante di Roma' ~stituto di Studi Romani, 
u--;- --
(xiv) 
Platner - Ashby 
S.B.PlRtner, completed and rev. T.Ashby. 
Dictionary of Ancient Rome, 19?9. 
A Toporsraphical 
A.Profumo, 1905 
" 
PW 
Le Fonti ed i Temni delle Incendio Neroniano. 
1909 
'L'Incendio di Roma dell'Anno 64' Rivista di Storia 
Antica, 1909, 3-29. 
Pauly, Wissowa, Kroll, Mittelhaus (eds.) 
Real-Encyclop~die der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. 
J.S.Rainhird and F.B.Sear, 1971 
'A possible description of the Macellum Magnum of Nero', 
with 'A note on Nero's Macellum Au~usti type' by Jean 
Sampson. Papers of the British School at Rome, xxxix, 
1971, 40-46. 
Rassep:na 
'Rasse~na storica delle uniformi e dei mezzi antincendi' 
Ministero del Interne - Direzione Generale dei Servizi 
Antincendi e della Protezione Civile - Ufficio Documentazione 
e Informazione - Rome. 1966. 
I.A.Richmond, 1930 
The City Wall of Imperial Rome. 
I.A.Richmond and J.P.Gillam, 1955 
'Some excavations at Corbridge, 1952-54' Archaeologia 
Aeliana, 1955, 218-252. 
G. Rickman, 1971 
Roman Granaries and Store Buildin~s. 
E.H.Rtlttges, 1956 
,, 
'Marcellinus Marcellus' Zeitschrift fur katholische 
Theologie 78, 1956, 385ff. 
S.Safrai, 1971 
'The Relations between the Roman Army and the Jews of 
Eretz Yisrael after the Destruction of the Second Temple' 
Roman Frontier Studies 1967, 224-229. 
E.Sarti, 1886 
Archivio della R. Societ~ Romana ~i Storia Patria IX,1886,438. 
Scavi di Ostia 
G.Calza, G.Becatti, !.Gismondi, G. de An~elis d'Ossat, 
H.Bloch. Scavi di Ostia - TopG~rafia Generale, vol.I, 1950. 
(xv) 
A.N.Sherwin-White, 1966 
The Letters of Pliny. 
C.Singer, E.J.Holmyard, A.R.Hall, T.I.Williams (eds). 
A History of Technolo~y, vol.II, 1956. 
W.Smith, 1890 
A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiauities, ed.3, 1890. 
H.Solin, 1971 
'I ~raffiti parietali di Roma e di Ostia' Acta of the 
Fifth International Conrrress of Greek and L~tin Epigraphy, 
Cambridge, 1971, 201-208. 
G.Spano, 1920 
'La illuminazione delle vie di Pompei' Atti della R. 
Accademia di Archeolo~ia, Lettere e Belle Arti di Napoli, 
n.s. VII, 2 (1920), 1-128. 
P.Testini, 1958 
Archeolo~ia Cristiana. Nozioni ~enerali dalle origini all 
fine del sec. VI. 
G.Tetius £E Tezio, 1642 
Aedes Barberinae. 
United Kin~dom Fire and Loss Statistics, 1968. 
Publ. H.M.s.o. 1970. 
United Nations, 1955 
'Age and sex patterns of mortality. Model life-tables for 
under-developed countries' United Nations, Department 
of Social Affairs, Population Branch, New York, 1955. 
Population Studies no. 22. 
D.Va~lieri, 1912 
Not.sc. 1912, 24,50,164ff. 
D. van Berchem, 19?9 
E. B. 
" 
" .. Les Distributions ne ble et d'ar117ent a la plebe romaine sous 
l'empire. 
van Deman, 1909 
The Atrium Vestae. 
1912 
'Methods of determinin~ the date of Roman concrete monuments' 
Americau J;)ur~nal of Archaeology, ser.?, vol.XVI, 1912. 
First paper 2)0-251, second paper ?87-432. 
R.Vielliard, 1959 
Recherches sur les ori~ines de la Rome chr~tienne. 
(xvi) 
Vip;ili del Fuoco 
Ministero del Interne - Direzione Generale della Protezione 
Civile e dei Servizi Antincendi. Rome, c. 1964. 
P.E.Visconti, 1R67 
'Sulla Stazione della Goorte VII dei Vi~ili .•. Ragionamento' 
Estratto dal Giornale Arcadico, tomo L, della nuova serie. 
P.E.Visconti, C.Fea, S.Morcelli, 1R69 
La villa Albani oro Torlonia descritta. 
H.B.Walters, 1899 
Catalo~ue of the bronzes, Greek, Roman and Etruscan, in the 
Dept. of Greek and Rom~n Antiauities, British Museum. 
J.B.Ward-Perkins, A.Boethius, 1970 
Etruscan and Roman Architecture. 
G.R.Watson, 1969 
The Roman Soldier. 
II 1971 
'The pay of the urban forces' Acta of the Fifth Internatio~al 
ConP;'ress of Greek anrl Latin Epip;raphy, Cambridg;e, 1971, 41?-416. 
P.Werner, 1906 
De incendiis urbis Romae. 
Leip~ip;. 
K.D.White, 1967 
Dissertation, University of 
A~ricultural Imnlements of the Roman World. 
Woodcraft= Hall, 1971. 
(xvii) 
DesRau rPfPrences of insc~intions c~ted 
CIL D CIL D 
- -
I. 286 6085 VI.3002 2175 
III.8110 230' 3010 2174 
VI.219 2162 3076 2176 
220 2163 31147 2182 
221 2160 32754 2165 
222 2161 VIII. 25'2 2487 
4148 4315a 18042 9133-91,5a 
414b 4315b x.388o 2171 
1056 2156 6674 2020 
1058 2157 XI. 1438 2166 
1063 2178 3520 2168 
1064 2179 5693 2666 
1156 722 XIV.6 414 
1180 765 226 2170 
2464 2089 4381 2155 
2987 2169 4397 2158 
2994 2172 4502 2165 
2998 2177 4505 9078 
(xviii) 
INDEX OF FIGURES 
1. Print of lar~e fire in Naples early in the nineteenth century, 
to illustrate firefi~htin~ operations. King Ferdinand II is 
present in fore~round. 
Rasse~na p.12; Vigili del Fuoco p.13. 
2. RedPawin~ of same, by Miss M.A.Auty. 
3. Cthsibius' pump. 
Reconstruction by A.G.Drachmann (1967,Abb.8) from 
text of Vitru'liu~ (X.?). 
4. Philo's pump. 
Ms drawi~~ reproduced by Drachmann (1967) Abb.6. 
5. Hero's pump. 
Ms drawin~ reproduced by Hall (1971 p.128: Woodcraft 
27: MS ·177r). There are slight differences between 
the manuscript dr~win~ and Woodcraft's version, but 
for the convenience of the reader Woodcraft's letterin~ 
has been used 36 closely as possible. 
6. Hero's squirter. 
Ms drawin~ reproduced by Hall (1971 p.122: Woodcraft 
9, MS 170r). 
7. Pump found at Bolsena, now in British Museum. 
Walters (1899) no.2573; Davis (1896) p.254. 
8. Pump founn at Bolsena, now in BritiRh Museum. 
Walters (1899) no.2574. Drawn by JSR. 
9. Piston found at Bolsena, now in British Museum. 
Walters (1899) no.2574. Drawn by JSR. 
10. ? piston linka~e, found at Bolsena, now in British Museum. 
Walters (1899) no.2574. Drawn by JSR. 
11. Typical stirrup nump. 
M&nual 1, ;.1~3 fig.3. 
12. Dolahrae (a) in lo~-snlitting scene on Trajan's Column 
Cichorius (1896-1900) Taf.LXIII,73,Bild 189. 
White (1967) fi~.?9. 
(b) or. sepulchral monument 
CIL V.908. White (1967) fig.15=37. 
13. Securis, examole from AliRe, Cote-d'Or. 
White (1967) fi~.34. 
(xix) 
14. Braidwood's Edinbur~h fireman's axe. 
Braidwood (18~0) Pl.6, fi~.7. 
15. One of the current tynes of British fireman's axe. 
Manual 1 n.371 fi~.1. 
16. Wheeled fire hook. 
Sixteenth-century print from St. Bene'ts Church, 
Cambrid~e. reproduced by Blacksto~e (1957),fac.n.17,(a). 
17. Current British hook ladder 
(a) bein~ placed into window at ~round level 
Manual 1 ~.153, fi~.10 (ri~ht) 
(b) being thrown to second or subsequent windows 
M~nual 1 p.154, fig.11. 
18. Current British ceiling hook. 
Manual 1, p.37~ fi~.3. 
19. Surviving Rom~n hooks (a) from Newstead 
Curle (1911) Pl.LXVI,8: identified 
as well-hook, p.288. 
(b) from Brarnpton, Cumberland 
Manning (1966) no.16: tentatively 
identified aR fire hook,pp.18f. 
20. Hook used by mahout for controllin~ eleohant. 
Drawing by Mr.W.Dodds of his example, which dates 
from the eighteenth century. Some examples have 
lvnl!';er handles. 
21. Hoko (Japanese hooked soear), eighth century A.D. 
Knutsen (1963) Pl.4. 
22. R.A.F. grab hook. 
Manual 6B, p.105 fi1!';.6. 
23. Sasumata (Jananese forked spear). 
24. Falx 
Knutsen (1963) fi~.15, and pp.45,47: It "was adapted 
for use by firefi~hters. • • • The sasumata nroved very 
nseful in holdin~ up or forking down thatch from 
burning houses. For thie use it was mod~fled from 
a blade to A flan~e without a sharp edl!';e. '' 
arborttria (a) example from Pompei 
-----
White (1967) fig. 59. 
(b) example from Comni~f"ne 
White ( 1967) fi.G;.t3. 
(xx) 
25. Chain ladder, in servir.e with Brai~wood's Edinbur~h bri~ade. 
Braidwood (1830) Pl.6 fi~.R. Some chain ladders 
did not have rigid run~s, but utilised chains, e.g. 
an example ori~inally from Bishop Auckland now at 
Beam::sh Museum. 
26. Location and distribution of castra and excubitorium in 
Rome, in relation to Re~ions, ·riber and Aurelian wall. 
27. Area around S.Marcello al Corso, to show location of castra 
of First Cohort below Palazzo Muti. 
28. Plan of remains ter.tatively (and probably wrongly) attributed 
to castra of First Cohort. 
From Mancini (1912) fig.1, p.138. 
29. Location of castra 'of Fifth Cohort and presumed location of 
Macellurn l·~aP:num. 
Rainbird and Sear (1971) fig.3. 
30~ Plan of remains of castra of Fifth Cohort discovered in 1820. 
From plan and profile in Biblioteca del Reale Institute 
di Archeolo~ia e Storia dell'Arte (Cat. no. 16571). 
31. Plan of excubitorium of Seventh Cohort, in Region XIV. 
Based on BR, nlan at end of volume, drawn by 
J.Rowland Pierce. 
32. Bronze torch found in excubitorium of Seventh Cohort. 
Pellegrini (1867) p.11. 
33 - 36 Plans of castra vi~ilurn at Ostia, based on plan in 
Not.Sc. 1912, p.164 (Vaglieri). 
33. Final (existing) phase, which may include features unconnected 
with occupation as fire statio~. 
34. -Ori~inal fire station, with two tabernae in north-west corner 
(shown hatched). 
35. Later Hadrianic to Severan phase, with original tabernae 
incorp~rated in fire station, and with row c~ tbbernae added 
along western end (shewn hatched). 
36. The Severan castra enlarged by i~cornoration of row of tabernae 
and further embellished. 
37. Plan of remains ofl C'lstra vi<"ilum at Portu;:;. 
From Mon. Inediti 8 (1~68), Tav.XLVIIII. 
38. Plan of buildin~ describeri by Ligorio and identified by him 
as the caAtra of the Fifth Cohort, but mer~ nrobably to be 
identified as the Macellum Ma~num. 
Rainbird and Sear (1971) fi~.1. 
(xxi) 
39. Plan, accordin~ to Li~orio, of the Castra Pere~rina, occupyin~ 
area below the churches of S.Stephano Rotondo and S.Maria in 
Domnica (S.Maria della Navicella). 
Ms reproduced by Huelsen (1907) p.413. redrawn and 
relettered. 
40. Plan of Casa di Diana. 
from Scavi di Ostia. 
41. Plan of C~sa delle ~use. 
ibid. 
42. Plan of Casa del Serapide. 
i'Did. 
43. Plan of Casa de~li Auri~hi. 
ibid. 
44. Plan of Horrea Epagathiana. 
ibid. 
45. Plan of Piccold Mercato. 
ibid. 
46. Plan of buildin~ to east of castra vi~ilum at Ostia. 
ibid. 
47. Plan of hellenistic ~ymnasium at Miletus (restored). 
Gerkan and Krischen (1928) Taf.III. 
48. Plan of Pozzuoli macellum. 
Dubois (1907) fig.28. 
49. Original plan, restored, of Huusesteads principia. 
Bosanauet (1904) fi~.10. 
50. Principia of Third Le~ion at Lamb~esis. (This is the building 
which is often called ''praetorium", incorrectly.) 
Ca~nat (1908), plan 2. 
51. Plan of House of Vestal Vir~ins. 
van Deman (1909), Plan B. 
52. Plan of Ludus Magnus. 
Colini and Cozza (1962) fig.75 + Tav.I. 
53. Plan of House of the Gladiators, Pompei. 
della Corte (1924) fig.7. 
54. Mortality curv~s to illustrate a selection of ~~models which 
describe v~rious levels of mortality. 
U~ited Nations (1955) fig.9. 
(xxii) 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This study has been financed by a Major State Studentship. Adiitional 
funds from the British School at Rorr.e and the Uni"ersity of Durham 
Research Fund have contributed in ~reat part to Chapters 6 and 7. 
I am grateful to those who have d5scussed specific points 9 
notably Dr.G.Hawkes (main argument of Chapter 3), Dr.A.G.Drachmann 
(pumps), Dr.B.Dobson and Dr.D.J.Breeze (parts of Chapter 5), 
Professor A.Blunt (antiouarians includin~ Li~orio), and Mr. J.B. 
Ward-Perkins (architecture of fire stations). Professor E.Birley 
has been a ~reat help on many noints. Two visits to the British 
School at Rome provided a ~reat stimulus, and I hope that all those 
who discussed the Vi~iles, whether at o~~er times or over dinner, 
will reco~nise their contributions. The Vatican Library and 
Museums, the German Archaeolo~ical Institute in Rome, the 
Capitoline Museums, the British Museum, and Durham University 
Library pro'~irted thei'r customary e,.;cellent facilities. I wish to 
thank the Amministrazione Torlonia for access to the Villa Albani. 
Mr. (now nr.) F.B.Sear was of ~reat assistance with the 
Li~orio texts, and he and I have jointly published our conclusions 
in Papers of the British School at Rome, 1971. 
Valuable assistance has been ~iven by firemen, amon~ whom I 
would specia~ly mention Divisional Officer L.B.A.Mirfin for his 
comments on ~ouipment and fires, and Si~. Antonio Ma~rini, of the 
Scuole Centrali Antincendi, Rome, who not merely answered my 
questions in excellent En~lish but also acted as my host at the 
passin~-out parade and disnlay at the School. More locally, 
Station Officer J.Bartle and his men at Washin~ton Fire Station 
were most helnful in demC'lr.stratina: eouinment. My thanks go to 
the present-day "nraefectus vi~ilum" of Rome, In~. Fabio Rosati, 
and his ~ol:ea~ues In~. Giomi and In~. Litterio, and also to 
Chief Fire Officer P.Watters, Assistant Chief Fire Of~icer Elmslie, 
and Chief Fire Officer J.~mith (rtrl.) for information and 
introducti:)ns. 
Dr.J.C.Mann haq been all that one hopes of a supervisor. 
Much of such merit ss ~ay oe four.d in this thesis is due to himo 
( 1 ) 
CHAPTER 1 
THE PROBLEM OF THE VIGILES 
The problem of the Vigilee has been to discover ~hat was missing 
r~om previous studies and then to try to supply it. It was clea~ at 
ihe outset that recent studies of certain historical aspects could 
supersede parts of the last etudy of the Vigiles, that of Baillie 
Reynolds ( 1926), but thle did not seem enough as it left too many 
looee ends. What was needed was a more general unification of our 
knowledge of the Vigiles. Such a unification seemed likely to be 
found in the area of the function of the Vigiles. Then, reading 
throu~h BR and other accounts, it became clear that this was indeed 
the missing fwctor: it had become a cliche that the Vigiles were a fire 
brigade, so much so that if any piece of evidence did not fit in with 
firefighting then it was related to the somewhat vague 'police 
functions' attributed to the corps without it being felt that this 
4etraeted from their firefighting function. An experiment was 
therefore tried, and with this the present study of the Vigiles took 
its major step forward. 
The basis of the experiment was the small body of direct 
evidence that the Vigile~ had firefighting functions, and the 
experiment actually took the form of seeing how much of all the 
evidence for the Vi~ilee~ both direct and indirect 9 was consiatent 
with it having been their major - and possibly even their sole -
function to act as a fire brigade. It became clear that this waa 
(2) 
the only hypothesis which made sense of all the evidence. As the 
study pro~ressad 9 therefore 9 new linea of investigation ware op~ned 
up9 all of them directed to answerin~ the question what sort of fir~ 
brigade the Vigilee were. It became necessary to import Q kno~ledga 
of firefighting, and thus to see how far the evidence, slight though 
it was, could be shown to have reaAonably definite implications 
concerning the mode of operation of the Vigilea. Ae a result of this 
approach, it ia possible to su~geet not merely ho~ they did operate 
~but also how much success they achieved. 
Most of the evidence has been worked over twice during the 
preparation of this study. The first time round, the approach was a 
fairly traditional claseical/archae~logical one, the aim being to 
ascertain the various possible interpretations of the individual 
pieces of evidence but without a special knowledge of firefigbting 
(or anythin~ else, for that matter) which might have provoked a 
selective treatment of the material. It was after this first working 
over that the experiment just described was carried out, and it was 
thus a layman's impression that the Vigiles could only have been 
primarily a fire brigade. Initially, that seemed the end of the 
problem 9 and all that remained was to bring up to date various 
aspects of the Vigilee. However, even the very first, slight 
acquaintance with the history and techniques of firefighting 
sug~eeted that this was really the starting point for a much more 
intergstin~ enquiry. The point i~ tha~ fire brigades can vary ao 
much that we have to define what sort of brigade we are dealing with, 
There waa 9 therefore, a pauAe from the historical researches while 
I set about acquirin~ an adequate understanding of the problem@ from 
(~) 
the fireman's point of view. The second examination of the evidence 
with the initial interpretations was therefore carried out with a better 
understanding of what is taken to be the Vigiles' main function. The 
results of this second examination are offered as the main contribution 
to knowled~e of this thesis. 
Embracing two fielde which are usually mutually exclusive, 
classical history and firefighting, study of the Vigiles started off 
~opefully, only to degenerate when the two fields became more 
~ 
specialised. The first study of the Vigiles, by Origo (1818), in 
fact marks the end of an era. About that time, classics was starting 
to become specialised and to develop beyond the scope of the average 
gentleman's education, and Origo, who was the comandante of the Rome 
fire brigade of hie day, was among the last firemen capable, if they 
wished, of reading the classicists and antiquarians on equal terms. 
After Origo, there were attempts by firemen to write histories of 
the Vigiles, but since these were entirely dependent on the classicists' 
presentation and basic interpretation of the evidence, they have not 
been successful. In addition, firefighting itself was starting to 
change, and to depart from methods which ha~ the merit for the 
historian both of resembling the ancient methods and also of being 
capable of understanding by the layman. 
One reason why Origo wrote successfully about the Vigiles is 
that the ancient sources told him what was familiar. Once manual 
pumps became very lar~e, in the first half of the nineteenth century 9 
and were then superseded by steam, then petrol and diesel pumps, 
and ladders became extending and motorised, pre-assumptions had to 
change: and ancient firefighting started to become foreign. 
(4) 
Origo took his sources at face value, and did not need to 
explain them. For this reason, his work has had lees influence on 
classicists than it might have if he had spelled out the significance 
of the sources. Also, of course, he was only as up to date as the 
classics of hie day, and the basic evidence had been quoted and 
requoted by antiquarians since the sixteenth century. Moreover, 
culturally he stood a little apart from the main stream of classical 
studies, for, although he read hie papar to the Pontifical Academy, 
.there was apolitical occasion for hie interest: Origo was trying 
to persuade the Vatican authorities not to abolish the fire brigade 
which the French had e~tabliehed in Rome, and one of his tactics was 
to invoke classical authority for such an institution. He went 
even further, claiming that the ancient brigade was superior to the 
present one, and in fact he won his case and the brigade remained in 
existence. But the politics and the history are in fact kept 
reasonably separate in hie paper, and the great pity is that he did 
not enter into details of how he thought the Vigiles would have 
operated. The value of hie paper, in fact, has not been so much the 
discussion of the bite of evidence as the refreshing feeling which it 
brings for the student of the Vigiles - particularly after reading 
more recent works 
- to find a fireman writing about the Vigiles 
and some of their odder methods as if they were entirely familiar 
and just what was to be expected. It now takes a certain amount of 
historical imagination for a modern fireman to grasp precisely how 
the Vigilee operated~ Origo waa probably the last classically-minded 
fireman whose own experienc~ and instincts w're close to those of the 
Vigiles thP.mselves. 
(5) 
The next two studies of the Vigiles came from classical 
historians, Kellermann and De Rossi (1835 and 1858 respectively). 
The discovery of the two large statue bases, VI.1057 and 1058, 
provided such an increase in information about the Vigil~s that after 
Kellermann published the texts and a certain amount of comparative 
material (drawn from the usual antiquarian stock), together with 
lists of men who appeared on both stones, De Rossi felt that his own 
study of the fire stations in Rome was merely complementary and that 
little more remained to be said (at that time the excubitorium in 
Trastevere and the caetra at Ostia had not been digcovered). In 
fact, the contribution.of 1057 and 1058 was exaggerated at that time: 
Kellermann's analysis of the men who recurred was taken as the end 
of the story, and the questions which he raised regarding the length 
of service implied by the inscriptions and the career prospects were 
left unanswered; and in incorporating wore recent researches and 
observations from classical workers he left unasked the question 
which should have been foremost in his mind, what these inecriptione: 
might ultimately tell us about firefighting in Rome. Possibly 
Kellermann had it in mind to study the lists further, but hie untimely 
death intervened. Certainly, as far ae he went, his work has been 
invaluable, and was incorporated in CIL largely unaltered, though 
wtth the addition of complementary lists cf men who occurred in only 
one of the lists. It was his presentation of the lists in CIL which 
first stimulated a second examination of them, and what this thesis 
adds to Kellermann's analysis is a hypothesis to explain why the 
men survived in the lists, or not, in the way in which they did. 
This in turn provides the foundation for the further analysis of 
careers, prospects and way of life in the Vi~iles. Without such an 
analysis, the Vi~ilee would have remained a rather amorphous body. 
(6) 
The next key work should have been that of De Magietrie (1898) 9 
himself a fire officer in the Rome brigade (Sotto-Comaridante !! 
II ~ Vigili ~ ~). Unfortunately, he wse not specially 
historically rninded, and wrote enthusiastically about what he 
thought he understood and found familiar, and left on one aide 
problema of evidence and interpretation. He did, however, touch at 
least on the major aspects of interest to a fireman 9 but perhaps 
.his moat glaring omission comes in hie discussion of the water supply: 
he knew that this was a vital aspect, and laboriously indicated 
evidence for springs and wells in ancient Rome and also referred to 
the Tiber - but thP aqueducts are not even mentioned, and even at 
that date there were sufficiently accurate.estimates of the amount 
of water which they delivered to show that they were far more use 
for firefightinp; than the natural sources. By this time, though, 
classics and firefighting had ~one their separate ways. 
With Baillie Reynolds (1926) we come to the work which has 
become accepted as standard on the Vigiles. The great merit of this 
book is that it contains, either in quotation or by reference, all 
the important evidence concerning the Vigilea. Its demerit, as far 
as the user is concerned, is that it does not offer a consistent 
pictura of the Vigilea. BR him~elf did not claim to offer one, and 
modestly expressed the hope that "the next person to attempt it" 
would find some value even in a collection of scattered materials (p.5). 
Certainly, thie hope has been realised, and in addition BR'e habit of 
presenting two or more interpretations without deciding on one or 
any other has been extr~mely useful (though doubtless it irritates 
the general reader and the quick looker-up). Possibly the most 
important criticism of BR'e approach is that he did not go 
(7) 
sufficiently into the needs of firefi.~hting and the range of methods 
and techniouee developed even ae far as 1926. It is true that he 
doea occasionally refer to firefighting of the twenties and a little 
earlier, but the range of firefi~hting to which he does refer is not 
enough to provide guidelines for a study of the Vigiles. Even more 
in 1926 than in 1898, firefighting and classics had moved right apart. 
This brings us to the heart of the problem. Either a 
: '! ··~ 
~laseical~-minded fireman had to"write about the Vigiles, or else 
a fireman-minded classicist. For the lattar, there are available 
in 1973 means of finding out about firefighting which did not exist 
in 1926, or even till after the Second World War. First and foremost, 
the Manual 2f Firemanship, the Home Office textbook for firemen, 
published in sections starting in 1942, sets out the principles 
and techniques for a wide range of firefighting situations~ and 
illustrates the equipment, including some historical notes on older 
pieces of (modern) equipment. Second, Blackstone's History ~ !h! 
British Fire Service (1957) is invaluable on two counts: it presents 
a very wide range of types of firefighting, and it reveals attitudes 
and reactions which I have found to be quite common among firemen. 
In fact, Blackstone's book has beAn more valuable for its comparative 
material than for its section on the Vigiles (which Blackstone 
erroneously supposed to have existed in Britain, hence their inclusion). 
Another book by a fireman, Morris's Fire! (1939), provides useful 
information on methods of organisation to fit particular situationa 9 
this time in the London brigade, of which Morrie was Chief Officer 
fr~m 1933 to 1938, together with first-hand accounts of fires and 
other activities. These published accounts have naturally been 
eupolemented by discussion with fire hri~ade officere 9 as indicated 
(8) 
in the Acknowledgements, because there are eo many little points 
which may not in themselves seem worthy of publication but which 
actually ~ive a much deeper insight into the practicalities of 
firefighting than the more formal statements of principles or even 
the accounts of unusual fires. Also of great value (both to the 
historian and to the modern fireman) are the works of James Braidwood 
(1830 and 1866), who re-established the first city fire brigade in 
Britain in Edinburgh in 1824 and then set up the first London brigade, 
the London Fire Engine Establishment, in 1832. He sets out principles 
and techniques, and also illustrates equipment used in Edinburgh, at 
a time when equipment had started to be improved but not so much 
as to make earlier firefighting into something foreign. For the 
majority of fires, even today, for which elaborate equipment is not 
required, Braidwood furnishes a good textbook. 
The problem, then, was to bring together a~ain the two fields 
of firefightin~ and history. Chapter 2 therefore sets out some of 
the general questions which arise in any consideration of firefighting, 
and in Part II (Chapters 3 to 8) we examine in detail the evidence 
relevant to this study of the Vigiles as a fire brigade. In trying 
to tie together the loose ends relating to firefighting, it has 
unfortunately been necessary to leave other ends loose, particularly 
as each of the Chapters 3 to 7 is concerned with a different branch 
of learning and it is not possible to go into equal detail in all of 
them. It is hoped, however, that this picture of the Vigiles is 
soundly-based, and that the overall consistency which has been attained 
may not need modification except in the details. It is also hoped 
that the more speculative paeea~es will be of interest, and one 
reason for their inclusion ie that, since oeople will continue in any 
(9) 
case to speculate about the Vigiles, it is felt better for the 
speculation to take place within an informed framework. 
With a mooern fire brigade, one of the most obv~~us 
questions which comes to mind is whether they would be welcome if 
your own house were on fire. It is hoped that this study of the 
Vigiles will show that in their case there are sound reasons for 
answering thiR same question in the affirmative. 
(10) 
CHAPTER 2 
THE PROBLEM OF FIREFIGHTING 
Thia chapter haa beeri written to provide essential background 
information about fires and firefighting and to provide a general 
framQwork for this study of the Vigiles. Further, the main conclusion 
~f this st~dy is that the Vigiles were an irrective f~re brigade:· 
the significance of this is only brought out when we realise that 
of all the fire brigades that have ever existed 9 only a minority 
have been really effective, and only a very small minority have been 
as good as could be got. In a limited sense 9 everyone underAtands fire. 
However 9 few people have actually seen a building burn 9 and fewer still 
have seen a fire in its early, and crucial, stages. There are, 
therefore, many romantic notions about fires, and their existence is 
demonstrated when people are, for the first time in their lives, 
confronted with a real fire. In their panic, they may do nothing 
except freeze to tha spot, or they may do whatever comes first into 
their minds: and so, perhaps, help to spread the fire. The job of 
the fireman is twofold. He has to solve the technical problems of 
rescuing people and extinguishing the fire; and he has to solve the 
personal problems of giving confidence to the panic-stricken and 
comforting those in distress. 
In the ideal situation, every building and its contents ~ill 
be compl0tely fireproof, and there ~ill be no need for fire brigades. 
In practice, the term 'fire-proof' is meaningless, and even the term 
'fire-rasietin~' has only a limited application. Fire brigades will 
( 11) 
be with us for a very long time. The situation in which they start 
to function is the final eta~e in a series of events which, 
cumulatively 9 show that society - both individually and corporately -
is responsible for fires, and that the demand which society makes of 
firemen is that they protect people from themeelveA. There is some 
truth in the saying that the three most common causes of fires are 
"men, women and children"; but specific responsibility also falls 
on the shoulde~s of manufacturers and builders, traders, maintenance 
people, legislators, and many others. In the case of a house, for 
example, the responsibility for a fire may be passed back along the 
line as far as the architect, clearing the householder and the 
building contractor, but should it stop there? Should not the local 
authority which approved the plane have considered the possibility of 
fire? Probably this was not within its legal competence: so are 
the legislators to blame? In the end, very often, the fire brigade 
is blamed for failing to prevent damage and for failing to offer 
advice beforehand: both of which may be unreasonable criticisms. 
Althou~h fire extinction and fire prevention are different 
jobs, the same factors restrict the effectiveness of both. The 
problem is not lack of knowledge about fires: the practical aspects 
have been known for at least twenty-three centuries in western 
Europe, the principles in use today, in 1973, being the same as those 
familiar to Aeneas Tacticus, in the fourth century B.C. Sometimes 
methode have worked despite wrong theories about how they worked, 
and even the 'special risks' with which we are becoming more familiar 
today (special chemical ri9ks, for example) are involved in a very 
small proportion of fires. Speed and water remain the chief weapons 
( 12) 
against fire~ and it is usually easy for anyone to predict whether a 
building can be evacuated quickly - once they have considered the 
question. 
The major restriction on all fire work is the almost universal 
feeling that "it will only 'happen to someone else", or, nit won't be 
very serious". The dangers of fire are realised only after disasters 
of some magnitude, for example, the Great Fire of London or the Second 
~· 
World War, with the blitz of London, Coventry, Birmingham, Liverpool 
and other major cities. It was only during this war that the value 
of fire brigades was fully appreciated. A second restriction arises 
from the acknowledgement of fire as a universal risk, which leads to 
it being ignored as commonplace and as something to be lived with. 
Without strong popular support, fire regulations cannot be made 
effective, money cannot be raised for extinction and prevention of 
fires, people cannot be persuaded to have buildings designed to behave 
well once a fire has broken out, architects cannot make fire-resistance 
a selling point for their designs if clients are unwilling or unable 
to pay extra. There are also political and economic factors, as shown 
in the following note which has been kindly provided by Mr. Mirfin: 
the 1947 Fire Services Act "made it a reQuirement of the County 
Councils and County Borou~h Councils who were nominated as Fire 
Authorities to form fire brigades and make provision for giving 
prevention a~vice. The cost of the brigades is borne out of the rates, 
collected by the various local authorities, and whilst it was left to 
their jurisdiction on what services the government subsidy should be 
used the efficiency of a bri~ade could be ensured. This, however~ 
was endangered when the ~overnment decided to insist on what services 
(1~) 
their subsidy was spent and to include the Fire Brigade in a "Block 
Grant": meaning that if a local authority wanted to improvn other 
servicea the Fire Brigade could be denied efficiency. 10 The·main 
restrictions are thus financial and social; for very complex reasonsv 
people generally do not plan for fires. 
The history of firefighting in modern times varies from country 
to country, and in each case the course of its development is a 
··strong reflection of ~he customs and constitution of the particular 
country. Switzerland, for example, manages by democratic means to 
achieve a very low rate of fire loss; in Germany, to have a fire is 
treated like a crime; and in the United States, the preservation of 
the autonomy of each state and city has led to a tremendous variety 
of brigades, including quite recently insurance brigades that have 
let "their" protP.cted properties burn if the premiums have not been 
paid. In firefighting, ~uch national characteristics are important. 
Technical limitations have also played some part along with 
social limitations in ~eetricting the effectiveness of firefighting 
and fire prevention. One obvious example of technical limitation is 
shown in pumps: only in the nineteenth century did they start to 
become adequately large, and for much of that century they were 
manually operated (some using over forty pumpers). With the 
application of the steam engine to fir~ pumps hopes were raised at 
first, to be dashed when for several decades fire officer& did not 
consider the steam engines sufficiently reliable for use in firefighting. 
Today, the use nf diesel and petrol engines with centrifugal pumps 
means that vast ~uantitiee of water can be pumped at high pressure~ 
(14) 
500 g.p.m. at 100 lb./eq.in. is common, and 1 1 000 g.p.m. at 100 
lb./sqein. i~ not uncommon. Another limitation arose from the 
non~exietence, initially, of hose, and, later, from the stiffness 
and ueight of leather hose. To be effective, water must reach the 
seat of the fire, and often it is uselesA simply to throw water or 
direct a jet of water through a window. Moreover, if a ho•e is not 
available, the pump must stand near the burning building 9 and run the 
risk of catching fire or being buried when the building collapses. 
l-_ 
~Tbe development of hoses kept pace with the developmerit of'pumps, 
and today there are hoses capable of withstanding the high pressures 
involved and which are also light and flexible. 
In general, brigades have not, until recently, used the best 
equipment available, and even today there are still a few doubts. 
If we include brigades from all places and all periods, and of all 
types ~ private, public, insurance, full-time, part-time, police, 
military, gentlemen's amateur, and so forth~ the striking 1 conclusion 
is that the majority could have been much better. The gallantry of 
the firemen is not, ~enerally, in doubt, though some brigades have 
drawn a fine line between rescuing people and extinguishing fires 
(the latter being the subject of financial arrangements) •. The 
question has normally resolved itself into one of finance,:RO that, for 
example, a country town in Britain, having suffered a bad fire, might 
feel it could epend a few pounds on a small and second-hand fire 
pump, ~nd so it would obtain one which a better brigade had 
discarded as being unfit for service. We are brought back to the 
soci~l limitations, together with keen estimates of the economic 
advantages of having a fire bri~ade. Smaller towns could not have 
( 15) 
afforded an effective bri~ade which would have paid for itself in 
preventing fire losses: hence the financial arguments. But there 
is no reason why even small towns should not have ensured that 
buildings were adequately constructed and properly spaced. One 
gets the impression that the risks from fire were not appreciated. 
Until the late 1940's fire officers could not be held 
completely blameless r~r the lack of appreciation of the risks. 
"'They often variad among·themselv~e in their apnroaches to fire 
extinction and ways of running their bri~ades, and ''domestic" problems 
occupied much of their time. Some sense of rivalry between brigades 
is good for morsle, but too often the derision of one brigade for 
another was justified, and the need for complete confidence in 
equipment made an excuse for avoiding innovations. This was 
unfortunate, because some of the developments made a real difference 
to firefi~hting - the larger pumps, in particular, and the 
development of extending ladders and of breathing equipment. 
S8veral decades could elapse between the invention of a piece of 
equipment, its patent, and its adoption by a bri~ade in a reliable 
form; and it is only recently, and particularly through the efforts 
of such bodies as the Institution of Fire En~ineers and the 
representatives of the firemen, the Fire Brigades' Union, that there 
has been any extensive and constructive interplay between firemen 
and designers of equipment. Before that, manufacturers probably 
played a major part in improving equipment. Yet, despite the 
diversity of views, the basic principles have always been known: 
speed and water. Some of the best brigades stuck to the principles 
without much elaboration, and were welcomed far beyond their own 
(16) 
areas: one of the best examples of a parish brigade was that of 
Hackney, London. Some of the Continental brigades avoided problems 
of manpower and discipline by being military (i.e. the firemen were 
soldiers), and among brigades of this type the French sapeurs-pompiers 
were held in specially high regard. In some of the larger British 
towns up to the beginning of the Second World War there were police 
fire bri~ades, in which policemen received special training and 
provided a fire service as needed; this type of provision ensured 
·that a degree of discipline and efficiency were available at all. 
times, and many police brigades were held in high repute. But good 
brigades were the exception; the average standard was fairly low, 
and the worst bri~ades were dreadful. One of them consisted of an 
aged widow who had inherited a pump and who occasionally managed to 
arrive first at a fire if it w•s nearby in order to claim the reward 
for arriving first; whereupon she would withdraw, and leave the 
firsfighting to working brigades. Yet this one-woman brigade was 
held to satisfy the legal requirements for a parish brigade (Act of 1?0?). 
The only criterion which is useful in a comparative study of 
firefighting (and one which is slightly different from criteria 
used for other purposes by fire officers) is how near to the ideal 
effectiveness a brigade came. Important issues are obscured if we 
start by qualifyin~ our assessment of particular brigades with such 
phrases as "good in view of the circumstances". Some of these iesuee 
have only an indirect bearing on firefighting, and should be isolated 
as far as poAsible. The need for this approach will gradually be 
made clear when we see how the Vigiles depended for their effectiveness 
on factors which were beyond their control, and we shall see how the 
( 17) 
possession of a fire brigade is itself an indicator of a certain 
de~ree of urbanisation and~ further, h:ow the possession of an 
effective bri~ade is another inrlicator of a different degree or 
type of urbanisation. Questions of urbanisation and of the ability 
of the Romans to direct their resources where they wanted must 
come into any study of the Vigiles, though broader studies of 
urbanisation are not needed in this thesis. All the time, we hav4 
to consider both how the Vigiles functioned and also what factors 
enabled them to function as they·did. 
We have to remove the cliches. It has been fairly widely 
known for at least four centuries that the Vigiles possessed pumps, 
and this f•ct has been assumed to show that they were a good brigade. 
But mere possession of pumps has not guaranteed the quality of 
bri~ades, and a good case could be made against any constant 
relation between possession of eouipment and quality of firefighting. 
Similarly, the fact that patrols were used has been generally 
recognised, yet the significance for firefighting has not been 
explained in detail. Patrols have been used by many brigades; the 
Vigiles must have had a unique type of patrol, since they had so 
many firemen available for patrols. We have to work out what effect 
the large number of men had on their firefighting in general, and 
set this a~ainst the ouality of their equipment. Even more basically, 
we have to look at the sources to see precisely what they say: one 
major change in our understanding of the Vigiles comee when we pay 
attention to the fact 9 which is often overlooked, that the list of 
firefightin~ equipment given by Ulpian (Dig.33.7.1.18) is not a 
list of e~uipment ueed by the Vigiles (except coincidentally) but 
(18) 
is a list of items of prop~rty which belong with the fabric and 
fittings of a house and which cannot be sold except along with the 
house. Moreover 9 we have to express the conclusions precisely. 
At the lowest level, if people believe that the Roman fire pumps 
were small, not too much damage is done to truth when they write 
of "stirrup pumps" - except that Roman pumps were not fitted with 
stirrups. More important, we have to be informed about fires and 
understand how they behave. We have also to understand how one 
piece of information about firefighting will imply something further. 
The evidence for the Vigiles will tell us a lot more than it has 
hitherto, provided that we understand the language of firefighting. 
Fires, a universal threat, have changed little over the centuries: 
so now let us take a closer look at fires themselves~ 
A knowledge of the physics and chemistry of combustion is 
necessary for firemen, though a fire does not provide the best 
occasion for scientific experiments and the methode of tackling 
different types of fire are normally worked out beforehand; there 
are now standard methods for extinguishing many types of fire. 
Chapter 1 of the Manual (Part 1) describes the physics and chemistry 
of combustion (and extinction), and details will also be found in 
many elementary textbooks, normally in lees complete and convenient form. 
Combustion is a chemical reaction evolving heat and light. 
The three basic requirements are fuel (i.Go a combustible subetance) 0 
heat and oxygen 9 often represented by the 'triangle of combustion': 
(19) 
Removal of one of these will stop the fire. 
A flame usually accompanies the combustion of any substance 
(carbon is an exception) and most flammable solids and all flammable 
liquids emit flammable vapours. In general, oxygen is drawn from 
the atmosphere, though some substances (e.g. celluloid) contain 
sufficient oxygen to burn without air. Volatile combustible matter 
will travel until it reaches an adequate amount of oxygen, and in 
a conflagration this eaplains why the flames are long. (In turn, 
long flames help spread the fire more quickly and easily.) The large 
amount of volatile matter in wood, together with some of its chemical 
constituents, make it one of the worst substances from the fireman's 
point of view: "It ie the general experience that if a timber 
structure once gets alight, the fire burns and spreads with great 
rapidity" (Manual 1, p.50). Methods of rendering timber non-flammable 
normally aim at preventing air from reaching the wood substances. 
In addition to understanding combustion, firemen have to 
understand how heat can travel, and fire spread through a building. 
Metals, whether in the form of girders or doors, transfer heat by 
conduction, and other common building materials conduct to various 
lesser extents: a metal door will not be fire-resisting unless it ia 
(20) 
alao kept cool (e.g. by water spray). Convection currents carry 
hot gases upwards, and hel~ a fire to spread rapidly upwards. In 
some cases it may be possible to vent the burning building to enable 
the hot gases to leave, but this technique always carries the risk 
of spreadin~ the fire. Radiant heat can travel for coneiderabla 
distances, and this is often the way in which a fire can jump acrose 
a street. A water spray, which absorbs heat, ia often used to protect 
a building from radiant heat, and may also be used as a heat and 
,: smoke shield by a fireman entering a building. 
Water is used for cooling because it absorbs a large amount 
of heat. Starting with 1 of ice at 0 gram -10 c., 
5 calories are required to raise its temperature from -10 to 0°C. 
80 calories required to 0 are chan~e the ice into water at 0 C. 
100 calories are required to raise the temperature from 0° to 100°0. 
540 calories are required to convert the water into steam at 100°0. 
10 calories are required to raise the temperature of the steam 
from 100° to 120°C. 
It is the conversion of water into steam that takes the greatest 
amount of heat from a fire. No other commonly available substance 
has such a great cooling effect, and this ie why water remains 
unsurpassed for firefighting ia the majorit1 of situations. 
An excellent account of the principles of fire extinction is 
to be found in the Manual, Part 1 9 Chapter 2 (pp.59-63). Rather 
than attempt to summarise it, I ~ive the whole of this chapter as 
Appendix I, to be read at this eta~e, because much of the thesis which 
follows assumes some knowledge of the principles of firefightingo 
(21) 
A careful reading of Appendix I su~gests certain implications 
for the methods to be used by a fire brigade. In the Manual, Part 1, 
the chapter which follcws the one on extina:ui~hing fire concerns 
"Methods used by the Fire Service", ann discusses the implications with 
reference to the eauipment available in the British Fire Service. 
The corresuondin~ uart of this thesis starts with Chapter 4. The 
remainder of this present chapter is inteJtled to be more general, so 
that the needs will be clear without our running the risk of reading 
back modern metho~s into the Reman period. 
The first requi~ement is clearly speed in attacking the outbreak 
while it is small. Convection currents can Apread the fire very quickly, 
and in addition they can even prevent an extinguishin~ a~ent (e.g. a 
jet of water) from reachin~ the fire. Therefore any method of 
extinction will be most effective while the fire is only small. Horeover, 
a smaller amount of extinguishing agent will be needed for a small fire, 
and there will thus be less dama~e (e.g. from watsr). 
Speed will depend on two factors: rapid detection of the fire 
while it is small and rapid arrival of firemen (including rapid access 
to the fire itself within a building). The old observation that most 
fires happen at night is still partly true, because at nig·ht people 
tend to be asleep or absent. Moreover, it often happens that the 
occupants of a burnin~ building are the last people to learn of the fire. 
If fire patrols are used, they can be a very powerful weapon against the 
incipient fir~, since the men who are lookin~ for fires will also 
be able to start tacklina: them at once: in these respects they may 
(22) 
be likened to a human sprinkler system. Specialist equipment may 
be needed for gaining ~ccees to bui1Jinge 9 and firemen need sufficient 
knowledge of building construction to enable them to select 'the easiest 
points of entry. 
There must be ~n adequate supply of water. It could be stored 
ready· on the premiees 9 it could be brought by the firemen 9 or it 
could be obtained from. a nearby artificial .or natural -supply. The 
~later a fire is detected, the mor~ water will be needed, and for a 
r~ally large fire several million ~allons might be needed; many 
medium-sized fires require several thousand gallons of water. There 
should be means of getting the water onto the fire itself, and this 
may well demand the use of powerful jets. Pumps without hoses are at 
a serious disadvantage. If the water is taken from a public main 9 
it is possible that the pressure in the ~stem will drop, eo that 
only a limited number of pumps can be fed from the ~ystem before the 
supply to each one will become inadequate. 
In order to obtain access to the fire, the firemen must be 
able to move around in smoke and in atmospheres deprived of oxygen 
and laden with carbon monoxide (a rapidly~acting poison) and carbon 
dioxide. Smoke filters might be of some use, but where the atmosphere 
is doubtful Aelf-contained breathing sets are a necessity. In some 
fires (e.g. those involving plastics) the toxic fumes necessitate the 
use of breathing apparatus. Firemen develop the ability to work in 
smoke and heat, far more than the average person could etand, but 
clearly there are limite to what will-power and training on their 
own can accomplieh. 
(23) 
While they are in a burning building, firemen have to be able 
to tell when the building is likely to collapse and also have to be 
able to predict where the fire is likely to break through. They 
have to be able to reco~nise the moment when rapid withdrawal is 
called for, and be ready with a knowledge of possible escape routes. 
Their knowledge of building construction will tell them in what way 
and to what extent a building has been damaged by fire (this is a 
separate question from ~hether the buildin~ it~elf is on fire), and 
this will help them to anticipate collapses. They should be awar'e 
of the effects of their methods of extinction on the building and 
its contents (this applies particularl:r to possible damage from water). 
In a small proportion of fires, there will be "special risks". 
These normally involve substances which have been invented or 
discovered only in modern times, and special methods have been 
devised to deal with them. For most of the history of firefighting, 
the special risks have been everyday substances stored in unusual 
quantities or in unusual ways - for example, bakers' furze (which was 
used in ovens) - or else they have been specially flammable buildings 
(normally, the more flimsy or badly-built, the worse a building is 
as a fire risk). For all of these everyday risks, water is the best 
extinguiAhant, so much so that rather than avoi~ the use of water in 
buildings installed with electricity special techniques are used to 
overcome the risks of electrocution. 
Rescue of persons is the first aim of any fire brigade, and 
even brigades which made (or make) money from extinguishing fires were 
{or are) willing to rescue people free of charge. As with extinction 9 
(24) 
rapidity is the key. Special equipment may be used to help the 
escape of injured or unconscious people. Very often, people in a 
burning buildin~ are suffocated in the first few minutes, and 
comparatively few people actually burn to death. 
It ie chiefly in the field of rescue that the fireman has to 
be able to cope with irrational and often obstructive people. Panic 
is the second enemy of the fireman, after fire itself, (some firemen 
would even rate it as the first enemy). The occupants of a burning 
building cannot be relied on to give any assistance or information, 
and they often have to be rescued in spite of themselves. The 
presence of a fireman can itself nroduce calm, and it might be possible 
to eave lives simply by the fireman staying with a group of people 
waiting for a ladder to reach the window. As well as being calm, 
firemen have to look calm and reassuring, and their training and 
their ability to treat a terrifying situation as a technical 
problem are vital. 
It will be apParent now that firemen need a wide range of 
abilities for their work. They have to be physically robust with 
large reserves of strength. They must be agile and able to per.f'orm 
all ~orte of operations in precarious situations, and have confidence 
in themselves as well as their equipment. They have to have 
assimilated a large amount of technical information, about fires, 
buildings and their equipment. They need personalities that can 
withstand periods of waiting, and that can also produce vast amounts 
of energy at instant notice, and as long as they are on duty they have 
to be able to provide continuous gallantry. Above all, they have to be 
able to reduce panic. 
{25) 
The duties are very wearin~, and the chances of injury are 
great. Men may decide to become firemen because, in part, they are 
attracted by the glamour and the opportunities to become heroea, but 
in order to survive at all they must channel their enthusiasms into 
professional skills. It ie only when they have reached this stage, 
of being able to treat fire and the results of fire aa technical 
problems, t~at they start to become useful firemen. 
(26) 
CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS OF VI. 1057, 1058 and 1056 
3. 1.1. 
Fire brigades consisting of several thousand men are familiar to 
us today. The Vigiles, too, consisted of several thousand men: but they 
covered an area much smaller than does a similar~sized modern brigade. This 
apparent discrepancy has led to exaggeration of the extent of the police 
duties of the Vigiles, for how could several thousand firemen ever have been 
fully employed in ancient Rome? It will be argued in due course that the 
sort of numbers which we find in the Vigiles are in fact consistent with 
certain methods of firefighting, and that by taking account of the number 
of men available we can deduce in considerable detail how the Vigiles will 
have set about their duties as firemen. 
3.1. 2. 
The question of numbers is therefore crucial for this study. It 
can, moreover, be resolved by an analysis of the lists of Vigiles on the 
three statue bases, VI. 1056, 1057 and 1058, which is largely numerical 
and which needs very few historical assumptions. In the course of this 
analysis we shall touch on various aspects of the administration and 
organisation of the Vigiles, though only so far as this analysis demands. 
Once we have clarified the question of numbers we shall be in a proper 
position in subsequent chapters to interpret our historical evidence in 
detail. 
3.1.3. 
The material in section 3.2, which is reasonably self-evident and 
generally accepted, was first worked out by Kellermann (1835), though I was 
not aware of this until this whole chapter was completed. The new part of the 
analysis, starting at 3.3.1, was not anticipated by Kellermann. Partly for 
ease of understanding and partly because we can now refer to the published 
(27) 
texts of VI. 1057 and 1058 without having to reproduce them, I have left 
this chapter in its original form. I have reached a different conclusion 
from that of Kellermann on the total number of men originally listed on 
1058. 
3.2.1. 
VI. 1057 and 1058 are two large statue bases discovered in 
1820 in the castra of the Fifth Cohort. They were published by Kellermann 
(1835). Both bases are now in the galleria lapidaria of the Capitoline 
Museums. The archaeological discoveries made in 1820 are described in 
section 6.2.5. 
3.2.2. 
Each base has lists of Vigiles, arranged by centuries, on the sides 
and back. The front of 1058 is inscribed with a dedication to the numen et 
maiestas of Caracalla by the Fifth Cohort of Vigiles. The consular date is 
that of A.D. 210. The names of the prefect, sub--prefect, tribune, the 
centurions and the cornicularii of the prefect and sub--prefect are given 
below. The date of the dedication is given on the corona, 7 July, and also 
on the corona are the names of four doctors. The front of 1057 was never 
inscribed. However, since about a third of the names on 1057 recur on 1058, we 
can be sure that it was indeed set up by the Fifth Cohort as its findspot 
suggests. It is suggested below (3.5.2.) that we should accept that its 
date is A.D. 205. 
For the moment, it is enough to note that the names of the men 
who recur tend to occur, on 1057, towards the bottom of the lists of each 
centuryD whereas in 1058 they occupy higher positions. This is explicable 
if new names were added to the bottoms of the list, thus producing an 
apparent upward movement. 1057 is therefore earlier than 1058. This 
apparent upward movement was noticed by Kellermann (p. 9) and has never 
(28) 
been in doubt. On the other hand~ the full implications have never been 
exploited. Given that during the interval covered by the two sets of the 
lists the names moved a certain amount~ it should be possible to work out 
how much they moved each year (i.e. how many recruits and losses there were 
each year), and it should be possible to estimate the annual survival rate. 
Then, once these lists have been divided up into year-groups, it will be 
possible to see at once in which years of service ·the various posts (nco 
and technician) were held, and to establish the career patterns. All this 
is the subject of this chapter. 
3.2.4. 
In referring to these lists I have followed the usage of CIL, in 
which each century is numbered (from 1 to 7). The recurrence of some of 
the men enables us to see which century in 1057 corresponds to each century 
in 1058 (none of the extant names of the centurions in 1058 is that of a 
centurion on 1057), giving the following equations:-
l:Q2I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
~ 
1 
2 
3 
7 
6 
4 
5 
Nothing on the original stones corresponds to these numbers. 
In order to distinguish between numbers (of men) and positions (of 
men within a list)~ I shall use square brackets to indicate locations as 
follows: 
"c. Bellenius Saturninus [56]" tells us that Saturninus occupies the 
fifty-sixth position in his list. "[1-4] = 4" means that in the first to 
fourth positions there are four men. 
(29) 
The centuries will be indicated by their numbers as explained in 
3.2.4. Thus 1057.3. [14] indicates the fourteenth man in the third century 
on 1057. 
3.2.6. 
Both 1057 and 1058 are somewhat chipped around the edges, and in 
places there is now plaster covering the lettering (left from the time when 
casts were made). The top of 1057 is undamaged, and no names are missing 
from this portion. 1058, however, is badly chipped around the top and names 
are missing from the tops of some of the columns. It is possible to 
estimate approximately how many names could have fitted into these positions 
(allowing extra space when the name of a centurion has to be supplied), and~ 
the results are as follows: 
in latere intuentibus sinistro 
col.l: centurion + 3 men 
col. 2: 5 men 
col.3: centurion + 5 men 
col.4: 4 men 
col.5: 6 men 
in latere intuentibus dextro 
col.l: 13 men 
col. 2: 8 men 
col.3: 8 men 
col.4: 12 men 
col.5: centurion + 
in postica 
col.l: 2 men 
8 men 
Kellermann's estimates are rather lower, so much so that I feel there is no 
doubt that they are wrong (briefly they are - following the same order as my 
own estimates ~ centurion + 0, 2, centurion + 3, 3, 4; 5, 5, 4, 6, centurion 
+ 4; ?). 1058.7. [41) may confidently be restored [M.Fuficius Donatus). The 
only names missing from 1057 are at the bottom of the list of the third 
(30) 
century, ~00-121], where all that survive are the initial letters of 15 
of the praenomina. 
ay using these estimates of the number of missing names, we can 
establish how many men there were in each of the centuries of 1058. These 
totals are given below:-
century 1057 1058 
1 1 160 178 
2 2 167 149 
3 = 3 121 158 
4 = 7 115 155 
5 = 6 143 85 
6 4 118 152 
7 5 93 150 
total in cohort 917 1027 
3.2.8. 
I have checked the readings on the stones themselves with the 
published readings, and my conclusion is that in most cases there is no 
doubt whatever, and that where the lettering is now missing or obscure, 
the best available readings are those of CIL. In no case is the Corpus 
obviously wrong, and if '~e feel that some of the titles of the immunes 
and principales are unlikely, then the mistakes (if such they are) are 
probably those of the Romans and not of modern editors. 
3.2.9. 
In carrying out my analysis I have been aided invaluably by the 
reprint in CIL (pp. 2o8-219) of Kellermann's analysis of the men, by 
centuries, who recur: with the addition of complementary lists of men who 
do not recur. I have noted only one serious error in CIL: on p. 217 the 
last man listed under century 7 Iusti = 5 Romuli, L. Caecilius Modestus 
(Modetus), should be no. 28 in the century of Romulus, not 29 as printed 
(~1) 
(Kellermann, with a different system of numbering, gives Modestus the 
correct number). On p. 219 the list of men who changed centuries needs to 
be used with caution, since the main lists in GIL's version of Kellermann's 
analysis are inconsistent in indicating whetl1er these individuals have 
been transferred, and without this caution it would be all too easy to 
produce inconsistent and inaccurate figures. 
3.2.10. 
The lists give the abbreviated titles of the immunes and principales. 
In 1057 these titles are scattered throughout the lists, though with a 
concentration towards the top of each list, whereas in 1058 theY are all 
at the tops of the lists (with the exception of the COD TR, at [54] in the 
first century: for most of the analysis which follows this title is ignored, 
since we do not know whether it was added afterwards or misplaced during the 
inscribing). Given that the men are arranged basically by length of service, 
we can see that in 1057 the immunes and principales are positioned according 
to their length of service, while in 1058 they have been placed together at 
the tops of the lists. There is considerable interest in the order in which 
the titles are themselves arranged in 1058. Initially we should note that if 
we can work out the year of service of a man in 1057 and if he recurs as an 
immunis or principalis in 1058, we can deduce his year of service in 1058 
even though there the order of those titles is not according to length of 
service. 
3.2.11. 
There are variations in the manner of abbreviation of the titles of 
the immunes and principales, though the greatest variations occur between the 
centuries. Within the centuries there is greater consistency, the changes 
being by way of simplifications as one reads down the lists. This indicates 
that the list of the whole cohort (in each inscription, despite the different 
arrangement of the immunes and principales) was compiled by stringing 
together lists supplied by the centuries. 
(~2) 
3.2.12. 
1057 and 1058 provide the basis of this analysis, but it is also 
possible to une the analysis of these two inscriptions to analyse 1056 
and so to obtain further material which can serve as a check on overall 
consistency. 1056 is a similar statue base to the other two, dedicated 
by the First Cohort in A.D. 205. The immunes and principales are 
distributed like those on 1057. Only four centuries are preserved, the 
back having been removed. For the discovery of this base see 6.2.1. 
3.3.1. 
We now pass on to the aspects of these lists which are less 
self-evident, and which lie beyond Kellermann's analysis. 
This analysis will be unavoidably complicated, though the 
complications arise more from variations in the way in which men survived 
in the lists (e.g. transferred to different centuries) than from the method 
of analysis. In order to make clear what the method is, it will be helpful 
now to define our notation, and to illustrate the use of this notation. 
Let us represent the number of recruits in any year by 'n', and let 
us assume (just for this illustration) that n is the same every year. Let 
us call the annual survival rate 'r'. r cannot be greater than 1, and the 
more men die or leave the lower will be the value of r. Thus, if in one year 
n = 100, and during that year 5 men die, 6 men are dismissed, and 7 men 
resign, the total losses will be 5 + 6 + 7 = 18; hence 82 men will survive. 
Then, since n = 100 and nr = 82, r = 0.82. If there were no losses r would 
be 1, and if all the men died or left r would be 0.00. 
Let 't' be the total number of men in the unit, and let 'y' be the 
total number of men who are serving beyond the required period. We can say 
that 
t = n + nr + nr 
2 
+ n~ + nr 4 X +············+ nr + y 
(33) 
Let us assume in this example that the number of years for which the men 
are required to serve is 6 (the number of years for which it will be suggested 
the Vigile~ signed on). 
In general the sum 'S' of the series 
a + ab + ab;2 + ab3 + ............ abm 
in which b is less than 1 is given by the formula 
S a(l-bm+l) 
1-b 
In our case, then, 
t = n(l-rS+l) + y 
1-r 
If we can find values for one or more of the unknowns, we can substitute 
in this formula to find the values of the others. 
Our list may be visualised as made up of the groups as follows (the 
largest group, n, is at the bottom of the list, as it consists of the new 
batch of recruits):-
y 
~ nr-
4 
r1r 
nr3 
2 
n.r 
nr 
n 
total t 
).).). 
For our actual lists we must avoid begging any questions and 
cli:::;tinguish the periods under consideration. Thus n1 is the annual 
intake pe:c century up to and including that of the year just before that 
of 1057; n is the new intake on 1057; and n3 is the annual intake after ;..J,,.--.. c' 
the yea.r of 1057 (including the new intake of 1058). y l is the total 
nwnber of men in their 7th or higher year of service in each century 
before the year of 1057; y2 is the number of such men in the year of 
1057; and y3 is the (calculated) normal nwnber of such men after the 
(34) 
year of 1057 (it will become clear why y
3 
has to be calculated specially). 
t 1, t 2 and t 3 are the total numbers of men per century for each of the 
three periods in question (the normal value of t
3 
has also to be calculated). 
On the other hand, we may assume that the value of r remains constant in 
~11 three periods, since the factors likely to have affected it (e.g. 
normal mortality, rigours of service) are unlikely to have changed 
perceptibly in "the small interval of years which we shall be considering. 
r will also apply with the same value to the men in their 7th or higher 
year of service (y). (N.n. y is not the number of men who each year stay 
Sve: ~ 
on: it is the total number ofkmen in the century, belonging possibly to a 
wide span of years of service.) 
Because there are seven centuries in the cohort, there are seven 
values for each of n1, n2, ~· y1, y2, y3 , t 1, t 2, t 3 ; the value of r 
will be based on the analysis of seven centuries. 
3.4.1. 
Our starting point is the group of men who appear in both sets 
of lists. If all the men who appear in the earlier lists had survived, 
the later list;::; would have contained all of them. They do not. Moreover, 
there are two observations which we can make at the outset concerning the 
men who do recur. First, in the earlier lists the majority of them 
occupy the lower part of each list, with the rest scattered higher up. 
Secondly, by noting which men have recurred in the later lists we can see 
the pattern according to which the other men have failed to survive. 
(In this char.t.er, we are concerned simply with survival in the lists; 
the nature of the actual survival - or operation of normal mortality, 
resignations, dismissals, etc. - is reserved for the historical chaptersJ 
ru1d especially 5.2. 10). The positions of the men who recur are shown in 
the tables at the end of this chapter, 3.12, columns A,C,E and G (these 
columns, and also B ~~~ F, simply set out the lists without any hypothesising; 
columns D and H contain conclusions; the tables which set out the analysis 
{35) 
of 1056 are at section 3.12.3.). 
3.4.2. 
It will be helpful first to consider a hypothetical list, to see 
how it would behave under extremely regular circumstances. Let us imagine 
that this hypothetical list contains 10 men. After a certain interval, 
let us say, l man drops out, leaving 9 men with l gap. After another, 
similar, interval, another l drops out, leaving 8 men with 2 gaps. This 
process repeats itself, until we have l man with 9 gaps. If we now 
think of the original 10 men as a batch of recruits, who survive for 
intervals of 1 year in the manner described, and if we imagine our list 
forming part of a much larger hypothetical list,.made up from successive 
lists originally with 10 men in each, and if we imagine that each 
successive batch of recruits survives in exactly the same way, we can 
see the sort of pattern which will be apparent. The result will be the 
same whether we consider the same batch in successive years or a whole 
unit made up of batches of men with gradually increasing seniority. There 
will be a gradually increasing number of gaps. As long as no batches are 
omitted, the increase will be gradual and smooth. This is shown graphically 
in the diagram below, in which the men's positions in the original lists 
are plotted against their positions in the final lists. In this example, 
the men are assumed to drop out in the order [4,7,2,9,1,8,3,10,5]. 
(A different order would produce a slightly different pattern, which might 
be slightly more even or uneven.) The vertical axis shows the original 
positions, the horizontal axis shows the divisions between successive original 
lists as the men drop out. Reading along the horizontal axis, the positions 
originally held are as follows: 
[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10; 
1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9,10; 
1,2,3,5,6,8,9,10; 
1,3,5,6,8,9.10; 
1,3,5,6,8,10; 
3,5,6,8J>l0; 
3,5.,6.,10; 
5,6,10; 
5,6; 
6] 
There are 100 men in the original list, and 55 in the final one. 
On the right are shown the gaps produced by men disappearing from the 
lists, increasing in number as you read upwards from junior to senior 
positions. 
The factors which produce this pattern are the number of men in the 
original lists, the rate at which men drop out, and the number of lists 
making up the composite list (which is directly related to the interval 
at which new lists are made and the period covered by the composite list). 
The key feature is the change in the number and frequency of the gaps. 
(37) 
3.4.3. 
Now for our actual lists. The manner of survival in the 
lists of the Fifth Cohort is not as simple as in the theoretical example, 
and it is necessary to take account of the irregularities (below, 3.7). 
It wou:d be possible to describe the pattern of survival in the lists 
in a quite general way by using formulae such as have already been 
described (3.3.2.), but historically there would be little purpose in 
this. Preferably, the pattern should be tied down to actual years. 
Theoretically, of course, it is possible to analyse the lists by making 
any assumptions about the date of 1057 and the normal period of service, 
but it may help the reader to know now that it is possible to establish 
both of these points with accuracy, and so to complete the analysis 
within a "genuine" historical frame of reference. This means that in 
the subsequent part of the analysis, the one historical possibility is 
taken, and the logically-possible alternatives are ignored. 
3.4.4. 
We start by estimating how many original lists have gone to make 
up the composite ones. In the theoretical example, it can be seen that 
the frequency of the gaps is related to the number of lists (=number of 
years) represented in the composite list. Since the irregularities in the 
manner of survival would prevent a curved graph from being as informative 
as the theoretical curve (with men recurring out of the original order in 
the same century or recurring in different centuries), we will take simply 
the distribution of gaps which "appear" in the lists of 1057. In the 
tables at;:·. the end of this chapter (3.12.1), the appearance of a dash 
- in column C indiaates that a man does not recur on 1058, i.e. a gap has 
appeared. The positions of these gaps are plotted in the diagrams below, 
and for convenience the diagram of gaps in the theoretical example is 
repeated, at the right. 
(38) 
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The striking feature of the distribution of these gape is that 
they are not at all regular as in the example. In every case there i" 
a fairly solid line of dots at the top of each list1 with a scatter below. 
Century 3 is anomalous in having a block of gaps at the bottom, and this 
is explicable by the illegible state of the stone; it is suggested (at 3.7.6.) 
that there should be about 8 gaps in this position. For the moment, however, 
we should avoid a circular argument and leave this distribution as an 
(39) 
anomaly. Otherwise, centuries 1 and 4 show clearly just two groupings, 
a high frequency of gaps at the top and a low frequency at the bottom; 
centuries 2,~6 and 7 have slightly more frequent gaps at the bottom than 
1 and 4, but there is still a clear division into just two frequencies. 
We would expect to find more gaps at the tops of the lists than at 
the bottoms, since this is where m·en would t~nd to leave from; but what 
is odd is that in the lower part~of the lists there is no suggestion of 
an increase in the frequency of gaps as one reads up the lists. Even if 
we take into account the possibility of imprecision caused by the uneven 
distribution of men leaving within various year-groups, it becomes 
clear that we must reckon with the possibility that just one year-group is 
represented in the lower portions of the lists. At the tops of the lists, 
also, only century 6 shows more gaps in the higher part of the portion 
with the higher frequency of gaps, so that here again there is the 
possibility of just one year-group being represented. Do 1057 and 1058, 
then, cover just two years? 
).4.5. 
This would be decidedly odd, and there are two other possibilities 
yet to consider. First, accepting that just two year-groups might be 
represented, it is possible logically that 1057 and 1058 are separated by 
several years; in this case, the great difference in the frequency of the 
gaps in the two parts of each list might imply that in all years but two 
titere were no recruits: this is implausible, in all seven centuries. The 
other possibility is that the situation is a little more complex, and that 
at some fixed point many men left the service. This effect is shown in the 
diagram below, which uses the theoretical example again, but has many men 
leaving after 5 years. The positions originally held are taken to be 
the same as at ).4.2. (see the list of positions which appear on the 
horizontal axis), but in this case numbers [1,8,3,10] are made to leave 
(40) 
after 5 years. The gaps develop as follows: 
i 
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(41) 
Set out as in the other diagrams, they look like this: 
[to] 
[i o] 
Do] 
[1o] 
Broadly, now, the pattern is like that which appears in the actual 
lists, though there is still an increase in the frequency of the gaps in 
the lower part. In effect, we have to remove some of the groups from 
the lower part in order to obtain our actual pattern. This may be done 
quite simply by assuming that the composite list covers a number of' ./f:arr; 
which is equal to the normal length of service. In this, the bottom part 
of the list would consist of one year's recruits, now in their final year 
(42) 
of service, with the gaps that developed over the period covered by 
the composite list, while the upper part would consist of men staying 
on beyond the normal period of service and representing an indeterminate 
number of years of service. This would be sufficient to produce the 
pattern which we observe in the actual lists. 
3.4.6. 
This conclusion enables us to state a relationship between the 
normal period of service of the Vigiles (i.e. the period after which most 
of them left) and the interval covered by 1057 and 1058 (1057, it will 
be remembered, does not carry its own date). 1057 (whatever its date) 
and 1058 (of A.D.210) themselves cover a period equal to the normal 
period of service in the Vigiles (counting the year in which 1058 was 
set up as a whole year). This means that if 1057 belongs to 201, 
for example, then,they signed on for 10 years, if it belongs to 191 then 
they signed on for 20 years, and so forth. This much is inherent in the 
lists. 
3.5.1. 
For the historian, this is indeed a fortunate coincidence, provided 
that it can be utilised. The analysis of 1057 and 1058 at this point 
cannot carry us further forward, and our next step is to make use of an 
historioally•based estimate of the normal length of service. 
3.5.2. 
For this, it is convenient to refer to the discussion of the length 
of service in Chapter 5 (5.2.5). The bases of the argument are, first, 
that analogous inscriptions to 1057 and 1058 belong to only A.D.205 or 210 
ahd hence that 1057 (which is earlier than 1058) should belong to 205, 
and secondly that the period of 6 years which was demanded of Junian Latins 
before they were awarded the citizenship for serving in the Vigiles should 
have been the same as the normal period of service in the Vigiles. If 1057 
belongs to 205, a period of 6 years is covered by the two inscriptions, and, 
( 43) 
from the argument culminating at 3.4.6, 6 years should also be the 
normal period of service in the Vigiles. This is beautifully consistent 
with the argument based on the arrangements for Junian Lat:ws. 
The part of the analysis which follows now is based upon the 
assumption that the normal period of service in the Vigiles was 6 years 
(and it should perhaps be emphasised that there is not a circular argument 
in utilising the proposed date of 1057 in order to establish this). 
The date of the dedication of 1058. 7th July, will have allowed the men 
who completed their 6 years of normal service on lst March (see 5.2.8) 
to leave, so that the men in their 7th year on 1058 may be presumed to 
be staying on with positive intent. 
(44) 
3.6.1. 
We must now define as precisely as possible the boundary between 
the two p;roup:.; Ln en.ch ot' our lint:: of :mrvl vors. Initially, in order to 
allow for the possibility that the lowest (down the list) of the larger 
numbers of gaps might include men who would have been in their sixth year, 
we may take off 1 from each of these lowest numbers and assign it to the 
group in their first year. The provisional grouping is therefore as 
follows: 
Century First (highest) man in group 
of recruits-of 205 ,, 
1=1 1057.1. [72] 
2=2 1057.2. [82] 
3=3 1057.3. [61] 
4=7 1057.4. [64] 
5:6 1057.5. [61] 
6=4 1057.6. [36] 
7=5 1057. 7. [50] 
3.6.2. 
By this provisional grouping 1057.2. [80] should be in his second 
or higher year, and when after transfer, he reaches 1058.7.[21] he should be 
in his seventh or higher year. However, the man above him in 210, 1C58.7.[20], 
has been transferred from 1057.3. [69] where he was clearly in his first year: 
in 210 he is therefore in his sixth year. This would imply that 1058.7[21] 
has become mixed up in the later group or that 1058.7.[20] has jumped ahead. 
Since the men retain their original order so consisteut1y in general, it is 
better to avoid either of these implications by adjusting the boundary of 
the groups, and assigning 1057.2.[80] to the first-year group: in 210, at 
1058.7.[21], he is therefore in his sixth year. 
The man just below in 205, 1057.2. [81], does not reappear in 210, 
(45) 
so his effect on the adjustment is neutral. The man above~ 1057.2.[79], 
is transferred and reappears in 210 at 1058.5. [16 ], where his position is 
ambiguous. 1058.5. [15] is certainly in his seventh or higher year of 
service, and 1058.5. [17] and [18] are to be assigned to their sixth year 
(see 3.7.5.). 1058.5. [16] could~ from his position, therefore~ belong to 
either group. So as not to depart too far from the provisional grouping, 
let us assign him to his seventh or higher year in 210. At 1057. 2. [79 ] then, 
he will be in his second or higher year. The first man in the group of 
recruits of 205 will therefore be 1057.2. [80). 
3.6.3. 
1058.1. (16 J started at 1057.1. (75 ] and should1 by the provisional 
grouping, have been in his sixth year. But 1058. l. [17 ], starting at 
1057.1. [63], and 1058.1. [15] starting at 1057.1. [64j, are certainly in their 
seventh or higher years of service. Since these latter two have exchanged 
places~ we cannot rule out the possibility of a wider confusion which also 
misplaced 1057.1. [16] and made him intrude into the group with longer 
service. The alternative is to adjust the boundary between the two groups, 
on the assumption that 1058.1. [16] is in the correct group and in 205 was 
therefore in his second or higher year of service. This is a more difficult choice 
than we faced with 1057.2. [80) = 1058.7. [21), since a greater number of men 
have to be re-assigned. However, again in view of the tendency of these 
lists to maintain their order, it is probably preferable to adjust the 
boundary, and to start the first-year group of 205 with 1057.1. [76]. 
(46) 
3.6.4. 
With these two adjustments, the recruits of 205 are as follows: 
Century First (highest) recruit Number of recruits (n2 ) 
1=1 1057.1. [76 ] 85 
2=2 1057.2. [80 ] 88 
3=3 1057.3. [61 ] 61 
4=7 1057.4. [64] 52 
5:6 1057.5. [61 ] 83 
6=4 1057.6. [36 J 83 
7=5 1057. 7. [5o l 44 
For the percentage values of these figures, see 3.11.3. 
Having identified the recruits of 205, we may see how many of them 
fail to recur and how many do recur, and from this we can work out the value 
of r (the annual survival rate). The majority of the men survive~ bloc, 
but some recur out of order because they have become immunes or principales 
(and on 1058 these are listed separately), and some recur in different 
centuries. In addition, there is a small group of men who appear for the 
first time in 210 but listed in with the sixth-year group (i.e. they should 
have appeared among our recruits of 205), and some of the names missing on 
the damaged portions on 1058 will have to be assigned to men in their sixth 
year (i.e. to recruits o:f 205). 
(47) 
3-7.2. 
First, the survivals ~ bloc. 
Century Block of recruits in 205 Block of survivors in 210 
l=l 1057 .l. [76-160] 1058.1. [19-70] 
2=2 1057.2. [80-167] 1058.2. [12-56] except 
[23. 34. 38 ] 
3=3 1057.3. [61-121 ] 1058. 3. [15-31 ] except 
[18, 26 ) 
4=7 1057.4. [64-115 ) 1058. 7. [22-49 ] except 
[24) 
5=6 1057.5 [61-143 ] 1058.6. [8-48 ) except 
[17, 18, 37. 47] 
6=4 1057.6. [36-ll8] 1058.4. [16-5~ 
[21, 39) 
except 
7=5 1057.7. [50-93] 1058. 5. [19-50 ] except 
[31.34.36.41,42,43.45] 
The exceptions listed in the last column will be accounted for 
in sections 3.7.4. and 3.7.5. 
3.7.3. 
Next, the men who remained in their original centuries but who 
recur in the lists of immunes and principales. 
Century Position in 205 Position in 210 
1=1 [1o8) [13] 
(109) [12] 
2=2 [ 87) ( 4 ) 
3=3 [ 62) [ 8 ) 
[ 75) (14 ) 
4,7 [ 65] [14] 
[ 66) [17) 
5=6 
6=4 [ 48) [11) 
[ 52) (12 ) 
7=5 [ 72) [ 8 ) 
( 48) 
The men who recur a::; rankel'S but in different centuries are 
as follows: 
Posi ti.on Ju 20~-) 
1057.1.-
1057.2. [So] 
1057.2. [ 101] 
1057.2. [103] 
1057.2. [104] 
1057. 2. [ 1101 
1057. 2. [ 1121 
1057.2.[JAO] 
105~(. 3. [ 6)] 
105 7 . 3. [ 69 ] 
1057.3. [ 98] 
1057.4.-
1057.5.[ 62] 
[ 761 
[ 951 
[ 117] 
[1281 
[1201 
[ 13~? 1 
105'(.6.-
7. [Go) 
Position in 210 
1058 . '7 • [ 21 ) 
1058.7. [24] 
1058. 3. [ 26 ] 
1058.1. ( 18] 
1058.6. (171 
1058.6. [18] 
1058.5. [451 
1058.7.[ 4] 
1058.7.[201 
1058 . 4. [ 39 ] 
1058. 4. [ 211 
5.[20] 
5. ()1] 
5. [34] 
5.[411 
50 [ 42] 
5.[431 
4. [ s1 
It will be t>een Lhat, taking into account the adjustments of sections 
3.6.2. and 3.6.)., ever'Y one of these recruits of 205 is grouped, after 
transfer, with other former recruits of 205: this consistency confirms 
our analysis. 1"'he::;e transfers account for most of the exceptions noted at 
3.7.2. 
The remainder of the exceptions are a very interesting group. 
These are men who appea1· in 2J(J for the first time but who are grouped in 
a particular way. Seven of them are clearly grouped with the men in their 
sixth year: 
(~) 
1058.2.[23] 
1058.2. [34] 
1058.2. [38] 
1058.3.[18] 
1058.5. [36] 
1058.6. [371 
1058.6. [47] 
The other two, 1058.5. [17)and 1058.5. (18] occupy an ambiguous 
position between 1058.5. [16] (who, transferred from 1057.2. [79], has been 
assigned to his seventh or higher year of service in 210: see 3.6.2.) and 
1058.5. [19] (the highest in the list of the men in their sixth year of 
service). The ambiguity is diminished if we reject the adjustment made at 
3.6.2. and assign 1057.2. 79 (= 1058.5. [161)to the recruits of 205, though 
the next man up, 1058.5. [15], is certainly in his seventh or higher year. 
What is certain, however, is that these nine men now under consideration are 
the only men who appear for the first time in 210 in positions as described; 
otherwise, with two exceptions, the men appearing for the first time are all 
in their 5th or lower year of service. One of the exceptions is 1058.2.[81, 
who is clearly grouped in 210 with men in their 7th or higher year of service; 
there is no gap to which he can be conveniently assigned in 205, and his 
presence remains an anomaly. The other exception is 1058.5.[161, who is 
in his 7th or higher year of service, having been transferred from 1057.2.[791 
(the only ranker in these years of service known to have been transferred: 
see 3.9.2.) 
The simplest solution is to assign 1058.5.[17) and [18] to their 
sixth year of service, like the other six in the group. It follows that 
in 205 they should have been listed among the recruits of that year. 
There are two possible explanations for their non-appearance on 1057. 
One is that they started off in another cohort and were transferred, a 
suggestion which, though logically possible, has nothing historical to 
support it (transfers between centuries are a different matter). The other 
is that they did appear, originally in the one portion of 1057 which is now 
missing: the bottom of the list of the third century (1057.3.[100-1211) 
(50) 
where all that remains is the initial letter of fifteen of the praenomina. 
111 1.11.1~; pu~:ll.lon Liley wou]d bf' appr·oprlnLel,Y in tllelr r·lrGl. year of 
service. 
In the next section (3.7.6.) we shall see how these nine men 
thus help to fill what would otherwise be an inconsistently large number 
of gaps. 
3.7.6. 
1he final group of survivors from the recruits of 205 are the men 
whose names may be presumed to have originally been present among the 
erased names on 1058. With a certain amount of reasonable guesswork 
they are as follows: 
1058.1: 
H)58. 2: 
1058.3: 
1058.4: 
1058.5: 
1058.6: 
1058.7: 
none 
2 immunes or principales 
5 men (5 of the six missing after 1058.3.[31]) 
8 men (all 8 missing after 1058.4.[49]) 
none 
2 immunes or principales 
none 
The other men whose names are missing may be assigned to other years 
of service (see 3.10.2.) 
The 5 men missing from after 1058.3.[31] will have come from the only 
damaged portion of 1057.3., nos [100-121]. With the other 9 men assigned 
to this original position (see 3.7.5.) we have now accounted for 14 of these 
erased names: the losses from this portion are therefore taken to be 8. 
(51) 
The totals of survivors from the recruits of 205 are therefore 
as follows: 
~entury Survivors 
in 205 en bloc as immunes 
---
transferred first appear- erased TOTAL 
or 2rincip- ance in 210 on 1058 PER 
ales CENTURY 
--
l 52 2 
- - -
54 
2 42 l 7 - 2 52 
3 15 2 3 9 5 34 
4 27 I 2 - - - 29 
5 37 :- 7 - 2 46 
6 38 2 - - 8 48 
7 24 l l - - 26 
3.8.1. 
We can now perform the calculation outlined in the first paragraph 
of Section 3.3.2, Having established the number of recruits of 205 
(n2 ) and ths nwnber of them that survived over 6 years, the calculation is as 
follows: 
5 the survivors from n2 are reduced to n2 .r , 
hen(!e r 
In other words, r 5 (number of survivors) 
(number of recruits) 
(52) 
3.8.2. 
The following table summarises the information obtained so far 
(columns b and c), the survivors in each century expressed as a 
percentage (column d), and finally the value of r for each century, 
(column e). 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Century Recruits of Survivors of % survivors r 
205 (n2) recruits of 205 
1 85 54 63.53 .9133 
2 88 52 59.09 .9001 
3 61 34 55.74 .8896 
4 52 29 55.77 .8898 
5 83 46 55.42 .8886 
6 83 48 57.83 .8962 
7 44 26 59.09 .9001 
These values of r are the keys which unlock the other secrets of VI. 1057 
and 1058. 
3.8.3. 
From these values of r Dr. Hawkes has very kindly worked out a 
T-distribution with a 5% confidence interval and 6 degrees of freedom. 
This gives values of 0.888 and 0.905. In historical terms, this means 
that for as long as the survival rate may be considered to have remained 
unchanged, in 95% of all years each century is likely to have its precise 
survival rate lying between those two limits: while in the remaining 5% 
of years the rate could have lain outside those limits, though it need not. 
(53) 
3. 9.1. 
'rhese limits will now be used to estimate how we should divide 
up the lists of name~> ac~or-din3 to year-grcups. By using thAse limits, 
in preference to usingJ for example, just the mean of the values of r, 
we can see the range of possibilities for assigning the men to appropriate 
groups: and it will be clear, in fact, that in most cases there is no 
choice, particularly with the nco's and technicians, who are of special 
interest. 
3.9.2. 
Let us start with the men in their 2nd to 6th years of service 
in 205. We have already defined the lower limit of these groups. The 
upper limit may be derived from a consideration of the number of rankers 
on 1058 who are certainly in their 7th or higher year of service, since 
they will already have appeared on 1057 in the portion containing men 
in their 2nd or higher year of service. They are as follows: 
Centu!:l Position 
1058.1. [15] (from 1057.1. [64]) 
[16] (from 1057.1. [75]: see 3.6.3.) 
[17] (from 1057.1. [63]) 
1058.2. [9] (from 1057.2. [64]) 
[10] (from 1057.2.[66]) 
[11] (from 1057.2. [78]) 
1058.). 
1058.4. 
1058.5. [15] (from 1057.7. [44]) 
[16] (transferred from 1057.2.[79)) 
1058.6. [7] . (from 1057.5.[47]) 
1058.7. 
To these should be added: 
1058.2. [8] (first appearance: see 3.6.3.) 
At most, thenJ there are 10 rankers in their 7th or higher year of service: 
we may accordingly reckon that on 1057 a similar number may apply. We can 
use this presumption because the number involved is so small, so that any 
error is negligible. In contrast, we cannot utilise the number of immunes 
and principales in this way, because too many are missing from 1058. The 
criterion, then, is the highest appearance of rankers on 1057, and this 
produces a reasonable result. 
The group in their 7th or higher year of service on 1057 is as 
follows: 
From this, the 
Century 
1057.1 
1057.2 
1057-3 
1057.4 
1057-5 
1057.6 
1057. 7·. 
groups in· their 
Century 
1057.1 
1057.2 
1057-3 
1057.4. 
1057-5 
1057.6 
1057.7 
Positions 
[1-5] 
[1-12] 
[1-7] 
[1-9] 
[1-6] 
(1-8] 
[1-7] 
2nd to 6 years 
Positions 
[6-75] 
[13-79] 
[8-60] 
[10-63] 
[7-60] 
[9-35] 
[8-49] 
inclusive are as follows: 
Number 
70 
67 
53 
54 
54 
27 
42 
3.9.3. 
These men will have been recruited at the annual rate of n1, and 
will be in year-groups as follows: 
Year of service 
Total 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Size of group 
I 
(55) 
From our formula for summing (3.3.2.) we can say that 
t 1 (2 _6 ) = n.r(l - r
5) 
(1 - r) 
When we substitute our two values of r, we find that 
when r 
and when r 
. 888, tl ( 2-6 ) 
.905, tl (2-6) 
3.5512 (n1) 
3.7467 (n1) 
3.9.4. 
Since for each of our centuries the val1~e of t 1 ( 2_6 ) is alr0ady 
known (3.9.2.) the val~e of n1 can be found. Then we multiply n1 by 
the corresponding value of r to obtain the n<~ber of men in each year 
group. 
Year of service 
Century tl (2-6) r nl 2 3 4 h. --' 
1057.1 70 .888 19.7 17.5 15.5 13.8 12.3 
.905 18.7 16.9 15.3 13.8 12.5 I 
1057.2 67 .888 18.9 16.8 14.9 13.2 11.7 
.905 17.9 16.2 14.6 13.3 12.0 
1057-3 53 .888 14.9 13.3 11.8 10.5 9.3 
.905 14.1 12.8 11.6 10.5 9.5 
1057.4) 54 .888 15.2 13.5 12.0 10.6 9.5 
1057.5 .905 14.4 13.0 11.8 10.7 9.7 
l057 .6 27 .888 7.6 6.3 6.0 5.3 4.7 
.905 7.2 6.5 5.9 5.3 4.8 
1057.7 42 .888 11.8 10.5 9.3 8.3 7.3 
.905 11.2 10.1 9.2 8.3 7.5 
L.__ 
5 
10.9 
11.3 
10.4 
10.9 
8.2 
8.6 I 
8.4 
8.7 
4.2 
4.4 
6.5 
6.8 
(56) 
3.9.6. 
Groups of these sizes will have the following lower limits in 
the lists: 
Century 7+ 6 5 4 3 2 
1057.1 [5] [15.9] [28.1] [ 41.9] [57.5] [75.0] 
[5] [16.3] [28.9] [42.7] [58.0] [75.0] 
1057.2 [12] [22.4] [34.2] [47.4] [62.2] [79.0] 
[12] (22.9] [34.9] [48.1] [62.8] [78._9] 
1057.3 [7] [15.2] [24.5] [35.0] [46.7] [60.0] 
[7] [15.6] ' [25.1] [35.6] [ 47.1] [59.9] 
1057.4 [9] [17.4] [26.9] [37.5] [49.5] [63.0] 
[9] [17.7] [27.4] [38.1] [49.9] [62.9] 
1057-5 [6] [14.4] [23.9] [34.5] [46.5] [60.0] [6] [14.7] [24.4] [35.1] [46.9] [59.9] 
1057.6 [8] [12.2] [16.9] [22.2] [28.2] [35.0] 
[8] [12.4] [17.2] [22.6] [28.5] [35~0] 
1057.7 [7] [13.5] (20.9] [29.2] [38.5] [49.0] 
[7] [13.8) [21.3] [29.6] [38.8] [49.0] 
It is not claimed that a man could occupy two year-groups: that 
would be a misreading of these figures. But the reason why I have given 
these results to one decimal place is to show how little difference i~ makes 
which value we use for r. Moreover, the majority of the immunes and 
principales - whose positions are of crucial importance - are not on a 
border-line between two year-groups, and they 1nay be assigned to the various 
years with reasonable confidence (see 3.12.1). 
3.10.1. 
Now we pass to the annual recruitment after 205, represented by the 
men on 1058 who are listed below the former recruits of 205. These men are 
in groups as follows: 
(57) 
The formula for summing to give t 3 ( 1 _5) is 
t3 (1-5) = ~(l-r5) 
1-r 
With the two values for r which have already been worked out (3.8.3.) we 
find that 
when r = .888, t 3 ( 1 _5 ) 
and when r = .905, t 3 ( 1 _5 ) 
3.9985(~) 
4.1360(~) 
3.10.2. 
The table below shows the positions of rankers in their first 
five years on 1058 (allowing for the names missing from the damaged 
portions), their total number, t 3 ( 1 _5 )' and the values of ~ for each 
century corresponding to the two values of r. 
Century Positions 
.13 (1-5)- 4-
r=.888 r=.905 
1058.1 [71-170] + 5 after [83] 105 26.3 25.4 
1050.2 [57-l40] + 4 after [84] 88 22.0 21.3 
1058.3 tJ2-l39 J + after [31] 122 30.5 29.5 
& 13 after [113] 
1058.4 [56-136] + 8 after [13~ 89 22.3 21.5 
1058.5 [51-138] + 12 after [72] 100 25.0 24.2 
1058.6 [49-75] + 2 after [64] 29 7.3 7.0 
1058.7 [50-155] lo6 26.5 25.6 
The total numbers of recruits will have been a little higher, but as too 
many of the imm~mes and principales are missing we cannot take these into 
account excep~ to note that we have ignored them. Possibly we should add on 
1 to 3 to each figure for an~ual recruitment. 
3.10.3. 
Since all the imnrunes and principales are listed together, there is 
no point (in this tt.esis, anyway) in dividing up the lists of rankers into 
year groups. 
(58) 
3.11.1. 
We now come to the final stage of this analysis, in which we 
utilise some of the conclusions already obtalned to analyse the lists of 
the 4 centuries which survive on VI.l056. Like 1057, also of 205 9 1056 
is set out with the nco's and technicians grouped according to length 
of service. There is a slight difference, however, in that there is 
a preponderance of immunes and principales at the tops of the 4 lists; 
but the presence of some of the immunes and principales lower down the 
lists confirms that 1056 shares the same pattern as 1057. 
3.11.2. 
This stage of the analysis will be far less precise than the 
foregoing, because we have to base it on the number of recruits of 205, 
and there is a wide range of possibilities for this. To overcome this 
gap in our information, we shall work out a T-distribution to show the 
range of percentages of recruits in the complete lists with a 5% confidence 
interval. For the value of r, the range of attested and calculated values 
is so small in comparison with the wide range of possibilities for the 
numbers of recruits that we shall use just the mean value obtainable from 
1057, i.e. 0.897. 
3.11.3. 
The following table shows. the number of men in each century on 
1057, the number of recruits of 205 (n2 ), and finally the percentage of 
recruits. 
~ ~ ~::::Y -~r~a~::~~r . ·~--------:-:--;-,! _P_e_r_c_en_:-:-.-:-2-:-:-re_c_ru_i_t_s-~ 
1057.2 I 167 II 88 II 52.695% 
1057.3 : 121 . 61 50.413% 
1057,4 115 I 52 I 45.217% 
1057.5 143 83 58.042% 
1057.6 118 83 70.339% 
1057.7 93 44 47.312% 
(59) 
Hence ift 95% of cases, n2 will tend to lie between 46% and 62% of the 
total number of men in each century. These percentages are surprisingly 
high, and cannot reflect a normal procedure. In fact, the size of n2 
means that in 205 the centuries were approximately doubled in size 
(both for 1056 and 1057). On the significance of this, see 5. 2. 1 . 
We now apply these limits to 1056 to obtain the limits for the 
numbers of recruits of 205 (n2 ). These are as follows: 
Century 
1056.1 
1056.2 
1056~3 
1056.4 
Total number 
in century 
120 
121 
112 
137 
L-Number of recruits (~) 
I 62% 46% 
. r-··-------····---· -----------1 
74.4 
75.0 
69.4 
84.9 
55.2 
55.7 
51.5 
63.0 
L------ ·-- ............. ····-------···-------·-·-·-·-···· .. ----- ........... ----· •·······----
These men will have been listed at the bottoms of the lists. 
3.11.4. 
The upper limit of the group in their 2nd to 6th years of service 
may be defined by subtracting from the list the men who are assignable 
to their 7th or higher year. OUr main guide is derived from 1058, where 
we know which men belong to the group in their 7th or higher year. We lose 
a little precision because some of the immunes and principales are erased 
and some of these would have been in their 7th or higher year of service. 
But it is significant that very few rankers belong to this group, and our 
best course is to estimate a similar number of rankers for 1056, and draw 
the line accordingly. The numbers of rankers in this group on 1058 are 
indicated in section 3.9.2., where we used a similar method dividing up 
1057. 
On 1056, as we have already observed (3.11.1.), the immunes and 
principales are concentrated at the tops of the lists, which implies that 
most of them will be in their 7th or higher year of service (otherwise a 
(60) 
greater number of rankers would be intermingled with them). It is 
correspondingly less likely that rankers would tend to belong to this 
group. Our criterion, therefore, will be the position of the first 
(highest) ranker in eac~ century. The divisions'are thus as follows: 
-
Century First ranker 7+ group First in 2nd-6th group 
1056.1 [8] [1-8] [9] 
1056.2 [8] [1-8] [9] 
1056.3 [10] [1-10] [ 1 ]_] 
1056.4 [10] [1-10] [11] 
3.11.5 
We can now determine the limits for the size of the group comprising 
the men in their 2nd to 6th years. These will be the total number in the 
century less those in their 7th or higher year (y) and less the recruits 
of 205 (n2 ), and are indicated in the final column of the table below. 
Century Total in ! I t c-=ntury y n2 1 ( 2-6) 
1056.1 120 8 74.4 37.6 
55.2 56.8 
1056.2 121 8 75.0 38.0 
55.7 57.3 
1056.3 112 10 69.4 32.6 
51.5 50.5 
1056.4 137 10 84.9 42.1 
63.0 64.0 
3.ll.6 
As at section 3.9.4., we can say tbat the totals t 1 ( 2 _6 )can be 
summed as 
t-
1 (2-6) 
6 
n1 (r-r) 
1-r 
In this case, we are using the value for r of .897. H~nce t 1 ( 2-6) = 
(61) 
The following two tables correspond to the two tables in sections 
3.9.5 and 3.9.6, the first of them showing the numbers of men in each 
of the year groups 2 to 6, and the second showing the lower limits of 
the groups in "the actual lists. 
Year 
--
--Century tl (2-6) nl 2 ) 4 5 6 
2 
n r 3 4 n r 5 n1r n1r 1 n1r 1 
1056.1 37.6 10.297 9.237 8.285 7.432 6.667 5.980 
56.8 15.555 13.953 12.516 11.227 I 
10.071 9.033 
1056.2 :;:K.O 10.407 9.335 f3.373 7.511 6.737 6.043 
57-3 :t5.692 14.076 12.626 11.325 10.159 9.113 
1056.3 32.6 .$.928 8.oo8 7.184 6. 41+4 5.780 5.185 I 50.5 13.830 12.406 11.128 9.982 8.954 8.031 
1056.4 42.1 11.530 10.342 9.277 8.321 7.464 6.G95 
64.0 17.527 15.722 14.203 12.650 11.347 10.178 
.....__ 
Year 
Century 7+ 6 5 4 3 2 1 
1056.1 [8] [ 14. 0] [ 20. 6] [28.1] [36.4] [45.6] [12o.cl 
[8] [17.0] [ 27 .1] [38.3] [so. 8] [64.8] [120.0] 
1056.2 [ 8] [14. o] [20.8] ( 28. 3] I [ 36. 7] [46.0] [ 121. o] 
[ 8] [17.1] [27.3] [38.6] [51. 2] [65.3] [ 121. o] 
1056.3 ( LO] [15.2] [ 21. 0] [27.4] [35.0] [ 42. 6] [112.0] 
( lO] [18.0] [ 27. o] [ 37.0] [ 48.1] [60.5] [ 112.0] 
1056.4 [10] [ 16. 7] [ 24. 2] [32.5] [41.8] [ 52.1] [ 137. o] 
[10] [20.2] [31.5] [44.2] [ 58.3] [74.0] [137.0] 
L-
(62) 
3.12.1. 
In this section the analysis of 1057 is set out fully, followed 
at 3.12.2 and 3.12.3 by the analyses of 1058 and 1056. 
Column A gives the positions of the men. 
Column B gives the abbreviated titles of any post held, as far as 
possible exactly as written on the stone; a dash - shows 
that no post was held. 
Column C shows whether and where a man recurred on 1058. Where no 
century is indicated, he recurred in the same century; where 
he changed century the century is indicated. An asterisk 
* in4icates that on 1058 he held' some post. A dash - indicates 
that a man does not recur. ? indicates that the man might 
have recurred (for these men, see 3.7.6). 
Column D shows the estimated year of service. 7+ indicates "seventh 
or higher". 
(63) 
1057.1 (=1058.1) 
A B c D A B c D 
-
[1] BPR 7+ [ 26] 5 
Y2l IMC 7+ (27] 5 
[3] ~TR 4. 7 * 7+ [28] 5 
[ 4] TES 7+ [29] 4 
(5] 7+ [30] 4 
[6] OPT 7 6 [31] 4 
(7] VEX 6 [32] 4 
[8] 6 [33] 4 
[9] 6 [34] 4 
[~0] LTR 7 * 6 [35] 4 
[ll] ABAL 6 [36] 4 
[12] 6 [37] 4 
(13] 6 [38] 4 
[ 14] 6 [39] 4 
[15] STR 8 * 6 [40] 4 
[16] 6 or 5 [41] 4 
[17] 5 [42] C TR 9 * 4 or 3 
[W] 5 [43] 3 
(19] 5 [44] 3 
[?0] 5 [45 ] 3 
[21) OPA 5 [46 ] 14 * 3 
[22] 5 [47 ] 3 
(23] 5 [48 ] 3 
[24 ] r:: [49 ] 'i :; / 
[25 ] 5 rso.l S TR 10 * 3 
(64) 
1057.1 (cont) 
A B c D A B c D 
[51] 3 [76] l 
[52] 3 [77] 1 
[53] 3 [78] [19] 1 
[54] 3 [79] [20] 1 
[55] J [So] [21] l 
[56] BVC 3 [81] [22] 1 
[57] B PR 3 [82] [23] 1 
[58] J or 2 [83] [24] l 
[59] 2 [84] [25] 1 
[60] 2 [85] l 
[61] 2 [86] [26] l 
[62] 2 [87] [27] l 
[63] [17] 2 [88] 1 
[64] [15] 2 [89] [28] 1 
[65] {; TR 2 [90] [29] 1 
[66] 2 [91] 1 
[67] 2 [92] 1 
[68] 2 [93] 1 
[69] 2 [94] FNC 1 
[70] 2 [95] [30] 1 
[71] 2 [96] 1 
[72] 2 [971 1 
[73] S TR [11] 2 [98] [31] 1 
[74] 2 [99] [32] 1 
[75] [16] 2 [lOO] b3l 1 
(65) 
1057.1 (cont) 
A B c D A B c D 
[101] [34 1 1 (126 1 1 
[102] [351 1 [127 1 1 
[103] [36] 1 [128] [51] 1 
[104] [37) 1 [129) [52) 1 
[105) (38] 1 [130] [53] 1 
[lo6] [39] 1 [131 ] [54] 1 
[107] 1 [132] [55] 1 
[loS) GTR [13] 1 [133] 1 
[109] 
-
[12] 1 [134] [56) 1 
[110 ~ 
-
1 [13:l B7l 1 
[111 ] 
-
[40] 1 [136) [58] 1 
[112) 
-
[41 ] 1 [137) 59 ) 1 
[nj 1 Q38] 1 
[114] [42) 1 [139) 1 
[115 ) 
-
1 [14o] f6o 1 1 
[1.16 1 
-
[43] 1 [141 1 1 
[117) 
-
[47 ] 1 [142 1 1 
[118 ) 
-
[44 ] 1 fl43 ) f61 ] 1 
[119 ] 
- ~5) 1 fl44 ) 1 
[1.20 ) ) - 1 fl45 ] [ 62 ) 1 
[1.21 ) 
-
1 h.46 ) [ 63 ) 1 
Q_22 ] 
-
~6 1 1 fi.47 ) 1 
[123 1 
-
[ 48 1 1 [ 1481 1 
a24 1 
-
~9 ) 1 fi.49 ) 64 ) 1 
~25 ] 
-
[50 ] 1 [ 1501 [ 65 ] 1 
(66) 
1057.1 (cont) 
A B c D 
(151] [66] 1 
[152] [67] 1 
[153] 1 
[154] 1 
[155] [68] 1 
[156] 1 
[157] 1 
[158] [69] 1 
[159] [70] 1 
[160] 1 
(6?) 
1057.2 (= 1058.2) 
A B c D A B c D 
[ 1] BS PR 7+ [ 26] 5 
[ 2] OP 7 7+ [ 27] 5 
[3) VEX 7 7+ [ 28) 5 
[ 4) B PR 7+ [ 29) 5 
[5] TES 7 7+ [30) 5 
[6] EMR 7+ [31] 5 
[ 7] ~TR 7+ [32] 5., 
[8] AQCO 7+ [33] - 5 
[9] ORPR 7+ [34] 5 
[10] OPCA 3. [5 ]* 7+ [35) 4 
[11] 7+ [36) SETR 4. [8)* 4 
[12] 7+ [371 4 
(13] BTR 6 [38) 4 
[ 14] 6 [39) 4 
[15) 6 [40) 4 
[16] 6 [41] 4 
(17) 6 [42) 4 
[18] 6 [43] 4 
(19] 6 [44) 4 
(20] 6 [45] 4 
[21] 6 [46] 4 
(22] 6 [47] 4 
[23] 5 [48] 4 or 3 
[24] 5 [49] 3 
[25] 5 [50] 3 
(68) 
1057.2 (cent) 
A B c D A B c D 
(51] 3 [76] 2 
[52] 3 [77] 2 
[53] 3 [78] [ll) 2 
[54] 3 [79] 5. [16 ]* 2 
[55] 3 [80] 7. [21] 1 
[56] 3 [81] 1 
[57] 3 [82] 1 
[58] 3 [83] [12] 1 
[59] 3 [84] [13] 1 
(60] 3 [85] [14] 1 
[61] 3 [86] [15] 1 
[62] ACPR 3 [87] HO [4 ]* 1 
[63] 2 [88] 1 
[64] [9) 2 [89] [16] 1 
[65] 2 (90] [17] l 
(66] (10] 2 (91] (18] l 
[67) 2 [92] l 
[68] [2 ]* 2 [93] [19] l 
(69] 2 [94) (20] 1 
[70] 2 [95] [21] l 
[71] 2 [96] [22] l 
(72] SETR 2 [97] [24] l 
(73] 2 [98] (25] l 
[74] 2 [99] (26 ) 1 
[75] 2 [led 1 
(69) 
1057.2 (cont) 
A B c D A B c D 
(101] 7.[24] 1 [126] [43] 1 
[102] 1 (127] 1 
[103] 3. (26] 1 [128] 1 
[104] 1. [ 18] l [129] [ 44] 1 
[105] 1 [130] [45] 1 
[1o6] [27] 1 [131] [ 46] 1 
(107) SETR 1 [132] 1 
[1o8] [28] 1 [133] 1 
[109] [29] 1 [134] 1 
[no] 6. [17] 1 [135] [47] 1 
[1ll] [30] 1 [136] 1 
[ll2] 6. [18] 1 [137] 1 
[113] [31] 1 [138] [48]. 1 
[114] l [139] 1 
[115] [32] 1 [140] 5. [ 45] 1 
[116] [33] l [141] [49] 1 
[117] [35] l [142] 1 
[118] [36] 1 [143] 1 
[119] [37] 1 [144] 1 
[120] 1 [145] 1 
[121] [39] 1 [146] 1 
[122] [40] 1 [147] 1 
[123] 1 [148] l 
[124] [41] 1 [149] 1 
[125] [42] 1 [150] 1 
(70) 
1057.2 (cont) 
A B c D 
[151] 1 
[152] 1 
[153] l 
[154] [50] 1 
[155] 1 
[156] [51] 1 
[157] [52] 1 
[158] 1 
[159] [53] 1 
[160] 1 
[161] 1 
[162] [54] 1 
[163] 1 
[164) [55] 1 
[165] 1 
[166] [56] 1 
[167] 1 
(71) 
1057.3 (=1058.3) 
A B c D A B c D 
[1D AQP 7+ [26J 4 
(2] VEX 7+ [27] 4 
[3] OP'( [3]* 7+ (28] 4 
[4] VIC 7+ [29] 4 
[5] TAB [1]* 7+ [30) 4 
[6] 7+ [31] 4 
[7] 7+ [32) 4 
[8] TES [4 ]* 6 [33) 4 
[9] 6 [34] 4 
[10] 6 D5 J ST [7 ]* 4 
[11] ST 6 [36] 3 
[12] 6 D7J 3 
(13) ln'R 6 [38] 3 
(111 ] 6 D9J 3 
[15] 6 [40) 3 
[16] 5 [41] 3 
[17] 5 [42] 3 
[18] OPC 5 [43] 3 
[19] 5 [44] 3 
[20] 5 [45] 7. [18j * 3 
[21 ] 5 [46] 3 
[22] 5 [47] 3 or 2 
[23] 5 [48] 2 
[24 ] ~PR [2 ]* 5 [49] 2 
~5] 5 or 4 [5o] 2 
(72) 
1057.3 (cont) 
A B c D A B c D 
[51] 2 [76] (21] 1 
(52] 2 [77] (22] 1 
[53] (13 ]* 2 [78] (23] 1 
[54] 2 [79] (24] 1 
[55] 2 [80] (25] 1 
[56] 2 [81] 1 
[57] 2 [82] [27] 1 
[58] 2 [83] [28] 1 
[59] 2 [84] [29] 1 
[60] 2 [85] 1 
(61] 1 [86] [30] 1 
[62] ~ [8 ]* 1 [87] [31] 1 
[63] 7. [4 ]* 1 [88] 1 
[64] [15] 1 [89] 1 
[65] 1 [90] 1 
[66] [16] 1 [91] 1 
[67] 1 [92] 1 
[68] [17] 1 [93] 1 
[69] ~TR 7. [20] 1 [94] 1 
[70] AQ,P 1 [95] 1 
[71] [19] 1 [96] 1 
[72] [20] 1 [97] 1 
[73] 1 [98] 4. [39] 1 
(74] l [99] l 
[75] 14 * 1 [100] ? 1 
(73) 
1057.3 (cont) 
A B c D 
[101] ? 1 
[102] ? 1 
[103] ? 1. 
[1o4] ? 1 
[105] ? 1 
(lo6] ? 1 
[107] ? 1 
[lOS] ? 1 
[109] ? l 
[110] ? 1 
[111] ? 1 
[112] ? 1 
[113] ? l 
[114] ? 1 
[115 ] ? 1 
[116] ? l 
1:117 ) 
- ? 1 
b.18 ] 
-
? l 
b.19 l 
-
? 1 
0.20 ] 
-
? 1 
0.21 ] 
-
? 1 
(74) 
1057.4 (=1058.7) 
A B c D A B c D 
(1] PR.PR 7+ [26] 5 
(2] CORoPR 7+ [27] 5 or 4 
[3] •• MI 7+ [28] 4 
[4] TESS 7+ [29] 4 
[5] OPT 7+ [30] 4 
[6] OPB [2 ]* 7+ [31] 4 
[7] VEX [3 ]* 7+ [32] 4 
[8] 7+ b3] 4 
[9] 7+ [34] [16 ]* 4 
(10] 
-
6 f35] 4 
[11] CPC [15 ]* 6 [36] 4 
[12] [1 ]* 6 b7l 4 
[13] 6 138] 4 or 3 
[14] 6 b9l 3 
[15] 6 [40] [7 l* 3 
[16] 6 [41] 3 
[1'7] 5. [5 ]* 6 [42] 3 
[18] BETR 5 [43] 3 
[19] BETR 5 [ 44] gTR (10 ]* 3 
[20] 5 [ 45] 3 
[21] 
- 5 [46] 3 
[22] 5 [47] 3 
[23] 5 [48] 3 
[24] 5 [49] 3 
[25] 5 [50] 2 
(?5) 
1057.4 (cont) 
A B c D A B c D 
[51] BVC 2 [76] [ 26] 1 
[52] 2 [ 77] [27] l 
[53] 2 [ 78] 1 
[54] 2 [79] l 
[55] 2 (80] [ 28] l 
[56] 2 [ 81] [29] l 
[57] 2 [ 82] (30] 1: 
[58] 2 [ 83] ~:. l 
[59] 2 [ 84] l 
[ 60] 2 [ 85] [ 31] l 
[ 61] 2 [ 86] [ 32] 1 
[ 62] 2 [ 87] [33] l 
[ 63] ·. 2 [88T l 
[ 64] 1 [ 89] [ 34] 1 
[ 651 [ 14] * 1 [ 901 [ 351 1 
[ 66] [ 171 * 1 [ 91] [ 36] 1 
[ 67] 1 [ 92] [ '37] 1 
[ 68] 1 [ 93] [ 38] 1 
[ 69] 1 [ 94] 1 .. 
[ 701 1 [ 951 [ 391 1 
[ 711 [ 22] 1 [ 96] 1 
[ 72] l [ 97] [ 40] 1 
[ 731 [ 23] 1 [ 981 [ 41] 1 
[ 741 1 [ 991 [ 42] l 
[ 751 [ 25] 1 [ 100] 1 
(76) 
1<)57.4 (cant) 
A B c D 
[101] 1 
[102] 1 
[103] [43) 1 
[1o4] 1 
[105] [44) 1 
[106) [45) 1 
[107) 1 
[108] [46) 1 
(109) 1 
[110] [47] 1 
[111) 1 
[112] [48) 1 
[113] 1 
[114] [49) 1 
[115) 1 
(77) 
1057·5 (= 1058.6) 
A B c D A B c D 
[ l] CoR'l' '7+ [26] l~ 
[~?] BB' 7+ [ 27] GT 4 
(3] TES 7+ [ 28] 4 
[ 4] OPT 7+ [29] 4 
[ 5] 7+ [301 4 
[6] 7+ [311 4 
[7] VEX 6 [32] 4 
[8] SIF 6 [331 4 
[9] 6 [341 4 
[lO] 6 [351 4 or 3 
[11 1 6 [36] 3 
[12] sv 6 [371 3 
[13] 6 [381 3 
[14] 6 [39 1 3 
[15 1 AB 5 [40 1 3 
[16] 5 [41] 3 
[17] 5 [42 1 3 
[18] 5 [43] 3 
(19] 5 [44] eT 3 
[20] 5 [45] 3 
(21] 5 [46 1 3 
[22) 5 [47] [7 ] 2 
[23] 5 [48] 2 
[24] SIF 5 or 4 [49] 2 
(25] 4 [5o] 2 
(78) 
1057.5 (cant) 
A B c D A B c D 
-
[51] '( • b] M rl r.. [?6] 5. [2ol 1 
[52] 2 [yy] [16] 1 
[53] ') ~- [yS] 1 
[54] 2 [y9] 1 
[55] 2 [Sol 1 
[56] 2 [81] .Q l 
[57] 2 [82] 1 
[58] 2 [83] 1 
[59] 2 [84] [19] 1 
[60] GT 2 [85] 1 
[61] 1 [86] ~ 1 
[62] 4. [21] 1 [87] l 
[63] [9 ] 1 [88] (2o] 1 
[64] [8 ] l [89] (21] 1 
[65] 1 [90] l 
[66] [10] 1 [91] [23] 1 
[67] [11 ] 1 [92] [24] 1 
[68] [12] l l93] 1 
[69] ll3] 1 [94] 1 
[yo] 1 [95] 5. b1] 1 
[71 ] l [96] f25] 1 
[72] 1 [gy] 126 ] 1 
[73] 1 [98] 1 
l74 ] [14 ] 1 [99] 1 
[75) ll5 ] 1 [ 100 [2y] 1 
(?9) 
1057.5 (cont) 
A B c D A B c D 
[101] [28] 1 (126] 1 
[102] 1 [127] 1 
[103] [29] 1 (128] 5.(41] 1 
(104] 1 [129] 5. [42] 1 
[105] (30] 1 [130] [ 41] 
(1o6] [31] 1 [131] 0 1 
[107] [32] 1 (132] 1 
[1o8] [33] l [133] 5. [43] 1 
[109] 1 [134] 1 
•'· [110] . [34] 1 [135] [42] 1 
[111] [35] 1 [136] 1 
[112] (36] 1 [137] [43] 1 
[113] 1 [138] 1 
[114] [38]. 1 [1391 [44] 1 
[115] [39] 1 [140] [451 1 
[116] 1 [141] 1 
[1171 5. [34] 1 [142] [46] 1 
[118] 1 [1431 [48] 1 
[119] 1 
[120] , 1 
[121] 1 
[122] [40] 1 
[123] 1 
[124] 1 
[125] l 
(80) 
1057.6 (= 1058.4) 
A B c D A B c D 
[1] :g PR 7+ [26) 3 
[2] IMC (3]* 7+ [27] 3 
[3J OPT7 7+ [28] 
- 3 
[ 4] VEX [4]* 7+ [29) 2 
[5] IMA (1]* 7+ [30] 2 
[6] TES 7 [6]* 7+ [31] 2 
[7] 7+ [32] 2 
[8j 7+ [331 2 
19] STR 6 [34] 2 
[10] 6 [35] 2 
[11] ABA [15]* 6 [36] 1 
[12] AQV 6 . [37] [16] 1 
[13] OPCO 3. [6 ]* 5 [38] 1 
[14] 5 [39] gQTR 1 
[15] 5 [40] 1 
[16] 5 [41] 1 
[17] 5 or 4 [42] [17] 1 
[18] :iTR 4 [43] [18] 1 
[19] 8T 4 [44] 1 
[20] 4 [45] 1 
[21] 4 [46] [19] 1 
[22] 4 [47] [20] 1 
[23] 3 [48] ~ [11 ]* 1 
[24] BV [10 ]* 3 [49] 1 
[25) 3 [50] 1 
(81) 
1057.6 (cant) 
A B G D A B c D 
[51] l [76] [34] l 
[52) [12]* l [yy] 1 
[53] [22] l l78] 1 
[54] l [791 b5l l 
[55] l [80] 1 
[56] 1 [81] [36] 1 
[57] [23] 1 [82] b7l 1 
[58] [24] 1 [83 J [)8] 1 
[59] l [84] 1 
[60] [25] l [85] [4o J 1 
[61] l [86] [41] l 
[62] 1 [87] [42] 1 
[63] [26] 1 [88] [43] l 
[64] 1 [89] l 
[65 J [27] l [90] [44] l 
[66] 1 [91] [ 45) l 
[67) [28] l [92] [46] l 
[68] [29] 1 [93] l 
[69] [30] l [94] [47] l 
[70] [31] 1 [95] l48] l 
[71) l [96] l 
[72] [32] l [97] [49] 1 
[73] [33) l [98 J 1 
[74] l [99] 1 
[75 J 1 [100] 1 
(82) 
1057.6 (cent) 
A B c D 
[101] 1 
[102) 1 
[103 1 1 
[104 1 1 
[105] 1 
[1o6 1 1 
[107] 1 
[lo8] 1 
[109 1 1 
[110 1 1 
[111 1 1 
[112] [50 1 1 
[113] [51 ] l 
l114) [52) 1 
[115 1 [53 1 1 
[116] 1. 
[117 1 [54 1 1 
u18 J [55 1 1 
(83) 
1057.7 (= 1058.5) 
A B c D A B c D 
[ 1] OPTB 7+ [ 26] 4 
[ 2] VNC 7+ [ 27] 4 
[ 3] VFX7 7+ [ 28] 4 
[ 4] KARC 7+ [ 29] 4 
[ 5] HEf'.m [ 6] * 7+ [ 30] ~ 
[ 6] 7+ [ 31] 3 
[ 7] 7+ .[ 32] 3 
[ 8] BVCC [ 9] * 6· [ 33] 3 
[ 9] TES 6 [ 34] EXCT [ 71 * 3 
[10] 6 [ 35] 3 
[ll] S// 6 [36 J 3 
[12] //C 6 [37] 3 
[13] .STR 6 [38] 3 
[14] 5 [39] 2 
[15] OP7 [ 3 ]* 5 [40 J 2 
[16) 5 [ 41] [13 ]* 2 
[17] 5 [42] 2 
[18] 5 [ 43] 2 
[19] 5 [ 44 J [15] 2 
[20] 5 [ 45] 2 
[21] g'l'R 5 or 4 [46] 2 
[22] 4 [ 47] 2 
[23] 4 [48] 2 
. 
[24] 4 [49] 2 
[25] 4 [50] 1 
(84) 
1057.7 (cont) 
A B c D A B c D 
(51) [19) 1 [76) 1 
[52] (21] 1 [77] [40] 1 
[53] [22) 1 [ 78] 1 
[54] 1 [ 79] [44] 1 
[55] (23) 1 [80] 1 
[56] 1 [81) 1 
[57] l24) 1 [82] 1 
[58) 1 [83] [ 46] 1 
[59] l [84] 1 
[60) 4. [5 ]* 1 [85] [47] 1 
[61] [25) 1 [86 J 1 
[62) [26] 1 [87] 1 
[63] [27] 1 [88] 1 
[64] [28) 1 [89] [48] 1 
[65] [29] 1 [90) [49] 1 
[66) [30] 1 [91] 1 
[67] 1 [92] 1 
[68] [32] 1 [93] [so J 1 
[69] [33] 1 
[70] 1 
[71) [35] 1 
[72 J [8 ]* 1 
[73) [37] 1 
[74] [38] 1 
['75] [39] 1 
(85) 
3.12.2. 
In this section the analysis of 1058 is set out. 
Column E gives the positions of the men. Roman numerals are assigned 
to the men erased from the top of the stone. 
Column F gives the abbreviated titles of any post held, as far as 
possible exactly as written on the stone. A dash - shows that no post 
was held. ? indicates that a post was held though because of the damage 
we do not know what it was. 
ColUmn. G shows whether and where a man has already appeared on 1057. Where 
no century is indicated, he first appeared in the same century; where he 
has changed centuries, the original century is indicated. An asterisk * 
indicates that on 1057 he held some post. A dash indicates that a man 
is appearing for the first time. ? indicates that a man might have appeared 
on 1057 (special cases only, e.g. the men discussed at 3.7.6, and immunes 
and principales who might be more senior). 
Column H shows the estimated year of service. As before, + indicates 
"or higher". ? indicates ignorance. In the few cases where a choice is 
indicated, the precise points of division may be found in the table at 3.9.6. 
(86) 
1058.1 (= 1057.1) 
E F G H E F G H 
[ i) ? ? ? [ 23) [82) 6 
[ ii) ? ? ? [ 24) [83] 6 
[iii] ? ? ? [ 25) [84] 6 
[ 1] ~ PR ? ? [ 26] [86] 6 
[ 2] PRE C ? ? [ 27] [ 87] 6 
[ 3] IMC ? ? l28] [ 89] 6 
[ 4) VEX ? ? [ 29] [ 90] 6 
[ 5] OP 1-5 [ 30] [ 95] 6 
[ 6) ? 1-5 [ 31] [ 98] 6 
[ 7] ? [ 10] * 11 [ 32] [ 99] 6 
[ 8] ? [ 15] 11 [ 33]. [ 100] 6 
[ 9] ? [ 42] * 9 or 8 [34] [ 101] 6 
[ 10] ? [50]* 8 [ 35] [ 102] 6 
[ 11] lll'R [ 73] * 1 [ 36] [ 103] 6 
[ 12] OPTC [ 109] 6 [ 37] [ 104] 6 
[ 13J STR [ 1o8) * 6 [ 38] [ 105] 6 
[ 14] ABL\L [ 46] 8 [ 39] [ 106] 6 
[ 15] l64) 7 l40) [ 111] 6 
[ 16J [ 751 7 [ 41] [1.121 6 
[ 171 [ 631 7 [ 42] [ 114] 6 
[ 18] 2.[ 104] 6 [ 43] [ 116] 6 
[ 191 [ 78) 6 [ 44] [ 118] 6 
[ 201 [ 791 6 [ 45] [ 119] 6 
l 211 [ 8o1 6 [ 461 fi.22] 6 
[ 22J [ 811 6 [ 47 ] [ 117] 6 
(87) 
1058.1 (cant) 
E F G w 
[48) [123) 6 
[491 [124] 6 
[5o )x 
-
[125] 6 
(51 ) (128] 6 
(52J (129] 6 
[53] (130] 6 
[54] CODTR (131 ) 6 
l:5J (132 l 6 'i. 
[56 ] U34 J 6 
[57 J U35 J 6 
[58] 0.36] 6 
[59 J fi.37 ) 6 
[60) [140] 6 
[61) (143 J 6 
(62) . [145) 6 
[63] (146] 6 
[64] U49 l 6 
[65] [150] 6 
[66] u51 l 6 
(67] .. u52 l 6 
[68] ll55] 6 
[69] [158] 6 
[70] U59 J 6 
[71-170] including [iv,v,vi,vii,viii] after [ 831, appear on 1058 for the 
first time, and are in their 1st to 5th years of service in 210. 
(88) 
1058.2 (= 1057.2) 
E E G H E F G H 
a J ? ? ? [ 21] [ 95] 6 
~i] ? ? ? [ 22] [ 96] 6 
[iii] ? ? ? ( 23] ? ? 
[ iv] ? ? ? [ 24] [ 97] 6 
[ v] ? ? ? ( 25] ( 98] 6 
[1] STR ? ? [ 26] [ 99] 6 
[ 2 ] COD [ 68] 7 [ 27] D.o6] 6 
-[ 3 ] STR ? [ 28] [ 1o8] 6 
[ 4 ] hC [ 87] * 6 [ 29] [ 109] 6 
[ 5 ] CTR ? [ 30]. [ 111] 6 
[ 6 ] CTR ? [ 31] [ 113] 6 
[ 7 ] CAR ? [ 32] [ 115] 6 
[ 8 ] 7+ [ 33] [116] 6 
[ 9 ] [ 64] 7 [ 34] ? ? 
[10] [66] 7 [35] (117] 6 
[11] [78] 7 [36] [118] 6 
[12] [83) 6 [37] (119] 6 
[13] [84) 6 (38] ? ? 
[14] [85] 6 [39] [121] 6 
[15) [86] 6 [ 40] ~ (122] 6 
[16) [89) 6 [41] [124) 6 
[17) [go] 6 [42) [125] 6 
[18] [91] 6 [43] [126] 6 
[19] [931 6 [44] [129] 6 
[20] [g4] 6 [4;] [130] 6 
(89) 
1058.2 (cont) 
E F G H 
[46] [131] 6 
[47] [135] 6 
[48) [138] 6 
[49] [141] 6 
[50] [154] 6 
[51] [156] 6 
[52] [157] 6 
[53] [159] 6 
[54] [162] 6 
[55] [164] 6 
[56] [166] 6 
[57-140 ], including [vi, vii, viii, ix] after {84 ], appear for the first 
time on 1058 and are in their 1st to 5th years of service in 210. 
(90) 
1058.3 (= 1057-3) 
E F G H E F G H 
[1] CORPR [5]* 12+ [26] 2. [103] 6 
[2) g PR [24]* l@ [27] [82] 6 
(3] AC.PR [3)* 12+ [28} [83] 6 
[4] VEX (8] 11 [29] [84] 6 
[5] OP 7 2.[10]* 12+ [30] [86] 6 
[6] T 7 6. [13]* 10 [31] [87] 6 
[7] gTF_ [35]* 9 [. , lJ ? 6 
[8] STR [62]* 9 [ii] ? 6 
[9] LIB -1-5 [iii] ? 6 
[10] CTR 1-5 [iv] ? 6 
[11] CTR 1-5 [ v] ? 6 
[12] EXCTR -. 1-5 
[13] [53] 
[32-139], with [vi] from before [32] 
ABAL 7 and including [vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xii, 
[14] [75l 
xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii and xixj 
VICT 6 from after [113], appear on 1058 for the 
first time, and are in their 1st to 5th 
[15] [64] 6 years of service in 210. 
[16] [66] 6 
[17] [68] 6 
[18] 
-
? ? 
[19] [711 6 
[20] [72] 6 
[21] [76] 6 
[22] [77] 6 
[231 [78] 6 
[24] [791 6 
[25] [So] 6 
(91) 
1058.4 (= 1057.6) 
E 11' G H E F G H 
[ 1] CORPR [5]* 12+ [26] [63] 6 
[ 2) SPR 1-5 (27] [65] 6 
[3] AQ PR (2]* 12+ [ 28] [67] 6 
[4] OP BA [4]* 12+ (29] [68] 6 
[5] VEX 7 7. [60] 6 (30] [69] 6 
[6] OPT 7 [6]* 12+ [31] [70] 6 
[ 7] TES 7 1.[3]* 12+ (32] ['72] 6 
[8] OPT C 2. [36]* 9 [33] [73] 6 
[9] OPT C 1-5 [34] [76] 6 
[10) BVC [24]* 8 [35J [79] 6 
[11] SEC TR [48]* 6 [36) [81] 6 
[12] g TR [52] 6 [37) [82] 6 
[13] CODTR 1-5 [38] [83] 6 
[14] CODTR 1-5 [39] 3. [98) 6 
[15] BAR [11]* 11 [40] [85] 6 
[16] [37] 6 [41] [86] 6 
[17] [42] 6 [42] [87] 6 
[18] [43] 6 [43] [88] 6 
[19] [46] 6 [ 44] [90] 6 
[20] [ 47] 6 [45] [91] 6 
[21] 5. [ 62] 6 [ 46] [92] 6 
[22] [53] 6 [47] [94] 6 
[23] [57] 6 [48] [95] 6 
[24] [58) 6 [ 49] [97] 6 
[e5] [60] 6 [i] ? 6 
(92) 
1058.4 (cont) 
E F G H 
[ 11] ? 6 
[iii] ? 6 
[ l.v] ? 6 
[ v] ? 6 
[vi] ? 6 
[vii] ? 6 
[viii] 
-
? 6 
[50] [ 112] 6 
[51] [113] 6 
[52] [114] 6 
[53] [ 115] 6 
[54] [ 11'7] 6 
[55] [118] 6 
[56-131], including [ix,x,xi,xii,xiii, xiv,xv,xvi] after [131], appear on 
1058 for the first time, and are in their 1st to 5th years of service in 
210. 
(93) 
1058.5 (= 1057.7) 
E F G H E F G H 
[1] ~ PR 1-5 [26] (62) 6 
[2] AQ PR 1-5 [27] [63) 6 
[3] VEX [15 ]* 10 [28] [64] 6 
[4] OPT 7 1-5 [29] [65] 6 
(5] TES 7 4. [17] 11 [3o] (66] 6 
[6] EMB [5 )* 12+ [31] 5. [95] 6 
[7 1 L 8 PR [34 ]* 8 [32] [68] 6 
[8 ] ~ PR [72) 6 [33] [69] 6 
[9] BVC [8 ]* 11 [34] 5. [11 t3 6 
[10) 8TR 1-5 D5l [71) 6 
[11] 8 TR 1-5 [36] ? ? 
[12] 8TR 1-5 b7l [73] 6 
[13] AQA [41) 7 [38] [74] 6 
[14] COD 1-5 [39] [75] 6 
(15] [44] 7 (40] [77] 6 
[16] 2. [79] 7 [41] 5. [128] 6 
[17] ? ? [42] 5. [129] 6 
[18] ? ? [43] 5. [13) 6 
[19] (51] 6 [44] (79] 6 
[20] 5. [76] 6 [45] 2. [14o l 6 
[21 ) [52] 6 [46] fB3) 6 
f22] [53] 6 (47] ra5 1 6 
[23] [55 1 6 [48] ra9 1 6 
f24) [57 1 6 [49] [90] 6 
f25) [611 6 [so 1 [93] 6 
[ 51-138 ], including [i,ii,iii,iv,v,vi,vii,viii,ix,x,xi,xiil after [72 ], 
appear on 1058 for the first time, and are in their lst to 5th years of 
service in 210. 
(94) 
1058.6 (= 1057.4) 
E F G H E F G H 
(i ] ? ? ? [18] - 2. [112] 6 
[ii] ? ? ? (19] [84] 6 
[iii] ? ? ? [20] [88] 6 
[iv] ? ? ? [21] [89] 6 
[v) ? ? ? [22] [90] 6 
[vi] ? ? ? [23] [91] 6 
[vii] ? ? ? [24 1 [92] 6 
[viii] ? ? ? [25] [96] 6 
[1 ] STR ? ? [26] [97] 6 
' [2] STR ? ? [271 hoo 1 6 
[3] EXC ? ? [28] lL01] 6 
[4 ] COIYI'R 1-5 [291 lL03 1 6 
[51 SIF 1-5 boL uo5 1 6 
[6] SIF 1-5 [31] uo61 6 
[7] 
-
[47] 7 [321 b.o7 1 6 
[8] 
-
[64] 6 b3] hoB] 6 
[9] 
-
[63] 6 b4] U10 1 6 
[10] [66] 6 [351 [111] 6 
[ 11] j 
-
[67] 6 [ 36] [ 1121 6 
[ 12] [ 68] 6 [371 ? ? 
[ 13] [ 69] 6 [38] [ 114) 6 
[ 141 [ 74) 6 [391 [ 115) 6 
[ 15] [ 751 6 [4o1 [ 1221 6 
[ 16) [ 771 6 [ 411 [1301 6 
[17L 
-
2. [no] 6 [ 42) [ 1351 6 
(95) 
1058.6 (cont) 
E F G H 
[43] [137] 6 
[ 44] [139] 6 
[45) [140] 6 
[46] [142] 6 
[47] ? ? 
[ 48] [143] 6 
[49-75], including [i and ii] after [64], appear on 1058 for the first 
time, and are in their 1st to 5th years of service in 210. 
(96) 
1058.7 (= 1057.5) 
E F G H E F G H 
[ 1] COR i!i PR [12] 11 (26] [76] 6 
( 2) g S PR [6]* 12+ [ 27] [ 77] 6 
[3] VEX.7 [ 7] * 12+ [ 28] [ 80] 6 
( 4] OPT 7 3. [ 63] 6 [ 29] [ 81] 6 
( 5] TESS 7 5. [51] 7 [30] [ 821 6 
( 6] g TR 1-5 [ 31] [ 85] 6 
[71 1!\TR [~0]* 8 [32] [86] 6 
(8] 1!\ TR 1-5 [331 [87] 6 
(91 EX.PR 1-5 [34] [891 6 
[101 OPT CONV [441* 8 [35] [90] 6 
(111 S TR 1-5 [36] [91] 6 
[121 8TR 1-5 [371 [92] 6 
[131 8 TR 1-5 [381 [931 6 
[14] BVC [65] 6 [39] [95] 6 
[15) CACVS [11]* 11 [40] [97] 6 
(16] VNC COh [34] 9 [41] [98] 6 
[17] VNC COh [66] 6 [42] [99] 6 
[18] EM C 3. [ 45] 8 [43] [103] 6 
[19] COD TR 1-5 [44] [105] 6 
[ 20] 3.[69]* 6 [45] [1o6L 6 
[ 21] 2. [So] 6 [46] [1o8] 6 
[22) [ 711 6 [ 47] [ 110] 6 
[ 23] [ T~l 6 [ 48] [112] 6 
[ 241 2.b0ll 6 [491 [ 114] 6 
[ 25] [ 75] 6 
[50 - 155) appear on 1058 for the first time, and are in their 1st to 
5th years of service in 210. 
(97) 
3.12.3 
In this section the analysis of VI.l056 is set out. There is 
a greater imprecision than with 1057 and 1058. as the range of 
possibilities for the proportions of recruits of A.D. 205 is wider 
than the range of values for the survival rate. 
For each century, the estimated years of service are set out 
first, and then follows a list of the immunes and principales with 
their estimated years of service. 
(98) 
1056.1 
Positions Year of service 
[1) to (8) 7+ 
~9] to [14·] 6 
[15) to [17] 6 or 5 
[ 18) to [20) 5 
[21] to [27) 5 or 4 
[28] 4 
[29) to [.36] 4 or 3 
[37] to [38] 4 or 3 or 2 
[39] to [45] 3 or 2 
[46] to [50] 3 or 2 or 1 
[51] to [ 64] 2 or 1 
[65) to [120] 1 
Position ~ Year of service 
[ 1) Q 7+ 
[ 2] AQ 7+ 
[ 3) OPT 7+ 
[ 4] TES 7+ 
[ 5] ~T 7+ 
[ 6] ST 7+ 
[ 7] oc 7+ 
[ 10] TR 6 
[ 28] s 4 
[53] VEX 2 or 1 
[56] ST 2 or 1 
(99) 
1056.2 
Positions Year of service 
[1] to [8] 7+ 
[9] to [14J 6 
[15] to [17] 6 or 5 
[18) to (20] 5 
[21] to [27] 5 or 4 
[28] 4 
(29) to [37] 4 or 3 
[38] 4 or 3 or 2 
()g) to l46 j 3 or 2 
[47) to [51] 3 or 2 or l 
[52 l to [65] 2 or l 
[66] to [121] 1 
Position Post Year of service 
[1 ] a; 7+ 
[2] OP 7+ 
bJ VEX 7+ 
[4) TES 7+ 
[5 j ar 7+ 
[6 ) vc 7+ 
[7] ST 7+ 
[g ] lj.T 6 
h4J ljp 6 
[52) ST 2 or l 
[6g] EXPR 1 
[78] C.T 1 
[a6l C.T l 
(100) 
1056.3 
Positions Year of service 
[1] ·to [10] 7+ 
[11] to [15] 6 
[16) to [ 18) 6 or 5 
[19 J to [20] 5 
[21] to [27) 5 or 4 
[28] to [35] 4 or 3 
[36) to [37) 4 or 3 or 2 
[38] to [43] 3 or 2 or 1 
[44]~to [61] 2 or 1 
[ 62 J to [ 112 ] 1 
Position Post Year of service 
[1] S PR 7+ 
[2] oc 7+ 
[3] iM 7+ 
[4] TESS 7+ 
[51 OPI' 7+ 
[6] VEX 7+ 
[71 EMER 7+ 
[8] EMER 7+ 
[9] liTR 7+ 
[11] VIC 6 
[12] ~ 6 
[14] v 6 
(31] ST 4 or 3 
[)8] s 3 or 2 or 1 
[411 ? T 3 or 2 or 1 
( 101) 
105{).4 
Positions Year of service 
[1) to [10] 7+ 
fll] to [17 J 6 
[18] to [20) 6 or 5 
(21] to [24] 5 
[25] to [32] 5 or 4 
[33] 4 
[34] to [ 42] 4 or 3 
[43] 4 or 3 or 2 
[44] to [51] 3 or 2 
(52] to [58] 3 or 2 or 1 
[59] to l74 J 2 or 1 
[75] to [137) 1 
Position Post Year of service 
[1) p~ R 7+ 
[2] c 0 7+ 
[3] VEX 7+ 
[ 4] OP 7+ 
[5) IM 7+ 
[6] AQ 7+ 
(7] EM 7+ 
[8) ~ 7+ 
[g] TES 7+ 
(16] s 6 
[18] oc 6 or 5 
[26] ST 5 or 4 
[46 J ST 3 or 2 
[47] EM 3 or 2 
[93] C T 1 
(g8] SN 1 
("102) 
CHAPTEF{ 1-t 
Tho basit evidence for equipment, techniques and operations 
4.1.1 
The difficulty with the Vigiles is to find a convenient point at ~hich to 
start a study. Kellermann (1835) placed his study of the equioment at th8 
begir.nir1g 9 while OR (1929) placed his near the end. In this prssent study 1 
the material is arranged differentlya A distinction i~ drawn between the 
direct evidAnce for equipment, techniques and operations on tho one hand, 
and the c:onclusions as to thG quality of the Viqiles on the '' O"CilBI'o This 
is because a list of equipment owned by a fire brigade ~ives no indication 
whether it was used effectivoly 1 nor even whether it was suitable for 
thei~ particular risks. Moreover, oven if the material provisions for a 
brigade remain unchanged, a change of pP.rsonnel in the higher areas of 
c~mmand can completely transform a brigade, for better or for worse. We 
must, therefore 9 look at both the material provisions of the Vigiles, to 
see what was potentially available, and also at the factors governing 
such indetErminates as morala, standards of training, and nature of the 
fire risk3o In this study, these two lines of enquiry are brought together 
in Chapter 8, at which point it is possible to answer the question~ "If 
my o:..:n hoL'se or f2ctory were on fire, 1uould I welcome the VigiJ~?" 
In this present chapter, we look at the evidence for equipment and fire-
fighting in a fairly basic way, to see what it implies for the potential 
effectiveness of the Vigiles. Although, unavoidably, reference is made 
to matters which are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this the~s, 
for example, architecture, nothing in this chapte~ relies on anything 
(103) 
which needs special discussion in the context of firefighting. Hence this 
chapter does not have a conclusion: that has to wait until Chapter B. The 
one matter which is 8ssential to this chapter a~d which is specially 
discussed elsewhere is the question of numbers; and here the analysis in 
Chapter 3 is used, so far as it is necessary at this pointo 
4.1.3 
The history of firefighting in recent times provides clear warning that 
numbers are i~portant. For example, the drills used in ~orld War II by 
the Auxiliary Fire Service differ from those used in peace-time in that 
far more firemen were used; the lower standard of equipment was compensated 
by the availability of a greater number of men. Again, although we are 
familiar with the 'authorised establishment' of modern loccl authority 
brigades, and the statutory numbers of attendants and firemen in places of 
public ente~tainment, there are also brigades which can afford to be more 
lavish with manpower. The difference reminds us that in many cases a 
brigade is operating with the maximum number of men that can be paid for, 
even though a better service might result if there were more men. It is 
not enough to list equipment used by a brigade. We have to visualise how 
it was actually used. For this reason, the analysis of VI.l056, 1057 and 
1058 is the first of the historical chapters in this studyo The implications 
of Chapter 3 are brought out in more historical terms i~ t~il subsequent 
chapters, including tho present one, but so central is the question of 
nL~bers that we do n8t finish exploring it until the final chapter. 
4.1.4 
Previous studies of the Vigiles have not faced squarely the questions of 
numbers and the environment ofthe Vigiles, and at most have offered 
comparisons with modern fire brigades which suggest that the Vigiles so 
(104) 
outnumbered modern brigades in comparable cities that they must have had 
other duties as well as firefighting (eg~ BR, pp.15f). Thus BR does not 
produce a satisfactory account either of the equipment or of the 
operations of the Vioiles, and with this approach is led to conclude 
(p.98): "So much; or rather so little, for equipment." 
4.2.1 
Since the Vigiles had to operate without motorised equipment, and 
without the aid of breathing and other moder~ equipment, it will be 
helpful, first, to look briefly at an illustration of a fire in Naples 
as fought in the pre-industrial age, early in the nineteenth century. 
The original print is in the hands of the Italian Vigili del Fuoco 
(lire Service), and a copy is shown in Figure 1. In order to show up 
the firefighting features more clearly, Figure 2 is a redrawing by an 
artist. 
To the bottom left, a large manual pump is shown in operation, with 
four men on one side (and presumably the same number on the other). Th<· 
objects with handles, at the bottom of the picture, are for winding hos~ 
on, very-like modern hose-winders. The firemEn are using hoses to take the 
water to the fire, and are directing jets from the ground, from ladders, 
and from within the burning building. Just right of centre, there is 
a wheeled extending ladder with a working platform about twelve feet up. 
Hinged ladders are being used to gain access to the balconies, and there 
are hook ladders between balconies and leading to the parapet. ~ingod 
ladders are al~e iM U3B. Rescues are being effected with a chute, kept 
taut by at least ten men, with a basket lowered on a pulley, by line, and 
by jumping sheet (held by at least fifteen men - probably twenty were 
(105) 
actually involved, though they are not all shown). I have not been able 
to ascertain the purpose of the long poles being dipped into barrels 
(bottom right). 
4.2.2 
The most striking contrast with a modern fire, apart from the difference 
in the equipment, is the large amount of manpower. In particular, the 
number of men engaged in pumping and in using rescue equipment is far greater 
than we sPe with modern equipment. Far more reliance had to be placed on 
manpower, simply because the equipment was less than adequate (a comment 
we can make with the benefit of retrospect). Within economic limits the 
manpower had to make up for the equipment. 
The other contrast is in the expendability of manpower. We can see this most 
clearly in the bottom right corner of the picture, where there are men 
engaged in firefighting who are far closer to the fire and the collapsing 
building than any fire officer would allow today. There was probably less 
emphasis on the safety of the firemen, though officers are hardly likely 
to have been careless with their men's lives. Probably the development 
of such equipment as breathing sets and radios has made possible the 
greater safety of firemen today, aided by the growth of trade unions. 
4.3.1 
When they were established in A.D.6 the Vigiles probably numbersd apout 
3,500 men, in cohorts nominaliy 500 strong. In A.D.205 they seem to have 
been doubled in size, giving a total of 7,000 men (see 3.11.3 above and 
5.2.1 below). 
(106) 
4.3.2 
In modern England, authorised establishments of full-time firemen range 
from 47 at Burton-upon-Trent (with 20 part-time) ~o 757 at Liverpool, 
among county boroughs, and among counties from 22 in Westmorland (with 
156 part-time) to 1062 (plus 1059) in the West Riding and 1063 (plus 835) 
in Lancashire. London is in a range of its own, with 5274 full-time firemen 
(and 1 part-time). (These are the figures as at 31st December 1972, as 
given by H.Me Chief Inspector, 1973.) 
The first permanent city fire brigade in Britain, set up in Edinburgh in 
1703, consisted of 84 p~rt-time firemen (Blackstone 1957, 62f.). In 1862 
the London Fire Engine Establishment consisted of 127 full-time men, and had 
50 horses, 37 pumps and 19 stations; at the same time, the Royal Society 
for the Protection of Life from Fire had 77 men and 4 Inspectors (Blackstone, 
168). Ten yGars later, the London Fire Engine Establishment consisted 
of 398 men, and the chief officer, Captain Shaw, wanted 931 (Blackstone, 198). 
In June 1938, the London Fire Brigade consis~ed of 1982 uniformed staff 
(officers and men), with 163 in administration, techni~al, clerical and 
workshops (Morris 1939, 16). The special conditions of wartime brought an 
increase-in the numbers, and the Auxiliary Fire Service in London in 1939 
had 30,000 members (Blackstone, 396). 
4.3.2 
These figures, which !lrobably represent the whole range of establishments 
in modern times, show clearly that there was something speGial about the 
Vigiles. The original number of the Vigiles is greater than any of those 
cited above with the exception of London, and if we take the increased 
figure for the Vigiles of 7,000 we find that it excseds all those given 
(107) 
above except for wartime London: and that figure was for the county 
of London, not just the City. There would have been no way of deducing 
the number of the Vigiles if we did not possess the inscriptions which 
provide the material for Chapter 3. It is fortunate that w~can start off 
by knowing how many men were available for Roman firefighting operations, 
since this information provides a framework for our investigation of 
their equipment and operations. If we can see how they could all have 
been employed solely as firemen, we do not need to ascribe police or 
other functions to them in order to fill o~t their time. 
4.4.1 
There is quite a wide range of firefighting equipment attested in 
classical antiquity, but we should not assume that the Vigiles used all 
-
of it. This point will become clear as we go through the evidence in detail, 
but it is probably worth emphasising it at the outset, since BR in 
particular is not clear, and assumes (p.96) that the list of firefighting 
equipment to be found in a house (Digest 33.7.12.18) is applicable to the 
Vigiles in its entirety. There is sufficient evidence to show both wh~t 
the Vigiles are likely to have done and also what they are likely not 
to have done. 
The really crucial piece of evidence for the equipment and operations of 
the Vigiles comes in the list of the responsibilities and powers of the 
praefectus vigilum in the Digest (1.15.3): 
"Sciendum est autem praefectum vigilum per totam noctem vigilare deb~re 
et coerrare calceatum cum hamis et dolabris." 
(108) 
The prefect (i.q. the corps) had to remain awake all night and go 
around wearing boots and carrying axes and buckets. This means fire 
patrols, throughout the night. The buckets and a~es represent the basic 
equipment which was always to hand, and which had to suffice for 
firefighting first-aid. There is a basic distinction to be made 
between these patrols and the reinforcements which would be required if 
a fire got out of hand. This distinction extends to the equipment, 
some of it being suitable only for reinforcement, and we may further 
extend it to the operations, since the first firemen on the scene had 
to manage with such equipment as they carried with them (basically 
buckets and axes) and this restricted the sort of actions they could 
perform. 
4.4.3 
In addition to this passage from the Digest, the number of firemen 
available must be borne in mind: there were potentially up to 3,500 men 
avai~able for the patrols and for firefighting (increased to 7,000). 
Even the Continantal city fire brigades of more recent times which used 
fire patrols could not match these numbers. These patrols are clearly 
something special in the whole history of firefighting. 
4.5.1 
Apart from the mention of buckets and axes in the Digest (1.15.3), we do 
not possess anything which resembles a list of equipment used by the 
Vigiles. Nor is there any such list for the army in general. The one 
list which does exist unfortunately is not a list of all the equipment 
used by any particular set of firefighters, but is simply a list of equipment 
which may be found in ~rivate houses and which would belong to the 
( 109) 
instrumentum (and which could not be disposed of separately). 
4 .. 5.2 
This list can be shown to include items which the Vigiles are likely to 
have used, together with some which they are unlikely to have used, and 
the individual items are discussed in their turn. For convenience, the 
text is given below, together with the preamble which establishes the 
nature of the list. 
"Si domus sit instrumentum legatum, videndum quid contineatur" (Dig.33.7.12.16) 
"Acetum quoque, quod e.xstinguendi incendii causa paratur, item centones 
sifones perticae quoqu~ et scalae, et formiones et spongias et amas 
et scopas contineri plerique et Pegasus aiunt" (Dig.33.7.12.18) 
4.6.1 
That the Vigiles used pumps is attested epigraphically, though there is 
no mention of it in any of the accounts of fires, nor are the Vigiles 
mentioned by arty of the hydraulic writers (Hero must surely have known 
something of th8m). The epigraphic evidence consists of the name of the 
specialist concerned with pumps, which occurs most fully on VI.2994: 
"MILIT. CDH. VII. VIGo SIPONAR 1', and also occurs on VI.1057 and 1058 
and possibly on VI.327B. The name in full is vsiphonarius'. VI.3744 
bore the name of the equipm.;,,~ (SIFDNI[bus] "), but in this case the 
names of the pieces of equipment provide the evidence that this inscription 
is relevant to the Vioiles (see Appendix II), so that we should not use 
this inscription as evidence for the use of pumps by the Vigiles. 
4.6.2 
Many modern fire enginGs are basically pumps, which may carry other 
(110) 
equipment such as ladders or their own supply of water. It is, however, 
somewhat misleading to equate fire pumps with fire engines, since some 
pumps are portable and may be carried in light v~ns or by two to four 
men, while some fire engines have other functions (e.g. Control Unit, 
or Emergency Tender). In earlier periods the equation of fire engine 
with fire pump was mars apt, though the term 'engine' often meant no 
more than ''apparatus'9 Often the only wheeled equipment was the fire 
pump (wheeled fire hooks seem not to have been called 'engines•). At 
all periods, however, there have been pumps without wheels. It is best 
then, in examining Roman firefighting, to avoid the use of the term 
·'fire engine', since thi~ could import misleading associations and is, at 
best, ambiguous. One wonders whether some such confusion prompted BR 
(p.BO) to write of "limber-gunners" in the Vigiles, as if their pumps 
bore some resemblance to a field gun. 
We shall, therefore, look first at the evidence for ancient pumps in 
general, in ordar to establish the range of pumps available for firefightir.g 
in general 8nd for the Vigiles in particular. Then we shall return more 
specifically to the question of the equipment actually used by the Vigiles. 
There is both literary and archaeological evidence for the nature of 
ancient pumps. Ths survivi~; pumps, unfortunately, are not from dated 
contexts, and for the development of pumps we have to rely on the written 
evidence. For the dates of the writers I follow Drachmann (19b3, 10-12; 
1967,16), to whom is al3o due the greatest credit for elucidating the 
history of ancient pumps. 
(111) 
The pump was invented by Ctesibius (e.300-270 B.c.), and his pump is 
described by Vitruvius (10.7.1-3): 
"Insequitur nuno de Ctesibiaca machina, quae i~ altitudinem aquam 
educit, monstrare. Ea sit ex aereo Cuius in radicibus modioli 
fiunt gemelli paulum distantes, habentes fistulas furcillae figura 
similiter cohaerentes, in medium catinum concurrentes. In quo catino 
fiant asses in superioribus naribus fistularum coagmentatione subtili 
conlocati, qui praeobturantes foramina narium non patiuntur quod 
spiritu in catinum est expressumo Supra catinum paenula ut infundibulum 
inversum est attemperata et per fibulam Gum catino cuneo traiecto 
continetur, ne vis inflationis aquae earn cogat elevari. Insuper fistula, 
quae tuba dicitur, C?agmentatione in altitudine.fit erecta. Modioli 
autem habent infra n~res inferiores fistularum asses interpositos 
supra foramina eorum,·quae sunt in fundis. Ita de supernis in modiolis 
emboli masculi torno politi et oleo subacti conclusique regulis et 
vectibus conmoliuntur. Qui erit aer ~bi cum aqua assibus obturantibus 
foramina cogent. Extrudent inflando pressionibus per fistularum nares 
aquam in catinum, ~quo recepiens paenula spiritu exprimit per fistulam 
in altitudinem, et ita ex inferiors loco castella conlocato ad saliendum 
aqua subministratur." 
The physical aspects of this pump are clear from this description, and 
Figure 3 shows Drachmann's reconstruction. Basically this pump consists. 
of a pair of cylinders with pistons, discharging into a valve chamber ~nd 
thence through a single outlet. The valves are of the flap type. 
Drachmann (1963, ~55) suppns8s that since the cylinders are very near 
to each other each piston will have been worked independently by its own 
lever, but it may be observed that the use of short, quick strckes would 
be needed in order to produce a fairly steady jet (on this aspect, see 
below, 4.6.8 and 9) and for this use a single lever would have been appropriate. 
Thore are no hose connections on this pump: the pump stands in a reservoir 
from which it draws its water as the pistons are raised, and the outlet 
consists simply of a nozzle. 
(112) 
To some extent the interpretation of Vitruvius' description of the pump 
has been bedevilled in the past by his notion that air played an 
essential part in the pumping (that is, beyond merely pushing water 
into the cylinders, of which he may not have been aware). Indeed, his 
phrase 
"e quo [catino] reci~iens paenula spiritu exprimit per fistulam 
in altitudinem" 
I 
has largely been responsible for the supposition that the catinus was 
an air chamber, such as was used on pumps f1um the eighteenth century 
for steadying the pressure of the water, so that variations in pressure 
caused by the pistons aid not make the jet pulsating. Blackstone, 
indeed, writes as if the air chamber had been invented by Ctesibius and 
then forgotten until the beginning of the eighteenth century (1957,50). 
However, as Drachma~n points out (1963,155), for the catinus to have 
served as an air chamber of this sort, the outlet pipe would have had 
to start at the bottom of the chamber, so as to trap some air; moreover, 
a c!.ose s"i.udy of Vi truvious' text shows that the "air" ("spiritus") 
operates even before the water reaches the outlet of the cylinders, so 
that he cannot·be thinking of "air" in our sense at all. 
It is true that in the water-organ (hydraulus) there is a chamber in 
which water pressure stead2.?s the air pressure, and thisis described 
by Vitruvius (10.8), but the reverse proceedure, of using air to steady 
the pressure of water, was not used at all. The notion of '~iritus' 
as a force for. moving water probably reflects the Stoic belief in a world 
spirit which was responsible for such natural phenomena as storms and 
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currents of water (on this see Sherwin-White 1966, 31Df, on Pliny fE• 
4.30.5, with further references). In order to understand the mechanics 
of the pump, it is best to leave these Stoic connotations on one side, 
and translate 'spiritus' as 'pressure', avoiding all mention of 1air'. 
No ancient pump had an air chamber. 
It may seem a little odd that Vitruvius describes a pump that was current 
over two centuries before he wrote, without describing any later developments. 
Yet there is some evidence that there had not been any improvements to 
the basic design. We can see this both from considering Hero's pump, 
described below, and also from deducing as much as we can from Philo's 
account of his pump (Philo being a younger contemporary of Ctesibius). 
4.6.4 
Philo actua:ly described two pumps (ed. de Vaux, ~p.213-218). One of them 
is a concertina-like device for installing in a well, and has no relevance 
to firefighting (evsn assu1ning that it evsr worked). The other is very 
much the same as Ctesibius' pump. Since it is so similar, I give just 
the manuscript drawing of it, ~~hich fits the text very closely (Figure 4). 
There ate, it must be admitted, some points of difficulty, both with the 
text and with the drawing: in particular, it is not clear why the two 
cylinders are in separate reservoirs, not why the cutle~~ feed independently 
into the raised tank. It looks more like a pair of single-cylinder pumps 
th8n a single pump with two cylinders. However, in its basic components 
(pistons, levers, valves), it is similar to Stesibiua 1 pump, and the 
description serves to confirm the implication of Vitruvius that the pump 
reached a fairly full stage of its development very soon after Ctesibius' 
( 114) 
discovery of the pumping effect of a piston in a tube. 
Hero 9 who was of sufficient maturity to be making obs8rvations of the 
eclipse of the moon in A.D.62, and was therefor8 likely to sa writing 
some time in the second half of the first century A.D., describes his 
pump thus (ch. XVlll): 
I 
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In Woodcraft's translation: 
"The siphons used in conflagrations are made as follows. Take two 
vessels of bronze, ABCD,EFGH, (fig. 27[= my Fig.S]),. having the 
inner surface bored in a lathe to fit a piston, (like the barrels 
of water-organs), KL, MN being the pistons fitted to the boxes. 
Let the cylinders communicate with each other by means of the tube 
XDDF, and be provided with valves P, R, such as have been explained 
above [i.e. fl:::p valves, Hero ch. Xl], within the tube XDDF and 
opening outwards from the cylind9rs. In the bases of the cylinders 
pierce circular apertures, s, T, covered with polishsd hemispherical 
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cups VQ, WY, through which insert spindles soldered to, or in some 
way connected with, the bases of the cylinders, and provided with 
shoulders at the extremities that the cups may not be forced off 
the spindles. To the centre of the pistons fasten the vertical rods 
SE, SE, and attach to these the beam A' A', working, at its centre, 
about the stationary pin D, and about the pins B, c, at the rods 
SE, SE. Let the vertical tube S1 E1 communicate with the tube XDDF, 
branching into two arms at 5 1 , and provided with small pipes through 
which to force up water, such as were exp:ained above in th8 
descriptions of the machine for producing a water-jet by means of 
the compressed air [see below, 4.6o6] • Now, if the cylinders, 
provided with these additions, be plunged into a vessel containing 
water, IJUZ, and the beam A'A' be made to work at its extremities 
A1 A1 , which move alternately about the pirp, the.pistons, as they 
descend, will drive out the water through the tube E1 S0 and the 
revblving mouth M1 • For when the piston MN ascends it opens the 
aperture T, as the cup WY rises, and shuts the valve R; but when it 
descends it shuts T and opens R, through which the water is driven 
and forced upwards. The action of the other piston, KL, is the same. 
Now the small pipe M1 , which waves backward and forward, ejects the 
water to the required height but not in the required direction, 
unless the whole machin~ he turned round; which on urgent occasions 
is a tedious and difficult process. In order, therefore, that the 
water may be ejected to the spot required, let the tube E'S' consist 
of two tubes, fitting cloioly together lengthwise, of which one must 
be attached to the tube XODF, and the other to the part from which 
the arms branch off at S'; and thus, if the upper tube be turned 
round, by the inclination of the mouthpiece M' the stream of water 
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can be for~ed to any spot we please. The upper joint of the double 
tube must be secured to the lower, tci prevent its beir1g forced from 
the machine by the violence of the water. This may be effected by 
holdfasts in the shape of the letter L, soldered to the upper tube, 
and sliding on a ring which encircles the lower." 
Figure 5 shows the manuscript drawing of this pump, taken from Drachmann 
(1967, p.21 Abb.lD). This drawing is consistent with the text, and 
shows with rea8onable clarity the distinctive feature of this pump -
Hero's special design of the outlet. It is suggested below that this 
may not be a scaled drawing, and that the relative proportions of the 
components of the pump cannot be deduced from it. Dn the other hand, 
his interest in the speed with which the jet can be directed seems to 
reveal an intimat~ knowledge of the practical difficulties of fire-
fighting, ar.d we are enabled to ~ake a reasonable guess as to the size 
of the pump (see 4.6.10). The valves of Hero's pump are spindle valves, 
instead of the earlier flap valves, and this p~ssibly represents an 
improvement hydraulically and in reliability. The outlet, even 
without Hero~s rotating joint, is an improvement, since the elevation 
of the jet san be altered without tipping the pump. Dth~rwise, there 
is no change, and in particular there are still no hoses nor air 
cylinders. 
4o6o6e 
Hero describes another device for squirting water, of which I give 
just the manuscript illustration (Figure 6). This is of interest 
because it embodies exactly the same principle as the modern type of 
stored pressure fire extinguisher, in which compressed air is stored 
(119) 
in the extinguisher and drives out the water when the outlet is opened. 
In Hero's device the air pump is built in. 
The outlet is made to rotate in a vertical plane, .thus altering the 
I 
elevation of the jet. The spherical container is said by Hero to hold 
in all six cotyls, or three pints. It is th11s small enough to be held 
in the hands. It was not for ease of directing the jet that the outlet 
could rotate: quite simply, the need for the pipe inside the sphere to 
go right to the bottom of the water so that water and not air would 
be forced riut meant that unless th~ jet was only required to be vertical 
the outlet had to be ca~ble of moving. And so, again, in the absence 
of flexible hoses this special joint was used. Unlike the fire pumps, 
however, there was no_ problem in turning tho whole vessel, so there was 
no need for Hero's special rotating jointi 
Hero does not give any indication of the uses to which this device 
was put. There is no reason, of course, why it should not have been 
used in firefighting, but it should be noted that its maximum usable 
size is limited by the weight of the water. (The common modern red 
fire extingt.isher contains two gallons of water.) It is not known 
why Hero gives the capacity as three pints: it could have been bigger. 
There is no othGr evidence for equipment resembling modern fire 
extinguisherso For the firefighting capacity of this sphere - if it 
were used in firefighting - see 4.6.11. 
A small piece of additional technical information comes to us from 
( 120) 
Isidore (20o6.9): 
"Sifon vas appellatum quod aquas sufflando fundat; utuntur enim hos 
[in] oriente. Nam ubi senserint domum ardero, currunt cum sifonibus 
plenis aquis et extinguunt incendia, sed et camaras expressis ad 
superiora aquis emundant." 
The reservoir hereis filled with water before the pump is brought to 
the fire. Clearly the amount of water must have been limited, in view 
of the weight to be carried. 
It is possible that in ~orne eastern cities any water had to brought, 
and it was most convenie~t to bring some with the pump. In Rome this 
problem did not exist, in view of the wide availability of water, and 
for speed the Vigiles probably carried their pumps without any water. 
4.6.8. 
The surviving examplffiof pumps are all of the same type as those 
described by Vitruvius and Hero. Figure 7 shows the best-preserved 
example, found at Bolsena and now in the British Mussum. It has flap 
valves. Figure 8 is a sketch-ssction of another pump in the British 
Museum, ;also at Bolsena, less complete thE~ the last, and fitted with 
spindle valves. Stored with. the latter are two further fragments, 
sl~own in Figures 9 and 10. The piston (Figu~e 9) does not fit the pump 
shown in Figure 8, and since the pump in Figure 7 already has two 
pistons, this one must belong to a third pump. The other fragment 
(Figure 10) is something of a mystery, since nothing like it appears 
in the complete pump (Figure 7). However, a similar fragment is in the 
cylinder of the pump in Figure 8, so it may be part of the piston linkage. 
It could belong either to that pump, or to another. Another similar 
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pump from Castrum Novum, said to be in the Vatican Mus~ums, cannot now 
be traced (referred to by Smith 1890 9 vol.l 9 p&570). For a dBtailed 
technical description of these pumps see Davis l896o Silchaster has 
produced a frame for a pump similar to these, made entirely of wood in 
one piece, but with the pump removed and other pipework substitutsd 
(Hope and Fox 9 1896, 232-4). Another pump is recorded in the museum 
catalogue of Metz (p.XX11 9 where the illustration is based on Vitruvius 1 
text, not the actual pump). 
The capability of these pumps is considered below (4.6.10). Whether 
they were intended for firefighting can only be surmised~ Their physical 
form is ambiguous, since on the one hand they clQsely resemble the pumps 
of the hydraulic writers, and Hero says that these pumps were used in 
firefighting, while on the other they do not have flanges suitable for 
attaching the L-clamps which Hero prescribed for his own outlet. There 
is one somewhat negative point which tends to suggest that most pumps 
of this type would have been for firefighting, and this is that when-
ever it was required to convey large amounts of water by other means 
than gravity, equipment sucn as wnter-screws, water-wheels or else 
bucket-chains were used. Pumps were not used unless an actual jet of 
water was required. Their use was thus restricted to firefighting, and 
to minor domestic uses such as washing high vaults (indicated by Isidore 
20.6.9, quoted above at 4.6.7). There is a strong presumption that 
any pump was for firefighting. 
The ancient evidence for pumps is thus completely consistente The 
pumps were single-acting force pumps 9 and they lacked flexible hose 
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connections. Although they would not have been capable of producing 
a steady jet (i.e. not pulsating with the strokes of the pistons), 
they would, with the use of short quick strokes, have been capable 
of producing a continuous jet; and the more skilled the operators, 
the steadier wo~ld the jet have been. It may be prudent to emphasise 
again that these pumps did not have air vessels. 
It remains to clear up some points of terminology. The term 'stirrup 
pump' is not appropriate for these pun,ps, since they were not fitted 
with stirrups (see Figure 11 for a typical stirrup pump: in this 
example the foot is placed on the stirrup instead of through it ). 
The term 1 double-acting 1 is not appropriate, since this term is best 
reserved for pumps in which water pa~ses through the piston via a non-
return valve; it ~hould not refer to a pair of single-acting pumps, 
such as these were. The term 'reciprocating' is acceptable, though 
it means little more than that pistons were used (instead, for example, 
of a centrifugal impeller). The term 1 li f"t-tJu,up 1 is not really 
suitable, since it normally implies that the pump can raise water from 
some level below itself, whereas these p~~ps had to stand actually in 
the water; ~eing without hoses or pipes on the inlets, they could not 
work if they were above the water. Finally, it is difficult to dis-
tinguish between 'fire pumps' and other pumps, except i~ the design of 
the outlet. Any sipho could have worked at a fire; it is probable 
thct most siphones did work at fires. 
(123) 
4.6.10 
The firefighting capability of these pumps is the major aspect of 
interest to this thesis which has been neglected by previous studies. 
In the case of the surviving pumps we can make a good gus~s. With 
the pumps described by Philo, Vitruvius and Hero there is the 
difficulty that we do not know how big they were. It is probable 
that pumps were made larger and larger, until either the materials 
proved inadequate, or the number of operatJrs became unreasonable, 
ur the water supply became inadequate. We should, of course, beware 
of identifying the ideal with actuality. The argument has often 
been put to me that because Roman buildings were high the pumps 
must have been large. Yet it is quite clear from modern practice 
that needs are Qot always answered in the most obvious way: other-
wise we should have extending ladders and pumps capable of reaching 
the top of a skyscraper. We must rely on the evidence for the 
pumps themselves. 
The two larger of the Bolsena pumps have a bore in the cylinders 
of l.~.sq.in. and a maximum possible stroke of 4 in. The maximum 
capacity of the two cylin9ers is therfore 12 cu.in. At one complete 
stroke per second this will give a total output of 720 cu.in., or 
2.6 g.p.m. The Silchester pump seems to have had a maximum stroke 
of 15", in cylinders of 3" diameter. Normally it is necessary to 
know at least two of the factors nozzle diameter, pressure at the 
nozzle and nczzle velocity before the output cf a pump can be 
calculated, but since these pumps were hand-operated there is one 
alternative factor which can be utilised. This is the frequency 
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with which human muscles can operate the pump. Two complete strokes 
a second should not present a great deal of difficulty with the 
Bolsena pump; with a great load, hoillever, or a multiplicity of 
operators, there would arise problems of co-ordination. It would 
also be necessary, possibly, to restrict the length of the stroke 
in order to produce a reasonabl9 steady jet. For these reasons it 
seems unlikely that more than 10 g.p.m. could be put out by the 
Bolsena pumps, and a more normal output wc1•ld probably be in the 
region of 5 g.p.m. Having two cylinders the pump would produce a 
continuous jet, but tRis would have been pulsating. The pressure 
would be no ~1ore than in any small hand-pump. The Silchester pump 
cannot have been worked as fast, but its output could have been 
similar, but with a steadier jet. 
The pumps which are described by Philo, Vitruvius and Hero could 
have been much bigger than those which have survived. Moreover, 
even if on general grounds it is possible to estimate the maximum 
size of pump that would have been satisfactory at the majority of 
fires, there would still remain the possibility of a yet larger 
pump which could only operate in certain areas where there was an 
unusually large supply of water and where the streets were wide 
enough to enable such a pump to be manoeuvred. 
It might appear that the proportions of the pump illustrated in 
the manuscript of Hero (Figure 5) are thos3 of a two-man pump. 
This would certainly be the case if we imagine that the cylinders 
are of medium size (with a diameter of a few inches) and that the 
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levers connecting the pistons are drawn to the same scale. However, 
Hero does not give dimensions, and his illustrations are usually 
diagrammatico We have the unusually clear case of the organ, of 
which his account and the illustration show just the bare essentials 
whereas Vitruvius (writing earlier than Hero) describes a much mo~e 
complex instrument (Vitr. lle Arch. 10.8). There·is another point 
in connection with the illustration of the pump, that if the outlet 
had been shown above the lsvel of the levers there would have been 
a problem in drafting. As it stands, it provides a clear diagram 
with the hydraulic pa~ts neatly framed within lhe cylinders and 
levers. There may thus be more than one ~cale in the drawing. 
Possibly this is not a scaled drawing at all. 
Hero does, however, provide us with some indication of size, in 
his account of his design for the outlet of the pump. Referring, 
as we have seen, to the pipe M1 in th~ diagram, he comments that 
turning the whole pump round to the required direction is tedious 
and difficult: 
••• €~ P"l ~Aov T~ ~e~o~vov Clllo-Te_~ff,-rJ..l" S ~ TO UTO "' 
1<c1.~ ~',X_ 8,e~v ne~S T~.S Kci.lfTT fl~o~cr-o~.s xe'~.LS II 
Why should turning the pump be tedious and difficult? Naturally 
such an action would entail a cessation of pumping, followed by 
a resumption to see whether the nozzle was now pointing in the right 
direction; several such adjustments could be necessary. But this 
cannot be thG whole explanation, since if the ~ump were small and 
light the problem would not exist in these terms. 
The heaviest part of tha weight to be moved would be the water in 
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the reservoir. For example, a reservoir holding about 3 cu.ft. of 
water would weigh about 1.7 cwt. If .we add on some more for the 
weight of the reservolr itself and of the pump we reach a total weight 
in the region of 2 cwte Ti 1.is is not the sort of weight to cause 
difficulty to two men (who need not be the same men as the pumpers). 
Probably we should infer that he is thinking of a 8eight in ~xcess of 
2 cwt. It is true that we do not know whether Hero's joint found its 
way into firefighting use,·nor do we know how far he is thinking in 
purely idealist terms of saving merely a few seconds. (bearing in mind 
particularly that pumps would not have been in the first attendance 
at a fire). He does s·eem, however, to be acquainted with one of the 
more esoteric of a fireman's problems, and on balance it i3 probably 
best to take it that he is writing in an informed way. Once we reach 
weights beyond 2 cwt. we reach a different class of handling. For 
weights of 3 to 4 cwt. the number of men would need to be increased to 
3 or 4. Thus in addition to the machine being more cumbersome there 
is the problem of co-ordinating the men. A reservoir measuring 4 ft 
x 1.5ft x 1ft will hold 3.3 cwt of water, and even allowing ample space 
for men to empty buckets into a larger pump than any now extant is 
required in order to justify having this size of reservoir at all. 
The larger the reservoir, the faster should be the rate of discharge 
and the larger the pump. 
for these reasons it is plausible that pumps were used which required 
·up to, say, ~ix ~en. Whether larger pumps existed cannot be deduced 
from Hero, though it is perhaps worth observing that if a pump were 
really large (over 12 men) it would have to be on a carriage and could 
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only be moved by being wheeled around. Such a wheeled pump would not 
have been suitable for the bumpy and narrow streets of Rome and could 
only have operated in a few areaso Possibly there were a few such 
pumpso 
By a similar ~eascning we may s~ggest that Philo's pump (Figure 4) was 
of considerable size. The leather reservoirs for this are said to be 
about 2 ft in diameter and 3 ft in depth (dd. de Vaux, pp216f). The 
method of filling them and the amount of water which it was desired 
to store in them will~have influenced their size; but it is difficult 
not to infer also some·relation to the size of the pumps which they 
supplied. Cylinders much big~er than any of the extant ones could 
have fitted into the reservoirs, and conversely it would have been 
absurd to have such large reservoirs for the extant pumps. The descrip-
tion also states that there was one cylinder per reservoir, not two, 
and this also is consistent with a large pump. Unfortunately, some 
important det~ils of the account and illustration are obscure, and for 
this reason we cannot press this description any further (see above, 
4.6.4). 
4.6.11 
Thus far we have concentrated on the size of the pumps, and we are 
now in a position to deduce something of their firefighting effective-
ness. It should be borne in mind that even today the vast majority 
of fires are put out with small-scale hand operated equipment, and 
that the occasions when a large pump is used tend to be only a minority. 
Modern specifications for pumps can require up to 1,000 g.p.m. at 100 
lb/sq.in; the jet should be capable of reaching the fire without being 
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carried away by convection currents, and so should be continuous and 
at a steady pressure. The pump should be capable of a wide range of 
work, from large quantities at high pressure to small quantities at 
low pressure. The charact~ristics of the centrifugal type of pump 
have led to its universal adoption by fire brigades for all larger 
pumps. For smaller pumps: there are the portable type\ carrled by 
two to four men, which are also centrifugal, right down to the stirrup 
pump, which (in the form that is familiar) was developed for the 
special requirements of wartime firefighting and produces a contin-
uous jet from. a singie piston (Figure 11). Ordinary garden syringes 
can be effective if tne fire is small, ar.d even a squeezy bottle 
filled with water can put out a fire in curtains or other hangings 
while creating a minimum amount of water damage. This is the sort 
of context in which Herots hollow sphere would have been very useful. 
Its main drawback would have been the necessity to keep it upright, as 
this would have precl:.Jded its use fm· fires at a lower level than the 
sphere could be held (a flexible hose would have been needed for this, 
or else a down-turned outlet). 
In order to assist our study of the Roman pumps we may divide modern 
pumps into three classes according to their effectiveness in fire-
fighting. In practice one class merges into the next, but the 
advantage of this clas~ification for us is that we do not have to 
try to give descriptions of pumps which are not based upon adequate 
data (e.g. lli3 aiG totally ignorant of the nozzle diameters of Roman 
pumps). Inetead we ask the much simpler question, to which class 
are the pumps likely to have belonged. These three classes are as 
follows: 
( 129) 
1)-small punps: light, portable, hand-operated, may be used indoors, 
do not require much water, very effective at the 
early stages of a fire, and pote~tially all that is 
required: 
2) medium pumps: port8ble by two men or a few more, morH ~owerful than 
small pumps (output from, say, 10 g.p.m. IJP to 400 
g.p.m.), hand-operated or motorised, useful for 
containing a largish fire, extinguishing a fire some-
what beyond the control oP a small pump, and drenching 
a building: 
3) large pumps: motci~ised, permanently mounted on a chassis (the 
conventional 'fire engine') or portable by four to 
six men, output over 500 g.p.m., capable of extinguish-
ihg large fires or controlling a conflagration, un-
suitable for many small fires. 
The surviving pumps will fit into the class of small pumps, while HEro's 
will belong to the medium class. If we accept that there may have been 
yet larger pumps, they will still belong to the medium class: the 
Romans had nothing which corresponds with the modern large pump. 
For the medium pumps such as that of Hero there is some interesting 
comparative material in a range of pumps described by Nathaniel 
Hadley in an advertisement of the period 1769-1790. The first to third 
columns are those of Hadley, the fourth and fifth are my own estimates 
(it is generally agreed that the maximum effective height of a jet for 
firefighting is about two-thirds of the maximum or actual height of a 
jet). 
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Men G.,p.m. Horizontal Estimated maximum Estimated maximum 
throw vertical throw for fire fighting height 
stated g.p.m. for stated g.p.m. 
1 16 12 yds. 18 ft. 12 ft. 
2 30 25 yds. 37 fto 25 ft .. 
4 50 33 yds., 49 ft. 33 ft. 
8 70 37 yds. 55 ft. 37 ft. 
There are larger pumps in the broadsheet, which need not be relevant 
to ancient pumps but of which the details are given below for interest 
and bec~use there is a comparative lack of actual figures for manual 
pumps. 
14 100 40 yds. 60 ft. 40 ft. 
16 120 45 yds. 67 ft. 45 ft. 
18 150 48 yds. 72 ft. 48 ft. 
22 170 50 yds. 75 ft. 50 ft. 
24 200 52 yds. 78 ft. 52 ft. 
The smallest three pumps are called ''Garden Engines" and were carried. 
The r~nge of "Fire Engines" started with the 8-man pump, and all 
of these were wheeled. 
4.6.12 
To see what this analysis implies with regard to the majority of fires, 
we may refer briefly to Table 3A: Methods of Extinction of Fires in 
Buildings, 1961-1968 (United Kingdom Fire and Loss Statistics 1968, 
H.M.s.o. 1970), which gives figures that reflect the general experience. 
This table shows that one fire in four to which a brigade is summoned 
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is extinguished before the brigade arrives, and that the most common 
method of extinction in this class is the application of water from 
buckets. Among the firas which are extinguished by the btigades 1 
the method which is successf~l on more occasions than all other methods 
put together is the use of the hosereel using only W3ter carried in the 
hosereel tank. The hosereel consists of a f" hose fed from a tar1k 
holding around 80 gallons, and this hose is ready to be pulled off 
the reel as soun as the appliance stops, and can furnish around 10 
gallons per minute. On the occasions w~en this is not enough, the 
hosereel tank may be filled from hydrants, or the use of one or more 
21" hoses fed from the main pump (500 g.p.ni.) or from hydrants may 
be required. Alternatively, on rather fewer occasions,. the use of 
extinguishers, stir~up pumps or hand pumps may be called for. It is 
thus only a minority of fires which require the use of large pumps. 
If we also take ~nto account all the fires to which the brigade is 
not summoned (possibly four times a~ many as those to which they are 
summoned), it becomes very clear that by far the vast majority of fires 
are extinguished by means of the simplest hand equipment: buckets of 
water, ~and, earth, stirrup and hand pumps, and extingu~shers. 
The successful operation of sprinklers is similarly oftp~ on a small 
scale, sprinkler systems being designed so that three heads should be 
sufficient to control a fire, each head producing 5 to 25 g.p.~. The 
statistics for sprinklers are less clear than those for o~her methods 
of extinction, si~ce often a fire is actually put out by other means 
eve~ when the sprinklers have succeeded in controlling it. However, 
the basic point remains that in the majority of cases only a small 
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amount of water is required to control or extinguish the fire. 
This brief lock at some modern figures demonstrates the well-worn maxim, 
that practically any fire can be put out with ease if it ~d caught early 
enough. It also emphasises two aspects concerned with hosereels and 
sprinklers. The point of a hosereel is to provide an instant amount of 
water at a reasonable pressure which may be taken into a building by one 
or two men; a similar amount of water conveyed without hoses (e.g. in 
buckets) would demand a large amount of manpower, and, even if comparable 
quantities could be de~ivered, the pressure would not be adequate to 
overcome the convection· currents around the fire and admit the water to 
the seat of the fire. Sprinklers operate automatically, and come into 
operation as soon as enough heat has built up to set them off. In this 
way they are able to operate while the fire is still in its early stages. 
As with the hosereel, they produce water at a sufficient pressure both 
to produce the required spray after hitting the deflector plate and ~lso 
to overcome convection currents (water dripping from ceiling height under 
gravity only might well fail to reach the fire). There are thus three 
points which should be satisfied when a method of extinction is adopted: 
detection must be rapid; water rrust be readily available in adeqcate 
(though not necessarily large) quantities; and it i~ preferable for 
the water to be applied with some pressure. For fires above the head of 
the firemen, for example, in ceilings, it is essential to have to~apply 
the water under pressure, otherwise it will not arrive. 
Returning now to the pumps used by the Vigiles, we have seen that there 
is good reason to suppose that they could have been operated by up to 
;· 
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six men or thereabouts (and they might have been bigger still, though 
there is no evidence for this). They would thus have been more than 
adequate for the majority of fireso In fact, the system of patrols was 
largely designed to avoi~ the need to use anything more than buckets 
of water. On the occasions when pumps would have been used, the lack 
of hoses would have restricted t.i1eir usefulness considerably. They 
could have been useful when operated near to the fire, and they would 
have been essential for fighting fires in ~uofs and ceilings. Ho~ever, 
as 8raid~ood observed (1830, 4): 
"I do not appro11e of_ small engines [i.e. pumps] for the service of 
large towns. ~uch has been said about the convenience of conveying 
them up stairs, &nd into places where the fire is ragin~; but I fear 
that those who have so str8ngly recommended them, have seldom made 
the experiment." 
He ex~lained that at the only stage of a fjre at which small pumps might 
be of use, there is too much smoke, and also it is inconvenient to 
convey weter into an appartment while the occupants are removing their 
propertyo He concludes: 
"I have no doubt that small engines may, in particular instances, have 
been useful; but I apprehend most of these cases might have been as 
wel~ provided against, by a few well-applied buckets of water." 
~.6.13 
Thus although their output in gallons per minute may have been greater 
than that of the ~odErn hoserP.el, the lack of hoses made the ancient pumps 
very inferior 5n their range of application. Pumps as small as the 
·, 
surviving ones could have been useful on fires in ceilings or partitions, 
and ~e should not rule out the possibility that one or two pumps were 
taken out with the patrols fer this type of fire; provided that they 
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could be brou~ht into operation quickly enouQh, they could have been 
successful in controlling or extinguishing such fires. Larger pumps 
must have been a reinforcement, and, to the extAnt that by the time these 
were brought into operation the fires had become bigger, such larg8r 
pumps may well have had a lower rate of success. 
4.6.14 
The crucial question which remains is the~sfore how quickly the Vioiles 
could detect fires and start to extinguish them. The higher the standard 
of training, dis<Jipli11e and morale, the greater the success they will 
have achiev8d with the pumps. This question is one of the main themes 
of this thesis, and the ans~~r is given in Chapter B. So far as the 
pumps themselve? are concerned, they were adequate if they u1ere applied 
soon enough to a fireo They had deficiencies in comparison with 
modern pumps: but they were backed up by a much larger number of fire-
men per acre than any other brigade. It was the availability and 
ceployment of such a large number of men which made up for deficiencies 
in the equipment. The pumps were as successful as the-patrolso 
4 .. 7.1 
One of the two types of equipment which the patrols were required to 
carry was buckets (Dig.l.l5.3). Although there is no archaeological 
evidence of direct relevance to fire-buckets in Rome, this does not 
matter much as far as the ~ffect on firefighting is concerned. What is 
important is the extent to which buck3ts were usedo 
4o7o2 
It is probable that they sufficed for the vast majority of fires, just 
as buckets and other small-scale hand equipment suffice for the vast 
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majority of fires of the present da,y. In the absence of hoses (see 
below 4.8), they will also have served for conveying water to the pumps 
when these were used, supplemented at large fires by u1ater carts and 
possibly the sarvices of the aguariio A bucket-chain which is working 
well should be capable of delivering at 120 g.p.m. to start with, and 
over a long period should avera9e over 40 g.p.m. This estimate assumes 
a. 
that the men are approximately 2 metres (6 feet) apart, withtsurplementary 
chain for returning the empty huckets. 
A multitude of bLcket-w.en provided one of the more striking sights at the 
big fire in A.D.l92 (Dio 73.24.1): 
The only fire a~ which buckets are recorded to have been effective in 
providing a large amount of water was the one in A.D.217, in which the 
Colosseum suffered severe damage from water, both applied by men and 
also falling as rain (Die 79.25.2): 
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that the aqueducts ware cut to enable the water to flow along the streets 
to the fire, since this technique, which worked well in medieval cities, 
would have been unsuccessful in Rome owing to the various drains and 
channels beneath. the streets. Probably it refers to the diversion of 
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water in the aqueducts to conc.e·ntrate it in the vicinity of the fire 
(cf. Frontinus ll9.!:!.2,117 and 2,87 for the facilities for diverting L,Jater 
as needed)o 
4.7.3 
The nickname 'sparteoli' which t1as applied to the Vigiles seems to have 
alluded to thGir buckets. The word occurs in two passages: 
"Sparteolorum Romas, quorum cohortes in ~utelam urbis cum hamis et cum 
aqua vigilias curare consueverunt vicis" (Schol.Juv.~.l4w305) 
"ad fumum coenae Serapicae sparteoli excitabuntur" (Tertullian, Apol.39) 
Analogy with later firefighting equipment led Kellermann (l835,p.2.n.6) 
to suppose that this nickname referred to the buckets, the buckets of his 
own day being made of esparto grass coated with pitch. He did not, 
however, discuss the passage in Pliny (N.H. 19.2f) where the uses of 
esparto grass are described, and in which there is no mention of buckets. 
Pliny otserved that esparto produced ropes which were easy to repair and 
were good both i~ wet and in dry uses. As such, it could easily have 
fou~d widesprGad use in firefighting. It does not, however, follow from 
this that ; sparteoli' u1ould have been ~ore likely to refer to ropes than 
buckets. 
The modern descriotion of the Vigiles as a "bucket brigade" is not relevant 
here, since it has reference to other types of brigade less dependent 
on buckets, and ~o such comparison existed in the Roman period. On the 
other hand, the satirists regarded buckets as a distinctive feature of 
firefig~ting. Thus Juvenal describes the millio~aire Licinus with his 
fire-watching slaves and buckets (.8rt_.l4.303-8): 
"Tantis parta malis c:.Jra maiore rnetuque 
( 137) 
servantur: misera est magni custodia census. 
dispositis praedives amis vigilare cohortem 
servorun1 noctu Licinus .iubet, attonitus pro 
electro signisque suis Phrygiaque columna 
atque ebore et lata testurline. 11 
Petronius also implies the use of buckets when he writes of the Vigiles 
who 
"effregerunt ianuam subito et cum aqua securibusque tumultuari suo iu~e 
coeperunt" (~ .. 78) 
And the patrols of the Vigiles must have be8n unusual since they narried 
buckets. In contrast; ropes will not have been used extensively at the 
majority of fires (see -4.17), while for rescues we should note the 
evidence of Juvenal (Sat.3.190-21D), that the unfortunate Cedrus had no 
alternative but to wait for his death ("ultimus ardebit", line 201). 
Buckets were the only ~rominent and distinctive feature of Roman fire-
fighting, and for this reason we should retain Kellermann's suggestion 
that Vsparteoli' referred to buckets. 
4.8.1 
In the absence of any evidence for hoses, it is pert1aps worth emphasising 
that there is positive evidence that hoses were not used. It has 
frequently been put to me in discussion that it would have been easy for 
the Romans to make hoses, and that their use by the Vigiles may therefore 
be taken for granted. Also BR (p.S~) refers to Domaszewski 1 s "Spritzen-
mMnner" = "hose-men" in discussing the sifonarii, and endorses this inter-
pretation as ~2ll as his own interpretation ("the 'Limber-gunners' whose 
duty it was to k9ep the 'e'ngine clsan"). This iG despite the fact that 
elsewhere (pp.94f) ho recognises that the pumps stood in their own 
reservoirs. Possibly he inferred that although thera were no suction 
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(input) hoses there were output hoses •. However, the sifonarii are 
better taken to be the technicians concerned with the pumps per se, 
that beinQ sufficient to explain their titleo The term 1 sifanarius 1 
does nat of itself imply h~~es. Lightfoot's translation of Pianius' 
~ .2.f. Pol"Garp refers to hoses (Lightfoot 1885,1063): 
"So the hose and water and every contrivance of art was brcught". 
This is, however, a mistranslation, since the Greek actually refers to 
siphones, water and every d€vice (Lightfoot p.l042): 
" , 1 / ~ ( , J. ' ~/ ( ' " / ' / " 
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We may also note that~the ability to deliver large quantities of water 
does nat necessarily r~quire the use of hoses, and that there is no 
reason why the extensive water damage to the Colosseum in the firs of 
J A.D.217 could not have been caused by bucksts and the rain (Die 79.25,2; 
abave,4.7.2). Finally, an the negative sida, it had been put to me that 
Caesar took precautions against the use of hoses when he built a 
musculus at the famaus siege of Ma:seilles (Caesar ~.£.2.10): 
.. 
"Super lateres coria inducuntur, ne canalibus aqua immissa lateres diluere 
possBt" 
This use of water implies the ability t~~uirt water at a fair pressure, 
but nat ms~ely would it be possible to use a rigid pipe for this, a 
flexible hose would be mast unsuitable since it would hang dawn or jump about. 
Even if we recognise the need for the pump and its operators to be 
protected from missiles, we still do not need to assume the use of a 
fl~xible pipe: a lead pipe bent round corners and over a parapet would 
work perfectly well. And, assu~ing that the water could be played an the 
ra.of before the mortar had a chance to set, all that would be needed would 
be a cascade of water aver the face of the tiles. Caesar himself seems 
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not to have had hoses available, since at Brindisium he resorted to the 
construction of towers two storeys high on every fourth raft to assist with 
firefighting (".ill!£. comrmdius ~ impetu navium incendiisgue defEnderet"), 
a precaution which would have been redundant if he could have used hoses 
(Caesar ~.£.1.25). 
4.8.2 
The one piece of positive evidence tt1at hades did not exist is in Hero's 
description of his new design for the outlet of the pump (see 4.6.5 an~ ro). 
If hoses had existBd,~there would not have been a problem over directing 
the jet of water. 
4.8.3 
It remains a hypothetical possibility that hoses were invented subsequently, 
but there is no evidence for this while we co know that the pump which 
Hero describes is the most advanced of the ancient pumps. There is more 
to making a ftrb hose than is apparent at first sight. As well as being 
capable of withstanding high pressures and sudden pressure shocks (e.g. 
those causBd by the pistons in the pump), they have to be light, easy to 
handle, and easy to couple and uncouple. The first hoses to be used in 
modern times were made of leather, rivetted along the seam, and they were 
very stiff and heavy; they came in short lengths, and took a long time to 
lay out. They were better than nothing in certain circumstances, but 
then as now the majority of fires were put out without using hoses at all. 
Suction hoses are .more of a technical problem than output hoses, since they 
must not collapse under a vacuum, and the descriptions of lairge nurrtbers of 
men carrying water as late as the third century (e.g. in 217, see above, 
4.7.2 ) mean that suction hoses were not in use. Thus the output of the 
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pumps must have been limited to the amount of water that could be carried, 
even though the pumps could raisd it higher than it could be thrown, and 
it might have been expected that if output hoses had existed they would 
have been used to rais8 the water from ground lavel to the reservoirs of 
pumps placed in the upper storeys of the Colosseum. This seems not to 
havs been done at the fire in 217. There seems to have b8en no advance 
after Hero. The Vigiles must have used thousands of buckets. 
4.9.1 
The Digest (1.15.3) esys that the praefectus vigilum (i.e. the corps) had 
to carry axes with him bn patrols, and these axes were dolabrae. The 
vigiles in Petronius (~. 78) were equipped •J.Jith secures. Either type could 
be useful in firefighting, though it is possible that the Digest is 
sufficiently precise to be indicating the standard issue in the Vigiles. 
Certainly the type of dolabra with the bent spike is useful for breaking 
down doors, as White observed (1967,63), though an axe with a flat b~ck 
can be used as a hammer.. Possibly, of course, the Vigiles used both types. 
Figure 12 shows a dolabra , Figure 13 a securis. For comparison, Figure 
14 shows the axe in service with Braidwood's brigade in Edinburgh, and 
Figure 15 shows the current British fireman's axe having a wooden handle. 
With axes, as with all equipment, full exploitation depended very much on 
the individual firemene It is perhaps worth noting that, in addition to 
their uses for de~olition, breaking in, and so forth, axes can often be 
used constructively, as hammers, for stickir.g i~ for standing on, ·and for 
attaching lines for rescue work. It is perhaps some confirmation that the 
Vigiles tended to use dolabraethat on Trajan's Column the troops tend to 
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use _g_olabr~ in preference to any other type of axe (cf. also frequent 
references to £o_labr2,_e, e.g. Livy 21.11, Tac.t!hl.3.20; \Jagetius de E.§_ ill• 
2.25). 
4.10.1 
The ~~ or ~Q2-~~~ is dismissed briefly by BR, who does not distinguis~ 
it clearly from the falx (pp.98 and 89f): 
"and there are also the ~ of the _f.i~.:!£~~' and the uncu.s or UflCi~ of 
the uncinarius" _________ ,__ 
"If the interpretation [of UNC COH ] is right, they WP.ra probably equipped 
with hooks for pulling down tottering walls, or with cli.irtJing iron3. 1 
1 Cf.Schol.ad !1~. Ant. in Canst. xxiii.BB: ferramenta per quae possint 
de pariete in parietem transire, et ita incendium extinguere. 
••• this [Falciarius] wo~ld be a man equipped with a Falx, and his 
function w~uld be much the same as that of the Uncinarius." 
(N.B. T~e corract reference to the scholiast is 1 schol. Juliani antecessoris 
in Canst. xxiii.BB': Du Frasne and Du Ca~ge, s.v. MATRICARII.) 
The basic evidence for these men and their equipmentconsist~ of 
abbreviated names, as follows: 
- VNC V1 .1 057.7 o [2 ] 
VNC.COh V1.105Be7e[15] and[16] 
V V1.1055o3. [1~] (assuming t!-tat this is the same post) 
VNC V1.3744 = 31075 
FALC V1.3744 = 31075 
V1.3744 is ~f interest for several reasons, and is discussed more fully 
in Appendix Uo For the purposes of this present section it is enough to note 
that sufficient survives in the lines above "FALC" to show that tools and 
not men are referred to (•SIFO~Itbus]'), and that the consular date for 
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this inscription is that of A.D. 362. There is no way of knowing 
c 
wheth8r VNC is an abbreviation of 'QQ£~1 and ·~~~iu~' or of '~1i2~~· 
Uc3go ~ bt't both forms are possible. 
The ~ is attested Jnly in the fourth century (For its relevance to the 
~~iles, seg below, 4.11.1). The fact that the ~Qcli~ and the~ 
a~pear together on V1.3744 should imply that they were different (not observed 
by BR). Mcreover, the actual words imply different types of tool. 
4.10.2 
In Latin usage the wards .!d.'l~ and f:'ilx a.re not interchangeable. U~~ 
means a curved or angled hook used for sticking into thi~gs. For example 
Valerius Flaccus (2.428) uses uncus to mean 'anchor'; 1!._~ l!las commonly 
used of the hook by which the bodies of criminals were dragged from ths 
prison to the Tiber (e.g. Juvenal Sat.1D.66); Livy describes har,ea_a?_fJ.~~ as 
8 asseres ferreo unco nraefixi" (30.10.16); and he also describes the use of 
_,__ .... --- ----.J-. .... ~--~..;.:;.-
an 1!.0.£1!.§. for sticking in the enemy's shi~s in order to drag th8ill along, 
chains being fitted for this purpose (30.10.17-20). Several hooks were 
combined to make the .f:.~~-r-~ .E!!,.'L~, which was normally thrown at the end 
of a chain (e.g. Q.Curtius Hist.~.4.2.12; Caesar ~.£.1.57; Diodorus 
(17.44.4); a:l .;!_1]£~ would have had only one point. 
The best account of~~~ is that of White (1967, 71-103 and Appendix E), 
together with PW. V1 (1909) s.v. FALX (Liebenam). Although Lil~~ took 
many forms, thsir essential characteristic was a curved blade with a 
~utting edge on the concave edge. The ancient sources indicate twelve 
types in agricultural use, and there was in addition thB falx m~al~ w;,ich 
was used in warfare (and of which there does not seem to be a good modern 
account). 
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We have therefore to be cautious in using the Englis~ word 'hnok', since 
it inclu::J,:Js the meaning of .!d.!J.£11._§ but also includes some of the meanings of 
falx (as in 'bill-hook', 'pruni~-hook'). In the field of firefighting 
the two sRns8s must he distinguished. 
Having said that the uncus and the falx should be distinguished from 
each other, we how havg to face the problem of what each of these pieces 
of equipm~mt actually did. Since there is not any strnng reason tn d.;.scuss 
thP.m together, the remainder of this section will consider the lill,~, a'ld 
the next section will consider the ~~· 
4.10.4 
Of the four possibilities for the .!d.C!.SL!§. (or uncinu~), tuJO can be rej ectad 
with a fai~ amount of confidence. First, it is unlikely that the ~~~~1 
was a throwing hook, like a grappling iron, sine~ the !£~ m~~~~ would 
have teen more able to find a hold than a single hook, and the term '.!d.!::.~':!.~' 
would ~ave b3en inapprop~iate. Secondly, it is unlikely that the ~i of 
the Vig};..!.~~ rasP.mbled the .B. rge fire honks of later medieval firefighting, 
of w~ich Blackstone (1957,11) gives the following account: 
"The stc-ong crook of iron with its wooden ~andle, chains and cords l•Jas 
tn be a feature of British fire fightin•d for many yea1:s. Its purpose>. 
was to drag off the burning thatch and to hook into the gables or othAr 
members and pull down the house to make a fire break •••• They are of 
great size, some thirty feet long and ten inches diamctsr i~ the staff, 
and horses were sometimes harnessed to them to pull down a building. 
Some houses were built with a strong iron ring let into the gable into 
which the fire hook couJ.d be inserted." 
figur 8 1 6 shows a wheeled example of a large fire hook. Such hooks would 
t manoeuvre r ound the streets of ancient Rome; have been too cumbersome o 
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their effectiveness in dentolishing buildings of brick and concrete 
must be in doubt; and the height of the Roman buildings would have 
put the operators of any such hook in great danger when the buildings 
collapsed. In contrast ~ith Britain, where it was one of the regUlar 
provisions of local regulations that fire hooks should be provided, the 
Roman world seems not t~ have used them: it is possible that if they 
h~d been at all common, Pliny would have referred to them in his 
correspondence about fir.e precautions in Nicomedia (~_.-1 0.33), though 
this argument cannot be pressed very 'far. 
4.10.5 
The two possibilities which cannot be rejected with confidenr.P. are more 
difficult, and the discussion which fullows should be read with the 
same caution with which it is offered. · 
First, the scholiast on Julian refgrs to 11f.~~ment_~11 for climbing frcrr. 
wall to wall (quoted above, though BR ~ivcs him the wrong name). ~uch 
implements will have be8n, in all probability, some sort of ladder, and 
if they were as useful and versatile as any modern equipm2nt, they are 
likely to have resembled the modern hook ladder. Figure 17 shows one 
of these in use at a window; they can be used for ascending from window 
to window, the fireman lifting the ladder up each ~ime he reaches a 
·.window sill; they can be used in a si~ilar way for getting over balconies 
or parapets; and, although hook ladders are by no means completely safe to 
q> 
usekthey tend to whip round and fall off, they have been used for such 
exploits as getting over overhanging balccnies. The British type of 
hook ladder has two strings and one hook: as in the illustration; 
Continental ve~sions sometimes have two hooks, one on each string, or 
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sometimes consist of one string (in thA middle, the rungs sticking out 
on either side) with a single hook at the top. 
Secondly, there is a possibility that th8 uncus was a smallish hook 
resemblin~ the modern ceiling hook or preventer, ~f which a present 
standard pattern is shown in Figure 18. The precise form of the type 
illustrated was developed for pricking lath and plaster ceilings to let 
water out and for cutting them away in order to see ·whether any fire 
remained among th9 joists. Small hooks like this are extremely versatile, 
being extensions to the fireman's own hand and arm, and capable of a 
wide range of uses:- pushing, pulling, clearing, demolishing, cutting, 
reaching. They have been common throughout medieval and modern firefighting 
in Britain and elsewhere. The Roman army, too, used implements of this 
sort, as attested by examples which survive (minus their wooden handles). 
Some exam~les are shown in Figure 19. 
Befor8 we attempt to choose between these two possibilities, we must note 
that the a~gument from typology alone may be misleading and ambiguous. 
There are vaious similar-looking implements of which the use would be 
difficult to infer from ths fOrm alone. Figure 2n shows an Indian hook, 
dating probably to the eighteenth century used by mahcut~ for controll~ng 
elephants (by pulling their ears and pushing their heads). Boat hooks 
u • ..+tdtt.> 
and well hool<s {for fishing out · \ost k') are similar in form (not illustrated 
Figure 2 1 is not properly a hook at all, but is a Japanese hooked spear 
(hoko), possibly more a;'tly described as like a falx with a spike; there 
is a cutting edge on the curved spur. Figure 2 2 shows a -~ra.b hook, 
used by air force fire origades for b{aking into aircraft (developed for 
canvas and light wood panels). The form is thus ambiguous. Turnin~ the 
argument round, Figure 23 shows a Japanese tool which is said to have 
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been a thatch hook (Knutsen, 1963. 47). This identification is open 
to a certain amount of doubt, since the tool very closely resembles 
the two-pronged spear used by the law enforcement officers, the spiked 
studs serving to catch hold of the loose Japanese clothing. However, 
the point has been made, and not positively refuted, that this was a 
thatch hook~ In this case, its use may have been different fro~ the 
west European varieties, and it might have been applied to the roof from 
the underside. So far as this argument can be taken, it shows that 
not all thatch hooks need be of the same pattern, and, by extension, 
that not all fire hooks need be of the same pattern. The fact that 
the identification of t~is implement is itself open to doubt is itself 
a further emphasis that we must be very cautious in applying typology. 
4.10.7 
The question which faces us is whether th8 Romas army used hooks like 
those shown in Figure 19 for firefighting. There is no evidence in this 
connection other than their form and the known preparedness of the army 
for firefighting (on this see also 7.9.5 & 7). Such hooks could also 
of course, have been used for pulling people off battlements and siege 
engines if their handles were long enoug~1. They could also have served 
as well hooks or boat hooks. In view of the amount of firefighting in 
which the army must have engaged (both in wars and also in peacetime 
with the many accidental fires which must have plagued their camps and 
forts), it is reasonable to sup~ose that these hocks were provided 
primarily for firefighting. All the surviving examples of these hooks 
which are known to me are from milit ary sites, (though note Manning's 
u 
caution as to 'Roman' or 1 native 1 in the case of the Brampton hook) and, 
few though they are,this may be some confirmation that the army was better 
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prepared for firefighting than the civilian population. (See 7.9.3 for 
the army assisting in civilian firefighting.) 
If it be accepted that such hooks were used for military firefighting, 
it tends to weight the interp~etation of uncus in this direction. There 
could thus hav~ been some borrowing from the army by the Vigiles. 
Possibly, also, the term 'uncus' is more appropriate for an implement 
consisting primarily of a hook, whereas the hook ladder (if such existed) 
would have attracted the nam~ by synecdoch e. The only direct evidence fur 
the "ferramenta" for climbing with does not, if must be observed, refer 
to the ~giles, but to the later matricarii (se8 Appendix!!). 
4.10.8. 
My own guess is that the Vigiles will have had more pressing needs to attend 
to than to try to climb up the outsides of buildings: they will surely 
have concentrated on forming instant bucket chains, and rescuing those 
inhabitants who could be got out most quickly. To anticipate a later 
section (4.13 ), it is probable that if hook ladders were used, it was 
not in sufficient numbers to justify a specialist named after them. In 
contrast, many of the firemen actually at the fire (as opposed to 
conveying water) will often have had good occasion to use smallish fire 
hooks. Indeed, one job which the modern fireman can use a jet of water 
from a hose for, knocking down loose pieces of ceiling before he enters 
a room, could only have been performed by the Vigiles with some sort of 
hook. 
On balance, then - and there is very little to tip the scales one way rather 
than the other, my feeling is that the uncus or uncinus was a smallish type 
of fire hook, like the modern ceiling hook. It was thus not a specialised tool; 
(14R) 
any fireman could have used it, just as any fireman could have used an 
axe. In a later section we consider why there was the specialist 
concerned with unci or uncini, the unc(in)arius. 
We have already looked briefly at the evidence for falces in service with 
the Vigiles, and have seen that the ~was different from the uncus. 
The sole mention of the falx in firefighting is on VI.3744:31075, which 
is datable to A.D.362 and which records a c~lebration involving the use 
of pumps, hooks and falces. The mention of the pumps and the hooks is 
our clue that fir8figh~ing equipment is involved, though it should be 
noted that thls inscription does not actually show that the Vigiles 
themselves were involved, nor, despite BR (P.9D), does it mention 
specialists conc~rned with the equipment. This inscription is discussed 
further in Appendix II. In particular, this inscription does not prove 
that the Vigiles still functioned in A.D.362. 
If we did believe that VI.3744 gave the names of technicians or officers 
in the Vigiles, we should have to try to explain why one of them - the 
falcarius - was not attested earlier. However, once it is recognised 
that equipment is attested, the problem is diminished. Indeed, to the 
same extent that the mention of the siphones and the ~ provides a 
connection with firefighting, so the appearance of the falces in this 
context prov~des evidence for the use of falces in firefighting. This 
implies that the Vigiles are likely to have used falces, even though they 
did not have a falcarius. 
Reference may be made to the discussions of falces noted in section 4.10 •. 2 
for the basic evidence and full range of .types of ~· In this present 
section, we need to note just two types. 
( 149) 
4.11 .. 2 
First, the ordinary sickle probably played an important part in 
firefighting in Rome~ in view of the large open spaces and the tendency 
of the vegetation to become dry in summero 
4.11.3 
Secondly, the .fi!125. such as the army used for demolition would have been 
of great value at fires in buildings. Milit ary writers describe their 
'-' 
uses thus: 
"asseribus falcatis detergebat pinnas" (Livy 38.5.3) 
"una erat magna usui res praeparata a nostris, falces praeacutae 
insertae adfixaeque longuriis, non absimili forma muralium falcium. 
His cum funes, qui antemnas ad malos destinabent, conprehensi adductique 
erant, navigio remis incitato praerumpebantur 11 (Caesar B.G.3.14) 
"falcibus vellum ac loricam rescindunt" (Caesar a.~.7.86) 
c r , '' The Greek name for the ~ is • ooevce6-rrJ.vov . This is in itself descriptive, 
but in addition Appian clearly describes the construction (ao~o5o119): 
•• ws 
White (1967) shows the wide range of falces available to the Vigiles. 
They range from the simple curved blade to the highly complex vine 
dresser's knife, with its six distinctive edges or spikes. There is no 
reason to suppose that the Vigiles adopted one type of ~ as standard. 
They probably used several types, including the versatile .fili arboraria 
with its cutting edge and h~ok on the back of the blades (see my Figure 2+). 
They would have been useful for demolishing roofs and timber structures 
and tearing down large hangings. 
( 150) 
Any fireman could have used a falxo It is interesting that the siohon 
and the uncus merited their own specialists, while the falx did not. 
For a discussion of this point please see section 4.24. 
4.12.1 
The svidence for the use of ballistae by the Vigiles is adequate to 
establish the fact, though it falls far short of establishing all the 
details which ~t would be desirable to know. Suetonius (~ 38) refers 
to the use of ballistae at the fire in A.D.64 though without actually 
naming them (see below)_, and the abbreviated titles OP.B (VI.1057.4.[ 6] ), 
OPT B (1057.7.[1] ), and DP BA (1058.4[4 J) are most plausibly expanded 
to read optio ballistarum or optio ballistae. Similarly, the B [ ••• 
on VI.3744 = 31075 of A.D.362 (see Appendix II) should probably be 
expanded ballistis, since the inscription refers to firefighting 
equipment. (The A BAL may also have been concerned with ballistaeJ 
Such as it is, then, the evidence for ballistae and optiones ballistarum 
in the Vigiles belongs to the third and fourth centuries, by which tim~ 
ballistae were of two types: stone-throw~rs or arrow-firers (the former 
being obsolete in the. fourth century according to Marsden 1969, 1 89). 
In A.D. 64 the question is not which type of ballista was in use (at 
this stage the arrow-firer had not been invented: Marsden p.189), but 
whether the Vigiles were themselves equipped with them. The use of 
ballistae is indicated in the following pas33ge (Suetonius Nero 38): 
"horrea ••• ut bellicis machinis labefacta ••• quod saxeo muro constructs 
erant" 
For my interpretation of this:whole passage and for comments on the 
quality of bhe firefighting in 64 see below, 7.3.5. For the purposes 
(151) 
of this section we should note that in the first century these machines 
could only have been ballistae of the stone-throwing type. It would have 
been quite possible for the Vigiles to borrow these machines with operators 
from the Praetorians (cf. Marsden, pp. 185 and 194f). The later evidence 
suggests that the Vigiles acquired their owh. By the fourth century, 
the stone-throwing typ8 of ballista had generally been superseded by the 
onager (Marsden p.189), which is not attested in the \ligiles at all. The 
Vigiles seem not to have replaced their ballistae with onagri; there is 
no evidence for any other sort of artillery in the Vigiles. 
4.12.3 
BR (83 and 94) does not see why the Vigiles should have been equipped with 
~llistae, though he thought (p.97) that they might have been used for 
launching fire grenades (on the non-existence of which cf 4.21.10). 
Domaszewski (19CS p.1D) suggested that they were for demolishing dangerous 
walls. Marsden (1969,194), without arguing the point, favoured 11 the 
view that, which8ver type of artillery they possessed[.i.e. stone-throwers 
or arrow-firers], the Vigiles employed it for police work 11 • 
Yet there is not a real problem connected with the employment of ballistae 
in firefighting. The brief passage of Suetonius is sufficient to 
demonstrate this. Gunpowucr had not yet been invented, and how else could 
stone and other solid walls have been demolished speedily and from a 
distance? Probably the suggestion that they were for demolishing tottering 
walls is a little too precise; the major use would have been for creating 
fire breaks, as Suetonius describes. For the extent to which ballistae 
are likely to have been used in the course of firefighting, see sections 
4.12.6 & 7 below on the value of demolition. 
(152) 
4.12.4 
Marsden (192) suggests that a team of about 10 or 11 men would comfortably 
have operated one ballista. Despite the appearance of just two optiones 
ballistae or ballistarum on Vlo1057 (Marsden finds three, p.193), Marsden 
supposes that the Vigiles had one ballista in each century (possibly 
by analogy with the legions). However, since the ballistae formed part 
of the reinforcements and were not carried round by the patrols (which 
corresponded to our 'first attendance'), they are more likely to have 
been allotted ~o the cohort itself and to have been taken to a fire and 
operated by the stand-by centuries. Since they were not a first line of 
defence against fire, we cannot calculate hew many will have been needed. 
But in view of manpower needs elsewhere, it is unlikely that more than 
the equivalent of one century could be spared for operating ballistae; 
and one century could operate 8 ballistae before A.Do205 and 16 after 
that date. As long as the patrols worked effectively, there would have 
been little use for the ballistae. On the other hand, once a fire got out 
of hand and started to spread, the Vigiles would have had to rely on the 
ballistae more than on any of their other 6quipment. 
4.12.5 
The purpose of demolishing buildings is to create a fire break, and this 
will normally not be done unless it is certain that a ii~e cannot be 
extinguished and that the only hope is to contain it and let it burn 
itself out. The fire of AeD.64 is the only accasion on which we know the 
Romans used this technique, though the ~ and the uncuG probably helped 
with demolition •. Is demolition likely to have been used as a regular 
tethnique by the Romans? 
( 153) 
Fire can spread in three ways: convection, radiation and conduction. 
"At large fires, convection and radiation probably produce the greatest 
fire spread, but conduction is often a contributory cnuse" (Manual 
6a, p.65)o The effect 8f convection causing smoke and heat to rise is 
well knowne What is less well known is that burning materials can 
the~selves be carried by convection (Manual 6a, p.67): 
"Flying brands are the result of convection and direct burning. The 
uprush of heated air above the fire carries small pieces of flaming 
material solitetimes to a great height, anc.t any wind there can drive 
them a considerable distance. Such brands alighting on combustible 
material will ignite it." 
This is how the first Great Fire of London, in 1212, leapt the River 
Thames. The fire broke out in Southwark, south of the Thames, and 
flaming brands set light to houses on the north side of London Bridge. 
Those who had gathered on the bridge to watch the fire could not escape, 
and were either burned or drowned, to a total of 3,000 fatalities 
(Blackstone 1957, 11). It is probable that this convection effect was 
ultimately responsible for the story in Dio (55.29.8), according to 
which crows flew down and removed burning meat from the altar where it 
was being sacrificed, and then dropped ~t on the Hut of Romulus, setting 
it alight. The burning material could Bdsily have been carried by 
convection currents; the presence of the crows (which is not in itself 
implausible)probably lent a superstitious atmosphere to the story. More 
recently, the fire storms of World War Two were a deliberate exploitation 
of the effect. It is evident that a fire break will be an unreliable method 
of stopping a fire which has created stron~ convection currents. 
On the other hand, a fire break will be more use against the spread of fire 
by radiation (Manual 6a, 64): 
( 154) 
"Radiation is a potent cause of fire spread when it has attained any 
magnitude, and is a frequent cause of a serious fire 'jumping' from 
one side of a street to the othere The intensity of radiation 
diminishes rapidly with distance, so that an open space of sufficient 
width is the most effective type of fire brake [ s.:h.£)." 
Nowadays buildings in danger from radiation will normally be cooled 
either by drenchers (a system rather like sprinklers but with the water 
applied over the outer face of the building) or by water sprays. Clearly 
these methods will sometimes create great rl8mands on the water supply, 
and the use of water sprays will require the use of powerful pumps. 
Both of these disarlvari_tages will have hit the Romans more seriously than 
they hit us today, and-demolition would thus appear at first sight to have 
been a more suitable technique for them. 
Demolition does carry its own limitations, however. One - which in most 
societies is the major one - is that a man's house might be demolished 
needlesely as it turns out; and thus there might well be battles between 
the authoritias and the householders before any demolition could take 
place. There could be special provision in the law to enable firemen to 
carry out demolitions in the face of opposition (e.g. the death penalty 
in the city of Stockholm for those who obstructed demolition), though 
no such provision is found in Roman law. In this case, however, the 
authority of the emperor and their military discipline could have given 
the Vigiles the advantage. 
But there are also technical limitations. First, if it takes a long time 
to create a fire break the fire will overtake the line of the proposed fire 
break. Secondly, the resultant debris must be removed, since a building 
lying in a heap~~ will probably burn even better that when it was 
standing. 
(155) 
Blackstone's account of the second Great Fire of London, that of 1666, 
brings out these technical limitations clearly (pp.44ff, based largely on 
Pepys' Diary): 
"Demolition was started, but too late; again the flames reached the 
resultant debrls before iG was cleared and soon the north side of 
[ Cheapside ] was involved ••• 
The use of gunpowder for clearing fire-breaks had been Lecommended on 
Sunday by a small naval party who had been called in, but the advice 
was disregarded on the gr6unds that it was too dangerous and might 
cause fire in the houses ·blown up. Now with more than half the City 
involved, dockyardsmen from Woolwich and Deptford were called in and 
a larger party of S?ilors arrived with permission to use powder. 
Pepys saw to it that they were put to work on the east side of the fire, 
ostensibly to protect the Tower but perhaps with the Admiralty office 
and his own house in Seething Lane in view. They started demolition 
on the north side of Tower Street, placing a barrel full of powder 
in each house-and igniting them by a train. The explosion lifted and 
broke the timber frame so that the building collapsed; then, handy 
with chain and rope, the seamen dragged the debris up the side streets 
and away from the advancing flames. 
Here the fire was stopped ••• " 
Pepys' entry in his Diary for Wednesday~ 5th September, 1666, reads as 
follows: 
"Back to the fire and there find greater hopes than I expected. By 
the blowing up of houses and the great help by the '•'orkmen out of the 
King's yards there is good stop given to it, as well at the Mark Lane 
end as ours." 
4.12.6 
Without the gunpowder the demolition would have been too slow, and 
without the aid of the workmen the demolished buildings could not have been 
removed in time. This throws considerable light on which was possible in 
(156) 
Rome. We can take it that the Vigiles would have been capable of dragging 
away any debris which they created, but it is less certain that they could 
have demolished the buildings speedily. Col. Gordon's experience of 
destroying Wazir huts is relevant here (described in Appendix IV). 
Although many of the buildings in Rome were of timber and at all periods 
there are references to the collapses of buildings, it should be borne in 
mind that as time went on - and ~articularly from the second half of the 
first century A.D. - an increasing proportion of the buildings were 
built of brick and concrete, and these wou2d have been very difficult to 
demolish with the equipment available. In addition, demolition would 
have been a considerable drain on manpower, and it is probable that the 
first priority would have been given to trying to extinguish the fire with 
water. It is, indeed, significant that the only time when we hear of th8 
use of demolition, in A.D.64, is when the fire was obviously inextinguishable 
and in this case use was made of ballistae. 
4.12.7 
It would seem, then, that demolition would not have been a primary technique 
in Rome, and it was probably confined, in the majority of fires, to small-
scale removal of burning material. This was near to the limit of the tools 
available. The choice which faced the Vigiles was worse than that faced 
in later times. After the invention of gunpowder there was a good 
alternative to trying to extinguish the fire with water; and, around the 
end of the seventeenth century, the development of more powerful pumps 
provided a good alternativa to gunpowder. The Vigiles had three possible 
courses open to them: relying on potentially inadequate pumps, risking the 
waste of their resources in demolitions, and catching fires while they were 
still small and so avoiding the need to use either of the two alternatives. 
This last course was the purpose of the patrols. Their importance cannot be 
exaggerated. 
(157) 
4.13.1 
We do not hear of the Vigiles using ladders, though BR is undoubtedly 
right to presume that they will have used ladders (p.96). Indirect 
confirmation is found in the Digest, which includes ladders in the list 
of domestic firefighting equipment (33.7.12.18). 
4.13.2 
It is uncertain whether these ladders would have been hinged or extending. 
The only illustrations of ladders in use with the Roman army, on Trajan's 
Column, show 'simple ladders, without hinges and not extending (Cichorious 
1896-1900, Taff. LXXXiii,301; LXXXIV, 302). A hinged fly-ladder is 
incorporated in the sambuGa as described by Biton (see next paragraph). 
Another possible type of ladder was the hook ladder, discussed briefly 
above (at 4.10.5). Possibly, also, chain ladders were used (Figure 25 
shows a modern example). 
In addition to this range of smaller ladders, we have to reckon with the 
possibility that ladders more like the large wheeled ladders of modern 
times were in use. The sambuoa or tollenno, as described respectively 
by Biton (57-61) and Vegetius (~ ~ ~· 4.21), is the only mobile 
ladder for use on land that is attested, and for an account of this 7 -
and of the various problems concerned with reconstructing it-we can best 
refer to Ma~sden (1971, 92ff). This machine (which differed considerably 
from the sambuoae mounted on ships, and using their masts for support) 
consisted of a chassis with a trestle mounted on it, at the top of which 
was a bracket to support a long ladder which could be elevated or depressed. 
There was provision for a heavy counterweight to assist rotation of this 
bracket and the ladder. The hinged fly-ladder was to assist men in getting 
on to the main ladder. 
~ 
(158). 
This sambuca or tollenno was potentially very useful for getting men 
on to enemy walls or towers, though it does not appear in any accounts 
v 
of actual sieges. Its usefulness in firefighting must be reckoned as 
rather lesso The long ladcc~ is said to have been 60 feet long, and 
it is made in one piece; thus there would have been difficulties in 
manoeuvring it round the st~eets. Secondly, the machine would have been 
too heavy to take to fires, particularly if we include in the total load 
the weights to be used at the counterpoise - possibly in the region of 
2 to 3 tons. 
4.13.4 
Aeneas Tacticus refers to the use (by an army under siege) of boar and stag 
nets and rope ladders for rapid retreats over the wall by men gathering 
stones, and they may also descend in the baskets intended for putting the 
stones in (3B.7f). At a fire, such devices would have taken up valuable 
time from activities with greater chance of success, and they are unlikely 
to have been used much, if at all, by the Vigiles. 
4.14.1 
We have met the term 1 ferramenta 1 in connection with the equipment used 
by the matricarii (A.D.535 and later: see Appendix II) and considered the 
possibility that it included some sort of hook ladder (4.10.5; 4.13.2). 
'Ferramenta' is, of course, a general nawe for iron tools and implements, 
and it includes the range of equipment which is often very versatile and 
now has the ~arne of 'small gear•. 
Small gear varies according to the type of situation and the type of 
appliance in attendance. It usually includes a full range of carpenter's 
(159) 
tools, metal-cutting tools and a fair range of builder's tools, together 
with any special equipment for particular local hazards. For example, 
appliances which may have to work on or near railw~y lines may carry 
train sirens so that a watchman can give warning of approaching trainso 
Again, an ordinary plastic dustpan with brush is very versatile, since 
it can be used for clearing up generally, baling water, or col~ecting 
evidence if there are suspicious circumstances. Naturally the usefulness 
of such equipment depends very much on the initiative of the individual 
firemen. 
Among other equipment of this general type, though somewhat larger, are 
jacks, lifting gear, and lighting sets, which may be carried on an 
emergency tender or an ordinary appliance. At the largest scale, there 
are special vehicles with winches and cranes which tend to be used most 
frequently at motorway crashes. 
Much of the above equipment is used in rescue work or in getting at fires, 
as opposed to actually extinguishing fires. In the case of the Vioiles, 
t~e should not think in terms of extensive rescue work not connected with 
fires.· The nightly patrols will have had their time filled with looking 
for fires and putting them out, and any additional work of a "civil 
defence" nature must have been secondary. Their small gear must have 
included a full range of tools for breaking in to buildings, together 
with equipment to supplement their axes for demolition directly connected 
with firefighting and rescues. It has also been suggested to me by Sig. 
Magrini that the Vigiles will have used many nails, both for temporary 
repairs and propping up collapsing buildings, and also for making footholds 
when access had to be improvised. 
(160) 
It follows that most of their small gear will have been in the nature of 
carpenter's and builder's tools. If they also used larger pieces of equipment 
such as winches, these will not have been used so frequently, and the 
Vigiles might have relied on builders to provide the~ when necessar.yo 
We should note the possibility that the Vigile~ used emer;sncy lighting: 
for the evidence which might well concern this, see section 4.31. 5-7 on 
sebaciaria. 
For the wide ~ange of tools available to the Vigiles, reference may be 
made to any of the larger museum catalogues or excavation reports. 
4.15.1 
Scopae are included in the list of domestic firefiyhting equipment in 
the Digest ( 33.7. 12.18 ), but are not otherwise attested in connection 
with firefighting. BR (p.97) writes of them: "Scopae are brooms made 
of twigs; it is difficult to see how these were used in fire-fighting, 
unless we are here in the presence of a technical use of the word." 
4.15.2 
We may accept that the scopae were brooms made of twigs, just like the 
most common type of broom used in Italy today. As such they closely 
resemble a type of fire-beater, in which the twigs, bristles or flails help 
to extinguish a fire by breaking up the burning material, depriving the 
fire of fuel. If this analogy is valid, then 'scopae 1 in the Digest 
passage is being used in a special and possibly technical sense, of 
"firebeater". 
4.16.1 
Sponges are included in the list of household firefighting equipment 
(Digest 33.7e12.18) and are attested as being carried to fires by the 
(161) 
later matricarii (Schol. luliani antecessoris in Const.xxiii.BB; and 
also see Appendix 11). BR (p.97), somewhat at a loss as to their use, 
suggested that "possibly they were for sluicing water over walls to 
prevent their catching fire so easily 11 o But buckets would have been 
more effective and more readily available. Blackstone (1957,3), in 
one of his rare references to other historians of firefighting, 
commented thus: 
11 nor can any fireman accept the theory of classical scholars who have 
made the Vigiles their study that the sponges were used for sluicing 
water over the burning buildings. Perhaps they were used with the 
brooms for clearing ~p water damage after the fire and the modern 
salvage tencier was a~ticipated by nearly two thousand years." 
The 11 brooms 11 to which he refers are the scopae (firebeaters), on which 
see 4.15. 
Blackstone appears less implausible than BR on this point, but he is 
unlikely to be right. Although there is nothing inherently improbable 
in the provi~ion of salvage gear, the remainder of the items in the list 
in the Diges~ are all for actual firefighting, and we should therefore 
consider the possibility that the sponges might have been used in 
firefighting rather than salvage. 
There is, in fact, one ot~gr possible use, and that is as a face mask, 
to prevent the breathing of smoke. The effect of some such protection.is 
so obvious that it must have occurred to the Vigiles - as it evidently did 
to householders. The technique is not, it is true, completely satisfactory 
and the Manual specifically warns against its use (6a, p.6D): 
"Wet face cloths, wet sponges, etc., remove some of the larger 
particles when smokey air is inhaled, but give no protection against 
asphyxiation from oxygen deficiency or excess or carbon dioxide, or 
poisoning from excess of carbon monoxide, and accordingly tend to give 
( 162) 
a false sense of security. Their use is not recommended" ....;..;..;=;;.._____ ' 
[ Home Office italics ] 
But despite such warnings, people do persist in using smoke filters, nor 
is the effect always dangerouso Very often there is sufficient oxygen 
available for firefighting and rescues to be performed without the aid 
of breathing apparatus, and, indeed, many types of fire only burn well 
when there is plenty of oxygen. When it is remembered that the Vigiles, 
without hoses or powerful pumps, would have had every reason for entering 
buildings, and that, moreover, it was usual for Roman rooms to open into 
the fresh air or at mo~t communicate with the open air by one other room 
or by a passage, the use of sponges would not have been as dangerous as 
the modern fireman might expect. This interpretation gains support from 
the matricarii text: why should sponges have been brought to the fire in 
the first attendance, if not for use as smoke filters? Since every fire 
could potentially have become a wide conflagration, salvage equipment ·~auld 
surely have waitedo Nor would the Romans have had any clear notions about 
the dangers from carbon monoxide or excesses of carbon dioxide: if they 
felt light-headed, they would just have come out and let a relief take 
their place. 
It is probable that the Vigiles used sponges as smoke filters, though since 
wet cloths and even moust3~hb3 can serve just as well we should not think of 
the whole patrol as carrying sponges. On the other hand, a certain number 
will probably have been carried by the patrols, since the pa~rols had to 
get at the fire and start the rescues before any reinforcements could 
arrive. 
On ropes, there is little that can be said in detail. Ropes are not even 
included in the list of domestic firefighting equipment (Dig.33.7.12.1B), 
though in view of the military uses of ropes (and cf. Aeneas T8cticus 
38.7f., above 4.13o4) the Vigiles are more likely to have used them than 
are civilians. Figures 1 and 2 show various uses of ropes in connection 
with firefighting and rescues at the fire in Naples, and it is possible 
that the Vigiles used them in similar ways. It should, however, be 
remembered that the Vigiles had less chance of extinguishing a fire once 
it got out of hand, and that the extent to which they could use ropes in 
the ways. illustrated were correspondingly reduced. Also, they had a 
smaller range of equi~ment which would be useful high up in a building and 
which would need to be hauled aloft. In general, of course, the ways in 
which ropes were used depended primarily on the initiative of the individual 
firemen. 
4.17.2 
Pliny describes ropes made of esparto in such a way as to imply that they 
were suitable for firefighting (~.~.19.29f): 
"Hinc autem tunditur ~partum] ut fiat utile, praecipue in aquis mariqus 
invictum: in sicco praeferunt e cannabi funes; set spartum alitur etiam 
demersum, veluti natalium sitim pensans. est quidem eius natura interpolis, 
rursusque quam libeat vetustum novo mlscetur. verumtamen conpelectatur animo 
qui valet miraculum aestumare quanta sit in usu omnibus terris navium 
armamentis, machinis aedificationum aliisque desideriis vitae." 
They were strong, good in wet and dry situations, and easy to repair. 
4.17.3 
It has been suggested that the term 1 sparteoli 1 as applied to the Vigiles 
should be referred to the type of bucket used by them (above, 4.7.3). 
Ropes were not a distinctive or prominent feature of Roman firefighting, 
and we do not need to consider a derivation connected with ropes. 
( 164) 
4.18.1 
Centones are attested in domestic firefighting (Dig.33.7.12.18) and 
in military use as described beluw; and collegia centonariorum assisted 
with urban firefighting in the western part of the Empire (for the basic 
evidence for the use of collegia centonariorum, which is epigraphic,see 
de Ruggiero, s.v., and also the discussion below at 7.9.4). Whether, 
and how far, the Vigiles used ce,,tones, is the question most in need of 
our attention. 
4.18.2 
The only extant descriptions of centones actually in use in connection 
with firefighting concern their use by the army. In each case they were 
fixed around siege engines, towers or ships. Sisenna (4, fr.107) records: 
11 puppis aceta madefactis centonibus integuntur, quos supra perpetua ac 
laxe suspensa cilicia obtenduntur 11 ~ 
The vinegar (acetum) was intended to make the centones fire-tesisting 
(see below, 4.21.4 & B). Caesa~ describes the use of ce~tones in 
conjunction with protective layers of various materials (!.£.2, 9 and 10): 
11 aamque contabulationem summam lateribus lutoque constraverunt, ne 
quid ignis hostium nocerF. posset, centon8squ1> insuper inicierunt, ne 
aut tela tormentis immissa tabulationem perfingerent aut saxa ex 
catapultis Jatericium discuterent,. 11 
11 lateribus lutoque musculu9 ut ab igni qui ex muro iaceretur tutus 
esset contegitur. super lateres coria inducuntur, ne canalibus aqua 
immissa latera diluere posseto coria autem, ne rursus igni ae lapidibus 
corrumpantur, centonibus conteguntur. 11 
Mere exposura to fire (e.g. by radiation) could have been countered by the 
use of tiles and clay; the .££.'2~' like the coria, provided protection 
against physical blows as well. Vitruvius describes a fairly elaborate 
protection against blows for a~~~~~ (10.14.3): 
(165) 
11 percrudis coriis duplicibus consutis, fartis alga aut paleis in 
aceta maceratis, circa tegatur machina tota. ita ab his reicientur plagae 
ballistarum et impetus incendiorum." 
A little earlier, he ref8rs to the use of rawhides for protection against 
blow (Diades 1 tower, 10.13.5); 
"tegebat autem coriis crudis, ut ab omni plaga essent tutae." 
The use of rawhides was long-established, bei,lg mentioned by Aeneas 
Tacticus (32). 
4.18.3 
These military centones~were clearly different f~om those in use in 
civilian firefighting, since there was no nEed to protect civilian buildings 
from physical blows. The difference need not have been other than in size, 
however. In the r1ormal way, centnnes were made 8f scraps of cloth or 
leather, anrl were either thick stuff like a bla~ket or else padded like 
quilts or mattresses. (Thes. Ling. Latos.v.). It is quite probable that 
the protection for the testudo described by Vitruvius (1D.14o3) was 
called 'cento'. 
4.18.4 
In the majority of civilian firefighting - both by ~legia ~ntonariorum 
and by ordinary individuals - the centones were probably ordinary fire 
blankets. These can oe used to smother practically any type of fire while 
it is still small, and do not require a groat deal of preparation (other 
than the actual provision of blankets). Centones made of cloth are more 
flexible than leather, and this is probably why we do not find collegia 
coriariorum engaging in firefighting. It is unlikely that fire blankets 
were made of asbestos, like the modern ones. Asbestos ~as known, in Africa 
at least, to be incombustible, but its only use was for making incombustible 
(166) 
table napkins (Pliny !•tl•19.4.19f), useful amid the dangers of a banquet, 
but not progressing beyond a novelty. 
Centones could also have been used as protective clothing. though there 
is no explicit evidence for this in connection with firefighting. 
(Cassar records the use of centones and coria for making clothing to 
give protection against arrows, apparently without success: ~.£.3.44.7; 
45-46.1) 
4.18.5 
The common use of colle·gia centoniariorum in firefighting is explicable 
by the general lack of adequate supplies of water for firefighting (both 
lack of actual water and also lack of means to get water on to a fire). 
4.18.6 
We know that the Vigiles made widespread use of water for firefighting and 
that they had to carry buckets with them on thei= patrols. It is most 
unlikely that they used blankets in addition. Their sole use for blankets, 
in fact, would not have been for firefighting itself, but for rescues, 
in situations where the only way to get people out of a building quickly 
was via the windows. Jumping from windows - or throwing people out - is 
not a totally successful method of escape or rescue, since untrained people 
are liable to break their ankles, backs or necks. As a last resort, however, 
it is difficult to argue against it. The Vigiles are unlikely to have 
provided their own ~tones since they had rnor'3 useful procedures open to them. 
4.19.1 
The bucinator is the only instrumentalist attested in the Vigiles. His 
abbreviated title BVCC, BVC or 8V occurs five times on VI.1057: twice in 
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Century 1, and once each in Centuries 4, 6 and 7. It survives three 
times on VI.105B, though there may have been other examples in the 
damaged portions of the stone. VI.221 records a "buc(inator) in (centuria)''· 
-- ' 
since on 1057 there is not one bucinator per century, this title presumably 
means that, although the bucinatores functioned at cohort level, this 
particular one was carried on the books of this particular century. A 
bucinator of the Seventh Cohort is attested at Ostia (XIV.4526a). 
4.19.2 
BR (p.BB, ~.1) refers to Vegetius 2.22 for the distinction between 
bucinatores and cornicines and tubicines, the latter pair sounding tactic31 
or field calls while the former sound barrack or routine calls, and 
concludes: "~us the latter[ cornicen and tubicen] do not appear in the 
Vigiles." However, the military analogy is not particularly apt, since 
a large amount of the signalling of the Vigiles must have been alarms 3~d 
calls to turn out. For such signalling the bucina was a natural choice, 
being in genB~al use for various types of summoning over considerable 
distances (Th8s. Ling. Lat., s.v.). 
4.19.3 
It is open to doubt whether the Vigiles used any sort of instrument for 
giving instructions in th2 co~rse of actual firefighting. Braidwood 
experimented with various audible signals, and writes thus (1830,47): 
"Amidst the noise and confusion which more or less attend all fires, 
I have found considerable difficulty in being able to convey the necessary 
orders to the firemen in such a manner as not to be liable to 
misapprehension. I have tried a speaking-trumpet; but, finding it of 
no advantage, it was speedily abandoned; It appeared to me indeed, 
that while it increased the sound of the voice, by the deep tone which 
it gave, it brought it into greater accordance with the surrounding 
noise. I tried a boatswain's call, which I have found to answer much 
better. Its shrill piercing note is so unlike any other sound usually 
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heard at a fire, that it immediately attracts the attention of the 
firemen. By varying the calls, I have now established a mode of 
communication not easily misunderstood, and sufficiently precise 
for the circumstances to which it is adapted, and which I now find 
to be a very great convenience." 
The first four of the calls which he described were to distinguish the 
four pumps and their crews, and the nine other calls were all instructions 
c6ncerned with the operations of the pump. No call was concerned with 
anything else, and Braidwoo~ evidently did not find any use for other 
calls. Since the siphon would not have demanded the complicated orders 
of the Edinburgh pumps~ the Vigiles are unlikely to have needed anything 
to supplement shouted Lnstructions. 
4.19.4 
For sounding alarms, the Vigiles needed a means of warning the inhabitants, 
a means of informing the home station (whether castra or excubitorium), 
and a means of summoning assistance from another cohort. Dio (54.4) writes 
of night guards in cities carrying bells ( ;:wSwvo4oeovcr-tv) 
to warn the inhabitants - a passage referring specifically to a dream of 
Augustus in 22 B.C. but probably reflecting a general practice of Oio's 
own day aiso. It is possible that the Vigiles carried bells, particularly 
since there were not enough butinatores to operate one with each century. 
However, the problem was not to warn the inhabitants - any loud noise 
would have worked. It was more important to have a reliable method of 
informing the home station of fires and of the need for assistance. To 
have used bucinae for this would have necessitated a very large number of 
calls, to identify the location of the fire and the type of reinforcements 
required, and runners must have been used (in pairs, for reliability). 
At the level of the patrols, then, it was both pointless and disadvantageous 
to use bucinae. l~here they would have been useful, and indeed essential, 
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was in signalling from one station to another. It would have been easy to 
hear a trumpet across the roofs of Rome, and a relatively small number of 
signals would have been needed. In addition, the bucinatores would have 
sounded alarm calls within the stations themselves. If it was normal to 
have about five bucinatores per cohort (as there were in the Fifth Cohort 
in A.D.205, VI41057), there were sufficient to maintain 24 hour cover at 
the castra, possibly with two bucinatores being detached to the excubitoria 
at night, and luith a furthel' one being stationed at Ostia or Portus. 
Even if there was just one station each at Ostia and Portus, there was still 
a need for bucinatores to sound alarm calls within the stations and to 
sound routine calls. 
4.19.5 
Confirmation that bucinae were used for fire alarms comes from Pstronius 
(Sat.74), in a passage which shows that trumpets signified either a fire 
or a death, on some occasions at least: 
"Haec dicente eo gallus gallinaceus cant~vit. Qua voce confusus 
Trimalchio vinum sub mensa iussit effund1 lucernamque etiam mero spargi. 
Immo anulum traiecit in dexteram manum et 1 Non sine causa' inquit 'hie 
bucious signum dedit; nam aut incendium oportet fiat, aut aliquis in 
vicinis animam abiciat. Longe a nobis. Itaque quisquis hunc indicem 
attulerit corollarium accipiet~" 
4.20 
In these days of motorised fire appliance3 it is natural to wonder whether 
the Vigiles usad horses. In more modern times, horses WRre used when the 
pumps and ladders were too heavy to carry and engines had not been invented, 
b4t until the eighteenth century it was very common for all hauling of 
equipment to be done by men. 
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Basically, however, the Vigiles were a different sort of fire brigade, 
since their first attendance was not the arrival of pumps and ladders, 
but the patrol 1 equipped with buckets and axeso With the number of men 
available for patrols, there was an excellent opportunity Par detecting 
and extinguishing fires before they reached the size at which pumps would 
be ~ecessaryo Thus the sort of situation in which horses were used in 
more recent times did not exist for the Vigiles. 
There are two situations in which the Vigiles might have used horses. 
We shall see, in conneption with sebaciaria, that the~e is some evidence 
that the sebaciarius rdde a horse (below, 4.31.5-7). Here, the horse 
served to carry torches and also to carry a messenger to summon 
reinforcements. Secondly, we cannot rule out the possibility that when 
pumps were summoned they were brought on horses or in carts pulled by 
horses. The surface of the streets of Rome, and their steepness and 
narrowness, must have restricted the use of carts to the main thoroughfares, 
so that, even if horses could be used in some areas, the Vigiles must 
none the less have been prepared to manhandle all their equipment. 
This minimal use of horses need not surprise us, nor imply that the 
Viqiles must have been seriously restricted. There are plenty of analogies 
in recent times for the sole use of manpower for conveying equipment 
(e.g. pumps carried shoulder-high in India), and, overall, the distances 
to be covered in Rome were comparatively small. With 21 fire stations 
spread throughout the City (see 7.10, esp. 7.1D.B, for their distribution), 
there would have been a very short time interval between taking the 
equipment out of the fire station and placing it ready for use at the fire. 
The lack of need for horses arose directly from the provision of the patrols 
and the distribution of the fire stations. 
( 171) 
4.21.1 
I )/'z: I ( ) This section is concerned with 1 acetum' or o::, o.s . BR p. 97 has this 
to say on it: "We are familiar nowadays with chemical fire-extinguishers, 
and it is instructive to find a beginning of this in Roman times. It 
is quite possible that this acetum was enclosed in vessels which were 
thrown into the fire after the manner of the present~day ·'Hand-grenade~ 
type of extinguisher. (If this is so, the projecting of these vessels 
may be a possible use for the Ballistae, if such existed.) Its principal 
use, however, appears to have been to soak the centones. 11 Ballistae and 
centones are discussed at 4.12 and 4.18; we now examine the evidence for 
4.21.2 
We cannot approach the study of acetum in quite the same way as for axes or 
buckets. With equipment like the latter items, it is quite justifiable 
to assum3 in the absence of detailed discussion that a resourceful Roman 
fireman could have used them in the same sorts of ways as a resourceful 
modern fireman, and, indeed, it would be unreasonable not to do so. Acetum, 
however, cannot be understood simply as a chemical. We have to look at its 
uses with some considerable precision, and see what its effects are llkely 
to have been1 and this means deciding what acetum actually was and what 
its chemical and physical properties actually were. Indeed, the fire 
grenades to which BR refers are a salutary reminder that actual effectiveness 
may vary widely from the e~~ected effectiveness (which may be illusory). 
These devices consisted of glass containers which contained water to which 
chemicals had been added, and upon the outbreak of a fire they fell from 
their mountings or broke (if they were fixed on the ceiling) or else were 
thrown on to the fi~e. The resulting discharge of dilute chemical was 
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supposed to be more effective than water on its own. The fact is, however, 
that these were not more effective than plain water, and the method of 
application was not very efficient, and thei~ reputation suffered a 
considerable setback when a factory which manufactured them caught fire 
and burned to the ground. They have not been made now for several decades, 
though there are still premises which have them installedo One can only 
hope that these remaining ones are never put to the teste Their owners' 
faith in them is quite unshakable. Extinguishers in which a chemical 
Deaction produces gas which drives out water are, of course, something 
different, since the extinguishing agent is the water. Chemical 
I 
extinguishment of fire~ is possible, though only in specialised cases, 
where the extinguishant is selected for the particular risk. 
4.21.3 
Although the lack of a precise chemical knowledge produced considerable 
confUsion in ancient terminology for identifying substances, there is no 
doubt about the mature of 'acetum' or '~s0s' . In practically every 
example of its use where the meaning may be inferred it denotes vinegar 
or sour wine (Tac.Hist. 5.6 appears to bo a unique exception). It 
included c~th spoiled wine and also vinegar specially produced, but from 
the point of view of its availability it is vital to remember that it also 
included the cheap and everyday wine of the Roman armyi th3ir vin ordinaire 
(Davies 1971,124). Thus the term 'vinegar', though chemically accurate, 
has a narrower application than 'acetum' or •'~~ o~ 1 • Chemically this 
ou+tc. 
substance was dilute~acid (or ethanoic acid), and as sucn it was the 
commonest diluts acid available in ancient times. It was used e;enerally for a 
wide range of purposes: cleaning, flavouring, disinfecting, preserving, 
as a refrigerant drug, and even for magiC {Thes.Ling.Lat., s.v. de usu). 
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Its use in connection with what may loosely be termed firefighting has 
produced the greatest controversy over any of its uses, and to this we 
now turn. 
4.21.4 
There are just three pieces of evidence that acetum was used for 
throwing on to fires. Firsi, Aeneas Tacticus describes its usc as 
V' 
follows (34): 
) A ' 1crx.veot ~rv:F:u<:J.IJI'f: 
) , If £~0. lTT(;Tci.L. 
"If the enemy tries to set anything on fire ~1.i.th powerful incendiary 
,, 
equipment you must pLLt out the fire with o~o5 , fo:;:- then it cannot easily 
be ignited again ••• ~ 
Aeneas' cxplanat.ion that the use of ~~05 is to prevent the n.atarial from 
being ignited again is probably intended to show why ordinary water was not 
to be used. Secondly, ~~is included in the Digest's list of firefighting 
equipment which may be found in houses (33.7.12.18, quoted above at 4~5.) 
Thirdly, acetum was used in fire-setting (the technique of heating rock and 
then cooling it suddenly in orde:;:- to break it) •. This is described by Livy 
(21.37.2f), referring to Hannibal in 218 B.C. 
"Inde ad rupem muniendam per quam unam via esse poterat milites ducti, 
cum caedendum esset saxum, arboribus circa immanibus deiectis detruncatisque 
struem ingentem lignorum faciunt, eamque, cum et vis venti apta faciendo 
igni coorta esset, succendunt ardentiaque saxa infuse aceto putrefaciunt. Ita 
torridam incendio rupem ferro pandunt molliuntque anfractibus modicis 
clivos ut non iumenta solum sed elephanti etiam deduci possent." 
Pliny also refers to this technique, more briefly (N.tl.33.71): 
"occ~rsant in iltroque genera silicas; hos igne et .aceto rumpunt, saepius 
vero, quoniam id cuniculos vapore et fumo strangulat, caedunt fractariis 
CL libras ferri habentibus ••• " 
And there are other mentions of it (Diodorus 3.12-13; ~itruvius 8.3.19). 
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More generally, vinegar and sour wine were held in high esteem as 
coolants. Plutarch praised them thus (£.Co~~· 652F): 
,, ) (" ' ('' "' / ,, ' / 
ooc)fV cit Tl.o.!V 6~1:-cJ\"'e•wv O~ov_s nvet ~~X'VWTeeov, 
J \ / I \ ) / 
d.AAcl. ~o.).tO"TJ. fiJ..V'TwV 6'flt r..fd-IE-t ko~-t tru(-'Trt£-~f-1 
T~v 9A~a-d- S,, ~Tr£-f~oJ.1v +'vxe~T,'Tos." 
Aulus Gellius wrote (17.8.14): 
"Acetum autem omnium maxims frigorificum est atque id numquam tamen 
concrescit". 
Macrobius seems to conrect the cooling property of vinegar with the 
violence with which it made flames spit (Sat. 7.6.12): 
. -
11 Quid aceta frigidius, quod culpatum vinum est? Solet enim hoc ex 
omnibus umoribus crescentem flammam violenter extinguere, dum per 
frigus suum calorem vincit elementi." 
There is a reference to the coldness of acetum in Pliny, though this is 
hardly more than a mention of a superstition - an antidote to whirlwinds 
for navigators (~.tl-2.132): 
"tenui remedio aceti in advenientem effusi, cui frigidissima est nature.". 
Similarly, the sprinkling of wine to extinguish funeral pyres is not 
~evidence for regular firefighting (Pliny ~.tl.14.BB). Plutarch, Gellius 
and Macrobius are not independent witnesses to the actual effectiveness of 
acetum for extinguishing fires, though they do reveal the persistence of the 
belief that acetum was good for cooling. 
Finally, acetum is used for soaking military centones (on which see 4.18.2. 
above). 
11 Puppis aceta madefactis centonibus integuntur 11 (Sisenna 4, frag. 107) 
11 Pemrudis coriis duplicibus• consutis, fartis alga aut paleis in aceta 
maceratis, circa tegatur machina tota 11 (Vitruvius 10.14.3) 
( 175) 
This use is analogous to that mentioned by Aeneas, since he recommends 
,, 
o~o.s for its value in preventing fires. The point of soaking the cen~ 
was to make them fire-resisting. Normally, of course, the army used water 
for putting out fires, though sand might also be used (archaeological 
evidence from Corbridge: see Appendix IV): Diades, it may be remembered, 
provided copious supplies of water in his tower in case of fire (Vitruvius 
10.13.6). 
4.21.5 
The story about Hannibal has produced the greatest volume of comment on 
these specialised uses of acetum, but much of it is subjective and some 
actually unreasonable. Hoover and Hoover (1950, 11Bf) summarise a good 
deal of opinion in their note on fire-setting in their com~2ntary o n 
Georgius Agricola's ~ £l§_ Metallica of 1556.. Th3y note, and seem to 
endorse, a suggested emendation of Livy's account to read "infosso acuto" 
in place of the transmitted reading 11 infuso aceta". There is no textual 
justification for this emendation, and the comment of Hoover and Hoover, 
that real scholars disbelieve the story a~out the vinegar while soldiers 
take it seriously but offer foolish explanations, invites the question why it 
should- not be true. Not merely might we have to emend all the passages in 
which the word 1 acetum 1 occurs, or translate them differently, but we 
might even be forced into assuming that only rational a~d correct practices 
were to be found in the ancient world. Singer and others (1956,8) follow 
Hoover and Hoover in their discussion of fire-setting. They refer to 
Diodorus [3,12 and 13] and Pliny (N.H.33.21.71) and comment: "Though mentioned 
by both Pliny and Diodorus (first century B.C.) it is hardly likely that 
vinegar was used., It would have had no effect except on limestone and little 
on that." In their main text they do not discuss the problem, saying simply, 
"It is probable that water was used to hasten the cooling and so promote 
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cracking of the rock." One wonders how many instances of vinegar being 
used in fire-setting would be needed to convince them; Vitruvius (8.3.19) 
provides another. Livy, Diodorus, Vitruvious and Pliny cannot be written 
off so lightly. 
4 .. 21.6 
Before we return to ahcient beliefs as to the effectiveness of acetumL 
it will be helpful to consider its actual effectiveness. Ancient vinegar 
was produced (both deliberately and accidentally) from the fermentation of 
carbohydrates (e.g. sU~::~r, starch) which produced alcohol (i.e. ethyl alcohol), 
which in turn was oxyd±sed to become vinegar (i.e. ethanoic acid or acetic 
acid). This acid was dilute, since in the conversion of ethyl alcohol into 
acetic acid 
100g of alcohol mixed with 695g of oxygen (236 litres of air) produces 39g 
of water and 130.5g of acid; if we take into account the ~later already in 
the wine and subsequently mixed with the alcohol the proportion of water is 
e~en higher. PurE {undiluted) acetic acid is produced by a different process 
which seems not to have been known to the ancients. We are therefore 
dealing with a dilute acid. 
For general purposes of fire extinction, acetic acid is unsuitable. The 
concentrated acid yields flammable vapours, it is capaole of producing 
chemical reactions which with certain substances can evolve heat, and it 
can cause chemical burns to the skin. Chemically, therefore, it is not 
useful in this <:onnection. In terms of cooling power, it is inferior to 
water: its specific heat is about half that of water (0.5118) and its latent 
heat of vaporisation only 96.8 cal/g at its boiling point (118°C) compared 
with water's 537 cal/g~ Thus it needs far less heat to raise it to its 
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boiling point and then evaporate it than does water. Clearly, the less 
acid it contains, the more it approaches the good qualities of uJater. 
There is one point of interest in connection with specific heat and the con~ 
version process mentioned in the last paragraph, and this concerns the ethyl 
alcohol. A mixture of 20%alcohol in water actually has a greater specific 
heat than water~ 1.046, ••greater than that of any other liquid below 100°" 
(Partington 1951,219): this is mentioned here just to forestall comment 
that this was the real point of the use of ••vinegar" - that it was really 
the alcohol mixture that was being used. The increase in specific heat 
would have had a negligible effect on firefighting; moreover, it is the 
conversion of ~ater into steam that removes most heat from a fire, and the 
alcohol would not have been helpful at that temperature. For cooling and 
chemical extinction of fires, then,acetic acid is not effective. When we 
look at the ancient applications more spacifically, the uses of acetum 
listed abovs at 4.21.3 should be borne in mind. 
4.21.7 
The evidence that acetum w~s regularly thrown onto fires is somewhat 
ambiguous. On the one hand, Aeneas Tacticus implies that normally some 
other ~xtinguishant would have been used (i.eo water), so that in this 
case the vinegar is used in order to achieve the benefit of soaking 
~ombustible material (see below). On the othar hand, PlutRrch and 
Macrobius could be taken to imply that vinegar was commonly used (even 
. if this were for no good reason), and it may be that the inclusion of 
vinegar in the list of domestic firefighting equipment i~ the Qigest 
~eflects an unsound belief in its effectiveness. There is no reason, 
h~wever, for assuming that vinegar was not widely used, in an ill-informed 
way; it certai~ly had a good reputation as a cooling liquid. It lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis to explors this reputation any further. 
(178) 
4.21.8 
So far as the centones and Aeneas' preference for vinegar are concerned, 
t~e explanation probably lies in vinegar's suit~bil1ty as a preservative 
and a penetrant of grease. We are familiar today with the heat produced 
by bacteri~l action, such as ~s found in compost heaps, haystacks and 
stacks of raw hides. If such materials are allowed to continue to heat up, 
they eventually either break out in spontaneous combustion, or else 
decompose into substances which are ready to burst into flames the 
moment air is admitted (as when a hot haystack is pulled apart). Once 
they have passed the d~ngerous stage, and have become completely dry (so 
that bacterial action is inhibited), the risk of spontaneous combustion is 
less while the risk of normal accidental ignition is now predominant. 
The centones would have behaved in the same way as a compo~t heap or 
haystack while they were drying, and, once dried, would have been susceptible 
to normal external ignition. The use of vinegar will have (a) inhibited 
bacteria, thus decreaoing the risk of spontaneous combustion, and (b) 
' kept them damp, thus reducing the risk of accidental ignitfon. Accidental 
ignition, in this context, of course includes firing by the enemy~ 'The 
leather itself would- have caused a problem if plain water had been used, 
I 
since the grease on the raw hides would have prevented the water from 
soaking in, and bacterial ·and pyrolitic decomposition would have taken over. 
Vinegar is a good solvant of organic compounds and grease in particular, and 
could thus penetrate right into the leather. One side-effect of the use of 
vinegar is that the fibres in the leather and tho stuffing would have been 
weakened, though this would itself have brought the benefit of being able to 
fit the centones really close and tight round the corners of the siege towers. 
It is not entirely clear what materials Aeneas had in mind when he recommended 
vinegar,_ but if there is a practical basis for his recommendation it 
probably is the same as applies to the centones. 
( 179) 
4.21.9 
On fi~e-setting, we have seen that thers is nc reason to doubt that vinegar 
was used, and it remains now to note the best expla11ation so far put 
forwa~d. Bailey (1929,199) approached the evidence more sympathetically 
than most writers, and sugg8sted the following explanation: 
"These stories [i.e. about fire-setting with vinegar] are no doubt due 
to a combination of factorso Firstly, when cold water is poured on very 
hot rocks, the rocks are more or less disintegrated [i.e. spalling on 
a grand sc8le]. Second!~, vinegar attacks slowly certain rocks of th~ 
limestone type. Probably the liquid used by Hannibal and the miners 
was mainly water, to which some vinegar had ~een added in a half-
scienti fie, hal f-sup.ersti ti·ous way." 
My only comment would be that since the vinegar was in any'case a large 
part water, it w~s probably used 'neat' on the rocks. In any case, if 
Hannibal's army was anything like the Roman army, they would have had 
plenty of vinegar (wine) with tnem, which would have saved them the time 
and trouble of obtaining water. 
4.21.10 
To return now to the Vigiles.• Not merely have we seen that the uses of 
~~in connection with firefighting and cooling were very specialised, 
but it is also apparent now that the Vigiles would have had no need to use 
acetum. Their system of patrols was partly based on the availability of 
water (on this see also 7o11o19), and, if they are unlikely to have 
carried water with them, th~y are even less likely to have carried 
vinegar or wi118., Since it doubtful that they used centones (see 4.18. 6), 
they had no need for acetum. It is also worth noting that, if there was 
any consistency in the applications of acetum, it is po8sible that the 
(180) 
acetum kept ready in houses was for the purpose of soaking the domestic 
centones: but at this point we go too far into the realm of speculation. 
So far as the Vigiles themselves were concerned, we must conclude that 
acetum was not among their equipment. There is no evidence that they 
used any kind of chemical extinction. 
4.22.1 
Formiones are included in the list of firefighting equipment in the Digest 
\~ 
(33.7.12.18). These could have oeen baskets used for rescues, but it~more 
likely that, in view of the basic simplicity of the equipment listed, and 
its domestic nature, they were simply stretchers for the injured. There 
I 
is no direct evidence on this point. 
4.23.1 
Perticae also occur in the list. Poles could have be~n used in various 
ways, but since there is no indication of what, if an;thing, was at the 
top 6f the poles, we cannot go further than to suggest that they might 
have been used for demolitions, shoring up, or for rescues in situations 
in which a ladder could not be used. In any case, they cannot have been 
other than ancillary to such basic equipment as pumps, axes and buckets. ) 
4.24.1 
We have discussed siphones, unc(in)i, and ballistae, but have not 
_ considered what precisely were the functions of the siphonarii, unc(in)~ 
and options~ ballistarum. If the a bal(?) was concerned with ballistae, 
he will have worked under the o~tio ballistarum. No other pieces of 
equipment gave their names to specialists; we do not hear, for example, 
of hamarii, ~larii, funarii or dolabrarii, nor of falcarii. 
(181) 
4.24.2 
In the Fifth Cohort in A.D.205 (VI.1057) there were two siphonarii 
(both in the 5th century), one unc(in)arius (in the 7th century), and 
two optiones ballistarum (in the 4th and 7th centuries). On VI.105B, 
the corresponding totals are two siphonarii (both in the 6th century), 
two unc(in)arii (in the 7th century) and one optio ballistarum (in the 
4th century), though the damage to the stone may have removed others. 
VI.1057 is, however, complete, and there is no doubt of the small 
numbsr·of these specialists. It contrasts with the number of bucinatores 
attested - five on 1057 and three (at least) on 1058. It was sugg8sted 
above that the bucinatores had an important role in the communications 
in the course of firef~ghting (see 4.19.4); can so few of these other 
specialists have played a key role in firefighting? 
4.24.3 
We hav~ seen that there could have been u~ to six men operating a single 
pump (and possibly even more) and around ten or eleven men per ballista. 
It is implausible that a single team of men was assigned to each of the 
specialists, since they would either have been grossly overworked or 
else. largely redundant. If the specialists were in charge of the 
opera~on of their equipment during firafighting, they must often have 
controlled several learns each. They cannot, however, have taken overall 
charge (qua specialists with their own equipment), thdugh when the efforts at 
firefighting centred on their equipment they will have become correspondingly 
important. 
4.24.4 
There is rather less reason for the unc(i~rii to have taken charge of the 
use of hooks, since any fireman could have used them. Moreover, although 
(182) 
it is possible that the siphonarii and optionee ballistarum directed 
the tactical use of their equipment, their main contribution must have 
been.technical and concerned with the equipment rather than with fire-
fighting. Indeed, it is quite probable that the reason for these 
technicians to attend fires (assuming that they did) was to protect the 
pumps and ballistae from damage caused by misuse. It is one thing to 
see the need for a pump or a ballista and to order it on; it is quite 
another thing to ensure that for as long as it is needed the equipment 
co~tinues to ~ark reliably. 
We do not know where.or how the Vigiles obt2ined most of their supplies. 
However, whether they bought them in Rome or had them specially made in 
military workshops, most of their equipment presented no special problems. 
Buckets, axes, ropes, ladders or lanterns were in general use, and could 
have been obtained and repaired without difficylty. Pumps were rather 
different, partly because they seem to have been peculiarly a firefighting 
tool and partly because they were likely t0 gi~e trouble at fires and to 
need speedy specialist repairs. This would have been sufficient reason 
for the Vigiles to have their own siphonarii, and a small number would have 
been adequate for the maintenance and repair of pumps. The ballistae 
were probably obtained from the same ·source as those of the Praetorians, 
and the optionee in charge must have had some of the skills and abilities 
of the architectus who built them. It is less easy to see why the hooks 
should-have presented a problem, though it may be surmised that the 
Vigiles could not rely on a normal public supply, particularly for the 
·quantities required, and it is possible that the unc(in)arii had to look 
after other equipment as well, such as axesQ Possibly these men were named 
after the unc(inh because that was a distinctive piece of firefighting 
equipment, whereas a title like dolabrarius or falcarius would not have 
been distinctive. 
4.24.5 
The hypothesis that these specialists were primarily technicians is 
consistent with the list of immunes in the Digest (50.6.7.6), which 
includes many technicianso Principally, they were not firemen, and if 
they did turn out to fires this was secondary to their main function. 
Much of their routine work must have been done during daylight hours. 
4.25.1 
We have met the technicians in the Vigiles, a small number of men named 
after their specialist pieces of equipment. Outside the Vigiles and 
Rome, certain collegia of tradesmen functioned as volunteer firemen, and 
it was- probably a condition of their being permitted to exist at all that 
they-undertook to attend fires. The three collegia most commonly 
involved were those of fabri, centonarii and dendrophori, sometimes 
referred to collectively as the ·~collegia'. The best discussion 
of the contribution which these particular collegia made to firefighting 
is that of de Ruggiero (1895-, s.vv), thGugh his discu,ssions fall short 
I 
of describing what the men actually did at fires. 
4.25.2 
Centonarii present the least difficulty. Centones were made of thick 
cloth, and were useful as fire blankets and as padding for people to jump 
onto; they could also provide a measure of protection from heat for 
getting into a burning building for the purposes of rescue. Although it 
is possible to sxtinguish fires with blankets, it is doubtful whether 
( 184) 
centones were relied on as a means of extinguishing fires. The lack of 
adequate water supplies in many cities must have made them more important 
than they are in modern times, but even so their applications lliere 
limitedo Once a flre had gained a strong hold, the centones must have 
I 
been used mainly in connection with rescue. 
4.25.3 
Dendrophori had two functions in their normal life. Each year, on 22nd 
March, they carried a sacred pine to the temples of Magna Mater (and the 
I 
greater part of the evidence for dendrop!J.£E.i._relates to this function). 
In industrial life, they seem to have been responsible for the hewing and 
transport of timber (de Ruggiero, s.v.). They were thus involved with 
heavy ,lifting. Their value at fires was probably greater after the fire 
than during it. ·It is possible, of course, that they could assist with 
rescues during the actual fires, particularly if makeshift access to upper 
floors was required, but for the job of picking through debris in the 
sea~ch for survivors and for clearing away d~b~is their trade skills were 
very appropriBte. And they would be useful at the stage of rebuilding. 
4.25.4 
Fabri were workers in metal, wood or stone (Thes.Ling.Lat.sv.). They 
covered a variety of skills, and will have included many of the builders. 
But~ while a knowledge of building construction will have been of great 
assistance in fighting fires, it will not of itself have made the men into 
good firemeno Braidwood, in fact, found that the usefulness of such men lay in 
another direction (1830 7 44ff). He considered that among retained firemen 
(i.e. those who followed another occupation and were available for 
firefighting when called on) the best men were slaters, house-carpenters, 
masons, plumbers and smiths. Partly, of course, their tradesman's skills 
( 185) 
were useful in fir.cfighting, but partly these men made good firemen 
because they were physically robust and able to endure heat and cold, 
wetness and fatigue; smiths and plumbers, moreover, were better able to 
endure heat and smokeo Such factors are likely to have influenced the 
Roman choice. 
These three collegia, then,were the best choice in a situation where the 
ideal solution of a full-time fire brigade was not acceRtable. Between 
them they provided a ~easonable possibility of /carrying out rescues and 
extinguishing fires, but since the men had their own jobs during the day 
it was not possible for them to carry out patrols like those of the 
Vigiles. Many fires must quickly have pass~d beyond their control and 
led them to conc~ntrate their efforts on rescue. ,. 
At the technical level, these collegia wer~ far inferior to the specialists 
in the Vigiles. The latter were speciaJ.ists in firefighting, the collegia were 
specialists in other fields to which th8 activities of firefighting were 
not entirely foreign. Confirmation of the low level of firefighting 
competence of these collegia is found in the trades of others attested in 
the same context, for example, dolabrarli and scalarii:· !Jo"i..h with more to 
contribute to rescues than to firefighting. There is no evidence for 
collegia of hamarii engaged in firefighting; possibly·the general public 
were expected to bring water (cf. Pliny f£.~0.34: "occursu populi"). It 
is unfortunate that the level of competence of these collegia is such as to 
suggest that the Vigiles could concentrate far more than they on firefighting. 
They tell us nothing about the Vigiles. 
( 186) 
On clothing of the Vigiles,there is little to add to BR (p.98 and his 
Plate VI). It remains the case that the only evidence for the uniform of 
anyone in the Vigiles is the sepuchral relief'of the vexillarius Q.Iulius 
Galatus (VI.2987). The best available photograph of this is the one 
published by BR (Plate VI), and inspection of the stone itself has failed 
to produce a clearer impression of what precisely it reprasents. The 
uniform of the vexillarius is clearly military in style, as we should have 
expected, tho~Jgh there is insufficient clarity to decide whether he is 
wearing any special protective clothing. It is even impossible to see 
whether the implement hanging at his right side is a sword or an axe. The 
helmet possibly has a crest, possibly decorative. 
4.26.2 
The demands of the job and analogy with the Roman army suggest that the 
Vigiles will have worn helmets of metal (there was no electricity to 
provide electrocution problems), and garments of a general military ~attern 
made of thick, heat-resisting cloth (possibly reinforced with leather), with 
. '. 
good protection for arms and legs, and thick~soled boots. The possibility 
cannot be ruled out that the Vigiles wore trousers. 
It would have been natural for the Vig~ to carry their axes at their 
waists, and they probably carried other equipment on their belts such as 
small tools. It is doubtful whether they used special belts by which the 
. ' ' 
men could be attached, for safety, to ladders, ropes or buildings, though 
again the possibility cannot be ruled out for all possible occasions. Men 
working at considerable heights could well have been tied or hooked on. 
(187) 
4.26.3 
Apart from the lack of direct evidence, our main problem as regards 
clothing is that there are not any close analogies to help us. The above 
suggestions and guesses lead one to suspect that the Vigiles made their 
own adaptation of a normal military uniform. The centurions and tribunes 
probably looked like ordinary centurions and tribunes. 
! 
4.27.1 
We have noted that the number of the Vigiles was far in excess of any 
modern brigade (in terms of fir~men per acre) and that we have to beware 
of attributing fu~ctiens to them other than firefighting until we have 
exhausted all the possibilities connected with firefighting. (4.3.2). 
BR in fact suggested that the explanation for the large namber of Vigiles 
"is probably to be found in the large slave population" (pp.15f), as if 
they were policemen-cum-firemen like some of the former British police 
fire brigades. He does not, however, discuss the manpower n~eds of the 
two jobs which are actually attested for the Vigiles, fire patrols and 
firefighting (Dig. 1.15.3). 
4.27.2 
Most fires start small, and if ceught early enough can be prevented from · 
becoming big (Manual 5,23): 
"There is rarely an occasion where a fire could not be subdued, with 
a minimum amount of damage to building and contents, if a brigade could 
get to work within a few minutes of the initial outbreak occurring. 
Many fires are not disco•tered in their early stages by occupants of the 
-p~amises involved, but are only revealed when they have developed 
sufficiently to become noticeable to passers-by, or from a distance, 
by which time considerable damage will usually have been caused." 
( 188) 
One common solution to this problem is to use a fire patrol, and there 
are various types of fire patrol, ranging from an intermittent inspection 
by a night watchman who may have other duties and who may be infirm and 
incapable of taking action, to a continuous inspection by a patrol who 
are properly equipped to deal with any fires that their search may reveal. 
In addition there are the daily and nightly inspections of selected risks 
such as the Liverpool Salvage Corps perform. Owing to the dangers from 
aerial bombardment in World War II, a certain amount of antagonism to fire 
patrols. developed among firem~n, since it was believed that they might be 
required to drive aro~nd during air raids pouncing on incendiary bombs 
(though this suggestio~ was never made officially), but for peace-time 
conditions there is no doubt of their value. 
Such a use of manpower is, however, difficult to justify economically 
except where the risks to be protected are of very high value (e.g. 
warehouses), and for this reason automatic equipment is now becoming very 
common. Automatic .equipment has the furth8r advantage that it largely 
avoids the possibility of human error, so much so that even the false alarms 
and .occasional failures are far less expensive than the cost of employing 
people~ A disadvantage is that, despite its excellence, each type of 
detector is necessarily selective in its mode of operation, whereas ideally 
a detector is required which will respond to any of the Garly indications of 
a fire, whether it bs smoke, heat, flame or distinctive chemical products. 
Men, with his five senses, is a universal detector, and this is emphasised 
by a comment from a leading manufacturer of aut·.omatic fire detection systems: 
........ 
"It is ~till our opinion that a man is still the best fire d~tector that 
exists. 11 
Potentially, then, the fire patrol is a very powerful weapon against fire. 
4.27.3 
Rapid detection of fires is no use unless the fires can be put out. 
The Vigiles carried with them on their patrols sufficient equipment for 
extinguishing fires which were caught while small: axes and buckets 
(Dig. 1.15.3). There is no statement in the sources that they carried 
anything else, and - while they might well have done - to comply with the 
requirements they only needed to carry axes and buckets. Even today, the 
majority of fires are put out with small-scale equipment, including buckets, 
and the aim is always to avoid the need to use large pumps. 
One difference between the Roman 'first att~ndance 1 and the modern 'first 
attendance' is that nowadays the brigade has'to be called and has to travel 
to the fire, whereas the patrol of the Vigiles which discovered the fire 
was itself the first attendance, and so could get to work much more quickly 
than a-modern brigade. There was a correspo~dingly greater chance of 
preventing a fire froiu becoming large. The effect was the same as having 
a fire engine in constant readiness on the doorstep. 
4.27.4 
In order to have been effective and wort~1 having at all, the patrols must 
have consisted of a minimum mumber of men. For the actual search for fires, 
~o definite number would be required. In some streets it would have: been 
sufficient to carry out superficial inspections from the front; in others~ 
it would have been necessary to. ;:mter buildings and courtyards~ We should 
not think in terms of something like a parade round the streets (Paoli's 
"measured tramp of the watch'', p.37), but of small groups of men giving the 
risks individual attention, and quietly listening, looking and sniffing for 
fires. Such smaller groups would have formed parts of larger groups, the 
(190) 
whole of which could spring into action if a fire was discovered. There 
is no limit to the number of men who could be employed in looking for 
fires; it is the firefighting function which sets a lower limito 
4.27.5 
Although diffe~ent fires would need different treatments, it is possible to 
make some estimates of the sorts of numbers likely to be needed, particularly 
since we have now seen that the equipment is predominantly on a small scale 
and entirely hand-operated. With 3,500 men available (later 7,ooo), the 
drills could afford to be more generous with manpower than in a modern 
brigade, and, even if only to avoid chaos and confusion, there must have 
been a high degree of planning:and organisation. 
For a smallish fire on or near the ground floor the following manpower 
might be needed: 
breaki~g into premises, 2 parties of 3 men 
warning inhabitants 
instant bucket chain, say, 
firefighting and rescue: the 6 breakers-in plus, say, 
mess~ngers to station 
in charge, 1 officer 
For a medium fire spreading rapidly upwards: 
messengers for reinforcements 
breaking in 
keeping occupants quiet 
bucket chain 
Total -
firefighting a~d rescue: the 10 breakers-in plus, say, 
further rescue party to approach via roof 
in charge, 1 officer 
Total = 
6 men 
1 man 
20 men 
10 men 
2 men 
1 man 
40 men 
2 men 
10 men 
1 man 
40 men 
10 men 
10 men 
1 man 
74 men 
(191) 
For a large fire with little chance of rescuing occupants: 
messengers for reinforcements 
rescues 
water for protection of surrounding buildings 
crowd control 
in charge, 1 officer 
Total= 
I 
I 
2 men 
10 men 
100 men 
40 men 
1 man 
153 men 
4.27.6 
The first two examples relate to situations with which a patrol would 
have to cope, and, although no two fires are alike, the manpower needs 
are typic~l of those a~ a small fire. These are l~rge turn-outs compared 
with many modern turn-outs. If we deduct from the estimates the "extra•• 
men needed in the absence of hoses and motorised pumps and ladders, we 
reach total~ in the region of .20 men, 30 men and 50 men. These are more 
consistent with modern attendances, though quite Df±en a first attendance 
to a smallish risk (e.g. a house fire) will consist of around 10 men. 
For older types of firefighting, however, ~he larger totals are quite in 
order (see, for example, the number of firemen in the illustration, Figures 
1 and 2). 
4.27.7 
There is ample evidence for the sort of numbers that are needed when 
only manpower is available. Blackstone (~957,146) observes that, in the 
last century, it was common .for 400 pumpers to be paid at large fires, 
and that at 6 fi~e in Warrington in the 1850 1 s over 600 pumpers were paid. 
He also refers (pp.18f) to ~True Report £[the burning £! the Steple 
~ Churche £! Paules in London, which records that at the fire at St. Paul's 
in 1561 about 500 persons "laboured in carrying and filling water" 
( 192) 
and succeeded in getting the fire under control in about .a hours. 
It is instructive to compare these figures with those for London in the 
1860's (Braidwood 1866, 85). In January 1861 the London Fire Engine 
Establishment consisted of:-
1 superintendent 
4 foremen (1 for each quarter of London) 
12 engineers 
10 sub-engineers 
4'( senior firemen 
43 junior .firemen 
117 individuale in all. 
There were in addition:-
15 drivers, living at fire stations 
37 horses, living at fire stations 
4 part-time supplementary firemen, living at stations 
4 part-time supplementary drivers, living at stations 
8 part-time supplementary horses, living at stations 
Onsthird of the men were constantly on duty, and all could be called on. 
Attendances were as follows 
Fire in Attendance from District 
District A B c I D 
A all 2/3 men 1/3 men -
1 engine 
8 2/3 men all 2/3 men 1/3 men 
1 engine 
c 1/3 men 2/3 men all 1/3 men 
1 engine 
D 2/3 men 1/3 men 1/3 men all 
1 engine 
bougBary all of adjoining Districts + 1/3 each of the others 
(193) 
These figures give an average attendance in the region of 60 to 80 men; 
ar.d they refer to manpower with the benefit of additional unskilled labour 
for pumping drawn from bystanders. 
4.27.8 
Since the Vigiles' patrol had to be self-sufficient in the early stages of 
firefighting, the most suitable unit for each patrol u1as the century, nominally 
80 men when the Vigiles were established and remaining at that figure until 
A.D.205. After that date, either the number of patrols could have been 
increased, or the size ~f each patrol could have been increased, or perhaps 
a combination of the two was chosen. Moreovei, the need for a !irefighting 
unit about 400 to 600 strong was met very conveniently by the cchort, in 
terms of administ~ation the most obvious reinforcement for the patrol. Again, 
after 205, when the cohorts became milli.ary, there was an improvement in 
cover. 
4.27.9 
Confirmation that the Romans were aware of the need for numbers in the~e . 
ranges may be found in their other arrangements for firefighting. The 
number rif slaves in the familia publica sAt up for firefighting in 22 B.C. 
was 600 (see 5.2.2 below). ·This was sufficient to cope with one fire. 
Pliny suggested to Trajan that a £211~~ of ~ b8 set up in Nicomedia 
for firefighting, consisting of up to 150 men (fE .• 1D.33); and an inscription 
from Hispalis (11.1167) in Baetica records a 
"corpus centonariorum indulgentia eius [i.e. Antoninus Pius]collegio 
hominum centum dumtaxat constituto". 
These brigades consisting of 150 and 100 men would have been adequate for 
first attendances, and could often have succeeded in containing a fire. 
(194) 
It is probable that Pliny was well-informed on firefighting, since he cor-
responded with Cn. Octavius Titinius Capito who became pra~fectus vigilu~ 
some time under Trajan (f£.5.8). 
4.27.10 
From this comparison of the numbers required for fi~efighting without 
modern equipment, we find that the problem which troubled BR and many 
others - what to do with 3,500 firemen - largely disappears. The notion 
of a whole cohG£t turning out to fight a fir~ is quite acceptable, and indeed, 
reasonable. It was very convenient that a cohort was the right sort of 
size to provide a fire(ighting unit; possibly military experience had shown 
the way (cf. 7.9.7 below). It was also convenient that the century could 
be expected to master a fire in its early st8ges. 
This does not entirely explain why seven cQhorts, 3,500 men, were required. 
~k~ 
This is related to~number of fires which might be expected to occur 
simultaneously, and is discussed at 7.10.6. 
4.28.1 
Although the Vigiles actually lived in castra and must have based their 
patrols on thum, they also pperated from excubitoria. There were fourteen 
nf these in Rome, two to each cohort, and one in each of the Regions 
(see 7.10.3). The name 'excubitorium' is our best evidence for the function 
of these additional buildings: they were places wh8re the men stayed awake 
at night, in other words, they were watch-houses and convenient places to 
serve as additional depots for the patrols and firefighting. The only 
excubitorium which has survived and been identified appears to have started 
life as an ordinary house (6.2.7), and it would appear that no special form 
of building was required. 
(195) 
Many of the graffiti from this excubitorium concern the sebaciaria (on which 
please see 4.31)e None of them tells us specifically how the rota for duties 
at the excubitorium was worked out, but there is a strong implication that 
the monthly rotation of the sebaciaria duty coincided with the duty of the 
century at the excubitorium. If this is the case, there is no convenient 
way by which to tie this duty in with the visits to Ostia. 
4.28.2 
It should also be noted that the Vigiles are likely to have provided 
attendants for public shows and public buildings. One graffito from the 
excubitorium in Trastevere (Region XIV) refers to 11 cohor(tis) Vigul(um) 
Niiron(ianorum)" and also to "tiirmis Niir(onianis)" (VI.3052), but this 
cannot be taken as evidence for any specific place of duty (BR is right to 
be cautious, p.57)o 
4.29.1 
The Vigiles sent a vexillation to Ostia. The castra of this vexillation have 
provided us with epigraphic evidence (official dedications and private 
commemorations) which tells us the essentials of the organisation. The 
building icself is quite informative, notably in providing evidence to 
confirm the suggestion that in A.D.205 the corps (i.e. including the 
vexillation) was doubled in size (6.3.8: confirming 3.1~.3 and 5.2.1). 
For the archaeological discoveries please see 6.3. 
The main points regarding the vexillation have been established by BR 
(pp.107-114). I differ from BR in interpreting the history of the building 
itself (see 6.3.5Ff), but his account of the organisation and history of 
the vexillation is largely acceptable. Some points can be amplified. 
(196) 
4.29.2 
Four centurions are described as "agentibus" at the time of the dedication 
to Gordian (XIV.4397, ~.0.239). This is our best evidence that the vexillation 
consisted of four centuries. Confirmation that this was the size at ar. 
earlier stage comes from XIV.450D, which lists four centurions (A.D.168). 
The centuries were composite, with men detached from their own centuries 
serving, sometimes, under centurions who did not belong to their own conGct 
(XIV.4500, 4501, 4503). Whether there was·a consistent pattern in the 
formation of these centuries is not known. Twa other vexillations of a 
somewhat similar composite nature are known: a vexillation from legio III 
Augusta consisted of one whole cohort and four men from each of the other 
centuries (VIII.2532, 18042: Dessau 2487, 9133-9135a); and another 
vexillation included one man drawn from each century of two legions providing 
men (III.6627, cf. 14147: Dessau 2487). 
4.29.3 
Although the praefectus vigilum is often mentioned on inscriptions, it is 
in fact the sub~raefectus who more often played an active part in the 
dedications ('curare'), along with a tribune as praepositus vexillationis. 
The first mention of the 3Ubprefect at Ostia belongs t~ A.D.168 (XIV.4500), 
from which time he is mentioned regularly (XIV.4500, 4502, 4503 7 4385, 4509, 
4378 - taki~g us to A.D.190), but none of these cases shows his pP.r~onal 
e 
invol~ent. The subprefect is first attested actually at Ostia in A.D.207 
(XIV.4381, ~386, 4387) and he appears subsequently (XIV.4393- A.D.217; 
XIV.4397 - A.D. 239). It would appear, then, that the subprefect acquired 
his special dutie~ at Ostia in the period 190-207Q It is tempting to 
associate this change with the enlargement of the castra and the increase 
in numbers. 
(197) 
The post of praepositus VP-xillationis also shows some development. It 
is first recorded for us in A.D. 195 ·(XIV.4380)~ and then, as in all 
subsequent appearances, there is no other tribune mentioned. Prior to 
references to the praepositus, we find ordinary tribunes mentioned, in one 
case as many as four (XIV.4500). In this, and other cases where a plurality 
of tribunes are mentioned, the choice lies between the tribunes of the 
men's own cohort in Rome, and successive tribunes in charge at Ostia. BR 
favours the latter, and in that case it follows that the ordinary tribunes 
took charge for shorter periods than did the praepositus subsequently; 
only one praepositus oer vexillation is recorded. The oraepositus was 
one of the ordinary t~ibunes detached for the purpose from his own cohort 
(XIV. 4381, 4386, 4387 -all the same man; 4388; 4397). 
4.29.5 
Of ranks below centurion, the following are attested: 
optic 
tesserarius 
cornicularius tribuni 
bucinator 
beneficiarius praefecti 
secutor tribuni 
an adiutor 
XIV.4500, 4501, 4502, 4503 
-XIV. 4509 
XIV.4397 
XIV. 4526a, ?b 
XIV.226, 4281 
XIV.4509 
XIV.4378 
There were evidently men detached to perform the specialist duties. 
XIV.4509 records the tesserarius along with the centurion and the tribunes, 
and the absence cf the optio implies that the ~esserarius was taking his 
place. 
(198) 
4.29.6 
A graffito survives which shows that the sebaciaria took place at Ostia 
as well as at Rome: XIV.4530, which includes the word "sebarius"o For 
details of the sebaciaria, please see 4o31o An exactus later (?nar] urn 
may have been connected with the sebaciaria (XIV.4527d). 
4.29.7 
The vexillation changed three times a year, on the Ides of April, August 
and December (XIV.4386; 4499, 4501 7 4502, 4503 7 4506; 4500, 4505, 4515). 
Depending on ~ow evenly the duty was spread throughout the Vigiles, an 
individual might expect to serve at Ostia once every two to five years; 
in an average career of six years (see 5.2.5) this would amount to two 
to four occasions. 
There is no evidence for provision for continuity. With the infrequent 
visits by the men, there would certainly have been a period of reduced 
inefficiency at the start of each new tour of duty, until the new vexillation 
could find its way around easily at night and ~ad become acquainted with 
the individual fire h~zards and remedies. At ~~rst, a vexillation might have 
half its members recently recruited and the other half not having visited 
Ostia for five years. The cent,Jrions mig~t have provided continuity, and 
on8 possibility would have bean to have benturions permanently at Ostia, 
witl1out any century of thoir own in Rome itself (on the analogy of legionary 
centurions nominally attached to a legion but serving away for long periods 
at a governor's headquarters, for exampl~; the supernumerary centurions of 
the third century A.D.) Jf this, ho~ever, there is no sign. Nor, as we have 
noted, can any pattern be discerned in the selection of men to serve in the 
vaxillation. But this may be an indication that some care was taken: a rigid 
selection of one man or four men from each century could have produced bad 
(199) 
results. At a slightly higher level, it is interesting to note that the 
centurion could hava his own ££~with him (XIVo4503). The effect of 
drawing men from different centuries at·all levels up to and including 
the tribunes was to spread the burden as evenly as possible among the 
units remaining in the City of Rome. 
4.29.8 
The evidence for a vexillation at Portus consists of the group of 
inscriptions XIV.6, 13, 14, 15 and 231, and the word "castra" on XIV.2)1, 
~-
all these inscriptions having been found in a building at Portus (s8e 6.4.1). 
This was probably part of the Ostian vexillation. Cassius Ligus appears 
on both XIV.4380(from Ostia) and XIV.13 (from Portus), and in the former 
is named as praepositus vexillationis. In addition, the four (?) centurions 
mentioned in XIV.13 are proba~ly the same four centurions who would be named 
on inscriptions from Ostia itself, only two of them, say, being actually 
at Pcrtus. 
The division of the vexillation into two parts, one one each side of the 
rivar, was a sensible precaution, since the river can D11ly have hindered 
mobility. Moreover, the port would have required its rnwn fire patrols. The 
statilJn at ~ortus was a castra, as opposed to a mere excubitorium, to avoid 
the need to cross the river twice a day. The praapositus probably kept his 
headquarters at Ostia simply because that was the earlier station (6.4.2). 
There is no evidence for a~ excubitorium at Ostia or Pnrtuso 
If it is accepted that the vexillation 1uas stationed in two ~~tr~, an 
arcl1itectural difficulty is removed: the Ostinn castra does not need to house 
(200) 
up to 600 men, and there is no need to postulate an implausibly hiqh 
building in reconstructing the caatra (cf. 6.7.l)e 
The stationing of the zra~ositus at Ostia, as suggested, may be paralleled 
by the stationing of the procurator portus utriusgue (or procurator ~nnonag 
Ostiae ~in 2ortu), who appears to have had duties in both Ostia and 
Portus and was stationed, to judge from the findspot of most of the 
inscriptions recording him, in Ostia. (F9r the evidence for this official 
see Meiggs 1960, 299f. Meiggs concludes that there were two officials, but the 
two titlRs quoted above imply that for some at least of the time one official 
covered both sides of the river.) 
4~30.1 
The evidence for the Vig,iles 1 firafiqhting does not tell us much about the 
actual structure of command and responsibility (as o~posed to the formal 
structure, which was much like that used in the other branches of the 
Roma~ army). Clearly the centurions, optiones and t3sse:·3rii played an 
important part, but it is necessa~y to wait until •us have analysed the 
carrer structure before we can see precisely where the equivalent of the 
modern professional firama,, could develop: to anticipate again the 
conclusion in section 5.2.5 that the normal period of service was six years, 
the arrangements in the fui~ must :1ave differed in practice from those 
in the rest of the srmy, simply because the average career lasted omly 
about a quarter of the time. Aqain, in order to see what part the triounas, 
the sub-prefect and the prGfect could play in the firafighting operations, · 
we have to wait until Ide have seen the sort of experience which these men 
brought to the ~~i~~· 
(201) 
4.31.1 
Before ~Je turn to these further matters, there remains the ~haciaria, 
which is best dealt with along with the other evidense f8r operational 
matters. 
The ~~~~£~ was an obscure duty performed by rankers and 
attested in the graffiti which survived in th8 excubitorium in 
Trastevere (for the archaeological discoveries made at this excubitoriu~ 
see section 6.2.7). Most of the graffiti have been published in CIL 
(Vlo2996 to 3091 and 32751), the three remaining being quoted below 
{at 6.2.7). Altogether 63 of these graffiti refer explicitly to 
The typical form of the gra ffit.i. is: 
name SEBACIARIA FECIT MENSE name of month 
usually with the man's century indicated, and often followed by a 
phrase to indicate that all was well {'OMNIA TVTA') o~ that the man's 
~~a~uli were safe (tSALVIS COMMANIPVLIS'). 
Nor~ally the duty was performed by one man an his own. This 
is shown both t:Jy the form of ti1e graffiti, with one man 'Jsually 
being named as sebaciarius for the month, .and also by U~3 follo'-'ling 
phrases: 
11 oeeS~~aciarius mese SUO ooo 11 (3053) 
" ••• sebacaria fBGit m(ense) Aprile in loco Sucessi" (3J66) 
" ••• sebaciaria fecit mense Maio nomine Claudii Nati o•o" (3076) 
"7 Felicis Fufius Getulicus dicit lasst~"' sum successors [ m dnte] 11 
(3072, almost cert.ainly referring to the .§...~121~) 
". o .sebaciaria fecit m[ ense ? ] {centuria) Victol'is coiT,anip [ ulo ] 
Vabio permitent [ e ] 11 ( 3068) 
4 .. 31.2 
One graffito shows the sebAciarius being assisted by anothgr man (3060): 
"••osebaciari secit mese Oecenbre cum Aelio Apodemo comanpulo" 
and another (3078) rnay possibly reveal (or perhaps conceal) an ~diutoi:' 
(202) 
(if this is n0t a different sort of adiutor): 
" ••• sabaciaria [ fecit ]tonio Aegn[ ] utore t( ? ) adiu [tore n ••• 
Finally, 3046 shows.ithat one man started the sebariaria and that 
a different man co~pleted it: 
"Felix f(ecit) s(~baciaria) Caeciliue Felix sebarius perfecit" 
4.31 .,3 
The rota c"anged on the first day of th11 month, and was 
performed every month of the year. 3062 and 3Q69 shoi.LJ the starting 
day: 
" ••• sevaciaria fecit ex Kalendas Iulias in Ka(lendas) Augu{stRs) ••• " 
"···K(alendis) Iunis Celius Saturninus sebariaria fecit n • 0. 
The months are attested by the graffiti indicated below: 
January 3006, 3056 
February 2998, 3002 
March 3008, 3028, _3032, 3058, 3067, 3087 
April 3023, 3066 
May 3004, 3013, 3039, 3057, 3076 
June 3003, 3010, 3069 
July 2999, 3000, 3012, 3015, 3020, 3062, 3063, 3080 
August 3001, 3019, 3079 
September 3033, 3064 
Octc:Jer 3005 
November 3054, 3065 
Oeca:'1ber 30l:i., 3060, 3088 
In addition 3029 and 3081 originally naniBd the month concerned though 
this is nouJ erased. 
------~·------.:.. ___ __:_ __ ------·--------------------·---·---- --~-"':.....;. __ ...;___.,_~-~-- _ _, _ __:........: __________________ _. __________________ .:..~--------- ......... 
(203) 
The ~baciarius performed the duty in or on behalf of his 
century» about 47 of the graffiti identifying the century by the name 
of the centurion in the usual wayo There is also a single reference 
to a whole century apparently taking some action (3045, discussed 
below), and in a few cases we hear of the optio and in one case of 
the !_~s.erar.~ standing in for the centurion (above, 4.30). It 
is probably that these officers had nothing specific to do in 
connection with the ssbaciaria but were just generally in aharge. 
If more than one century were on duty at the excubitorium it would 
presumably follow that there was more than one sebaciarius, but this 
is unlikely to have been the case (above,4.31~)o 
4. 31 • 5 
The direct evidence for the nature of the sebaciaria is very 
scantyo There is al!D the point that by their nature any of these 
graffiti might be humorous rather than documentary, in which case the 
joke might turn out to be on the historiano However, the examinatiGn 
is worth attempting, and the following are the items which we should 
not ignore. 
1) The word 'sebacia~' itself, with its variants, including ·~~ciarius 1 o 
The reference is clearly to lighting, specifically to tallow candles. 
2) References to other lights and to oil: 
AD LVCIRn////AII///////OiEVM P N VOT XX • C 
AD LVCINI V X ALNINO ET MAXIMO COS (3019) 
COH VII VIG GDRDIANI.D.N 
7 MARCELLIANI EGRILLI RVFINIANI 
SVBACIARIAM TVtA FECIT 
/ 
(204) 
OLEV CVR AVRELIVM AGRIPINVM DPTIONE 
SEBACIA 
LVCINIVM 
LVCERrJAS 
AD" PORTA 
AD POMPAS (3038) 
The following should probably be placed with the two preceding since 
it mentions oil: 
7 PATROILI 
Q G~JINVS MILE 
DLEVM 
IN C.'\LlGAS SABACIARIVS SIN~ QVE MESE SVO DMNIAREL-A 
TVTA 
(3053) 
3) The ph~ase 'fysgo ~· 
COH. VII UIGVLUM • CENTVR 
IAM • CRISPIN! SEBACIARIA • FE 
MESIS • MARTIV AVFIDUS • SE~VA 
NUS • FVSGO SVO 
FIILICISIME INTECRE (3057) 
4) A ho~eman in the century (3045): 
S • IVLI AEMILIANVS 7 SEBACIARIVS • CENTURIA EQVES FACTUS 
Mommsen did not favour the idea of there nFJing horse:r,en in the ligiles 
and suggested (CIL,n.) that the reading should perhaps be: 
"(centuria)Iuli Aemilianus (centuriae) sebaciarlus centuriae qu(i) 
·3~> ( t) factus" 
(205) 
There is, howevar, a seconj piece of evidence that horsemen should 
not be ruled out, and this is a picture of a man on a horse which is 
drawn in outline among the graffitio This picture is not referred 
to in CIL, but it is clear enough on Parker's photograph. 
Unfortunately it is so mixed up with the graffiti, and these are so 
squashed together, that is is impQssible to see whether the picture 
belongs with any of the graffiti. Its presence lends a certain amount 
of c0nfidence that the text of 3045 should.be allowed to stand, and that 
a horseman had s8mething to do in con,ection with the sebaciaria. 
3045 would imply that the sebaciarius and the horseman ~ere one and 
the same. 
5) The conclusion of many of the graffiti recording that all was well:. 
fQr example, OMNIA TVTA, FELICITER, 
and, recording the safety of the companions of th~ sebaciarius, 
--
SALVIS COMMANIPVLIS. 
6) The re~erences to votes and vows, as in 3019 (quoted above), or 
in 2999 and 2998 which have these references set out more elaborately 
in pa~els to either siGe of th9 main texto 
7) Two referenc8sto the start of the fou~th year of service (i.e. the 
1st of March following the first th~ee stipendia): 
COH~VII.VIG SEVERIANA 7 FAVENti 
NI IVLIVS SATVRNINVS FECIT SE 
BACIARIA MENSE AVGVSTo FVSCo 
II ET DEXTRD COS SVB CR///// SEVERINO 
///////// OPTIONE OMNIUM 
FELIC!Ter COMEAT STIPENDIOR 
VM TRIVM I MARTIAS o TR 5 (3001) 
(206) 
GAZER II M E SEBACIARIVM 
7 ARRIANI.IVLeM/// 
SEBACIARIA fecit MoDEc 
////// accepto COMMEATV 
STIPENDIORUM III 
8) ThJO references to t emi tu1iarius' : 
COH VII VIG ANTONINIANA 7 SECVr~DI 
(3011) 
IMP ANTONINO AVG II ET SACERDOTEM COS I DPTIO 7 TITANVS 
VOT XX 
FLAVIVS ROGATIANVS MIL COH ET 7 S S 
.I 
SEBACIARIA FECIT MEN MAl 
SCRIPS! Ifff KAL IVNIAS TVTA 
AGO GRATIAS EMITVLIARIO 
CHO 
VII VIG 
l~lP M AVRELI 
0 SEVERO ALEXAN 
ORO COS 
OPTIONE P NVMISI 
0 NEPOTE 7 ADIVTO 
RE POMPEIO CELSO 7 
7 AVRELIO HERCVLA 
NO RV2PIVS DEXTER 
SEBACIARIA FECIT MEN 
SE IY!AIO NOMINE 
CLAVDII 
NATI 
OMNIA TVTA 
SALVO EMITVLIARIO 
FELICITER 
VOT XX 
-......------·- -· ------ ---
(3057) 
(3076) 
(207) 
4.31"6 
BR (pp.l03-107) sets out briefly the various suggestions 
put forward to explain the sebaciaria 1 himself emphasising that th3 
variOUS phrases 9 omnia ~~, 1~1Vis s~mrnanipulisl Rnd tfelicitert 
should imply that there was some danger in connection with the duty. 
Conjecturing that the ~bac.tarius was the man who carried a .torch 
at the head of the patrols, BR suggested that "the particular 
purpose in question was some night duty of considerable danger, of 
more danger perhaps to the lantern-bearer, fro~ his exposed position, 
than to the rest of the force. What this duty was I prefer to leava 
unspecified". The only circumstances in which the lantern-bearer 
would have been in greater danger than the others in the patrol would 
havs been when the patrol was likely to be shot at or otherwise intercepted: 
in firefighting, we should not assume that he was in greater danger than 
the others, whether from baing run over by nocturnal traffic or by 
marching first into a fire; on the contrary, he shouid have been safer. 
Probably it is best nJt to start by assuming that ths 38baciarius was in 
sane sort of "police" patrQl. The opinions o~ the other scholars 
cited by BR need not ba rehearsed in detail, since they all have the 
generic fault that they concer.trate on just parts of the evidence to the 
oxclusion of the rest. Let us first, then, look at thB evidence in 
detail. 
1) 'sebaciaria' and ·• aeba2iarius 1 do not present any difficl1lty as 
--
~egards the basic meanin~ of the words. Basically referring to 
tallo~J candles, the ending '-arius' s: ,wuld bear its usual signi fiance, 
'one who is concerned with the naking or usd of 1 • 
The 11.10rd ·•se!·8ciaria' is interesting, since in the neuter plural 
---
it probably rafers to the particular activity or the sebaciarius, 
being used in the phrase 1 sebaciaria fecit' (i.e. diffe~ent from 
(208) 
1 sebacea fecit', which does not occur in these graffiti). 
-a 
More than simply produGing candles is involved. 
2) The other references to light, this time using oil, are interesting 
because we may see a little of the functions of the sebaciarius. 
3019 indicates the use of two types of lamp (possibly the distinction 
is simply of size), and 3038 appears to show where the lamps were 
placed or (metaphorically) thei~ function. 
·~_porta' must mean 1at the door', and probably refers to the 
main entrance; in this connection the discovery of a lamp in the form 
of a flame near the entrance tc the excubitorium is of great interest 
(below, 6a2o7),though it must unfortunately remain a conjecture whether 
this was a precursor of tht:J modern red lamp and the particular lamp 
referred to in the graffitoo ·~pampas' is mo!'e difficult., 1 pompa 1 , 
I like ''ltoptt'l', most commonly rneans a public procession, and its other 
attested meanings are connBcted with this or derive from it;~opn, is 
used to indicate a Roman triumpho Metaphorically, it probably would 
be possible for .E£lll~ to refeJ' to the patrols, and so for the graffito 
to refer to lamps for the patrols to carry; on the oth~r hand, tad 
porta' in the line just abov3 it does seem extre~ely literalo Moreover, 
althoug:1 any venture into the interpretation of colloquial Latin must 
be attended with caution, it is worth exploring the possibility that 
;'pomp~' here might mean 'pump'. The pro:.lem is that this sense is 
not attested in any classical writinas. There is not ~uch to help us 
if we try to work back from the modern use of thH word. According 
to many of the dictionaries of the first part of the nineteenth century, 
the Italian •'pompaV tuas bo:rrowed from French mariners' slang, and thBre 
(209) 
is agreement that, in whichever language the word first appeared, it 
was onomatopoeic and slang used by sailors. The oo~ollary of this'is 
that until the compilers of these dictionaries start8d to include 
mariners• sl3ngp the word went unnoticeda It did not, however, not 
exist, for Du Cange (s.vo) cites what is probably the first attested 
occucrence of ths word in the sense of pump, in the Necrologium of the 
Abbey of Daoulas (in the diocese of Quimperle, Finistere), unfortunately 
without giving a date, though the abbey was only founded in the eleventh 
century: 
"Partem domus restauravit~ quae respicit ad Pompam, et unum villagium.• 
Just as useful, not least because its date is known, is the occurnnce 
of the word 'bombare' meaning to pump, in a poem (in Italian) by 
Erasmo di Valvaso~ep ~c~~ 3ol45, dated to 1593o This is probably as 
far as we can uo, since thE linguistic complications overtake us, but 
for present purposes two points may perhaps be made: · 
(a) the meaning #pump 1 makes very ~ood sense 
(b) Roman pumps would have made a sound for which ~pampa' 
would have been an appropriate representation~ and as yet only th~ 
Viqiles among the ancient users of pumps have provided us with any 
suggestion as to what they might hava called:the pumps when they were 
not using the more sophis~icated termino~ogyo 
As to why the Vigiles were placing lamps by the pumps 
(assuming that this is the interpretation ~hich ~akes better sense), 
we must wait until we have gone through the ramaining evidenceo 
(210) 
3) Both 3053 and 3067 are of interest because they reveal a little of the 
personal side of the duty. 3053 records that the oil was distributed 
among the soldiers ( 1 in ca.ligas') without complaint. Does this mean 
that sometimes the oil was distributed ineqiJitahly? 3067 is straightfcrward 
except for the odd phrase 1 fysgo ~·· BR rightly notes that this is 
an extremely odd form if 'fisco suo' was intended, and "it is doubtful 
if fiscc ~could be used for ~ pr.cunia" (p .. 105).. One alternative 
possibility exists: that 'fys_g_o' is a latir.lisation of •+v~J,II•, which in 
Pollux 7.205 means a threw of dice. If this hypothesis be accepted, the 
;Jhrase 'fysgo ~· would tell us that the vigiles arranged their rota by 
lot, ancthat Aufidus Secuanus performed his duty at the time so allotted. 
In this case, it becomes impossible to follow Henzen in assuming that 
the sebaciarius paid fer the illuminations at his own expense (BR p.105), 
and we cannot put forward what wouJd otherwise have been an attractive 
explanation for 1 sina ouerella' that if the sebaciarius was short of 
money some of the vigiles went short of oil. 
4) There is no practical reason tuhy just one of the firemen should not have 
used a horse. It would have been very practical for the patrol to have 
been preceded by a light, both for sReing where they were going and also 
for ease of re-assembly in case of fire. If, as 3072 implies (quoted above), 
the sebaciarius was liable to become fatigued (i.e. by carrying a large 
light) it would have been sensible to mount him on a horse, though this 
would not havg removed all of the exertion9 A supply of emergency flares 
COIJld also have been carried hy the horse, and, in the event of a fire, 
the horseman could have deposited most of his flares for the firefighters 
to use, and returnerl to the fire station fixing flRres at crucial points on 
buildings to guide the reinforcements. In this 111ay, the horse will have 
been used as a bicycle, the extra hei~ht removing the need to carry a 
ladder. 
(211) 
5) The references to safety and danger are not a great deal of help in 
suggesting what the sebaciaria consisted of, since practically any 
activity in Rome at night had its dangers, and, allowing for superstition, 
the night itself will have presented a dangero 
6) The references to votes and vows, as BR saw {p.1Q4), occur in so many 
months and years as to suggest that they do not refer to public 
celebrations; possibly they were connected directly with the sebaciaria. 
7) Henzen suggested on the strength of 3001 that the sebaciaria were 
illuminations held by the vigiles when they completed three years• 
service (~.~· 1867, 12-30). BR is probably a little over-critical 
when he comments (p.105): "this explained nothing but the r3mark upon 
which it was based." While admitting the difficulties caused by the 
lack of evidence, we cannot overlook the words in the graffito. Even 
if we do not go so far as to believe that the sebaciaria was purely a 
celebration, there is no inherent reason why the sebaciaria should not 
have been restricted to the more senior men •. 
B) The word 1 emituliarius 1 occurs only in 3057 and 3076. In the former, it 
is in different letting from the remainder of the graffite, though the 
first part of the clause in which it occurs would appear to be in the 
same lettering as the rest of text, and we may take it that it did for~ an 
original part of a single graffito. 3076 does not present any textual 
difficulties (only Visconti has a variant reading: o •••• VARIO, where ~11 
the other editors read E~ITVLIARID). 
BR summarises the various suggestions concerning the meaning of the word 
(pp.92f., with references), and these need be noted only briefly:- "bucket 
(212) 
man" (from hama, tulo), "mattress for jumping on'' (from tritolium or 
---- ----
emitolium), "bed-fellow" (from the same derivation as the last), "the 
man who bears half the burden of the sebaciaria", the "artificer who 
was responsible for the ~mp-brackets in the streets", "a man armed 
e I I 
with a club half-studded with iron" (from ,~\ T~~wT~ ), "the man who 
bought provisions" (from emere), and BR 1 s own contribution: 
"No one seems yet to have suggested that it may be a proper name. 
Personally I do not fin~ny of these explanations sati~fying, and 
until further evidence comes to light I am content tc take it as some 
technical post, possibly of a temporary nature, and to admit that we 
have no idea of its derivation or signification." 
Certainly thb cautious approach is the right one for such an obscure 
word, and since both the Thesaurus and also Liddell and Scott (s.vv) are 
non-committal as to its meaning we should perhaps devote a little attention 
Q 
to the context in which the word is used. In the one case the emitu~rius 
is being thanked, while in the other he has been preserved. It seems to 
me that we should not consider emituliarius to be an official or semi-
official designation at all, but rather take it to be an obscene reference 
to someone who was in a position to play an important part (and perhaps 
failed to do so) and who was regarded as valuable (though possibly only 
by himself): perhaps the centurion? These are, after all, graffiti. 
Whether or not this suggestion is acceptable, ~e should certainly reject 
the hypotheses which fail to consider the context and rely solely on 
guesses at the etymology of the word. 
(213) 
4.31.7 
Probably the best explanation of the ~ebacia.rius is that he performed a 
job which was not in itself difficult or specialised~ that of heading the 
patrol with d light and with a supply of emergency lights, and 8f attending to the 
lighting of the fire stationso It was more a matter of being well-organi~ed. 
With the night being a period for the su~erstitious to become afraid and to 
try to avert evil, it would not be surprising if the sebaciari~ thus became 
in some sense a guardian of the safety of the men, since he wa~ in charge 
of lighting, and so came to have a ritual or ceremonial function in addition 
to his primary job. Such an explanation wo~ld satisfy the references to 
lights, horsemen, safety, votes and vows. 
It would also account for the appointment by lot of the ~baq_i..ari_~, if the 
post carried a certain ceremonial standing, and, inde~d, would explain the 
reference to t.he ~"tL.!l.~.:. (assuming that the centurion is intended) on the 
gro:...101d that the sebaci_~rius led the patrol rat~,ar better than the officer-
in-charge. For a post of this standing, it would be natural to restrict it to 
men with longer service and of the stand.ing to be recipients of .f_~!!!_e~t'!.lll 
.f!.i:lbl~c.~ after three full year3 1 service •. 
The post of sa~~~~ does not appEar anywhere except in graffiti. 
Officially it was probably regarded more as a duty than a post, but the 
regular organisation of the duty seems tc ~ave led to its being treated as a 
regul.ar post, at least among tha rankers. 
This examination of the RVidenc8 for ths equip~ent and techniques of the 
Vigiles shows us the material resources available for firefightin;. We now 
(~14) 
go on to examine other factors, to enable us to see how effectively the 
V~il~ could operateo 
Two points stand auto First, the lack of hoses restricted the capabilities 
of the pumps, even if these themselves ~ere large. Second, the lack of 
equip~ent capable of extin~uishing a largish fire was not really a 
disadvantage, provided that the Vigiles could tackle a fire in its very 
early stageso Overall, the most important potential of the Vigil~ lay 
in their numbers. As long as the patrols were effective in discovering 
fires, there was no reason why the ~il~~ should not be very successfulo 
Most fires today are put out with the simplest of equipment; the ~i-~~ 
had to aim to do likewise. 
(215) 
CHAPTER 5 
PERSONNEL 
..... 
The use of manpower has two aspects which are considered separately 
in this thesis: in Chapters 4,6 and 7 we look at the functional aspects, 
with firefighting taking the major place (in Chapter ~; and in this 
present Chapter we look at the management aspects - terms of service, 
personnel structure, and nature of career. The framework is provided by 
the analysis of VI.1057 and 1058 in Chapter 3. 
5.1.2 
Broadly the ~iles were organised in the same ~ay as the rest of 
the Roman a~my. This means that they differ from some fi~e brigades of 
the present day in that they did not have either a clear-cut officer-entry 
system or a simple system of promotion from the ranks, though fairly close 
parallels may be found on the Continent. This is not to say that the 
Ihgiles had diverged from some ideal standard, but the difference does 
lend considerable interest to the structure of the corpso In particular, 
we have to look carefully to find the areas in which the equivalent of the 
modern professional fireman could develop. The evidence, by and large, 
tells us more about the system than about individuals within it, so that 
we have to leave the answer to the question more in terms of potential which 
the system offered, and suggest that realisation of the potential was as 
extensive as we judge the ~~ile~ to have been successful. 
(216) 
5.1.3 
We start off by looking at the rankers (5.2), followed by the immunes 
and .E£.inc.:!F-ales (two groups who between them comprised the nco's and 
technicians), who were drawn from and largely remained within the ranks 
(5.3). Then we look at the higher officers: centurions (5.4), tribunes (5.5), ' 
the sub-prefect (5.6) and the prefect (5.7). Finally, we look at the corps 
as a whole (5.8j. 
5.2.1 
The only direct evidence for the size of thB cohorts and centuries 
is the pair of lists of the Fifth Cohort (Vl.1057 and 1058) which are 
largely the subject of Chapter 3~ 1057, datable to A.D.205 (see 5.2.5), 
contains 917 men, while 1058, of A.D. 210, contains an estimated 1027 
(3.2.6;3.2.7). They may thus be reckoned to have been milliary. The 
seven centuries varied greatly in size, the smallest ih each year being 
93 and 85 respectively and the largest 167 and 178 (3.2.7): the average 
numbers are 131 and 147 in each year. VI.1056, in the same series of 
inscriptions, has had the lists of three of the centuries of the First 
Cohort removed, but the remaini11g four centuries are of similar size 
(3.11.3), with an average based on the four. centuries of ·122. Although 
the point has never been fully argued, different scholars have taken 
different views of the size of the cohorts ~hen they were first established, 
in A.D.6 (for the date, Dio 55,26). E.Birley (1969,64f) took the view that 
Severus was responsible for increasing th8 ~ize of t~e cohorts from 3,500 
to ?,ooo, though he does not cite any evidence f0r this; Watson (1971,19) 
again without discussion, assumed that the Vigiles always numbered ?,ODD. 
There are two points which support the Birley view. First,in A.D.6 all 
(217) 
cohorts were quingenary: the milliary unit does not appear for several 
decades (probably not before the Flavian period: E. Birley 1966,55)j 
hence the seven n~w cohorts should also have been quingenary$ Second, 
unknown to either of the two scholars in 1969 and 1971, the lists of 
the Fifth Cohort imply that in A.D.205 that cohort was doubled in size. 
The precise basis for this statement is set out at 3.11.3, where the 
recruits of 205 on 1057 are given as percentages of the total number in 
the unit. For each century, they are as follows: 
53.125% 
52.695% 
50.413% 
45.217% 
58.042% 
70.339% 
47.312% 
The average percentage is thus 53.878%. Such a situation is clearly 
exceptional, otherwise the u~its would have continued to increase ad infinitum 
from minute origins. I~ 205 the new intake must.have doubled the size of 
the centuries and of the cohort. In view of the increases attested for the 
Praetorians and the Urban cohorts (see Birley 1969, 64 for references) this 
increase in the Vig~ must have been intended to keep them in line with 
the other City troops. From a firefighting point of view, there is no 
particular reason for the Vig~ to have been increased in 205, nor even 
at that general period; the effect on fir5~~ghting and the patrols must 
have been incidental. The need for increased accommodation may be seen 
in the £~ at Ostia, which was enlarged by Severus precisely in A.D.205 
{6.3.8); there must also have been a huge increase in the amount of 
paperwork in the administration. 
(218) 
It is noteworthy that the increase was performed quite crudely, 
since the effect of taking in a number of recruits approximately equal to 
the existing number of men was to create a 'bulge' which would take some 
years to pass througho Even if recruitment were cut down for a few 
years (and the variation in the size of the centuries may reflect such 
an action), the cohorts were bound to be oversize for a time, and this 
would explain why in 210 there were 90 men more in the Fifth Cohort than 
there had been in 205. For an unknown reason, the smallest century, 
no.7, received the smallest number of recruits in 205. 
Clearly the centuries varied in size even before 205. In general, 
they would seem to have consisted of 60 to 80 men. For the rates of 
recruitment, it is estimated that after the doubling in size in 205, 
the annual rate will normally have been in the region of 20 to 30 men 
per century (3.10o2), and before 205 the rate was presumably about half 
that amount; and, consistent with this, VI.220, which lists the recruits 
of one year (A.0.199-200: see below, 5.2.8) who survived until 203, shows 
16 names. 
5.2.2 
The establishment of the Vigiles by Augustus in A.D.6 is described 
in some rletail by Dio (55, 26 and 31): 
''When many parts of the c!ty were at this time destroyed by a fire, he 
organised a company of·freedmen in seven divisions, to render assistance 
on such occasions, and appointed a knight in command over them, expecting 
to disband them in a short time. He did not do so, however; for he 
found by experience that the aid they gave was most valuable and 
necessary, and so retained them. These night-watchmen exist to the 
(219) 
present day, as a special corps? one might say, recruited no longer 
from the freedmen only, but from the other classes as well. The.y have 
barracks in the city and draw pay from the public treasury." 
"And as there wa~ need of more money for the wars and for the support of 
the night-watchmen, he introduced the tax of two per cent. on the sale 
of slaves". 
Suetonius commented on the unusual step in employing freedmen (~.25): 
"Libertine milite, praeterquam Romae incendiorum causa et si tumultus in 
g~aviore annona metueretur, bis usus est." 
In both these other cases, he tells us, the freedmen were former slaves 
who had been specially liberated; and the same might have applied to the 
original Vigiles, recruited perhaps from the familiB publica set up for 
firefighting in 22 B.C. under the charge of the aediles (Dio 54.2), and 
transferred in 7 B.C. to the vicomag~~ (Dio 55.8). 
Two reasons may be suggested for the positive choice of freedmen 
for this new corps, and four reasons for not choosing any other class. 
On the negative side, there were probably too f~w Roman citizens who would be 
willing and able to sBrve, bearing in mind the aftermath of the civil 
wars and subsequent wars;.it W8s in the interests of Augustus to make the 
new corps look as non-military as was practically possible, and freedmen 
were normally barred from military service; thirdly, to have used slaves on 
such a sL:ale would have invited insurrection; and fourthly, the collegia 
were in bad odour, and, while they might act as firemen in smaller cities, 
in Rome the scale of the operations would h8Ve given them too much importance 
had they been given firefighting duties. Moreover, the collegia would 
probably not have been well.-suited to performing ~ight-duties. On the 
positive side, freedmen were available in large numbers in Rome, and as a 
(220) 
class they enjoyed wide experience of practical occupations which would 
make them suitable for firemen. 
There is epigraphic confirmation of Dio 1 s statement that other 
classes than freedmen came to serve in the Vigiles. It is often impossible 
to deduce the status of a man who displays simply the ~nomina, but in 
the following cases we have explicit statements that the man in question 
was a libertus (indicated by 'L' in his name), or an ingenuus Roman 
citizen (indicated by the filiation 'F' in his name), while the ~thers 
- -
were presumably pereqrini or citizens by special grant (where, in a list 
in which some men give 1 L1 or 1 F1 , others give nothing, and so presumably 
were neither freedmen nor citizens by birth). The numbers in each class 
are given. 
Status 
Inscription Date Freedmen Ingenui Other 
XlV.4499 166 1 2 8 
(=AE.1912,230) 
XlV.4500 168 4 4 0 
XlV.4502 175 2 3 0 
XlV.4503 181 2 5 0 
XlV.4505 282-3 0 7 0 
Vl.220 recruits of 5 11 0 
199 and 200 
XlV.4378 ? 0 0 3 
' XlV.4509 ? 0 0 3 
XlV .. 4506 ? 1 0 0 
XlV.4508 ? 1 0 0 
I 
(221) 
Clearly 9 this evidence confirms the trend, though it is not possible to 
work out precise proportions of each classo Status does not appear to 
have been a major source of advantage or disadvantage in recruiting to 
the Vigileso 
5.2.3 
The question whether the Vigiles were properly soldiers {milites) 
is one which is closely bo~d up with the standing of the corpso At the 
outset, Str,abo called them "o-reJ.TIWTit<ov" {5.3.7) but Tacitus omitted them 
from his list of the armies under Tiberius (auu. 4.5 ; A.D.23), suggesting 
that at that date, even if not in his own time, they were not reckoned 
to be military. However, there is only one source which even implies that 
there might have been a problem, and that was solved by Ulpian (Dig. 
'-
37.13.1): 
11 in classibus omnes remiges et nautae milites sunt; item Vigiles militss 
sunt, et iure militari eso testari posse nulla dubitatio est." 
BR co~ments on this passage (p.66): "But the very 'fact that there can have 
been any question on the subject shows that the position of the Vigiles 
was not sa certain and well known as that of the other troops, and 
probably also that at one time their status was different." Surely it was 
well known that the Vigiles were different; and, if so, the question will 
have been provoked by this diffe~enceo The solution followed the normal 
pattern, in that existing military practice was adopted. It seems best to 
regard the Vigiles as a unique corps, but one which made full usg of military 
analogies a~d arrangements whe~ they were helpful. Not merely did this 
extend to the org;atti'.sation of the Vigiles, in cohortes and centuriae, but 
the centurions, tribunes, sub-prefects and prefects came to serve in the 
-
Vigiles, as they went to serve in other types of unit in the course of 
their careers. 
(222) 
Further, the nature of the duties and the service were such as to demand 
the use of normal military vocabulary and detailed arrangements. Hence 
we find the use of "miles factus 1' (for example on VI.222 and XIV.4509), 
the name 11!!)jjes 11 on tombstones (e.g. VI.296D, 2962b, 2964), together with 
the verb "militavit", and, in the Lex Visellia uf A.D.24 (i.e. only 
eighteen years after the Viqiles were establish8d) we again find the 
verb "militavsrit" (see 5.2.4). Many of the immunes and principales 
have the same titles as are found in other types of unit; there was an 
established period of service (legi tima st.iper.dia), and the possibility 
of honesta missio, just as for other troops (see 5.2.5); some even called 
themselves veterani (5.2.6). All this evidence indicates that in practice 
the Vigiles were treated like soldiers, and that it waa only in certain 
leyal aspects that any problem arose. However, as BR rightly notes, there 
always was felt to· be a difference,and we should beware of assuming that 
there was a gradual rise in status until thd ~giles were regarded as 
proper soldiers; the m~jor move towards parity of status will have come 
with the constitutio Antoniniana (A.D.212-214), which extended Roman 
citizenship to most of the free people in the Empire (though without 
ending the production of freedmen subsequently: Jones 1960,133f.). 
5.2.4 
Although the Vi~iles were established as a corps of freedmen into 
which pereqrini and even citizens by birth were admitted, there was one 
class which was admitted but whicl1 provoked special 3rrangements applicable 
only to itself. These were the Latini Juniani. In a senea, they were a 
special type of freedmen, distinguished by having been manumitted informally, 
but the informal manumission did not of itself confer th·e !;>tatus of Roman 
citizen, and there were other disadvantages also. 
(223) 
Before it is possible to discuss the Junian Latins in the Vigiles, 
it is necessary to refer briefly to the thorny question of the date of the 
lex Iunia Norbanao This uas the law which created the class of Latini 
from those who had been manumitted informelly (Gaius ~· iii.56): 
"eos qui nunc Latini Juniani dicuntur. olim ex iure Quiritum servos 
fuisse, sed auxilio praetoris in libe~tatis forma S8rvari solitos. e • 
postea vero per legem Junibm eos omnes, quos praetor in libertat€ 
tuebatur, liberos esse coepLsse et appellatos esse Latinos Junianos". 
The question of the d2te hinge's on whetber to rely on the consular date 
of A.D.19 given in its title by Just.~· 1.5.3, the only source which 
gives an identifiable date. 
The arguments for and against acceptance of A.D.19 ar~ set out by 
Crook (1967, 44 and 296 n.29), and by Last (CoA.H. vol.X, 888ff.). Last's 
objection to A.D.19 arises from consideration of the relation of the lex 
Iunia Norbana to thE lex Aelia Sentia of A.D.4, and he finds strong grounds 
in certain passages for supposing that ttie lex Iunia Norbana was the 
earlier. On the other hand, he admits "it must be plainly stated that 
the meaning of these texts is not beyond dispute. Even though such an 
interpret?tion is not perhaps the most natural, if demonstrative proof 
were forthcoming from some other quarter that the lex Junia was a later 
measure than the Lex Aelia Sentia, thsy could be interpret?d ~ithout 
great difficulty to accord with the version of the social legislation 
which would then be imperative." Last then refers to A. Steinwenter in 
P~W. XII, cols. 910 ~o' for such a treatment. However, wftile it is 
true that the title of the law occurs in OLJr sources only once, it is 
un~ec~ssury to dismiss that passage (Just. Inst. 1.5.3) as "a single 
text from the sixth ce~tury'': not all such sixth century texts are wrong. 
(224) 
The value of Crook's discussion is that it asks whether there really is 
a problem over the date: what is wrong with referring the law to the 
consules ordin3rjll of AoDo19? Moreover, although this is not the plece 
for further study of this point, it is not impossible that P••en before 
the passing of the Lex Junia Norbana there was a class called 'Latini', 
who appear as such in the Lex Aelia Sentia. A small contribution to 
settling the question is provided by the discussion below, in which it 
is suggested that assigning the law to A.D. 19 helps to explain why it 
was in A.D. 24 that another reform was needed. In this matter, then, I 
follow Crook in accepting A.D. 19 as correct. 
The date of the Lex Junia Norbana is important, becau~e the 
Vigiles,it ~ay be argued, were established thirteen years before there 
was such a status as Junian Latin. In A.D.6 there were only two types of 
liberti which we know to have been recognised by law, the cives Romani libertini 
and the dediticii,of which only the formsr will have been eligible for sBrvice 
in the Vigiles; also there may have been a class of Latini (see prece~ding 
paragraph). Since there has grown up a tendency in discussir.g the Vigiles 
to assume thet Latinus was synonymous with libertus,it is perhaps ~orth 
observing the distinctions set out at Just.~. 1.5.3: 
"Libertinorum autem status tripertitus antea fuerat: nam qui manumittebantur, 
modo maiorem et iustam libertatem consequebantur et fiebant cives Romani, 
modo minorem et Latini ex lege Iunia Norbana fiebant, modo inferiorem 
et fiebant ex lege Aelia Sentia dediticiorum numero." 
This passage goes on to outline the development of freedman status, which 
became simplified though with the addition of many new ways of obteining 
!ibertas. 
(225) 
The early presence of Junian Latins in the Vigils~ is attested 
by one of the clauses in the Lex Visellia of A.D. 24 (Ulpian Fr. 3,5): 
"Militia ius Quiritum accipit Latinus (si) inter Vigiles Romae sex 
"'i 
annos ~itaverit". 
It should be observed that this refers to Latins, not to freedmen in 
general. The other interpretations which are reviewed briefly below all 
take this provision to refer to the whole of the corps of Vigiles, not 
just the Latins. 
A summary of the ~egal attributes of Junian Latins is given by 
Duff (1928,78ff.j. They had the full~ mancipationis but only a 
restricted ~ testameQii factionis: they could witness wills and could 
exercise ~~' but they could not make their own will, they could not 
receive bequests except under the form of fidec8mmissa, they could not 
appoint ~tares by will, and they could not succeed to an estate over 
which they exercised tutela. 
. ~--- - --
Their own estates passed at their death to 
---~_h~--p_atron (Gai~.Jti .!.Qll.3.5;): 
"res eorum peculii iure ad patronos pertinere solita est." 
Duff conc~udes "The ~ Latinorum, the patronage of Latin freedmen and 
the right to their estate, was therefore a lucrative possession", and it 
was this financial interest 1o1hich largely provoked the legislation 
concerning Latin freedmen. 
The clause of the Lex Visellia. quoted above was just one part of 
a much bigger law, concerned in part with the provision of methods by 
which rich freedmen might obtain fictional ingenuitas and so proceed to 
the honours of the free-born (Duff, Appendix II). The clause which would 
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probably have had the most widespread effect stated that only the 
emperor could award the right to wear a gold ring and so enable freedmen 
to hold municipal magistracies and priesthoods (CoJo ixo21)~ 
"Lex Visellia libertinae condicionis homines persequitur, si ea quae 
ingenuorum sunt circa honores et dignitates ausi fuerint attemptare 
vel decurionatum adripere, nisi iure aureorum anulorum impetrate a 
principe sustentanturo" 
A further special grant would be needed to confer the eguus publicus. 
The existence of the clause which refers specifically to the Junian 
Latins serving in the' Vigiles suggests that they enlisted in considerable 
numbers. Before the institution of the grant of citizenship after six 
years' service, a Latin who had served in the Vigiles could not really 
call his pay his own: at his death his savings would pass to his patron, 
and not to his family or any other person he might wish to choose, and 
a greedy patron might even exert pressure to acquire the money before 
the man died. The presence of Latins in the Vigiles must have added a 
considerable burdento the wo.rk 'of the praetor, ,as well as loweri:-~g the_ 
dignity of. the corps. The solution in the Lex Visellia is, in eff~ct, 
aut oma·tic i teratio (formal repeat of the informal manumission) with the 
automatic. sanction of the emperor (beneficia e_rincipis: an alternative 
to the patron undertaking th~ ceremony of iteratio cfo Duff 8Df.). 
Duff notes that the consent of the patron would not be required if the 
freedman had proved "that he had contributed to the welfare of the state 
and in virtue thereof had a claim to be numbered among its citizens ••• 
3y his service the Latin had merited citizenship; the patron's right 
to his estate was overridden by the Latin's right to the franchise." 
(227) 
The period of 6 years was one which was already familiar in 
the context of service hy which a man might attain full citizenship. 
Under the Lex Iulia municipalis (the tabula Heracleensis, 45 BoCo) 
a citizen might, even if he were under 30 years of age, seek office if 
he had served for 6 years as a foot-soldier in a legion (I.206 = Dessau 
6085, lines 89-94 and 98-103): 
"Quai mindr annos natus est erit, nei quis eorum o o o gerito, nisei 
quai eorum stipendia equo in legions III aut pedestria in legions 
VI fecerit." 
The three-year provision is relevant to.the frumentum arrangements of the 
Vigiles and is discussed below (5.2.8) •. The six-year provision is 
clearly a suitable precedent for the citizenship of the Latins in the 
Vigiles,infantry service in a legion being analogous to service in the 
Vigiles. In the for~er case, though, the qualification was for holding 
office for under-age citizens, in the lattec for Latins to become citizens. 
A little later~ Claudius made further use of the six-year period in his 
arrangements for assisting the corn supply of Rome. In these, citizenship 
was offered to any Latin who would build a ship of 10,000 modii capacity 
and help provide corn for Rome for a period of 6 years (Suet. Claudius 
19; Gaius·l!:J..2i· 1.32; Ulpian fr.3,6) .• Six years, then, was a period which 
if spent in service to the state could bring the full reward and exercise 
of citizenship. For the Latins in the Vigiles,it meant liberation from 
the claims of their patroni. For the majority of the liberti,who already 
possessed citizenship, the reward 1uas meaningless ar:d not applicable. 
This interpretation of the clause in the Lex Visellia differs from 
• earlier ones. The general opinion is given by BR on page 66: 
(228) 
"It seems that there must have been some difficulty in recruiting for 
the Vigiles in the first years of their e~istence; the duties were 
arduous, the prospects of rromotion small, the serv~ce probably~ng, 
and the reputation of the corps apparently poor. At any rate, in the 
reign of Tiberius it was found necessary to add some inducement, and 
in A.D.24 a Lex Visellia was passed by which the men of the Vigiles 
acquired the full citizenship after six years' service in the corps." 
Much of this is upen to doubt, and SR also ignores the more general aims 
of the law. Duff (1928,84) also regards the law as an inducement to 
recruiting, though he rightly observes that tha assistance of the Latins 
was genuinely needed while wrongly assuming that they were unwilling to 
serve. Durry (1938J 19)~sees the Lex Visellia (again, the whole of it) 
as "un geste en leur faveur au moment o~ 1 1 on r~unissait les pretoriens 
~As la caserne neuve du Vimina!.". Watson (1969,19) considers that 
the Lex Visellia provided "the first stage in the upward climb of the 
viqiles ·towards social respectability",.and probably encouraging free-
born citizens to join (how?). It should not be forgotten that this 
clause of the Lex Visellia concerned an anomalous group of men, and 
that the Vigilec W8re principally cives Romani when they joined. The 
majority lacked only ingenui±as. 
There is an interesting implication of this~interpretation of the 
clause in the Lex Visellia concerning the Latins in the Vigiles. It is 
suggested below (5.2.5) that six years was the normal period of service in 
the Vioilesa Junian Latins were, as we have seen,unable to retain their 
EBculium against the wishes of their patrons, and this disadvantage must 
have haunted them as long as men of that class were serving in the Vigiles. 
The question ther-;fore arises why it w9;s not until A.D.24 that their 
po~ition was improved and thay were enabled to keep their savings. 
(229) 
The answ~r would appear to be found in the date of the Lex Iunia Norbana; 
before A.D.19 the class of Junian Latins did not exist, and, in law, 
the problem of their pay did not exist. Starting from AeDo 19, Junian 
Latins in the Vig~les must have realised t~at they were liable to lose 
their savings. As long as they were still serving this would probably 
have remained a minor worrye Once they left, however, they were vunerable 
to pressure from their patrons. It therefore becomes interesting that 
the improvement in their status in A.D.24 would apply to the very first 
batch of recruits who would have been listed under the new heading of 
Junian Latins. In A.D.24 they would have been preparing to leave the 
Vigiles after serving their six years. It is very neat to suppose that 
the improvement in their position was incorporated in the Lex Visellia 
because that law was made in the year when the problem would have become 
major. In other words, if the creation of the class of Junian Latins 
had taken plaGe earlier than A.D.19, it might be supposed"that the reform 
for those Latins in the Vigiles would have also been ~ade earlier than 
A.D~24, otherwise they would have been harder tc recruit. Thus it would 
appear that the existence of the clause in the lex Visellia confirms that 
ths Lex Iunia Norbana should be assigned to A.Da19. 
Subsequently, probably when the right to frumentum publicum was 
awarded to the Vigiles, the special position of the Junian Latins again 
caused difficulties. The six-year provision seems to have been superseded 
by one of three years. This change is discussed in the section on 
frumentu~ publicum (5.2.8). 
5.2.5 
The normal periad of service in the Viailes is e. matter ofso~e 
difficulty. Analogies with the fleets and the legions led BR (p.65) to 
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wonder whether it started at 26 years and was reduced to 20; Domaszewski 
(19DB, p.7,n.1) confused his figures and argued that since one third of 
the names on VI.1057 were missing on 1058, and the interval between these 
lists was five years, the period of service should have been 16 years 
('one third' is corrected by Domaszewski-Dobson 1967, VII to 'two thirds') 
Thus these lists imply a period nearer to eight years (that is, leaving 
various factors out of account). Breeze (1970,I,92) partly based his 
view on the attested stipendia of immunes and principales and assumed a 
period of 25 years. It has also been suggested to me in discussion that 
there was not a regular period of service at alll 
Vigiles served for a recognised period (the legitima stipandia) 
followed, normally, by honesta missio (Ulpian Frag.Vat.t44; VI.32754; 
and A.E.1933,B7: quoted below in section 5.2.6). The purpose of this 
section is to consider what the recognised period of service actually 
was in terms of years. 
It was suggested at 3.4.6 that the period covered by VI.1057 and 1059 
was about the same as the normal period of service. This relationship 
was worked out without reference to 1 exterP::1l 1 historical data, and was 
valid whatever the period act"ually was: 1058, it will be remembered, 
~e&rs the date of A.D. 210, while 1057 does not.bear a date. In order 
to keep the arithmetic logic in one place, the subsequent part of Chapter 
3 went further into the analysis or those two inscriptions making use of 
the conclusion of this section regarding the length of normal service, 
so it is important to emphasise now the precise point the analysis had 
reached when it became necessary to use the 'external' historical data. 
(231) 
Up to and including 3a4Q6 the actual length of service was irrelevant. 
It is hoped, therefore, that no confusion will arise, and that circular 
arguments will be avoided, if we now make use of those two same inscriptions 
to help us doduce the normal period of servicee This may be achieved if 
we deduce the date of 1057. 
- r -
Inscriptions of the type to which 1057 and 1058 belong are unusual, 
and, in the case of the Vigiles, those that carry dates belong to either 
of only two years: 205 and 210. To 205 belong VI 1055 (coh.IIII) and 
1056 (coh.I): and to 210_ belong 1058 (coh.V) and 1059 (coh.II). The 
objection that so few inscriptions cannot tell us the date of a fifth 
because so few dates are indicated may be countered with the fact that 
205 and 210 are not the obvious dates for any known celebration or 
anniversary: thus ~e are likely to be concerned with dedications particularly 
associated with those two years. Also, the apparent upward movement of 
men from 1057 to 1058 has shown that 1057 is the earlier, and there has 
been general ac=eptance of the date 205 for 1057o This dating is so 
reasonable, and any alte~native so unreasonable, that it provides an 
excellent foundation on which to build a further hypothesiso Dating 
1057 to 205 means that 1057 and 1058 cover a period of 6 years; hence, 
from 3.4.6, the normal period of service in the Vigiles should also be 
about 6 years. 
Secondly, we have seen that Latins who served in the Vic{les 
could acquire full citizenshi~ after 6 years' service (5e2e4)e In order 
to qualify, this period of 6 years was complete, that is, no further 
service was actually required of the Latin. The other services to the 
·state for which 6 yea~3 were required worked on the same principle. 
(232) 
The crucial question is whether the period of service demanded of the 
Latins differed from the normal period of service demanded of the Vigiles 
in generalo For practical reasons it is unlikely to have been differento 
Moreover 7 for the same reasons that applied in the case of the Latins, 
it is probable that the period of service prescribed for the freedmen 
in general who served in the Vigiles was also 6 yearso The analogy with 
infantry service in a legion is a strong onea There was, it is true, 
another qualifying period in use for the Vigiles, one of 3 years which 
led to admission to the right to frumentum publicum (on this, see 5.2.8), 
but some of the frumentum inscriptions show men still serving well beyond 
3 years, and the required period of service seems never to have been 
reduced to 3 years. 
This conclusion may be strengthened by reference to the grants 
of citizenship to soldiers upon discharge fr~m the army. Although such 
grants were not technically contemporaneous with discharge, there is 
little question that the grant was most commonly made upon completiori 
of the normal period of service {for the precise terms, see Mann 1972). 
Indeed, the modern misnomer 'discharge certificate' for 'citizenship 
diploma' does reflect ancient practice. Thus, although the precise 
period of service in the Vigiles was fixed with r~ference to the status 
of the men, analogy with military practice tends to imply tna~ the Latins 
who received the citizenship would do so at the end of their normal 
period of service. 
Confirmation that 6 years was the normal period cf service may be 
found·in the attested lengths of service of men who died apparently still 
in serviceo These are as follows (in years, and months and days wMere given): 
(233) 
Reference 
VIa2992 
VI.2986 
VI.2970 
X.5669 
VI.2964 
VI.2975 
VI.32757 
VI.2983 ::: VI.7845 
XI.1438 
VI.2990 
VI.2967 
VI.2978 = VI.7007 
XI.3520 
VI.2971 
VI.2987 
VI.2966 
Length of service at 
time of death 
1 0 ( ?)6 
1.8 
1 .1 0 
3 
6 
6 
6 
6.6 
6.7 
6.8.11 
7 
8 
11 
.13 
14 
22 
The number of these inscriptions is very small, particularly 
since we may estimate that over a quarter of a million men must have 
served ~n the Vigiles. Even so, the lengths of service are totally 
inappropriate for a period of service similar to those in the other 
branches of the Roman army: there are too few long periods and too many 
short ones. On the other hand, although thesG inscriptions are too few 
to suggest a normal period, they do suit very well a period less than 10 
·~-- -~----
years and more than 4; 6 fits very neatly. 
- . --- ·----- --------------------- ------- ------- --~--~-;-:~--
(234) 
We may further observe that there is a very wide consistency 
between the attested ~tipend~ of immunes and orincipales and the 
~ipendia worked out from VI.1057 and 1058 on the assumption that 6 years 
was the normal period of service (this anticipates the discussion of the 
immunes and Qrinci,.E_ales in section 5.3). Turning the argument round, 
although it is not in doubt that the immunes and principales on 1057 
are listed according to length of service, what does need to be emphasised 
is that the longer the period of normal service which we may assume, 
the later in their careers do these men attair1 their various ranks and 
grades: the consistency with the attested stipendia would be diminished, 
and the more implausible would become the career structure, with most 
promotions being made towards the end of the period of service and very 
few in the first decade or so. Again, the period of 6 years fits very 
neatly. 
To sum up, the special six-year provision of the Latins and the 
analysis of VI.1057 and 1058 reinforce each other in suggesting that the 
normal period of service in the Vigiles was 6 years. There is no evidence 
which supports a different period (the significance of the attested 
stipendia of immunes and erincipales is discussed in section 5.3), and 
acceptance of 6 years brings with it consistency both with attested lengths 
of service and with the oaro8r ~tructure of the immunes and principales. 
5.2.6 
Very few veterani are attested from the Vigiles, and none of them 
indicate how many stipendia had accrued to them. M. Iuventius :Felix 
(VI.32754) is described on his tombstone as "vetrano ~ coh ill vig missus 
honest missions", and Sextus Modius Salvianus (VI.2989) is descri~ed on his 
(235) 
as "veterani ~ coh .\!.!.. vig". The former breaks e~ff after "niil(itavit)", 
the latter appears complete. Possibly a ~eteran of the Viqiles is 
concealed in the poorly-preserved text of XI.2705: 
COH V • VIC // 
/IIIII I/ 
X o VETER • MIL. // 
II/IIIII/ 
EC //////0// 
The only other veterans of tha Vigiles known to me are a group dedicating 
to L. Tatinius Cnosus, a former centurion of the Fourth Cohort (A.E.1933, 
87). These describe thernselves as "veterani gui ~ l!J. vigilib (..!:!.§.) 
mili taver (.!dl)i) ~ honesta· missions missi §.!d!:!."t". 
The fewness of attested veterani is, on its own, enough to ~aise 
some suspicion that the retirement arrangements of the Vi~iles differed 
in some way from those of other branches of the Roman militia. In general, 
this would be consistent with their orig~nal and official freedman status, 
and with their normal period of service of o~!y 6 years. But further, 
we find that Ulpian did not hold that former vigiles could become veterani, 
despite his assertion that they were properly milites and could use the 
;military form of testament (Dig. 37.13). He sets out his views· 
.. -----. 
clearly in his liber ~ excusationibus (Frag. Vat. 144 and· 140): 
frag. 144: "Is qui inter vigiles militat, quamvis post emerita 
stipendia legitime missus sit, non in perpetuum vacat a 
a tutelis, sed intra annum quam missus est; ultra non 
vacat." 
frag. 140: "Vsterani quoque post emerita stipendia missi honesta 
missions in perpetuum a tutelis vacant." 
(236) 
According to Ulpian, veterans, with the perpetual immunity from tutelae, 
were different from former vigiles, who enjoyed immunity fur only one 
year after their dischargee Maxfield (1972,II,177) has worked out a 
chronology for the career of Cnosus, which shows that before he became 
centurion in the Vigiles he was decorated as evocatus by Domitian. There 
is thus no doubt that the dedicators' use of the title veterani predates 
Ulpian 1 s exposition by about a century. Since it is implausible that the 
status of former visil~ was lowered during that century, so that they 
lost the privilege of being veterani, we have to reckon with an apparent 
contradiction in the evidence. How are we to reconcile Ulpian's view 
with the undoubtP.d appearance of veterani ex vioilibus? 
There are probably two elements in the use of the term veteranus 
by former vigiles. The first is the common use of the word to indicate 
a discharged soldier (cf.LS.s.v.1), though r.ormally this would be 
one who had actually served a long time. Since they signed on for a set 
period of service and. underwent honesta missi~, former vigiles could 
easily, despite their shorter service, havs assumed or usurped the title 
veteranus. Secondly, there arises the queRtion how former vigiles were 
referred ·to durir1g their first year after discharge, while they enjoyed 
the immunity from tutelae. For this one year they were unique amo~g 
freedmen. As freedmen, they enjoyed certain immunities, t.hou~h with 
the exception that ".!! patroni .2.!di liberorum tutela ..!:!£!:!. excusantur" 
(Ulpian, Frag. Vat.152); but,during this year, they had a special privilege 
to be excused this one duty which ... normally was obligatory. Thus 
in relation to their origins they merited some special ~ark, and the 
term ~eteranus is an obvious choice. In some cases, though not all, it 
is also possible that men used the term after they had served for a long 
(237) 
time in the Vigiles; the 16 years of the Praetorians were sufficient to 
qualify for the status of veteran, and it is probable that any period 
approaching this would be held to qualifyo But it is most likely that 
the question of time was only secondary: primarily the term will have 
indicated an achievement by a freedman which brought with it a rise in 
status and a unique privilegeo Legal niceties were over-ridden by 
justified pridee 
(238) 
5.2.7 
On pay, Watson (1971) is in agreement with BR (68f.) that at first 
the Vigile~ will have been paid less than legionarieso BR also supposes 
that "there is no reason to suppose that it was brought up to the legionary 
standard. 11 Watson, however, argues that their 'pay actually overtook that 
of legionaries. 
At the start, the status of the freedmen would have ensured that 
the pay was below that of legionaries. It should, however, as Watson points 
out, have been above that of infantry auxiliaries. As time went an, the 
Vigiles must have been thought of more in connection with the Urban and 
Praetorian cohorts than with the legions, and Watson cites in particular 
the .career structure for the centurions and tribunes which was very closely 
linked with the other Roman units. In support of this, he refers to Xo6674 
(= 0.2020), in which a centurion of the Vigiles is listed after a Praetori~n 
centurion but before a legionary centurion: 
L.Veratio C.f. ~u~. Afro, Foro Iuli, veterano, decurioni, quaestori 
Anti, L. Mur.ati~s Sabinus 7 specul., C. Mamillius Naus 7 coh. VII pr., 
N.Naevius Rufus 7 coh. VI. vig., L. Veratius Certus 7 leg., heredes. 
On general grounds of style this inscription may be assigned to the first 
century A.D., but in addition Ore Mann suggests that the somewhat unusual 
occurrence of a veteran (the ~3CBased) holding municipal office and having 
taken the tribe of the colony in which he held office (Antium, tribe 
Quirina) tendsto suggest that the deceased was one of the origin~! colonists: 
and the colony was founded by ~!era. This closer dating puts the inscription 
a little into tho second part of the first century. Watson comments after 
citing this inscription (p.414): "It is hard to believe that the pay of the 
~~still remained below that of the legions 11 • 
(239) 
There is nothing to suggest directly when the change took place. Tacitus 
sheds a little light (Ann. 1.8) in writing of the legacies of Augustus to 
the troops: 
!'• •• praetoriarum r:ohortium r .. _;_li tibus singula nummum milia, urbanis quingenos, 
legionariis aut cohortibus civium Romanorum treccnos nummos viritim dedit." 
From this, the absence of the Yigiles suggests that in A.D.14 thGy were 
still reckoned below the legionaries and the other citizen troops, and 
this is consistent with their absence from the list of troops referring to 
A.D.23 (.&!£!..4.5), where the "proprius miles" of the City is defined as 
"~ urbanae, novem praetoriae cohortes". (In tr.is interpretation I 
differ from Breeze 197D,I,91f., who takes the "urbanis" to include the 
Vigiles.) Thus the change may be placed certainly after A.D.14, and probably 
also after A.D.23; possibly the development (by the time of Nero) of the 
career patterns for centurions and tribunes had some effect on the standing 
of the corps; see Dobson and Breeze (1969) for the centurions, and Dobson 
(1955, I.44) for the tribunes. It is unlikely that the presence of cives 
Romani ingenui in the Vigiles had any effect w&o tne standing of the corps, 
if there were any at such an early date: b¥ the time that they seem to 
have become more prominent (later second century), the order of precedence 
had already been established for a long time. So, at some time between 
the middle of the reign of Tiberius and the reign of Nero, the Vigiles will 
have advanced in standing, and may have received a corresponding increase 
in pay (it should be noted, however, that Watson suggests the reign of 
Trajan for the attainment of parity with the legions: see (2) in the next 
paragraph; but tl~~ e~rly date of X.6674 may imply that tha change came 
earlier and should be ascribed to Nero). 
(24o) 
For the actual amount of the pay there is no direct evidence, 
and Watson puts forward suggestions for which he makes the modest claim 
that they are not unreasonable but which do possess the merit of consistencyo 
The basis of the arguments are set out by Watson, and need not be repeated 
here. The historical development outlined above enables him to fit the 
Viailes into the patterns which he has deduced for other branches of the 
Roman armye Briefly, his suggestions are as follows. 
1o When the Vigiles were established, pay was above that of infantry 
auxiliaries (75 denarii a year) and below that of legionaries (225 
denarii a year): 150 denarii a year is suggested for the Vigiles. 
2. Possibly in the time of Trajan, when the subprefect was added to the 
establishment, and probably after an increase under Domitian, the 
Uigiles achieve~ parity with the legions: at this stage, then, they 
will have received 300 denarii a year. 
3~ With the increase of pay by 50% under Severus, it is suggested that 
the Vigiles will have received 450 denarii a year. 
4. Following the further 50% increase under Caracalla, the Vigiles will 
have received 675 denarii a year. 
The whole question of pay is a diffiGult one, and broadly Watson's 
suggestions seem acceptable. One qualification which is worth noting is 
tnat the date of X. 6674 may, as we have seen, imply that there should 
have been a pay rise before the earliest which is suggested by Watson 
(under Domi tian). Dr possibly the Vigils~ had parity with the legi.ons · 
right from the start. For the moment, howeve~~ I propose to let the matter 
rest there. 
(241) 
The Vigiles were paid from the public treasury (Dio 55,26) and 
when this did not prove adequete from the new 2% tax on the sale of 
slaves (Dio 55.31). From this latter passage BR (po65) deduces that the 
Vigiles were paid from the aerarium militare, but this latter remained 
restricted to the provision of gratuities for veterans and did not 
concern the Vigiles. 
5.2.8 
There is just one piece of evidence which shows explicitly that 
the Vigiles received frumentum publicum. This is the inscription XIV.4509, 
which is generally difficult to read but does clearly include the words 
"frumentum publlE!!!J. accipit".. From this it is possible to interpret the 
abbreviation "£•£•.B.•" on other i11scriptions as "f(rumentum) p(ublicum) 
a(ccipit)", and so to deduce something of these arrangements. 
The most useful piece of evidence concerning practical details 
of the Vigiles' right to frumentum publicum is the bronze tablet VI.220. 
This was dedicated to Severus, Geta and Caracalla in A.D. 203 by a group 
of vigiles who were commemorating their admission to the right of 
frumentum Eublicum after three years' service. As well as recording the 
names of the officers and immunes and principales, it gives details of 
the men themselves, all in onB c~ntury, and in particular it gives the 
following details concerning the frumentum publicum: 
1) II QVI FRVMENT PVBL INCISI SVNT KAL MARTIS 
This shows that the official year used by the Vigiles ran from 1st March. 
This is despite the fact that the dates of joining of the individual men run 
from 31 May in 199 to 13 February in 200; 3 clear years elapsed between this 
(242) 
last date and the year, 203, in which they were admitted to the right of 
receiving frumentum publicum. A man might thus serve nearly four years 
before he was reckoned to have served for three. 
The First of March was a day of some importance, being the 
traditibnal start of the new year, and in particular th3 date of the 
festival of Mars Victor, an important military festival (Fink, Hoey and 
Snyder, 1940, 82-85). There is, further , the inscription VI.31147 
(:0.2182) which suggests that 1st March was also the start of the military 
year. This is an altar to Juppiter Optimus Maximus and the Genius of 
Hadrian, set up in 139 on the Kalends of March by men discharged from 
the Eguites Singulares "~ ~" (line 4). Fink, Hoey and Snyder (p.85) argue 
that this altar was set up because that date was a military holiday, but 
it is difficult to follow them in this. ".a£~" is crucial, because it 
does imply tha~ the Kalends of March was the precise day for the men to 
be discharged, whereas normally men might wait somewhat longer and thus 
serve more than the legitime stipendia. On this view, it is a coincidence 
as far as the dedicators were concerned that that date was also a festival; 
they were celebrating their unusually prompt discharge. Also, it is 
against the C3Se put forward by Fink, Hoey and Snyder that in fact the altar 
was dedicated not to Mars Victor but to Juppit8r and the Genius of the 
emperor. If we accept the alternative explanation of VI.3l!41, VI.220 
appears in a different light. Fink, Hoey and Snyder comment thus on 
VI.220 (p.68,n.200): 
"lli. VI, 220, an the other hand, is an inscription of the vigiles,whose 
personnel and conditions of service were so different from those of the 
reet of the army that no general conclusions can be drawn from it." 
(243) 
A deduction which does seem to be justifiable is that VI.220 shows the 
Viglli.§. to have been following the rest of the army in organising their 
year. In other cases, too, where the military analogy was useful and did 
not conflict with any special arrangements, the Vigiles followed the rest 
of the armyo 
2) The typical entry for each of the men runs like this: 
Name - origo - date of being miles factus -.[.E.~ Q (number)I(number) .!S, f 
The expansion of these latter a,bbreviations except for .!S, f. is attested on 
XIVa4509: f(rumentum) p(ublicum) a(ccipit) glie) (number) o(stioj (number), 
where ostia is clearly equivalent to tabula. Mommsen suggested that r£ 
might stand for k(apite) c-(entesimo), with uncertain significance (VI.22Dn.) 
The numbers are those of the day on which and of the counter over which the 
frumentum was received. Incidi was the technical word for being placed on 
the list of those eligible to receive the frumentum (cf.Pliny ~.28: 
".2i guanto maiorem infantium turbam iterum atgue iterum iubebis incidi"), 
whereas accipere referred to receipt of the actual frumentum. 
3) What is most significant about the numbers for the day and for the 
counter is that they are the same for all the men in the list: 
d(ie) X • t(abula) CXLIV 
Since these men were all recruited in the same (notional) year, we may 
conclude that each batch of recruits in a century would rccqiv2 (accipere) 
their frumentum at the same time from the same placeo This deduction, 
from the only evidence which indicates with precision part of the proce. dures 
. '-.J 
for administering the frumentum publicum in the Vigiles, is of vital 
importance for interpreting the other inscriptions concerning frumentum 
and the Vioiles, a group from Ostia. 
(244) 
The relevant data on these inscriptions is as follows (they all 
record receipt of frumentum publicum): 
XIVoi~4499 (cohort 111 9 7 Claudi~ at Ostia August to December 166): 
D T Number of Men 
VII II XLVIII 1 
VII XLI 1 
VII LVIII! 2 
I LVIII I 1 
VII LXXXII 1 
uninscribed 5 
~ (men from 77 Quinti Valeriani coh.VI, Iuli Martialis coh.VII, Rufri 
Octobris coh.I, Opili Dextri coh.II; at Ostia, 7 Marci, December to 
April 168): 
D 
_IX 
VII 
XXII 
uninsc:!:'ibed 
T 
LV 
LXIX 
XLIV 
Number of Men 
1 
2 
1 
3 
~ (7 Papiri, at Ostia August to December, year unknown): 
D 
XXII 
IX 
XIII 
I 
uninscribed 
T 
XX\lii 
LXXII 
XLI 
IIII 
Number of Men 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
(245) 
.1§Q§. (7 Carpiani, coh.,III; at Ostia December 181 to April 182): 
D T Number of Men 
CXXVII 1 
VIII 1 
IIII 1 
!III X 1 
III! 1 
~ (7 Valent., coh.VI, at Ostia August to December in 189, 194 or 202, 
and dedicated in November'): 
D T Number of Men 
VIII X XXXII 1 
XXII xxxx 4 
i§.Q2. (a muddled inscription, most of the data being unusable): 
0 T 
T. Afrius Sarapio ? ? 
M. Atteius Primitivus I XVI 
We may deduce from one bit of light amid th2 darkness that since 
Sarapio was made miles on lli ~ ll!l ar.d Primi tivus was made miles 
on~ Iulias [ ••• , they in fact joined at the same time. 
~ (no details) 
0 
XXII 
XII 
T 
M 
XXX 
Using the conclusion that in each century the recruits of one year 
would receive their frumentum at the same counter at the same time, we can 
say that the appearance of different counters and days in these records 
(246) 
indicates either that the men were recruits of different years or that 
~orne of them had been transferred from other centuries (something which 
I do not envisage as having occurred frequentlyg ef. 3.?.4 )o On 4499, 
4500 and 4502 it is possible that the men at the foot of the lists whose 
numbers are not inscribed had the same numbers aa the men immediately 
aboveo It is also possible that on 4500 the four (or possibly three) 
sets of numbers belong to the four (or three) centuries attested, with 
the possibility that all the men were in the same year of servicee On 
4499, then, the intake of 5 different years wo~ld appear to be represented, 
of 1 year, at least, on 4500, of 4 years on 4502, of 2 on 4505 (at least, 
though it need not be mar~ than 2 if the "0 IIII" was accompanied by the 
same "T" number each time), of 2 years on 4506, of 1 on 4509, and of 2 on 
4511. 
Since these men in receipt of frument,~m publicum must have completed 
three years' service at Jgast, the following are the minimum years of 
service which must be represented (though some could be much high~r): 
4499 Bth 
4500 4th 
4502 7th 
4505 5th 
4506 5th 
4509 4th 
4511 5th 
Apart from this, these inscriptions give us no information about length of 
s9rvice or rate of recruitment, since we cannot take these as complete lists 
either of all the recruits per century in any year or of all the recipients 
of frumentum publicum on any occasion. 
(247) 
The question therefore arises what precisely united the Ostian 
~ 
dedicators. Withtthe origines we cannot say whether it is pre-existing 
friendship, nor do we know whether each group was made up of contubernales 
(though this is the explanation which I would most favour). At most we 
can be certain that the one thing which they had in common was receipt of 
their frumentum £Ublicum at Ostia. 
The method of providing the vigiles with their frumentum publicum 
while at Ostia was discussed, inconclusively, by Van Berchem (1939, 42), 
and in addition he suggested a reason why these inscriptions might have 
been set up: 
~ ' 
"Les vigiles d 10stie assurement ne remontaient pas a Rome pour y recevoir 
leur ration de bl~; pourquoi done s'en pr~valent-ils sur leurs 
inscriptions? 
A notre avis, ils ne franchissaient pas le seuil du portique de 
Minucius. Mais s'ils r~f~rent aux listes qui devaient y etre affich~es 
au moment de la distribution, c~est uniquement pour publier leur 
qualit' nouvelle de citoyens." 
We have seen that the vigiles were regularly admitted to the right to 
frumentum publicum on 1 March, and they will have collected the frumentum 
monthly {Suet.~· 40). Only in one case, that of 4505, did the first of 
March fall within the period of duty at Ostia, so that newly-admitted men 
could have been receiving th8~~ first frumentum; in all the other cases, 
the men must have waited several months, and for some the delay appears 
to have been several years. It is therefore justifiable to reject Van 
Berchem's suggestion, while adn~itting that we do not have sufficient data 
to form an alternative. Possibly, the mere fact of being in receipt of 
frumentum publicum would have been worth advertising. 
(248) 
It is unlikely that the vigiles would have had to return to Rome 
monthly to collect their corn. Since about half the vigiles would have 
been in receipt of frumentum, some procedure must have been worked out and 
used regularly. Probably the names of those about to leave for duty at 
Ostia were submitted to the staff of the praefectus annonae, who could 
then issue tesserae for the next four months for th8se men and advise the 
staff of one of the granaries at Ostia that these men would be coming to 
collect their frumentum. There must have been some special arrangements 
for admitting men to the right when they happened to be at Ostia: though 
again it is u~likely that_they would have had to travel to Rome specially. 
It would be fascinating to know more about these arrangements. 
The direct evidence for the Vigiles' right to frumentum publicum 
is thus epigraphic, though there is, of course, literary evidence for 
frumentum publicum in general (on this, see Van Berchem 1939). The two 
pieces of literary evidence (both legal sources) which help to supplement our 
picture of the Vigiles' right to frumentum ars fdirly complicated, and 
before we consider them in detail it is necessary to establish who was 
eligible to receive frumentum publicum. 
Van Berchem observes (p.43) that frumentum publicum was restricted 
to Roman citizens living at Rome ("civis Romanld§_ ~ ~" :•. These 
included both citizens by birth and also freedmen (pp.46-49), but not 
Junian Latins (p.4B). He follows Mommsen in assuming that all the 
Vigiles were Junian Latins (p.41), with the result that the reward after 
three years• service is taken to be not merely admission to the right to 
frume~tum oublicum but also citizenship itself. But as we have seen (5.2~4) 
(249) 
we must distinguish carefully between freedmen and Junian Latinso In 
the discussion which follows, Van Berchem'~ definition of eligibility 
is accepted, but the two classes of freedmen in the Vigiles are carefully 
distinguishedo The ten inscriptions referred to in the table at 5.2o2 
are all frumentum inscriptions, and show that both liberti and ingenui 
received frumentum. Soldiers could count as their domus the place where 
they were serving if they had no property in their place of origin (Dig. 
50.1.23), and we might therefore wonder whether some of the Vigiles were 
not eligible in their own right. The complication is caused by the 
presence of Junian Latins. 
In setting out the position regarding the rights of Junian Latins, 
Gaius and Ulpian write as follows: 
"• • id est fiunt cives Romani si Romae inter vigiles sex annis militaverunt. 
Postea dici·~ur factum esse senatusconsultum, quo data est illis civitas 
Romana, si triennium militias expleverint." 
(Gaius, ~· 1.32b) 
"Militia ius Quiritium accipit Latinus (si) inter Vigiles Romae sex annos 
militaverit, ex lege Visellia, praeterea ex senatus consulto concessum 
est ei ut si triennium inter Vigiles militaverit ius Quiritium consequatur. 11 
(Ulpian, fr.3.5) 
These passages refer just to Latins (cf.5.2.4), and there d~pears to be some 
indication that the six-year provision had been altered. BR implies that the 
use cf the present tense in describing the six-year provision indicates that 
it remained in force (p.67), and he also takes Gaius' 11 dicit••r 11 to indicate 
that "he was not very certain about it 11 (p.57). 
(250) 
We should, however, be careful to distinguish between the men 
of different status who served in the Vigiles. No special dispensations 
were needed to enable the citizens by birth and the freedmen proper to 
receive the frumentum, while from A.D.24 (under the Lex Visellia) 
Junian Latins acouired Roman citizenship after six yee~s' service. 
Probably the specific issue of frumentum to the Vigiles en bloc was 
introduced with the freedmen in mind, and the cives in~enui were 
absorbed into the system. The Junian Latins, though, were technically 
still slaves. The simplest solution, then, would have been to give 
them their citizenship after three years instead of six. WaR this the 
purpose of the senatus conRultum? Did it supersede the clause in the 
Lex Visellia? Evidently the latter remained in the record, though the 
use of the present is less decisive than BR supposed, since it would 
be perfectly natural and normal to cite a law in this way. It would 
have become redundant, however. It is odd that it is Gaius, the 
earlier of the two writers, who uses the word "dicitur" in referring to 
the senatus consultum. If there was any doubt, it seems to have 
disappeared by the time of Ulpian. Possibly, however, Gaius was 
accurately recording what was the common impression, in the knowledge 
that there was a slight technical inaccuracy. It is not out of the 
question that what the senatue consult~rn actually ~ranted was not the 
right to citizenship but the right to frumentum publicum. In this case, 
1f the Vigiles en bloc were awarded the right, the Junian Latins 
would thereby seem to have won an additional path to the citizenshiP. 
This would be sufficient to explain Gaius' "dicitur", and also to 
explain why the Lex Vieellia continued t0 be cited. Indeed, som~ 
link such as "dici tur'' would now be needed in order to demonstrate the 
(251) 
relevance of the senatus consultum to the provision of the Lex Visellia. 
This explanation of the apparent confusion enables the sources to be taken 
at face value, and is also consistent with what is known generally of the 
legal untidiness of many Roman arrangements. 
To sum up, then, it is suggested that the senatu8 consultum 
awarded to the Vigiles the right to frumentum publicum and that the 
Latins who served anomalously in the Vigiles exercised this right as if 
they were fully entitled to it. When ths legal position was first set 
out, by Gaius, he recorda~ both the original law concerning the Latins' 
right to citizenship through service in the Vigiles and also the current 
impression of the Latins' position in relation to the frumentum publicum. 
Ulpian, about half a century later, simply set down the lex anJ senatus consultum 
as being a complete-statement of the position, custom having by this time 
given legal validity to the earlier impression. 
It remains simp~y to note that, like the ei.x-year period of service 
(5.2.4), the three-year period was consider8d ouitable for meriting a reward 
for service to the state. In the passage from the Lex Iulia municipalis 
(quoted above, 5.2.4), three years of cavalry service in a legion made a 
Roman citizen aged less than 30 years eligible to stand for municipal 
office, while Trajan provided that a Latin who provided a mill and ground 
100 modii of corn a day for three years at Rome was granted Roman citizenship 
(GaiL'S ~· 1 .34). It appears from the dates of the known provisions of 
this sort that although both the three and six year periods ~ere used in the 
Republic, the last use of the six-year period was instituted by Claudius 
whereas the three-year period continued to be instituted after that (i.e. 
in effect the longer period gave way to the shorter). There is no way of 
dating the change in the arrangements of the Vigiles: the senatus consultum 
must belong within the period from A.D.24 to the time when Gaius was writing 
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{middle of the second century), and it is tempting to assign it to Trajan, 
to whom may also be ascribed the introduction of castra vigilum {6 .. 5o1) and 
the institution of the subpraefectus vigilum (5.6.6). 
5.2 .. 9 
Although this thesis is primarily a study of firemen and 
firefighting, it may be convenient to note briefly the evidence for the 
ages of joining the Vigiles and for the origines of the men. 
There. are fifteen inscriptions which record both the age at 
death and the length of service and so indicate the ages of joining; 
five more show just the ages at death; and three show just the length 
of service (VI.2967, 2978, 2990; a complete list of attested lengths of 
service is givsn in_section 5.2.5). The two lists below show the 
attested ages at joining, and the attested ages at death when no 
length of service is indicated. 
Reference Age at death Length o"f. ·s-el:'v1ce . Age at joining 
VI.;2983 = 7845 20 6o6 13 
X.5669 20 3. 17 
VI.2970 20.4.17 _1.10 18 
VI.32757 25 6 19 
VI.2971 32 1.3:. 19 
VI.2964 26 6 20 
XI.3520 31 11 20 
XI.l438 27 6.7.19 20 
VI.2988 30 9 21 
VI.2986 23 loB 21 
VI.2966 44 .. 0 22 22 
VI.2987 37 14 23 
VI.2992 30 1 .. ( )6 28 
VI.2975 35 6 29 
VI.2780 55 7 (+ 13 els:lwhere)35 
.' 
Reference 
Xo4834 
VI.3610 
VI.34408 
Xc5187 
X.1767 
(253) 
Age at death 
22.6 
22.0.6.2 
25 
25.(7) 
28.0.29 
Two points stand out concerning these ages: the fact that 
they are typical of the-ages at which men joined the other branches 
of the army; and the comparative youth of the firemen. Given that 
the majority served for only about six years (above, 5.2.5), the 
majority of the firemen must have been less than thirty years old 
when they completed their sarvice.. Even the men who stayed on as 
principales and immunes need not have been old, and many will not 
have been anywhere near past their prime. This conclusion reminds 
us of the typical modern advertisement for firemen: 11 fit, active 
young men required •• •" 
Oriq5nes are given explicitly on some of the frumentum 
inscriptions and on some tombstones, and in addition we may use the 
findspot of a tombstone as evidence for origo if it reco~~~ (whether 
as deceased or commemorating) an obvious member of the immediate 
family of the deceasea (particularly the mother or the father). Of 
indeterminate value are records of a frater (who might equally have 
been a fellow-soldier as a brother if the name is absent), wife 
freedman or freedwoman, heir, collegium, as is mere knowledge of the 
findspot. In cases where the findspot does have evidential value, 
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J!i.qile~. may be found among the commemorators as well as the commemorated,. 
In the list belowp .ugu means that the origo is actually stated 
(usually in abbreviated form), 'R' means that the mention of a 
particular relative suggests that the findspot was also the origo .. 
CJri,go Reference 
Rome VI.220 (six men) s 
VI.221 (one man) s 
VI.2962a:6151 R 
VI.2969 R (doubtful) 
VI.2973 R 
VI.2976 fl 
VI.2983:7845 R 
VI.2984 R (a £5lqnatus) 
VIo2988 s + R (patroness) 
VI.2994 R 
VI.2994 R 
VI.32756 R 
Italy Reg.I, Campania 
Neapolis VI.220 s 
VI.221 s 
Surrentum VI.221 s 
Puteoli Xol767 R 
Capua XIV.4500 s 
Italy Reg.IV, Samnium 
Rufrae- X.4834 R 
Histonium VI.221 (two) s 
Italy RegoVI, Umbria 
Interamna Nahartium VI.221 
Tuder XIV.4500 s 
Italy Reg. VII, Etruria 
Blera VI,.221 s 
Vetulonia VI.221 s 
Italy Rego VIIo Etruria 
Florentiae 
Pisa 
Centumcellae 
Feronia 
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Italy Reg. VIII, Aemilia 
Regium 
Forum Cornelii 
Ravenna 
Italy Reg. IX. Liguria 
Dertona 
Italy Reg. X, Venetiae 
Verona 
VI .. 32753 
XIV.4500 
XIol438 
Xlo3521 
XIVo4500 (two) 
VI.220 (two) 
Vlo2990 
XIVo4SOO 
Vl.221 
VI.2970 
Vl.-32754 
Italy, -Reg. XI, Gallia Transpadana 
Ticinum 
Gallia Narbonensis 
Forum lulii 
Pannonie Superior 
Emona 
Macedonia 
Lycaonia 
I conium 
Cilic:I.a 
Tharsus 
Africa 
Karthage 
Utica 
Vlo221 
VI.221 (two) 
Vl.34408 
XIV.4500 
Vl.220 
VI.2964 
Vlo220 
Vlo220 (three) 
VI.220 
s 
s 
R (probably) 
R 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
S (probably a vioil) 
S (for the form 
Aem(ona) of. 
IIIo3569 
Aem(o)n(a), and 
III ... P .. 489) 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
Byzacena 
Hadrumetum 
Thysdrus 
Numidia 
Cirta 
(256) 
VI.220 
Vl.,2987 
Vlo32757 
s 
s 
s 
Thls evidence should be supplemented by the study of 
names, motably the lists of the First and Fifth Cohorts (VI.l056j 
105? and 1058)~; Such a study is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
particularly since there is the specmal difficulty with the Vigiles 
that the City of Rome produced its own unique patterns of 
nomenclature. However, the evidence from explicit statements and 
inferred from tombstones, as listed above, shows, first, the 
predominance of men from Italy and from Rome itself, and, secondly, 
an apparent lack of men from Gaul and Spain. The totals are as 
follows: 
erigo li!Jmber of men 
Rome 15-16 
Italy excluding Rome 26 
other provinces north 
~f the M~diterranean 6-7 
provinces south of the 
Mediterranean 7 
54-56 
One important ~oint which has been put to me in discussion has been 
the apparently large number of Africans on the lists of the First and 
Fifth Cohorts (notably those named ·1 5!3-turninus' or with names ending 
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in ~ 0 -etus1 ), and the possibility was raised whether Africans were 
brought in to fill out the ranks when the corps was doubled in size 
in 205o The simple answer~ based on initial inspection of those 
lists and also the analysis given above» is that this was not the 
case, and that Africans served in the Vigiles before 205 in noticeable 
numbers~ Further work will: be needed to establish whether or how the 
proportion of Africans changed over the yearso Otherwise~ it seems to 
be established that recruitment to the Yigiles was based locally, 
as happened with the rest of the army, and that no more than a quartor 
of the men need have come t'rom outside Italy. 
(258) 
5.2.10 
The annual survival rate in the Vigiles was found to be 89.7% around 
the start of the third century AoDo (3oll~~ This rate seems 7 on first 
inspection 7 to be rather high 7 and one wonders whether men were really 
attracted to a service in which over 10% of the men disappeared from the lists 
each year. It is i~plausible that over 10% died each year, but before we 
consider factors other than mortality it is necessary to establish what 
percentage are likely to have succumbed to mortalityi 
This is a topic f~r which the evidence is far less good than used to 
be supposed, and for the general considerations it is best to refer to 
Hopkins (1966) and Brunt (1971, particularly Chapters X! and XX!, and 
Appendix 27). These scholars are in agreement that life expectation at birth 
is unlikely to have exceeded 30 years, though Brunt suggests a much lower 
figure. In dealing with the Vigiles we have to beware of assuming that t~ey 
were typical of a civilian population, and on general grounds it is more likely 
that their conditic~s of service affected their mortality in the same sort of 
way as militnry service. It is therefore the more valuable that there does 
exist a certnin amount of evidence for military mortality although, as with 
the Vigil~s, the direct evidence is for disappearance from the army lists. 
The earlier evidence, for legionaries in the second half of the first century 
B.c., has been analysed by B~'l~t (1971, 339ff.). The later evidence, for legionary 
veterans in the second century A.D., has been analysed by Mann (1956,336ff.). 
Brunt sta::-ts uJith the statement in the ~ Gestae (3 .3) that of 
500,000 soldiers 11~ sacramento ~~~ 300,000 received land or money on 
discharge. Then, since at the end af his reign Augustus had 25 legions in 
service (making up nominally 167,000 men and actually perhaps 140,000), 
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Brunt argues that Augustus cannot have included in the 500,000 the men 
still serving (otherwise only 50-60,000 men would have failed to survive, 
an impossibly low proportion)o He then offers reasonable estimates of the 
numbers of men discharged from before 30BoCo to 2BoCo The conclusion 
which he offers as being the most plausible, despite the need to use a 
certain amount of guesswork, is that about two fifths of all the soldiers 
failed to survive and be discharged. This represents an average wastage 
of about 2% per annum, including perhaps a certain number of deserters. 
Many of the men will have served 20 years or more, though some of the 
recruits of 36 may have served for a shorter period. For this period in 
general an averagA length of service of about 20 years may be assumed, 
though it was progressiusly being lengthened. In the discussion below, 
the figure which is used is the loss of two fifths over 20 years, or 
survival of 60%. 
For the second century A.D., the only period for which this type 
of evidence exists, Mann examines the numbers ~f veterans listed as 
discharged in certain years after 25 or 26 jears' service (discharges 
being carried out normally every two years). He first calculates how many 
men could have been discharged bi~nnially per legion, on the assumptions 
that each legion actually contained 6,000 men, and that normal service 
was for 25 years. If no men were lost, each legion would have released 
240 men each year, giving a biennial total of 480. In fact, these lists 
suggest that under half this number actually survived to be discharged. The 
data is as follows (an asterisk indicates that a number has ueen estimated): 
(260) 
Reference Legion 
Date of 
recruitment 
Date of 
Discharge 
Number 
Discharged 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
III .811 O:ILS 2303 VII Claudia A.D.135,136 A.D.160 (probably) 239 
III 6189 .. V Macedonica A.D.108,109 A.D.134 (probably) 200* 
IIi 6580 &: JRS 
1942 pp.33ff. II Traiana A.D.168 A.D.194 120* 
(intake of 
1 year) 
III 14507 VII Claudia A.D.169 A.D.195 230* 
VIII 18068 III Augusta A.Do173 A.D.198 300* 
The numbers of men discharged in the last two cases are unusually large, 
explicable by the special recruiting needs of particular earlier years. Mann 
concludes (p.338): 
"All told, it is unlikely that the number of veterans discharged from a 
single legion in any one year will have much exceeded 100, on the avarage." 
The survival of 100 instead of the predicted 240 is taken to show that under 
half survived (about 42%), a loss of about 58%. 
These two estimates of.the lo~ses (40% and 58%) can be reconciled 
~hEo we convert one of them so that we are comparing like with likeo The 
period of service for Brunt's legionaries is 20 years, for Mann's legionaries 
25 years. Moreover, I feel that the estimate for the actual size of the legion 
~f 6000 is too large, and that we ought to assume that in general legions 
were below their paper strength, say about 5,000. Thus over 25 years, the 
rate of loss for the second century evidence becomes so%. In order to 
reconcile the two periods over which the men survive we have to take account 
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of the increase in mortality as men get older, and in addition we have to 
formulate our data so that we can bring into the comparison the period of 
service of the Vigiles, six yearso 
The United Nations Model Life Tables (U.N.1955) are designed for 
application to this ~art cf problem. The nature of these tables is 
explained in Appendix III, as is the method which has beon used to convert 
portions of them to show survival rates over certain periods starting from 
certain ages. In our particular case, we are interested in survival over 
periods of 6, 20 and 25 years. The majority of legionaries and vigiles 
will have been recruited around the age of 20, so that this is the starting 
age of chief interest, though the survival rates starting at 15, 25 and 
30 years of age are also shown fur comparison in the Appendix. These 
survival rates are applicable to any populations with the levels of 
mortality shown in the second column in the table below, and for present 
pu~poses there will not be much distortion if the actu31 ancient data 
includes slight 11ar.iations from th:"3 norm in the proportions of the men 
within each age group. (A similar use of these Model Life Tables has been 
made by Hopkins, e.g. in column (e) in his Table 5.) 
. --·· 
Model No. Life Expectation at 
Birth (Male) in Years 
29 33.50 
30 31.90 
31 ' 30.35 
32· 28.86 
33 27.40 
34 26.02 
35 24.68 
36 23.39 
37 22.15 
38 20.95 
39 19.82 
40 18.74 
.. 
'· . 
Percentage survival over 
20 years starting from 
age 20 
76.052 
74.534 
73.111 
71.702 
70.308 
68.819 
67.319 
65.860 
64.437 
63.028 
61.697 
60.412 
Percentage survival 
over 25 years 
starting from age 
20 
68.751 
66.798 
64.947 
63.121 
61 .317 
59.405 
57.474 
55.606 
53.785 
51.982 
50.285 
48.653 
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If our two legionary survival rates were controlled entirely by 
normal mortality, Brunt's calculated rate of 60% would correspond fairly 
closely to Model 40, which gives a rate of 6De412% survival over 20 years 
starting from age 20, and Mann's rate (modified to 50% to allow for 
an actual strength of a legion of s,ooo) would co~respond to Model 39, 
that is, survival of 5De2B5% over 25 years starting from age 20. Since 
it is probable that the distribution of battle casualties was spread 
fairly evenly throughout the age groups in the leQions, we may takeit 
that the difference in the two survival rates of 10% is explicable mainly 
by the operation of normal mortality in two differing periods of service. 
What is important is the closeness of the two levels of mortality which 
correspond to the survival rates: the slight difference, indicated by the 
selection of two consecutive Models, may well be explicable by the greater 
amount of fighting which took place in the last half of the first century 
B.C. If, as Sd8ms most probable, this is in fact the case, then the 
difference of 1-2% in the survival rates in the two Models is a fairly 
precise indication of the rate of battle casuRlt58s, and this confirms 
Brunt's suspicion (p.134) that battle casualties would not normally add 
greatly to the mortality losses in an army. It should be noticed, however, 
that the conditions of military service may have caused a higher @ortality 
among soldiers than obtained among civilians, particularly from susceptibility 
to epidemics, and that most of the losses from the army lis~B may have been 
clue t~ mortalities (Brunt pp.l34f)·. In respect of their living c·o~dltions, 
the \iigil~ probably resembled the other troops, being crowded in their 
castra and not helped ty living in Rome, ~o that the rates for the 
legionaries are directly comparable. 
·-
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In selecting Models 39 and 40 as approximating most closely to the 
survival rates for the legionaries what we have actually established is 
a lower limit for military mortality. Not only will these rates include 
(tho~gh perhaps to an imperceptible extent) sundry losses from the army 
other than those due to mortality, but there is in addition the ample 
evidence from inscriptions and from citizenship (discharge) diplomas that 
legionaries did in fact manage to produce offspring and so need not 
necessarily represent a declining population (i.e. with a hypothetical life 
expectation at birth below that of Model 40). It is ~ore difficult to 
establish an upper limit, though for the reasons indicated in the preceding 
paragraph it is unlikely to have been more than one or two Models higher 
than 39 or 40. 
We are now in a position to estimate the sort of figure which 
described normal (i.eo non-firefighting) mortality among the Vigiles. 
The lack of precision which will be forced on us b; the nature of the 
avidence does not crucially matter. This is because the Vigiles served 
fQr a shorter period than the legionaries, and were generally a much 
younger age group. As explained in Appendix III the portions of the age 
scales which refer to the Vigiles are subject to the least variation 
between the levels of general mortality. 
To illustrate this point~ the table below which shows survival 
rates over 5 years starting from age 20 includss data from Model 29 right 
through to Model 40; though it is the bottom three or four Models which are 
most relevant to the Vigiles. In the third column the survival rate over 
6 years is shown; this has been established by decreasing the survival 
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rate over 5 years by one fifth of the survival rate for the next age 
group (25-29). The fourth column expresses this as the average annual 
percentage mortality over the six years of column 3. 
Model 
No .. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Percentage survival over 
5 years s£arting from age 
20 
94.363 
94.029 
93.742 
93.46f_ 
93.185 
92.870 
92.559 
92.257 
91.920 
91.677 
91.406 
91.146 
Percentage survival 
over 6 years starting 
from age 20 
93.206 
92.799 
92.444 
92.095 
91.752 
91.366 
90.985 
90.614 
90.211 
89.902 
89.569 
89.249 
Average annual 
percentage mo~ity 
for column 3 
1.133 
1.217 
1.259 
1.317 
1.375 
1.439 
1.502 
1.564 
1.631 
1.683 
1.739 
1.792 
It will be seen that the survival over 6 years ranges from 93.206% in 
Model 29 to 89.249% in Model 40. Per annum the corresponding mortality 
rates average out from 1.133% to 1.792%. The annual percentages in the 
bottom Models are very close to each other: the choice of Model is not 
crucial. The annual normal mortality is always less than 2%. It would 
only become granter than 2% if most of the men were recruited over the 
age of 25 (Model 40) increasing to age 40 (Model 29); but e~en the 
exclusive recruitment of men over 50 in Model 40 would produce a rat8 of 
only 5.54%. 
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It will now be clear why the imprecisions in these calculations 
do not matter: the annual wastage worked tiut from UI.1057 and 1058 is 
about 10%, always over 5 times the possible mortality rates which have 
been worked oute No amount of refinement, nor the addition of error to 
error, will make these different rates the same. It might be argued that 
the difference would~disappear if we assumed that the Vigiles served for 
periods comparable to those of legionaries. But this would go against 
the trend of the evidence, and would also ignore the special conditions 
which can exist in a fire brigade. In fe~t, the apparent discrepancy is 
very important for our understanding of the Vigiles. 
We should exclude the possibility that the high wastage was 
due to fatal accidents in the course of firefighting. Apart f~8m the 
improbability of men joining a service in which one in ten of the men were 
killed in a yeGr, there is no reason to suppose that any large proportion 
of the men would actually have been engaged at the scene of a fire. The 
majority would have been in bucket chains or controlling crowds, with 
ohly a small proportion actually throwing wate~ onto the fire and engaged 
in such other risky tasks as carrying out rGscues ( 4.2?). Moreover, 
without breathing apparatus, at some fires a smaller proportion of the 
men actually needed inside a burning building could have got in compared with 
modern standards. The activities of firefighting then, arc ur.likely to 
have increased ~~lity beyond 2% per annum; this leaves B% to account for. 
There is a much simpler explanation for the high tdastage, and one 
which finds parallels from more recent times, and this is that the men 
resigned in large numbers. To take one striking instance, Blackstone 
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(1957, 198 & 302) gives figures for the London brigade in 1872 and 1876, and 
these show that in a brigade with about 398 men, and with 640 resignations 
in 10 years, the average annual loss due to resignations was about 16%. 
There were two main reasons for these resignations: the occupational 
diseases of consumption, "lung disease", bronchitis and rheumatism 
(Blackstone p.196), ~nd secondly the nature of the duties. On these latter, 
there is ample evidence that the more efficient the brigade was the more 
arduous the duties were, and, in particular, the more the men were tied to 
the fire station. If they were lucky, a ~oom might be set aside for courting 
while they were on call, and if a church was near (it rarely was) they 
might be allowed to attend, but normally all the men - married as well 
as single - had to remain within the confines of the fire station. This, 
indeed, is the reason why some brigades recruited only from ex~sailors. 
As Blackstone explains (p.118): 
"Though it was always publicly averred that sailors were selected for the 
reasons given by Braidwood [obedience, familiarity with night and day 
watches, and being accustomed to uncer~ainty], and for their general 
handiness and agility, in the comparitive privacy of Royal Commissions 
and Select Committees over the ne~hundrGd years mwnicipal representatives 
often admitted that they were selected bacause, being used to confinement 
aboard ship for long periods, they were less averse than others to 
confinement in a fire station for even longer." 
~~l It may be suspected that some significance is thus to be attached to the 
~ 
fact that it was only seven years after London removed the restriction 
on recruiting from ex-sailors, in 1899, that the first firemen joined 
a trade unionp in 1906 (Blackstone, pp.269-and 310). 
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In other words, it may be an indication of efficiency and 
discipline if we find ffiany men leaving regularly, and in this respect 
there is, broadly speaKing, a difference from discontented men in an 
army: they can be made to stay and do something considered useful, 
whereas a disconte~ted or invdlid fireman is a risk and a handicap 
(though in modern conditions in Britain and some other countries there 
is some scope for the continued employment of casualties). Clearly, 
because of the centurions, thi Vigiles were under military discipline 
and a potential recruit would know this. Probably men were taken on 
in full knowledge of the conditions and were allowed to resign if the 
duties rendered them unsuitable. Evidently there was no lack of 
volunteers. In these circumstances, there would not have been 
any special reason to recruit from ex-sailors (and it must b~ suggested 
that the joint celebrations of vigiles and sailors arose from some 
other groupir.g: VI. lot3c~-lol>+). It is interesting that the wastage rate in 
the Vigiles due to resignation, estimated to be B%, is about half the 
rate of resignations calculated for the London brigade in the 1870's 
(16%), and this difference could well be explicable solely by the shorter 
period of service demanded of the Vigils!~ A man might tolerate the 
conditions for a short and known period, whereas he might be less willing 
if the period were longer and possibly unknown. Thus, whatever we might 
make of the moral aspects df the high wastage rate of tr.~ ~giles, there 
is no doubt that this testifies amply to the demands and-to the quality 
of the service. Not the least of the arduous duties were the continuous 
night patrols. 
We are now in a position to estimate for which period this 
survival rate is valid. If it was the nature of the duties which chiefly 
(268) 
governed the rate, then we should not expect it to have varied much 
at all throughout the history of the Vigiles. Night patrols were 
demanded at the outset (Suet. ~· 30), and even after the corps was 
doubled in size in 205 it seems not to have been large enough for all 
contingencies (see l112 for the provision for reinforcements at the 
Secular Games in 2~4). It is possible that the increases in pay had 
some effect on resignations, and also the provision of castra in Rome 
(attributable to Trajan: see 6.5.1) may have eased the living conditions 
and improved morale. The greatest influence un morale must have been the 
qualities of the individual officers. But none of these can have 
had much effect on the wear and tear of regular night duty. Resignations 
are always likely to have been in the region of B% per annum, from the 
time of Augustus until the abolition of the corps in the fourth century. 
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We now examine the immunes and principales. These were 
"soldiers below the rank of ..• centurion who held a pe~manent post" 
(Breeze 1970,1,1), comprising the nco's, specialists and technicians. 
lmmunes were excused fati~ues in return for carrying out their special 
duties (Dig.50.6.7.6), while principales received "privileges" for 
carrying out th~ire-. (Veg. de !.!!. mil. 2. 7). In practice, the distinction 
was blurred, with some posts being variously ascribed to one category 
or the other (and this depended partly on the period in ouestion). In 
principle it seems that the main privilege of the principales was extra 
pay. Those who received one and a half times the pay of the rankers 
were known as sesguiulicarii, those who received double pay duplicarii. 
(The evidence is set out and discusued by Breeze 1970, App.I.) 
Breeze (1970) provides the best full-length study of immune~ 
and principales, and I am pleased to acknowledge that this section has 
benefited from discussion with Dr. Breeze. The scope of this section 
is to establish the system within the Vigiles, sug~esting modifications 
to Dr. Bree~e's scheme, and to explore the implications of the system 
I 
for the functioning of the Vigiles as a fire brigade. Dr. Breeze and 
I are broadly in agreement over conclusions which are based on career 
inscriptions. The chief ~if~erences arise from the analysis of 
VI.1056, 1057 and 1058 in Chapter 3. This analysis enables us to 
supplement the career inscriptions by adding conclusions ~s to the 
years of service in which most of the imrnunis and principalis posts 
were held, and these may in turn be related to the hierarchical order 
of the posts to provide us with a clear picture of the workings of the 
system. The analysis in Chapter 3 is based, in its details, on the 
conclusion (argued at 5.2.5) that the normal period of service in the 
(2?0) 
Vigiles was 6 years, with the possibility of some of the men Rtaying 
on beyond this term (3.4.6 onward). The tables at the end of Chapter 
3 (3.12.1 9 2,3) show that the majority of the men who stayed on beyond 
6 years were in fact immunes and principales, and the more senior ones 
at that. This distinction between the nor~al,six-yea~ ~~rm and the 
longer career foll~wed by some of the irnmunes and princinales ~rovides 
the major difference between Dr. Breeze and myself. In addition, the 
period of 6 years for the normal term of service departs from the 
received opinio~s (e.g. 25 years: Breeze 19?0, esp.I.92f)o 
We start with VI:1056, 1057 and 1058. The titles of the posts 
in these lists are usually abbreviated and in the summaries below there 
is little difficulty over the expansion of most of them; the doubtful 
and ambiguous ones are indicated. The tendency of the expansions is 
to be cautious (for detailed discussion reference may be made to Breeze 
19?0, II, 6off). 
? a ballistis AB, ABAL 105?.1.[11],5[15],6(11] 
--
1058.1.[14],3(13] 
actarius nraefecti AC PR 105?.2.[62] 
? AQ, 
? aauarius AQA 
? AQCO 
a auaestionibus nraefecti 
beneficiarius 
? 
B 
BAR 
1058.3.[3] 
AQV 1056.1.[2],4.[6] 
105?.6.[12] 
1058.5.[13] 
105?.2.[8] 
AQP, AQ PR 105?.3.[1],3.[70] 
1058.4.[3],5.[2] 
105?.5.[81] 
1058.4.[15] 
----~---~-
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? BF 1057.5.[2] 
beneficiarius praefecti BP, BPR, B PR 1056.2.[14] 
1057.1.[1],1.[17],2.[4], 
3.[24],6.[1] 
1058.1.[1],3.[2],4.[4], 
5.(1],5.[8] 
"t beneficiarius suhpraefecti BS, B5 
? beneficiarius subpraefecti BS PR 
beneficiarius subpr~efecti B S PR 
beneficiarius tribuni BT, B T, BTR, 
B TR, BETR 
1056.2.[1],4.[8] 
1057.2.[1] 
1058.7.[2]. 
1056.1.[5],2.[5],2.[9],3.[9] 
1057.1.[3],2.[7],2.[13], 
3.[13],4.[18],4.[19], 
6o(9],6.[18] 
1058.1.[11],3.[7]~7.(6], 
7.(7],7.[8] 
bucinator . BV, BVC, BVCC 1057.1.[56],1.[94],4.[51], 
6.[24],7.[8] 
cacus 
? carcerarius 
? 
CACVS 
CAR 
c 0 
1058.4.[10],5.[9],7.[14] 
1058.7.[15] 
1058.2.[7] 
1056.4.[2] 
cornicularius ~raefecti CORPR, COR PR 1057.4.[2] 
1058.3.[1],4.[1] 
cornicularius suopraefecti COR S PR 
cornicularius tribuni CaRT 
? CPC 
codicillarius tribuni CT, C T, CTR, 
C TR, CO TR, COD, 
CODTR, COD TR 
1058.7.[1] 
1057.5.[1] 
1057.4.[11] 
1056.2.[78],2.[86],4.[93] 
1057.1.[42],1.[65],1.[108], 
3.[62],3.[69],5.[27], 
5.[60],5.[86],6.[39], 
6.[48],7.[21] 
1058.1.(54],2.[2],2.[5],2.[6], 
3.[10],3.[11],4.[13], 
;4. [ 14 J ' 5. [ 1 4] ' 6. [ 4] ' 
7.[19] 
?- --- --- --- -- ------ -'-----'------ --:.Jcf.:_ -~--------1657 ;7. E 12 J · 
? 
? 
EM 
EMB 
- ~. -- ·- --- - - --- --- --- -- - -
1056.3.(12],4.[7],4.[47] 
1058.5.[6] 
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? EM C 
? EMER 
? EMR 
exceptor EXC 
? exactm praP.fecti EX PR 
e~ceptor tribuni 
? 
? = EMB 
? horrearius 
imao;inifer 
;. 
EXCT, EXCTR 
HC 
HEMB 
HO 
IM, IMA 
? imaginifer IMC 
carcerarius KARC 
librarius LIB 
librarius subnraefecti L S PR 
librarius tribuni L TR 
? .]MI 
? 0 
? oc 
optio centu~iae OP, OPT, OP7, 
OP 7, OPT 7 
1058.7.[18] 
1056.3.[7],3.[8] 
1057.2.[6] 
1058.6o(3] 
1056.2.[69] 
1058.7.[9] 
1057-7.[34] 
1058.3.[12] 
1058.2. [ 4) 
1057.7 • .[5] 
1057.2.[87] 
105~.3.[3],4.[5] 
1057.6.[5] 
1057.1.(2],6.[2] 
1058.1.[3] 
1057.7.[4] 
1058.3.[9] 
1058.5.[7] 
1057.1.[10] 
1057.4o[3] 
1057.5.[131] 
1056.1.l7J~3.[2],4.[18] 
1056.1.[3],2.[2],3.[5],4.[4] 
1057.1.[6],2.[2],3.[3],4.[5] 
5.[4],6.[3],7.(15] 
1058.1.[5],3.[5],4.[6],5.(4] 
7. [4] 
? ontio armamentarii OPA 1057.1.[21] 
optio (?) OPC, OPTC, OPT C 1057.3.[18] 
1058.1.[12],4.[8],4.[9] 
optio carceris OPCA 
optio ballistae (-arum) OPB,OPTB,OP BA 
1057.2.[10] 
1057.4.[6],7.[1] 
1058.4. [ 4] 
optio convalescentium OPCO~ OPT CONV 1057.6.(13] 
1058.7.[10] 
? ORPR 1 057. 2. [ 9] 
? P B R 1056.4.[1] 
praeco PRE C 1058.1.(2] 
? 
? 
? 
? 
aecutor tribuni 
sifonarius 
? 
? 
? 
tabularius 
tesserarius 
? 
vexillarius 
? unc(in)arius 
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PR PR 
Q 
s 
S[ 
ST, S T, STR, 
S TR, SETR, SEC TR 
SIF 
SN 
S PR 
SV 
TAB 
T 7, TES, TESS, 
TES 7, TESS 7 
1057.4.(1] 
1056.1.[1] 
1056. 1. [ 28 J '3. [ 38 J' 4. [ 16l 
1057.7.[11] 
1056.1.[6],1.[56],2.[7], 
2.[52],3.(31],4.[26], 
4. [ 46] 
1057.1.[5],1.[50],1.[73], 
2.[36],2.[72],2.[107], 
3.[11];3.[35],4.[44], 
5.[44],6.[19],7.[13] 
1058.1.[13],2.[1],2.[3], 
3.[8],4.[11],4.(12], 
5.[10],5.[11],5.[12], 
6.[1],6.[2],7.[11], 
7.[12],7.[13] 
1057-5.[8],5.[24] 
1058.6.[5],6.[6] 
1056.4. [98J 
1056.3.[1] 
1057-5.[12] 
1057.3.[5] 
1056.1.[4],2.[4],3.(4],4.[9] 
1057.1.[4],2.[5],3.[8],4.[4], 
5.[3],6.[6],7.[9] 
1058.3.[6],4.[7],5.[5],7.[5] 
?] T 1056.3.(41] 
?] TR 1056.1.[10] 
VEX, VEX?, 1/EX 7 1056.1.[53],2.[3],3.[6], 
4. [3] 
1057.1.(7],2.[3],3.[2],4.[7], 
5.[7],6.[4],7.[3] 
1058.1.[4],3.[4],4.[5],5.[3], 
7.[3] 
v 1056.3.[14] 
? unc(in)arius cohortis VC 1056.2.[6] 
unc(in)arius VNC 
unc(in)arius cohortis VNC COH 
victimarius VIC, VICT 
1057-7.[2] 
1058.7.[16],7,[17] 
1056.3.[11]; 1057-3.[4]; 
1058.3.(14] 
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Next we must establish the order in which the posts were ranked. 
Three pieces of evidence are (1) the order of the posts on VI.1058, 
(2) the changes in posts held by some of the men who appear on both 
VI.1057 and 1058 (of A.D.205 and 210 respectively), and (3} the four 
inscriptions which record careers or parts of careers. All these 
types of evidenc~ were used by Kellermann (18~5), Domaszewski (1908) 
and Breeze (1970), but the lack of an explanation of the pattern 
within 1057 and 1058 left too many ambiguities and unknowns. 
Domascewski Ollserved (p.'l) that on 1058 the order (i.e. of immu.1es 
and principales) was by rank whereas on 1057 it was by length of 
service, and to the extent that he did not try to tie it down to 
stipendia he nroduced valid, thou~h limited, conclusions. 
The table-below sets out the order of the posts on 1058. (For 
their precise position in the lists see 3.12.2.) In ~eneral the 
posts of codicillarius tribuni, ~ecutor tribuni, beneficiarius tribuni, 
tesserarius, optio and vexillarius provide fixed ~oints ab~ve and below 
which the other posts are arran~ed consietently. The occurrence of a 
few of the posts out of the normal order-is shown by indentation; a 
post off totally ambiguous position is indented for each occurrence. 
'o' indicates that owin~ to dama~e on the stone there is a ~ap in the 
evidence, but it may, none the lese, be restored with confidence. 
In some cases only a ~eneral relationship between particular 
posts is established: e.~. this table does not show whether LIB 
should be above or below AQA, thou~h both ar~ placed between C T and 
S T; on the other hand, VNC COH comes below CACVS • 
.. 
•·'· 
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'POST CENTURY 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
COR PR X X 
COP. 3 PR X 
B PR X X X X 
B S PR X 
PRE C X 
AQ PR X X 
IMC X 
OP B.!\ X 
AC PR X 
VEX. X 0 X X X 0 X 
OPT 7 X 0 X X X 0 X 
TESS 0 0 X X X 0 X 
EMB X 
L S PR X 
B PR X 
· B T X X X 
EX PR X 
OPT CONV X 
OPT c X X 
BVC X X 
S T X X X X X X X 
BVC X 
CACVS X 
VNC COR X 
COD X 
S T I X HC X 
LIB X 
AQA X 
ABAL X 
EXC -- X 
EM C X 
C T X X X X X X X 
EXC TR X 
ABAL X 
BAR X 
SIF X I VICT X J CAR X 
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The table below lista the posts of the men who held a post in 205 
and in 210. With the exception of those cases which show no change, it 
mAy be inferred that the post held in 210 is higher-ranking or more 
senior than the post held in 205. 
;. 
Ref o Breeze Position in Post in 
no. 205 210 205 210 
·--
a 74 1.[108] 1.[13] C T S T 
a 75 3.[62] 3_ ._(8J- C T S T 
a 76 6.[48.] 4.[11] C T S T 
b 77 1.(73] 1.[11] S T B T 
b 78 3. (45] 3.[7] s T B T 
b 79 4.[4o] 7.[7] s T B T 
c 8o 2.[36] 4.[8] s T OP C 
d 81 4.[44] 7.(10] s T OPT CONV 
e 82 1.[3] 4.[7] I~ T TES 
f 83 6. [ 13J ).[6] OP CO TESS 
~ 84 3. [8] 3. [ 4] TES VRX 
h 85 6. [6] 4.[6] TES OPT 7 
i 86 2o[10] 3.(5] OP CA OPT 7 
j 87 3. (3] 3.(3] OPT 7 AC PR 
k 88 7.[15] 3.[5] OPT 7 VEX 
1 89 4.[7] 7.(3] VEX VEX 
m 90 6. [ 4] -4. [ 4] VEX OP BA 
n 91 4.[6] 7.[2] OP B B S PR 
0 92 3o(24] 3.[2] B PR B PR 
p 93 3.[5] 3. [ 1 J TAB COR PR 
Q 94 6.[5] 4.[1] IMA COR PR 
r 95 6.[2] 4.[3] IMC AQ PR 
s 96 7 .[5] 5.[6] EM '3 t EM B 
t 97 6. (24] 4.[10] BVC BVC 
t 98 7.(8] 5o(9J BVC BVC 
u 99 2.[87] 2. [ 4] HO H C 
v 100 6.[11] 4.[15] ABA BAR 
w 101 7. (34] 5.[7] EX TR L S PR 
X 102 4.[11] 7.[15] CPC CACVS 
(277) 
Set out dia~ramma tically 9 these chan~es a P"f.H'!al~ as 
follows. 0 0 1 marks the earlier and lower of each pair of 
Posts, 'x' the later and hi~her. 
POST c H A N G E s 2 0 5 - 2 1 0 
a b c d e f1~ h i j k m n p Q r v w X 
COR PR X X 
TAB 0 
B S PR X 
AQ PR X 
IMC 0 
IMA 0 
OP BA X 0 
AC PR X 
VEX X X 0 
OPT 7 X X 0 0 
TESS X X 0 0 
L S PR X 
B T X 0 
OPT CA 0 
OP'f CONV X 0 
OPT C X 
S TR X 0 0 0 
CACVS X 
CPC 0 
C T 0 
-eAR X 
EXC TR 0 
ABAL 0 
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Thirdly, the four career inscriptions show the following 
sequences of posts. The references are: 
1 = VI.2987 (Q.Iulius Galatus) 
2 = x.388o (C.Aecius Similis) 
3 :::: XI. 1438 (C.1firriu~; Lucundus) 
4 :::: VI.37295 (i!';t:vtus) 
~ 
Careers 
Post 
1 2 3 4 
l 
? emeRITVs· X' 
COR PR X 
COM PR X 
TAB B I X 
B PR X 
B S PR X 
[mil.urbo] •X 
VEX X X X 
OPT 7 X X I I 
TESS x· 
·-
B T X X -
S T X 
(miles] X 
These three pieces of evidence may now be combined. They are 
consistent in the order in which the posts appear, and the table below 
sets them out alongside each other. In the sections referring to VI. 
1058 the numbers indicate the number of men holding each post, and 
square brackets show posts listed out of normal order (Chan~e 'v' suggests 
that ABAL was normally below C T, and this ambiguity is r~moved). In the 
Changes section, 'o' inoicates the lower and earlier post, as before. 
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POST VI. 1058 CAREERS CHANGES 205 - 210 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 a b c d e f p; h i j k m n P a r v w X 
-RITV- X 
COR PR 1 1 X X X 
COR S PR 1 
COM PR X 
' TAB B X 
TAB 10 
-B PR 1 1 1 2 X 
B S PR 1 X X 
PRE C 1 -
AQ PR 1 1 X 
IMC 1 0 
IMA 0 
OP BA 1 X 0 
AC PR 1 X 
VEX 1 0 1 II 1 0 1 X X X X X 0 i 
OPT 7 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 X X X X 0 0 
TESS 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 X X X 0 0 
EMB 1 
L S PR 1 X 
[B PR] 1 
B T 1 1 3 X X X 0 
EX PR 1 toPI; CA 0 
OPT CONV 1 X 0 
OPT c 1 2 X 
BVC 1 1 
S T 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 X X 0 0 0 
[BVC] 1 
CACVS 1 X 
CPC 0 
VNC COR 2 
[COD] 1 
[S T] 1 I 
--HC 1 
LIB 1 
AGA 1 
[ABAL] 1 
EXC 1 
EM C 1 
C T 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 
F.XC TR 1 0 
~· 
.Lirt 1 X 
ABAL 1 0 
VICT 1 
SIF 2 
' CAR 1 
(miles ) X 
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We now relate this ordering of posts to the years of service in 
which the posts are attested as bein~ held, usin~ the conclusions of 
Chapter 3 (3.12. 1,2,3). 
In the tables which follow, an asterisk • indicates the holding 
of a post in a particul&r year or group of years of service. In ambiguous 
cases, a line indicates the plurality of years in which a post may 
have been held. The nature of the analysis of VI.1056, 1057 and 1058 is 
such that for the first two of these inscriptions the years of service 
which may be distin~uished are 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7-or-higher, while for 1058 
they are 1-5,6,7,8,9,10;11 and 12-or-higher. The fourth and final tabl~ 
of this group therefore summarises this evidence in the only common form, 
i.e. 1-5, 6, and 7-or-higher. 
The first table sets out the evidence of 1056 and 1057 which ~elates 
to posts which can be fitted into the order arrived at at 5.3.3; the 
second relates to nosts which cannot be fitted into that order , and also 
includes the •mbiguous and fragmentary abbreviations (this table is not 
referred to subsequently, but it will be nofed that so far as i~ is 
meaningful it is consistent with the main conclusions). The third table 
sets out the evidence for 1058. The fourth table summarises the evidence 
of the first and third. Pco~s for which the year cannot be deduced are 
naturally omittedo 
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1056 1057 
POST y E A R 0 F s E R v I c E 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 
COR PR • 
TAB • 
B PR • ~ • ••• 
AQ PR • • 
IMC •• 
IMA •• • 
OP BA •• 
AC PR • 
VEX -I- ••• • • ••• 
•• 
OPT •• • • ••• 
•• •• 
TESS • • • • ••• 
• • •• 
HEMB I • 
B TR • ••• • •• ••• • • 
EX PR • 
OPT CA • 
OPT CONV * 
OPT c • 
BVC • • •• • 
s TR -1-- -1-- - 1- - 1- •• • •• ••• ••• • •• 
-
1--
CPC • 
-
c TR ••• ••• •• : ~ . ••• ~ 
EXC TR 
• 
ABAL • •• 
VICT • • 
SIF -~ • 
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1056 1057 
POST y E A R 0 F I s E R v I c E 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 1 2 3 4 
' 
5 6 7+ 
AQV •• • 
AQCO • 
B • 
BF • 
BS •• 
BS PR • 
·-c 0 
"' 
CORT • 
. . ]C • 
EM -1- • * 
EMER •• 
EMR • 
HO • 
KARC • 
!1 TR • 
• ]MI .. 
0 • 
• 
oc -:- •• 
OPA -· • 
ORPR • 
P B R 
"' 
PR PR • 
Q • 
s • * 
S[. • 
SN • 
S PR • 
sv I • 
?]T 
?]TR • 
v • 
vc • 
VNC • 
---------·- --~----------~-------------------·- --~--------:-;---- ----------
------------- ----
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VI.1058 
POST YEAR OF SERVICE 
1-5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12+ 
COR PR •• 
COR s PR • 
B PH • • • • 
B S PR • 
AQ PR • • 
OP Bft. • 
AC PR • 
VEX • • • • 
OPI' •• • •• 
TESS • • • • 
EMB • 
L S PR • 
B T~ .... • • • 
EX PR • 
OP"T CONV • 
1---· 
OPT c • * * 
BVC * • • 
S 'l'R ••• • • 
••• •• 
CACVS -·. 
VNC COH • • 
HC" • 
LIB • 
AQA • --
EM C • 
C TR •••• • 
••• 
EXC TR • 
BAR • I 
ABAL • • 
VICT • 
SIF •• 
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1056 1057 1058 
POST y E A R 0 F s E R v I c E 
1-5 6 7+ 1-5 6 7+ 1-5 6 7+ 
~ 
. COR PR • •• 
COR s PR • 
.;. 
TAB • 
t-
B PR • •• ••• •• • • 
B s PR • 
AQ PR • I • • • 
IMC •• 
IMA •• • 
OP BA •• • 
AC PR • • 
VEX • • •• •• • •• • • •• 
•• 
OPT •• • • • •• •• • •• 
•• •• 
TESS •• •• ••• • • 
•• •• • • 
EMB • • 
L s PR • 
B TR • ••• • •• ••• •• • • • •• 
EX P:R • • 
OPT CA • 
OPT CONV • • 
OPT c • • • • 
BVC •••• • • •• 
s TR ••• •• ••••• • •• • •• •• 
•• •••• • •• •• 
CACVS 
• 
CPC • 
VNC COH • • 
HC • 
LIB • 
AQA I • 
EM C • 
c TR ••• • ••••• • ••• • 
••••• ••• 
EXC TR • • 
BA..Q • 
' 
ABAL • •• •• 
VICT • • • 
SIF • • •• 
-------- ----·------------------·------ --------------...-~---;:-~----~-
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The tables show a very good consistency. The posts fall into 
two cate~ories: those normally held during the first six years of service, 
and those normally held later. The only post which does not show a 
tendency in either direction is beneficiarius tribuni. Pos~ above this 
tended to be held in the seventh year of service or later, posts below 
tended' to be held fn the first six years. Codicillarii tribuni tended to 
be the most junior group; secutores trihuni seem to be spread fairly 
evenly among the first six years. The exceptions to the pattern are 
clearly isolated, e.g. the vexillarius on 1056 in his first or second 
year, or the beneficiarius praefecti on 1057 in his third year. The 
system could be flexible when the need arose. 
The increase in the size of the cohort in A.D.205 (see 5.2.1) 
does not produce any disturbance in the pattern o~ holding posts. The 
number of administrative posts probably increased. 
The five tombstones which record stipendia of immunes and 
principales tenc to confirm this analysis. This evidence is: 
Post AEErox. year of service Reference 
B PR 22 VI.2966 
s TR 8 & 9 VI.2987 
B TR 10 & 11 
" 
VEX 12, 13 & 14 
" 
B TR 9 VI.1988 
~X " XI.1438 ( 
0~ before 7 " 
TESS before 7 " 
TESS 11 XI.3520 
The career on VI.2987 seams to be somewhat slower than was normal. 
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The immunes and principales on VI.220 and 221 are listed broadly 
in accordance with the order set out at the end of 5.3.3, if we allow for 
a plurality of centuries on 220 and read the left column of 221 before 
the right. There are divergences, however, which are explicable by 
the date of these inscriotions (203 and 113 respectively); being earlier 
than the change to listing according to rank (as on VI.1058 of A.D.210), 
they list according to length of service (as or. VI.1056 and 1057). 
Breeze (1970,!,80) comments that VI.1057 and 1058 "probably 
provide more problems than they~tually solve." The analysis just 
completed shows that they are, in fact, our only reliable evidence for 
the career structure of immunes and principales in the Vigiles. The 
career inscriptions turn out to show a very small part of the picture. 
The double career system, with most of the men serving just six years, 
and with a small minority staying on much longer (and in some cases for 
a career as long as a normal military one), is unique to the Vigiles, 
and cannot be evidenced by inscriptions which record only or chiefly 
careers other than as plain rankers. A view must be taken of the normal 
length of service; six years fits the best. But even if one disagrees 
over the ~ct&al len~th, the fact remains that the longest-serving vigiles 
tend to be immunes ana prtncipales; their length of service is greater 
than that of· most of the rankers. 
The flexibility of the system is aloo a feature which this new 
analysis brings to light. The opportunity to advance men rapidly or 
retain them for a number of years in a post arose mainly from the 
relatively short normal term of service. Six years was long enough to 
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spot and train talent, an~ was short enou~h to enable failures to leave 
without much positive action; and after six years each man who stayed on 
could be subject to re~ular review. It is possible that more positive 
action was necessary to retain the men than to ~et rid of them; the 
high annual loss rate of ove~ 10% (3.11.2; 5.2.10) included immunes 
and principales. Early and rapid promotions mane up for the lack of a 
large pool of men still deve!opin~ after six years, such as ~xisted in 
the rest of the army. 
In a force whose primary purpose was firefighting, a clear 
distinction cannot be made between firemen and non-firemen. There were, 
however, certain specialists. The technicians, siphonarius, unc(in)arius 
cohortis and bucinator, tended to be low-ranking, though they might 
serve beyond six years. The optio ballistae (-~) was more senior. 
The optio and tesserarius, who will have taken charge at many of the fires 
(cf.4.29.5), tended to have several years of service to their credit, and 
were probably selectPd mgood firefighting nf!icers. There were thus very 
few openings for specialist firemen. Among the administration, there was 
some scope for development on the staff of the tribune_(codicillarius, 
secutor, beneficiarius), but beneficiarius tribuni was the end of the 
line for most. For those who rose higher, a career longer than six years 
was normal, with another bar at beneficiarius praefect1. The table at 
5.3.3, complex though it may appear, does not repr~sent a career with 
multiple opportunities. A specialist fireman as such could find only 
limited scope; if he aimed for higher rank, he had_to go onto the 
administrative side. But a good man could be retained for years in a 
post where his potential m~tched the needs of the system. The optio, 
in particular, is likely to have been a key man in firefighting. 
(288) 
5.4.1 
There were 49 centurions in the Vigiles,seven in each cohort, and 
the size of the century was 60 - 80 men, raised in A.D.205 to 120 - 160 
(5.2.1). These centurions formed a very small proportion of the total 
number of centurions in the whole of the forces, some 2,000, and a 
little over one third of the total number of centurions serving in the 
units at Rome. After completing their time in the Vigiles, the centurions 
went on to serve in the other units at Rome: the Statores (sometimes), the 
Urbans and the Praetorians; some eventually went out to the legions a~d 
attained the primipilate. Centurions as a group are one of the more 
neglected areas of Roman ~ilitary studies to date. The studies on which 
this section is based are those of Birley (1941, 1965, 1967), Dobson (1970 
and 1972), Dobson and Breeze (1969), and Breeze (1971). 
The source which supplied centurions for the Vigiles is of 
considerable interest (Do~son and Breeze 1969). In general, centurions 
came from limited areas: promoted from the ranks of the legions (the 
largest proportion), promoted from the ranks of the units at Rome ·after 
serving as cornicularii of the pratorian ~refect or of the praefec~ 
vigilu~ or of the praefectus.annonae, promoted from the body of evocati 
having served 16 years with the praetorians, or having been directly 
commissioned being already eguites (i.e.~ eguite Romano). Centurions 
in the ligiles were drawn from ana area only: evocati. Evocati who 
went straight to a legionary centurionate (only a small number) did not 
return to Rome as centurions, though they might return as primipilares 
to hold the tribunate. The pro~otion from cornicula~ praefecti 
vigilum is attested twice only. One of the men, Aetrius Ferox (XI.5693 = 
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0.2666, time of Antoninus Pius), describes himself as the first man so 
promoted, and he went to a legion; the other man, Caecilius Rufus, 
(VI.414b), took the same path, a little later (A.D.191). Such promotions, 
from cornicularii of the Rome prefects (other than Urban) to legionary 
centurionates, were not uncommon, but what distinguishes the Vigiles 
is the fewness and~ateness of the known exampleso No centurion in the 
Vigiles had served in the ranks of the Vigiles. In this the Vigiles 
resembled the Urban cohorts, but not the Praetorian, since in due course 
former evocati returned to the Praetorians as oenturions. Also, no 
centurion in the Vigiles had previously served as a legionary centurion. 
Men who received direct commissions as centurions served at once in a 
legion and when they did come to Rome they omitted the Vigiles from their 
cu~sus and went straight into the Urbans; they seem similarly to have 
by-passed the Statbres. Legionary centurions who had risen from the ranks 
of the legions did not go to Rome to serve as centurions. 
The pattern which thus emerges is consistent with the nature of 
the duties in the Vigiles. The certainty of continuous night duty overlain 
with the duty of fighting fires must have been regarded as a chore; and 
in addition the men were a non-fighting corps of freedmen, the class 
normally barred from military service. These factors will explain the 
lack of centurions with direct commissions. The positiva choice of 
former praetorians is explicable by their previous experience, since their 
aixteen years' service must have given them an intimate knowledge of the 
City and also, probably, occasional experience of firefighting in 
conjunction with the Vigiles (c~. 4.12.2). 
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In addition, the operation of the administration will itself have tended 
to reinforce this choice, with convenience ensuring that evocati,who 
were already in Rome, served in the Vigiles and the other Rome units 
before going out to legions, nor should we overlook the possibility of 
personal favour and influence in Rome itself affecting a man's career and 
letting him serve first in an area subject to such influence. Such 
factors as these are likely to have influenced the men with direct 
commissions also, in their case letting them serve first in legions 
subject to particular areas of patronage. W~at is important is that any 
type of man could have b~en got to Rome to serve as centurion in the 
Vigiles: the evocati wer~ chosen partly for thGir previous experience 
and partly because they could conveniently be assigned to this chore. 
These centurions, like most of the legionary centurions, would 
proba~ have been in their late thirties or a little older when they 
attained this rank. But their average age must have been much lower than 
that of legionary centurions, since the centurionate in the Vigiles was 
just the first stage of a cursus whereas it was possible to hold one 
legionary centurionate after another with 3bout equal chances of dying 
still a centurion or being promoted to primuspilus and thence on to 
primipilaris posts. 
5.4.5 
For the pay of the centurions in the ligiles, it is necessary to 
work out to which pay grades various posts should be assigned, bearing in 
mind ~hat promotion in the Roman system was not necessarily accompanied by 
an increase in pay, and so to reach actual figures (Dobson 1972,especially 
206f). Our major guide is the career pattern of evocati who went either to 
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a legionary centurionate or to a centurionate in the Vigiles: "There 
is nothing here to suggost that the legionary centurion was paid less or 
more than the centurion in the vigiles, and it seems fair to suppose 
that both were paid the same" (Dobson 1972 9 206)o Further promotions to 
centurionates in the Urbans and the Praetorians were not 9 in this scheme, 
accompanied by increases in pay, but the next promotion, to a post in 
the legionary primi ordines, did bring an increase in pay, and so did 
the next promotion, to primuspilus. In Rome, the only promotions which 
probably did bring increases in pay were promotions to the equivalent of 
primi ordines in a legion, that is, the senior posts in the Guard (primus 
~' trecenarius, princeps castrorum); these, when held, were normally 
followed by a legionary centurionate in the primi ordines before going 
on to the primipilate. The pay of centurions in the Vigiles is thus taken 
to be as follows (Dobson 1972, 203): 
Augustus to Domitian 15,000 sesterces 
Oomitian to Sever us 20,000 sesterces 
Severus to Caracalla JO,OOO sesterces 
Caracalla onwards ~o,ooo sesterces 
Primi ordines received double these amounts, primipili four times. 
Despite their parity with legionary centurions, centurions in the Vigiles 
were probably better off because of donatives and other rorks, 
There is no direct evidence to indicate how lo~g centurions 
served in the Vigilaso In particular, no centurion ii attested at 
two p,recise dates while serving in the Vigiles,and the probabla lengths of 
service have to be guessed ato The stror.gest indication is based on the 
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throughput of centurions in the Rome units. This is because the majority 
of the centurions in Rome were former evocati whose first post as centurion 
was held in the Yigiles 7 before they went on to the Urbans and Praetorians 7 
whereas only a small proportion of centurions in the Urbans and Praetorians 
had earlier received direct commissions as legionary centurions and 
subsequently omitted the Vigiles from their cursuso The clearest career 
for the present purpose is that of Co Caesernius Senecio, attested on 
VI.1057 as centurion of the Fifth Cohort of Vigiles in 205, who may be 
identified with the c. Cesennius Senecio commemorated on VI.2464 = 0.2089 
who died in Britain during Severus 1 campaigns. His successive posts are 
given as: 1 vig, l ~' 1.££, exercitator eguitum ££• It was presumably 
in this last post that he went to Britain in 208. Given that VI.1057 is 
datable to 205 ( 5.2.5 ) and that Senecio received his last promotion 
probably by midsummer of 208, there are three complete years in which he 
finished in the Vigiles, held two posts, and started as exercitator equitum. 
At most, therefore, the average tenure of the intervening posts is 1t years. 
Another indication, less precise than the foregoing, is provided by 
M. Lollius Venator, who dedicated an altar as centurion of legio II Augusta 
at Piercebridge around A.D.217 (Birley 1967). If, as seems probable 
he is to be identified with the centurion :tenator on VI.1063 (coh. VI 
vigilum, A.D.212), then in five years he completed his period in the Vigiles, 
passed through the Urban and Praetorian units, and went out to leqio II 
Au9u~. Again, this attests fairly short periods in the Rome units, at 
most an average of two years. It may therefore be significant that none 
of the four extant names of the centurions on VI.1058 is the same as the 
corresponding name on 1057, five years earlier,though in view of the 
shortness of tenures suggested by the careers of Senecio and Venator it 
may be more probable that the centurions on 1058 are not the direct 
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successors of those on 1057 but are rather the successors of the successors. 
There are, however three considerations which must qualify any estimates 
of the length of tenure of centurionates in Romeo First, there could not 
be a numerical regularity in passage through the Rome centurionates, owing 
to the bottleneck part-way through. The numbers are estimated as follows 
# 
(Dobson and Breeze 1969, p.116 n.42): 
Vigiles 
Urbans 
Praetorians 
49 centurions 
24 centurions (assuming that the two cohorts 
o~tside Rome had their own 
arrangements) 
60 centurions 
The effect of this bottleneck was accentuated by the fact that men ex 
eguite Romano entered the Rome units at that narrowest point. This 
numerical pattGrn provided a ready mechanism both for delaying the promotion 
of slow developers and also for enabling a centurion who was so inclined to 
develop his potential as a specialist fire officer. Secondly, the length 
of tenure cf the centurionate may have been subject to variations according 
to period (Dobson and Breeze 1969, 115): on this aspect, there is a lack of 
information. Thirdly, men who went on to become primuspilus normally held 
only one legionary centurionate between leaving Rome and becoming primuspilus; 
tne short period as a legionary centurion looks like an induction into the 
~ays of the legion before tenure of the senior centurionate, and the latter 
looks like a reward for good service in Rome. Though there was a better 
chance of beco1~ing primuspilus after service at Rome than after service just 
in a legion, the men who did progress in this way rarely proceeded further: 
they made their car aer at Romeo Thus "the temptation to think of a rapid 
~ 
transit must be resisted" (Dobson and Breeze 1969 , 107). It was possible 
(and could evan have been ur.remarkable) for a centurion to become a really 
good specialist fire officer and make this his life. 
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The tribunes commanded the cohorts, and each had charge of one 
castra and two excubitoria. In addition, one of the tribunes was 
detached to take charg~ of the vexillation at Ostia, acquiring the title 
praepositus vexillationiG late in the second century. This duty fell 
upon the various ceonorts (sec 1~. 29. 4). A prim!-oilaris seems to have stood 
in for the tribune ~s curator cohortis (VI.3909). 
The normal system for providin~ tribunes has been elc~idated by 
B.Dobson (1970 and 1974). The men were primipilares, selected from 
"the cream of the; centurionate" which was itself "the P:reat repository 
of fighting and administrative eo;:perience:' (1970, 100 & 115). The evidence 
shows that men~ eguite-Homano- the ~roup who at an earlier stage in 
their careers enjoyed the privile~e of omittin~ the centurionate of the 
Vigiles and proceeding direct to the Urbana (5.4.2,3) - now had to take 
their turn in the Vigiles (1974,419). Est~blished now as orimipilares, 
the original distinction was meaninP:less. Moreover, at this stage there 
was a much greater element of individual selection. Occasionally men did 
omit the tribunate of the Vigiles or of the Urban Cohorts, but the 
explanation is still to seek (1974,418). ~ne minimum age of the tribunes 
was usually around 50 (1970,102). Tenure o( the tribunate was probably 
about a ~ar for men destined to be procurators and prefects, but could 
have been much lon~er for others(1974,418f), 
5.5.3 
The background of these men ~ua~anteed their political reliability. 
It also provided the~ with opaortunities for firefightin~ as legionary 
centurions, and it is auite possible that a man who had been involved 
in firefi~hting in war conditions (cf. 7.9) carne to the Vigiles with 
a much better experience than many of the centurions in the Vigiles had 
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been able to obtain as Praetorian rankers. Even if the ex-Praetorian 
had had experience of firefi~hting, whether in war or through assisting 
the Vigiles in Rome, the tribune still had the edge, since he had been 
a centurion. The tribunes thus may well have brought crucial experience 
to the Vi~iles, and could have played a key role in maintaining the 
standards of firefightingo 
5.6.1 
The subprefect did not have a command of a specific firefighting 
unit, but from references on inscriptions was clearly in charge in a 
general sense but secondary to the prefect. He seems to have acquired 
special duties which took him to Ostia from A.D.207 or a little earlier 
(see 4.29.3). It is probable that his duties were more closely allied 
to those of the prefect than those of the corps (see also 7.7 and 8.1.3). 
It is possible that a curator cohortium stood in for the subprefect 
(VI.1092, cf. BR p.37 n.1 for summary of ~on~licting interpretations). 
5.6.2 
The majority of subprefects are known to us simply as names. 
The list given by BR (Appendix A) may be lar~ely updated by reference 
to Pflaum (1961), and the following is a summary giving the names of 
subprefects and dates attested: 
113 c Maesiuo Tertius 
156 T Flavius Anterotianus 
before 158 T Desticius Severus 
168 -er -to (XIV.4500) 
175 Ulpius Archelaus 
under Aurelius T Alfenus Senecio 
181 c Sempronius Urbanus 
191 Orbius Laetianus 
under Severus 
203 
c.203 
207 
?210,?212 
217 
239 
241 
period 241-244 
first part C3 
C3 
? 
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Ti Claudius Zeno Ulpianus 
C Iunius Balbus 
(erased: XIV.4385) 
C Laecanius NovatilJianus 
M Firmius Amyntianus 
Flavius Lupus 
Aelius Spectatus 
Marcius Montanus 
Valerius Alexander 
Valerius Titus 
Salvius S~lvianus 
-erius {E.E.vii,1213) 
The post of subpraefectus vigilum was lower echelon centenarian 
in the equestrian hierarchy (Pflaum 1950,233). It followed posts in the 
equestrian militiae, and the men who went to centenarian posts rather 
than sexap,enarian tended to be more successful and to have established 
more influential connections (Pflaum 1950,217,218,226); they did not 
necessarily, however, reach the top (ibid.217). Men who served as 
subpraefecti ~i~ilurn, in fact, tended in their later careers to just 
miss the key ~ositions, and none became praefecti vigilum. The fact 
that they progressed should, however, remind us that they were by n~·. 
means without ability (ibid.214). 
5.6.4 
Their previous posts, praefectus cohortis, tribunn• militum 
and praefectus alae, could have provided them with opportunities for 
firefighting which would have been a ~ood preparation for service in 
the Vigiles. It may doubted, however, whether they personally did much 
firefighting in the Vi~iles. Their place in the organisation is more 
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closely tied to that of the prefect than to individual cohorts, and 
since they were youn~er than the tribunes - often considerably so 
(Pflaum 1950,211 and 213) - and with less military experience, they 
probably lacked in firefi~htin~ auctoritas. In the only two cases 
where special aptitude or interest may be discerned, the subprefects 
specialised in law. C Laecanius Novatillianus is described as "iurie 
peri to" (VI. 1621); and Ti. Claudius Zeno Ulpi:J.nus may be inferr&d to have 
been a lawyer (XI.6337): "adhibi(to) in consil(ium) praef(ecti) 
praet(orio) item urb(is)". 
The length of te~ure is not known. The maximum possible 
' 
average period, based on the number of subprefects attested in the period 
113 to 244 is about 7 years, but gaps in our knowledge and the number 
attested in the first decade or so of the third century tend to suggest 
that the maxi~um average was nearer three years. 
The picture which emerges of the eubprefect is of a capable and 
reasonably young man acting as number two to the prefect in an 
administrati•te and judicial capacity. In Ostia he probably did much 
of the work which would have fallen to the prefect. Any firefighting 
was probably only occasional and in emergencies. It ~~y oe surmised 
that his period in the Vigiles ?rovided the aspiring equestrian with 
a very sound knowledg~ and experience of administration, building on 
the foundations previously acquired in the army, "le s~minaire de 
!'administration ~questre" (Pflaum 1950,182). 
The post may well have been instituted by Trajan. 
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The praefectus vi~ilum had overall charge of all the 6perations 
of the Vi~iles and in addition had judicial functions ( 7.7, 8.1.3). 
The prefect was the personal representative of the Emperor, and ranked 
above the palatine posts and about eaual to th~ praefect~~ annona~. 
It is well establisped that the prefect had a post of considerable 
politi~al potential, with a force of 3,500 or 7,000 men at his disposal 
who were as good as armed, and occasionally this position was exploited. 
This political Rbpect should not be lost si~ht of, and in suggesting that 
the Vigiles were nrimarily a fire brigade this thesis does not seek in 
any way to diminish this aspect. 
The eminence of the post, near the peak of the equestrian system, 
ensured a supply of exr.ellent men. (In ~eneral see Pflaum 1950 and 1961). 
There is not a fixed pattern in the apnointments, rather appointments 
were in accordance with individual circumstances (Pflaum 1950,295,257). 
The majority of prefects probably had a combination of military and 
administrative experience, and may have had opportunities for firefi~hting 
in their military service. Some, like Rustius Rufinus, will actually 
have served in the Vigiles as tribune, and others may have served in the 
Vigiles as centurions. Those who had been procurator governors and 
prefects of a fleet may be considered predominantly military in backgrounde 
The prefect was probably concerned less with firefi~hting than the other 
officers in the Vi~iles, and more with judicial matters, in which he 
was assisted by the sub-prefect. The prefP-ct was in the same general 
age ~roup as the tribunes. 
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Pflaum (1961,264) seems to sug~est that in selecting prefects 
there was a preference for men who had been a libellis, because both 
pests were concerned with law. There does not seem to be any explicit 
evidence for this preference, and such evirlence as does exist for the 
post which preceded praefectus vi~ilum tends to contradict the idea. 
Preceding attested posts are listed in the next section, together with 
evidence for two~legal specialistso 
The list of prefects ~iven by BR (Appendix A) can be supplemented 
and some corrections incorporated. The check list which follows is 
mainly based on BRand Pflaum (1961). 
under Tiberius 
31 
48 
54 
62 
before 65 
69 
Ves~ or Titus 
under Trajan 
111-113 
119 
149 
under Pius 
168 
under Aurelius 
1?5 
181 
190/?1 
190/?1 
under Severus 
199-200 
203-5 
205-? 
210-11 
?210' ?212 
C- Ai- Fla-
P G~aecinius Laco 
Decrius Calpurnianus 
Julius Paelignus Laelianus 
Sofonius Ti~ellinus 
Annaeus Sererius 
Plotius Firmus 
C Tettius Afticanus 
Cn Octavius Titinius Capito 
Q Rammius Martialis 
T Haterius Nepos 
-Jcordem (A.Eo19?1,33) 
C Tattiua Maximus 
M Bassaeus Rufus 
umbricius Aemilianus 
Q Cervidius Scaevola 
Sempronius Laetus 
Aelius Iulianlis 
Clodius Catullus 
P Cassius 
T Flavius Ma~nus 
C Junius Rufus 
Cn Marcius Rustius Rufinus 
C Julius Quintilianus 
M Aurelius Va-
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Severua-Caracalla Ti Claudius Vibianus Tertullus 
212 Cerellius Apollinaris 
217 Valerius Titanianus 
Helio~abalua Cordius (? = the following) 
?221 or 222 Aurelius Concordius 
223 
225 
?226 
period 
239 
241 
period 
?244 
;;. 
226-244 
241-244 
C Iulius Paternus 
Cr... Severinus 
Aelius Florianus 
HP.rrennius Modestinus 
(erased: XIV.4397) 
-ltius Philippus 
Valerius Valena 
Faltonius Restitutianus 
? Sempronianus 
c.258 L Petronius Taurus Volusianus 
269 Julius Placidianus 
under Constantine Poltumius Isidorus 
period 333-337 Rupilius Pisonianua 
between Diocletian & Valentinian Aurelius Maximilianus 
period 375-383 
late 
Flavius Maximus 
P Aelius Apollinaris 
after Severus Alexander 
Preceding attested posts: 
Cn Octavius Titinius Capito 
T Haterius Nepos 
M Bassaeus Rufus 
Priscus S- (VI.1628) 
~ epistulis 
a censibus et libellis 
a rationibus 
N.B. Q Cervidius Scaevola "praecipue iuris perito" (SHA Marci 11.10) 
Cn Marcius Rustius Rufinus praepositus annonae 
Ti Claudius Vibianus Tertullus a rationibus 
N.B. Herrennius Morl~stinus "iuris consul tus" (VI. 266) 
L Petronius Taurus '/olusianus 
Priscus S-
trib. coh. praet. 
map;.~ libellis 
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Forty prefects are attested up to A.D.269, a period of 263 
years. The maximum possible average tenure of the post is 
therefore 6~ yearsj ~ut the seaucnce of prefects attested around 
the first decade of the thi~d century suggests that the period could 
actually be under 2 years. With a post of this nature, we should not 
expect a fixed period. 
In examinin~ the personnel of the Vi~iles, we have noted the 
areas in which it was-possible for specialists to develop, and have 
also noted that specialists were relatively few. The short period 
of normal service in the ranks and the overall demands of the military 
system on the progression of officers were two limiting factors, 
but so also was the continuous night duty which led to a high wastage 
among the men. Centurions, immunes and principales, and rankers 
could, if they were exceptional, make a life-lon~ career in the 
Vigiles. How far firefighting prowess was likely to be a factor in 
selection for promotion is a crucial aueation which is reserved for 
discussion in Chapter 8. 
The provision of four doctors for the Fifth Cohort (VI.1058) 
indicates good provision for injuries. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE FIRE STATIONS 
6.1.1 
The Vigiles are known to have had 23 fire stations. The main 
ones, where the men lived, were called castra (XIV. 4381 and 
4387), and there were 7 of these in Rome and one each at Ostia and 
Portus. In addition, just in Rome, there were 14 sub-stations, OT 
excubitoria (the name is given by VI.3010 and the Notitia Urbis (Nordh, 
1949, 105]). There seems to be no direct authority for the name 
statio vigilum, which has been current since the sixteenth century and 
has become firmly established in modern usage together with the Italian 
stazione. Figure 26 shows the location of the four castra and the one 
excubitorium which have been identifie~ with certainty in Rome. The 
significance of this distribution is considered below (at 7.10). This 
chapter looks at th~ fire stations as buildings. 
6.1.2 
Despite modern assertions to the contrary (e.g. BR pp. 47, 49, 
52 and 53), it is not necessarily true that the Vigiles were stationed 
in the same places as their Republican predecessors. Paulus (Dig.1.15.1) 
describes the Renublican familia publica as "circa portaA et muros 
disposita''· Leaving aside the metaphorical portae of the customs bar 
~ 
and the customs murua (if it existed: see Richmond, 1930,7), the only 
possible candidate for the disposition of the familia publica is the 
Servian wall. Paulus did not, however, believe that the Vigiles were 
stationed in the sli.ID.e places. His actual words are (~. 1.15.3): 
"itague septem cohortes opnortunis locis constituit, ut binas regiones 
(303) 
urbis unaguaeque cohors tueatur •• " This implies that Augustus 
placed the cohorts where they were needed. MorP.over, it would be odd 
if the Servian wall had had any influence on their disposition. Not 
merely would it have been mere antiquarianism to follow the line of a 
wall which was largely obscured (Dion.Hal. ~.Rom.4.12), but the 
recently-created 14 Re~ions, amon~ which the Vigiles were distributed, 
positively ignored the Servian wall. Thus, while it may be legitimate 
to conclude continuity n~ar one spot (as does Colini, 1944, 231, with 
regard to the Fifth Cohort), it is not legitimate to use proximity to 
a Servian gate as an-argument for identific~tion, nor distance from 
a Servian gate as an argument for not identifying remaino as a castra 
or excubitorium vi~ilum. 
6.1.3 
The locations of the fire stations are known only partly, and 
vaguely, from the Notitia Urbis; the castra vigilum do not as such 
appear in it at all (see Appendix II), and the excubitoria are not 
actually assi~ned to Regions by it. Our ~ood information is largely 
archaeological, both discoveries of tt~ actual stations and also the 
findspots of informative inscriptions. Where information was available, 
De Rossi (1858) remains unsurpassed, though a certain amount of 
research has been needed to translate his nomenclat~~e of places and 
buildings in Rome into the current nomenclature. The two most 
informative stations, the excubitorium in Trastevere and the castra 
at Ostia, were discover~d after he wrote, and consequently he is rather 
thin on the nature of the fire stations. BR tracked down most of the 
scattered info~mation available to him, but unfortunately he is not 
sufficiently ri~orous in assessing the VRlue of the evidence and produces 
inconsistencies and non seouiturs. On all major point~ concerning 
(?04) 
fire stations there is little, if anything, to add to BR by way of 
basic evidence. It is, however, possible to make far more sense of 
the evidence, and even to su~gest that the castra vigilum are a distinct 
type of building. First, we examine the evidence for each station 
in turn. 
6.2.1 
The castra of the First Cohort were located below the palazzo 
Mu~i, to the east of S. Marcello al Corso (Figure 27). Five 
inscriptions of the Vigiles can be shown to have come from there, three 
of them specifically mentioning the Firat Cohort. There is very little 
information about the plan of the castra. 
The earliest account of discoveries on the site is also the 
longest: Cod. Vat. Lat. 9141 f.143 verso, by Holstein, published by 
De Roeai (1858, 269f.): 
"Delle sudette cohorti finhora nisaun antiquario ha aaputo dire 
in che luogo fossero le stationi, o che forma d'edificio fossero, 
ma al tempo nostro con l'occasione della fabrica nuova che fa il 
si~. Cavagliere Giovanni Battista Muti nella Casa hereditaria della 
sua famiglia, si e scoperta. una parte~·grandissima di una delle dette 
stationi, con diverse stanze ed appartamenti ornati con colonne, 
pedestalli e statoe, parte incrostati intorno con marmo, parte 
intonicate con la calce, con sedili o muricciuoli da sedere, 
coperti pur con tavolozze di marmo segato. E vi sono t~ovate 
diverse inscrittioni antiche, che di tutto questo ci fanno fede, e 
mostrano come appunto in quel luogo anticamente fosse la statione 
della prima cohorte o vero de 1 vigili primano, che servivano per la 
settima regione, detta Via lata, che fin hora ivi appresso retiene 
il nome. Mostrano anco che in quella prima statione oltra il 
Tribuno o Capitano dimorasse anco il prefetto stesso. L'inscrittioni 
sono queste: 
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La prima in un piedestallo grande e bello. 
[text of VI.233] 
In una tavola di marmo rotto. 
[text of VI.1092] 
Questa pure si legge in una tavola di marmo rotto de' tempi 
assai bassi. 
[text of VI.1226] " 
233 is dedicated by a praefectus vigilum, Aurelius Maximilianus, to 
the genius of the Firat Cohort, and 1092, a dedication to Gordian III, 
includes among its dedicators a tribune of the_First Cohort; 1226, 
dedicated by a pr~fect and sub-prefect of the Vigiles, >.U'l<E" "~"' 
Concordius and Salvian.us, to an Augustus, has no indication of cohort. 
The first publication concerning the castra was Tav. X of 
Bellori's Vesti~ia veteris Romae (1673), the first printed edition of 
the Severan Marble Plan of Rome. Thi5 showed the fragments of the Plan 
(no. 36) which for just over two and a half centuries remained 
identified as the castra of the First Cohort. BR shows them in his 
Plate II; Piante shows this section of Bellori's map as Pianta l.10.b, 
Tav.II. Later knowledge of the topogra~hy of that area showed tl•at these 
fragments did not fit there very easi\y, and slight adjustments (such as 
those of Jordan and Richter, moving them to the west of the Via Lata) 
were not improvements (HUlsen 1893, 131-4). Finally, however, Gatti 
(1934) identified these fra~ments as the Horrea Galbana, just east of 
the porticus Aemilia. In thi3 position, the fragments correspond with 
sufficiently extensive archaeological discoveries to make the attribution 
certain. Gatti shows their new position in his Tav. II, and the area 
is shown with more of the surrounding fragments in Piante, Pianta I.7, 
Tav. 8. 
(306) 
.. 
It is something of a mystery why Bellori decided that these 
fragments represented the castra of the First Cohort. It is possible 
that he was influenced by Ligorio's notion that the castra of the 
Fifth Cohort on the Celio was a large courtyard buildin~ (see 6.2.5 
and 6.5.3), but this possibility only raises the further question, 
. 
why Bellori identified the fragments as the castra of the First Cohort 
in preference to any other cohort. In view of the fairly short 
interval between the date of his publication, 1673, and the date of 
the dis~overies beneath the Palazzo Muti, completed in 1644, we can 
speculate that the fragments did in fact seem to represent what had 
been seen. This is, ~dmittedly, speculation: but it would explain 
what otherwise appears to be inexplicable. 
Another inscription is assignable to this area, VI. 1157. 
This is dedicated to Constans by Rupilius Pisonianus, praefectus 
vigilum. First published by Fabretti (1699, p.683, no. 75), it is 
given the pr-:::-v~nance "apud Mutium" in the Cod.Barb.XXX,182,p.103' 
(De Rossi, 1858, p.274, n.2): the site of the earlier discoveries. 
Fabretti also published the text of a copy of VI.1056 
(260ff., no. 91). This inscription has a more complicated history 
than the others of the FirEt Cohort, by whom it was set up. Marini 
(1785, 206) explains that the original base used to stand in the garden 
of the Casa Barberini, whence it was moved to the Palazz~ Barberini, 
and that it was the text vf the original inscription which Tezio 
published, without noting a findspot, in his Aedes Barberinae (1642). 
The copy from which Fabretti published a text was in the Palazzo 
Muti, and in Marini's own day it stood in the Villa Albani (where it 
remains today). It was a poor copy, based in part on Tezio's 
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published text. Fabr~tti did not indicate that his inscription was a 
copy. With this information before him, De Rossi (1858,271f.) surmised 
that the ori~inal base had been discovered below the Palazzo Muti, 
and the copy made when the original was moved to the Palazzo Barberini. 
Certainly the text of the inscription is consistent with a dedication 
in the castra of the First Cohort. The date of its first publication, 
1642, is interesting, sin6e it is probable that it was discovered 
during the same building oper~tions as those recorded by Holstein. 
If so, Holstbin's first sentence and his failure to record it will 
imply that 1056 was discovered after he had written his own report. 
The only sug~estion that we might have a plan of part of the 
castra was made by Mancini (1912,337), and Gatti (1934,124) felt that 
he could not exclude this possiQility. The remains in question were 
to th~ north and east of the church of S.Marcello al Corso (see 
Figures 27 and 28). Albarelli (1913,116-124) gives further information, 
which is admittedly more detailed than Mancini but is still inadequate 
for a full interpretation. However, only the lowest walls could have 
belonged to the castra, together with th~ lowest pavement (Krautheimer, 
1912,212). The records have just one merit, that in showing how these 
earliest walls were positioned, they imply that the west end of the 
castra would pass beneath the prewent chancel of th~ church. Such 
an occurrence is unlikely, since under or very near the church would 
have been the house of Lucina, in which Marcellus founded the titulus. 
The foundation took place during the papacy of Marce~lus (= Marcellinus) 
in the period 296-304 (RHttges, 1956,385ff.), at which period the 
Vigiles were still in existence and presumably in their castra. It is 
therefore almost certain that the castra stopped short somewhere east 
of the church, and these remains are therefore irrelevant to the castra. 
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More walls with vaults and arches and a large quantity of 
marble were seen in 1844 below the Palazzo Muti (Sarti, 1886,438). 
No plan has come down to us. In 1852 the discovery of VI.1725 and 
1736 from the same area did not bring with it any sign of the Vi~iles 
(De Rossi, 1858,278). De Rossi (1852,184) suggests, plausibly, that 
these inscripti6ns, which have no connection with the Vigiles, were 
brought there from Trajan's Forum. 
Apart from the five inscriptions ~oncerning the Vigiles which 
we know to have come from the castra below the Palazzo Muti (i.e. 
VI.233, 1056, 1092, 1157 and 1226), there are others which might 
have come from there. VI.2961, dedicated by a centurion of the 
I:'irst Cohort, C. Iulius Secundus, "sibi coll~e;isoue ~ ~ futuris", 
would be approp·riate for a caetra (or just possibly an excubitorium). 
Its findspot, however, is unknown. Fi.rst recorded in the Villa 
Albani in the 1869 c~talo~ue (Visconti, Fea, Morcelli, 1869), it is 
grouped with the later addi tiona to the collection, presUi!lably of the 
nineteenth century. There is no reason for supposing that it was 
taken to the Villa Albani at the same t1me as the copy of VI.1056. 
De Rossi (1858,274) suggested that VI.1144, 1180 and 1181 
formed a series, with 1157 and 1226, of inscriptions set up by 
praefect£ vigilum in conjunction with statues or busts of emperors, 
on the side of the castra facing the porticus Constantiniana. None 
of these three, however, indicates a cohort, ~~d, unlike 1157 and 
1226, the original locations are unknown. 1144 was iirst noted 
"in hortis Farnesiis", which was a collecting place for inscriptions, 
while 1180 and 1181 were first noted in S.Anastasia in Trastevere 
(~.Barb.182,37 and 79). Arguing simply from proximity, these two 
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latter inscriptions are more likely to have been set up in a 
building of the Seventh Cohort. Thus both the texts of these 
inscriptions and also what may be deduced of their origins tend 
not to support De Rossi's sug~estion. 
The resuit of this discussion, despite what seemed at first 
to be a promising amount of evidence, is that we have no plan of the 
castra and only vague verbal reports. There is no reason, however, 
for douhting that the castra of the First Cohort are in the place 
traditionally assigned to them. Nothing is known of the excubitoria 
of the First Cohort. 
6.2.2 
We hear ·only incidentally of the discovery of the castra of 
the Second Cohort. In connection with the discovery of what he took 
to be the castra of the Fifth Cohort, LiP,orio noted that the castra 
on the Esquiline had been disinterred and levelled in his own day 
(see 6.2.5 and 6.5.1-3). This in entirely plausible, since at that 
period, in 1550, the statue base set up by the Second Cohort, VI.1059, 
had been discovered. Ligorio knew of its existence and its findspot 
from Smetiua (CIL.VI.1059,n.), though Smetius did not mention the 
eastra specifically; Li~crio must have learned of ita plan by other 
means. Two more inscriptions, VI.414 a and b, were discovered in 
1734, coming from a shrine of the Second Cohort. All th~se three 
inscriptions are from the same area: a little to the south-east of 
the Piazza Vittorio Emmanuele. 
A very brief description comes to us from Ficoroni (De Rossi, 
1858,282): "un avanzo di vasto edifizio, dove erano incastrate due 
tavole di marmo scritte" (i.e. VI.414 a and b). This tells us hardly 
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anything. The stron~est evidence for the nature of the building is 
the fact that Li~orio saw a resemblance between it and the remains 
which he saw on the Celio and of which he left a written description. 
This resemblance is crucial for our understanding of castra vigilum 
and is discussed fully in section 6.5 • 
; 
Nothing is known of the excubitoria of the Second Cohort. 
6.2.3 
On.the castra_of the Third Cohort, there is no evidence to add 
to what appe~~s in BR (48-51), though we should add some precision to 
the discussion. In fact, there is so little evidence that we cannot 
advance beyond the position of De Rossi (1858,285), who does not even 
sug~est possibilities for identification. 
The findspot of VI.3761, dedicated to s~~erus by T.Flavius 
Magnus, pra~:f'ec!us vi~T,ilum, and found near the Baths of Diocletian, 
led LanciRni (1876,174 and Tav.XVIII) to sug~est that the remains of 
a courtyard building, paved with marble -and with rows of rooms ("celle") 
along two sides, should be identified as an excubitorium, it being too 
small for a castra. He claimed that the 11 feritoie" - loopholes -
were typical of Urban m1litary buildings, but in fact they could well 
have been ordinary ventilators, such as are found in horrea (Rickman 
1971, 81). He also described the courtyard as "vasto", a.nd hie plan 
shows it to have been abo~t 12 metres wide: this is comparable with 
that of the Ostian caRtra, but even the Ostian castra would not fit 
into the space available and the Roman castra must have been bigger. 
Also, we should not forget that we do not know what an excubitorium 
looked like (unless it was a converted Private house: see 6.2.?). 
- -
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Moreover, as BR points out, 3761 need not have been set up in a fire 
station at all; it could just as well have been set up in Magnus' 
own house, or in any public place. 
The other identification which BR mentions is the building in 
which was found the fragmentary inscription VI.3908. This building 
consisted of three double rows of tabernae, superficially resembling 
frag.36 of the Severan Marble Plan (see 6.2.1; BR Plate II). The 
resemblance is, however, irrelevant, since frag.36 has no connection 
with the Vigiles. Lanciani {1876,107 and Tavv.XVI-XVII) actually 
identified the buildipg as the Ten Taberaae, an odd sug~estion in 
view of the several decades of tabernae which it contained, though 
possibly with more merit than the fire station suggestion. 
BR ended his discussion inconclusively, and we must end 
negatively. 
-
The location of the castra of the Fourth Cohort is known 
fairly precisely, and there is little to add to the accounts of De 
Rossi and BR. The findspot of VI.220, a bronze tablet dedicated to 
the genius of a centur~ clearly names officers of the Vigiles though 
without indicating the cohort, and those of VI.219 and 1055 
both of which do uame the Fourth Cohort, all indicate the area around 
the church of S.Saba, on the Aventine, possibly extending a little to 
the west of the church. VI.219, the dedication on an aedicula, was 
fciund ''a dextra clivi quo ad S.Sabbae ascenditur" (CIL.VI.219,n.), 
and the probability is that this aedicula was situated within the 
castra. VI.643, which is incomplete but does record a tribune of the 
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Fourth Cohort and also one of the centurions recorded on 1055, 
(M. Aurelius Tato), was found in the nearby church of s. Alexius. 
Despite excavations below the church of S. Saba there are no 
excavated remains which may with certainty ~e attributed to the castra 
vi~ilum. The plan of the exc~vatinns in Not. Sc. 1902, facing page 
:;. -- --
270, shows that the extent of the work was too limited to permit 
interpretation, as indeed Cannizzaro admitted (1901, po 11). From the 
reports of Ca.dfzzaro (1901, 11 and 14), ~'>nd Ga ..... vini (1902, 204~206) and 
Gatti (1902, 270-3, 357), there are only two items of obvious relevance 
to the Vigiles·. One _of them is the discovery of the inscription VI. 32.795, 
which was found below·the church, though not in a securely-interprEted 
context. The other is a report of enormous blocks of travertine, used 
in the foundation of the cosmatesque church, "evidentemente provenienti 
da un grandiose edificio romano" (Cannizzaro), together with a great 
number of marble tiles bearin~ numbers and also many architectural 
fragments. This report is very Aimiliar to the report of the discoveries 
of 1844 of the £~tra of the First Cohort (Sarti 1886, 438: see 6.2.1), 
sug~esting impressive buildings with lots of marble. 
Nothing is known of the excubitoria of the Fourth Cohort. 
6.2.5 
The Fifth Cohort provides us with our beat archaeological 
information about castra vigilum in the city of Rome. Not merely do 
the findspots of four inscriptions indic~te the location, but in 
addition we have part of the plano Colini (1944, 228-231) gives a 
good review of the archaeolo~ical evidence. 
.., 
VI. 222 is given the provellfe "Romae, in Honte Coelio ad D. 
Stephani, prope na vic_~llarn" by Manu tius VI. 221, found 
in 1735, came from the Villa Mattei (De Rossi, 1858, p.290, n.2). 
VI. 1057 and 1058 were found in 1820, "in villa Matthaeiorum Caelimonyana 
~ parte, ~uae introeunti tibi per portam horti majorem ad manum 
I 
sinistram est'' (K~llermann 1835, 3). These four inscriptions all refer 
to the Vigiles, 222, 1057 and 1058 mentioning the Fifth Cohort 
explicitly. The location and surrounding area are shown in Figure 29. 
The description which purports to be of this castra, written by 
Ligor io in the middle. of the sixteenth century (Cod. Taur. V, f, 
127-128), probably refers to the Macellum Magnum (Rainbird & Sear, 1972) 
and is discuesed more fully below (6.5.1-4). The earliest account 
genuinely of the castra is that of Kellermann, supplemented by the 
manuscript plan and profilee discovered by Colini in the Biblioteca 
del Reale Institute di Archeologia e Storia dell' Arte (Cat. No. 16571; 
Colini 1944, 223f. and fig. 191) reproduced below in Figure 30. 
Further excavation in 1931 revealed the row of rooms XIV in Figure' 1q 
(using Colini's numbering), which certainly do form part of the castra, 
and also a row of rooms~V)which almost certainly do not. The plan 
of these (in Fig.Jq) is taken from Colini's Tav.XIII. The relation 
between the discoveries of 1820 and the row of rooms XIV is not known 
precisely, but Colini has plotted them plausibly (Colini 1944, 230}. 
Kellerman describes the findspote of 1057 and 1058 as follows (p.3): 
"Sitae erant decem vel quindecim palmas sub superficie terrae supra 
pavimentum arte factum, in quo immissae erant duae tabulae lapidie 
tiburtini, utraque foramine inntructa, quae quidem insignibus 
cohortia infigenJis inserviisse videntur." 
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He goes on to note that each base had two holes in the top to support 
a statue, and that the statues were probably about the same size as 
each other. With th~ aid of the manuscript prdilewe can see that 1057 
(which is in one piece) w~~ found to the north-east of 1058 (which has 
its base and corona separate). 
;. 
Colini ~onsidered it more likely that the two travertine slabs 
with holes were for colle~ting liquids used during religious 
ceremonies. He also interpreted the slab underneath 1057 as the 
remains of a pavemen-t running across the la.rge roon; towards So Mariao 
The rooms XIV measure~ about 3.8om x 4.90m, and opened to the west. 
Although Colini gives details of the type of construction he does not 
offer a date, while BR(p.53) records some Severan brickwork, without 
further description, to the south of the entrance to the garden. These 
may or may not be the same. The rooms XV (measuring 7m x 3.40m, with, 
probably, a stairwell) open to the east and lie outside the line of the 
rooms XIV: they probably do not form part of the same structure, even 
though they might have come very close to it (Colini p.230). Colini 
suggests that the castra might have faced east, beiug aligned along 
the road which runs beneath the modern road. In fact, however, it can 
be suggested more plausibly that the castra faced north (see below, 
6.7.1), an argument which, like that of Colini, is not based solely 
on the remains of the castra. These are, in themselves, ambigious. 
It is in the light of our study of Ligorio that the castra of the Fifth 
Cohort becomes more comprehensible. 
Nothing is known of the excubitoria of the Fifth Cohort. 
(315) 
6.2.6 
It is paradoxical that the region in which the Sixth Cohort was 
stationed, Fe~ Romanum, has not produced any evidence of its stations, 
despite the large amount that is known of that region. VI.3909, a 
statue base, records a sub-prefect, and should therefore be connected 
with the corps of Vigiles: but it need not have been set up in a 
castra or excubitorium at all, and its findspot, between the temples 
of Julius Caesar and of Antoninus and Faustina, certainly was not a 
castra or excubitorium (Fiorelli 1876, 25). 
BR (p.63) is right to indicate that the identification of ~ 
supposed excubitorium in the forum lacks positive evidence, though he 
could have gone further and said quite firmly thAt even "slit windows" 
(i.e. ventilators) are not distinctive features of fire stations. The 
main difficulty with excubito~ia is that we do not know how to 
.-
recognise them. 
'.-
The only excubitorium which has been identified with certainty 
is situated in Region XIV, in Trastevere, and belonged to the Seventh 
Cohort. Nothing is known of the castra of this cohort. The 
excubitorium was discovered in 1886 and partly excavated in a private 
excavation. Though roofed over, the building is now in a very bad 
state of repair. Its main ccntribution to knowledge lies in the 107 
graffiti found on tre walls; architecturally, it contributes less than 
could be hoped, since the building has the form of a normal private 
house and was probably taken over by the Vigiles as a second or later 
phase of its history. Thus it does not provide information about the 
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distinctive form of excubitoria nor, indeed, does it tell us whether 
there was a distinctiv~ form at allo 
The literature on this building is repetitive, and BR (pp.58-60) 
gives all the imprtant conclusions regarding the building itself. The 
following are all the main reports and di6cussions: Pelligrini (1867), 
chiefly on the archae~logical discoveries; P.E.Visconti (1867) 9 Henzen 
(1867) and Henzen (1874), on the graffiti; Capannari (1886), on 
sebaciaria (see 4.31 ); Nocella (1887), on the graffiti; and 
Castagnoli (1949-1950), recording some earlier brief notices. 
The beet available texts of the graffiti at the moment are those 
in CIL.VI, 2998-3091, together with the following three which are not 
in CIL but which are given by Capannari (1886,268f.) without precise 
provenances: 
(no.4) COR VII VIGIL ANTONIANAE I 7 ARRIANI T :N ROGATVS I SEBACIAR!A 
FECIT ex k FEB I IN PRIDVE • KAL MARTIAS I IMP AJIITONINO AVG • 
IIII • I ET ALEXANDRO CESARE COS 
(no. 5) •••• RVM ET I ..• I VII VIG GORDI I ... POLLENTINVS I ..• 
HIARIAM FECIT I ..• M SALV!S COMMA I niPVLIS SV!S BONO SVO 
(no.6) FILIX I SEBACIARIA FECIT HSE I RE OMINA TVTA [&,!?.] 
The plaster bearing the graffiti has now all gone from the walls; but 
there do exist photographs of some of the graffiti, in the collection 
made by Parker for the exhibition of the British and American 
Archaeological Society held in Rome in 1870 (catalogue: Parker 1870). 
The negatives of these photographs have be~n destroyed, but a few sets 
of the prints survive. In the set in the British School at Rome, nos. 
639 and 64o show graffiti scratched in the plast~r while it was still 
wet, nos. 642, 643, 653, 655, 657 an~ 658 show many of the other graffiti. 
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These are a most valuable record, and it is hoped that they will be of 
use in the compilation of the new corpus of graffiti (Solin 1971). 
For this thesia, I have not attempted to disentangle the graffiti in 
the photographs, and the graffiti are discussed in the places relevant 
to their content, using the readings in CILo 
It is one of the graffiti, VI.3010, dedicated to the genius of 
the excubitorium, which identifies the building as an excubitorium. 
The building consists of a courtyard surrounded by rooms, with 
a fountain in the centre (Fig.31). It iR built in brick-faced 
construction, datable by brick stamps to the reign of Hadrian. In the 
south wall of the courtyard is an aedicula, now very damaged, but dated 
by Lanciani fro·rn the style of the mouldings to the time of Severus and 
Caracalla (Lanciani 1897,549). There aow remain only ~light traces of 
the frescoes in the aedicula; it is clear that firefighting scenes 
are not represented, but identification of the figures is very 
difficult. The courtyard was paved with mosaic·marine scenes, but these 
have now gone completely, together with -most of the herring-bone tile 
found~tion of the floor. BR Plate III shows the fountain and the 
aedicula; a portion of the mosaic can be seen in the illustration given 
by Lanciani (1888, facing p.20). Rather more can be seen, together 
witb a good impression of the walls and windows, in an aquarello 
painting, kindly shown to me by Professor Cozzao It is not clear at 
what stage the Vigiles took over the building. The evidence for their 
occupation, the 107 graffiti, belongs to the period A.D.215-245 (A.D.215: 
VI.3002; A.D.245: VI.302R), though we cannot rule out the possibility 
that some of the undatable graffiti belong outside this period. What 
does seem probable is that the building was extensively redecorated 
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around 215, with the a~dicula being built or rebuilt and the walls 
newly plastered. But this need not have coincided with the takeover 
by the Vigileso 
There is a bath nearby, but the incom?leteness of the excavations 
makes it uncert~in whether it even forms part of the sarne building. 
The tunnel which connects the two structures is modern, but is built 
with ancient bricks. The north~rn part of the excav~ted section of 
the excubitorium incorporates some medie~al walls, the building having 
probably remained in use. Today, part of the shell survives to second 
or third floor level. 
The archaeological objects found in the excubitorium include 
statues, lampsi piece~ of frieze, part of a hinge, a small clay altar, 
and the inscription VI.579, none of thsse and th~ other small objects 
having any apparent ~onnection with the Vigiles, and raising the 
suspicion that they did not use the building into the lat~r phases 
of its imperial history. Just one object is of interest in connection 
with the Vigiles, and that is more for the questions which it raises 
than from any new facts'which it provides~ Near the door was found a 
bronze torch (Fig. 32 ), ~.3m in length, in three sections fitting into 
each other. One end is pointed, as if for sticking in, the other 
consists of a globe in the form of a fl~me, and with a hole in the 
ovoid side of the globe. Th~ globe is hollow, and could have held fuel; 
the hole would have been at th~ highest point when the torch was at an 
angle of about 45°. Simply as a lamp, thib torch is very elaborate, 
and it is interesting that it would have worked at that angle. Could 
it have been placed by or over the door, near which it was found, an 
equivalent, perhaps, to the red lamp of modern times? Had it any 
(319) 
connection with the duty of aebaciaria (cf.4.31.5)? There is no obvious 
way to follow up these ouestions; but this torch deserves to be 
remembered. 
The information obtainable from this 9 the sole excubitorium which 
has been certain~y identified and examined to any extent, is very 
disappointin~. H6weve~. the information from the graffiti, and the 
fact that such a building was suitable for an excubitorium, are 
important. 
6.3.1 
The existing (final) plan of the ca~tra at Ostia is shown in 
Figure 33. The excavation reports are generally clear in themselves 
and do not need detailed rep~tition here (Lanciani 1888 and 1889, 
Vaglieri 1912). ·Although discussion of the n~ture of the type of 
castra vi~ilum must be based on the Ostian castra, some of the basic -
and wrong - assumptions of the original reports have not been 
challenged, and the type of buildin~ has consequently remained in 
a certain amount of confusion and obscurity. In order to build a good 
foundation for the general discussion, we-have first to establish the 
character and development of the Ostian castra. Then it will be 
possible to show that in its main features it resembled the castra in 
Rome for which we do not ~qv~ adequate information (6.6.5), and to 
generalise from it. 
We must first clear away the misconceptions in the excavators' 
reports. Basically, certain conclusions WP.re reached before the 
evidence was properly available. The building was identified at the 
outset of the excavations by the discovery of the marble base 
(320) 
dedicated to Diadumenianus (XIVo 4393). At this early stage, only 
the western part of the building had been seen, and Lanciani had 
observed two periods of work (Lanciani 1888, p.741). The tabernae 
at the western end had been closed in and made accessible only from 
the east, and general app~arances suggested that "l'edificio, in 
origine appartenente a privati, foss~ espropriato o tolto in affitto 
dalla prefettura urbana, per alloggiarvi il disaccam~nto dei vigili, 
di servizio in Ostia ed in Porto". Hence arose the notion of original 
private ownership. After a little more excavation, but still before 
it bad reached as fa.r east as either of the main side entrances, 
Lanciani wrote as fo].lows (IKtnciani 1889, p.19): 
"Il carattere della tre fronti e caratteristico, e dichiara assai 
bene 1~ natura e la destinazione dell' edificio. Si tratta 
certamente di una domus si~norile, con botteghe, ed ingressi sulle 
quattro strade, tolta in affitto o comperata dal fisco, e 
trasformata in caserma. La trasformazione ha avuto effetto mediante 
la chiusur~ di tutti i vani di porte o botteghe, conmuro a cortina 
traforato da feritoie. I muri di chiusura hanno impronte figuline 
dei tempi di Severo e Caracalla: mentre il resto della fabbrica 
sembra appartenere ai tempi di Hadriano." 
The observations of th~ alterations are valid, as are the datings; but 
by this stage the notion of the originA.l "privati" had become fixed 
in Lanciani's mind, and it affected his interpr~tation uf the components 
of the building. The Augusteum was interpreted as originally ''la· sala 
principale, tablino, tribunale, o che altro si fosse" (Lanciani 1889, 
p.77), though it is hard to find any valid analogy in private houses. 
The cental courtyard, when only partly excavated, was interpreted as 
an atrium (Lan~iani 1889, plan on p.?8). This was as far as Lanciani 
(321) 
ca1·ried the excavation. \Vhen Vaglieri took over and completed it 9 he 
also took over too much of Lanciani's unjustified interpretation and 
lent it permanence. ThPse excavation reports need to be read with 
critical attention. 
The building consists of a large courtyard, originally paved 
with stone, surrounded on three sides by a portico and single rows of 
rooms, with ~he cermonial focus (the Augusteum) on the fourth side. 
Large rooms with large windows flank the Augusteum, and b~hind these 
rooms is another row of rooms. Behind these is a narrow courtyard, then 
the moat westerly row of rooms. Three large entrances open into the 
courtyard, which is almost bi-axial in plan. There ar~ two latrines 
in the building, three water tankE, and six staircases. The overall 
size of the building is approximately 69m east-west and 40m north-south, 
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and the total area is about 2,760m • s~veral phases may be observed 
in the construction of the bu1lding, and since these were ·not set out 
clearly in the published reports it ~s assenti~l to show them now. 
The greater part of the building is of brick-faced concrete 
(opus caementicium). Brickstamps, of which the ea~li~at belongs to 
A.D.123, give an approximate indication of the start of the construction, 
and the dedication of A. D .137 (XIV. 4357) a terminus 'lnte guem for its 
completion. There are no bonding courses, normally ;'the only marked 
characteristic by which the monum~nte of opus caementicium of the time 
of Eadrian may be distinauished from those of the periods immediately 
preceding and following it" (van Deman 1912, 421). This lack of 
bonding courses ~ay possibly be ascribed to the influence of the 
(322) 
architec~ Apollodorus in an official building of this sort, even 
outside Rome itself {ibid.). For datin~ the various parts of the 
structure, it is possible to use the criteria i~~icated by Miss van 
Deman (1912), utilising the size, colour and type of bricks, and the 
thickness and colour of the mortar joints, to~eth~r wit~ the composition 
of the concr~te where visible. These criteria are, in part, based on 
the walls of this castra vi~ilum which are databl~ fro~ brick stamps. 
Th~re are also structural chan~es in the building which h~lp 
to establish the history of the building. These changes are as follows: 
(1) The row of rooms at the west end (shown hatched in Fig.35) 
started life as a row of shops. It was not in the original plan, 
since not only do all the east-w~st walls join onto the north-south 
wall with straight joints, but also the room in the south-west corner 
of the ori~inal building has ventilators intended for the open vir but 
now opening into one of the shops. The narrow courtyard did form part 
of the original plan, and had two pe~est~ian entrances in the west 
wall; the southerly was blocked, probably when the shops were added, 
and remained blocked with a tank later placed across it, the northerly 
was Presumably blocked whe~ the shons were added, but was found unblocked 
(the unblockin~ probably having taken place when the shops were 
incorporated into the fire station). The brickwork of the shops is 
Hadrianic, that of the street door blocking walls is Severan. 
(2) In the outer walls, where they survive hi~h enough to show it, 
there are narrow snlayed openin~s, which have often been referred to as 
(323) 
"loopholes", "feritoie''; they are in fact ventilators, such as are 
commonly found in storerooms (Rickman 1971,81). These ventilators 
represent a change of plan durin~ the original construction, since below 
some of them are straight vertical joints in the brickwork where ordinary 
rectangular windows have been bricked in. Construction did not proceed 
evenly everywhere, and the south end of the west wall in the original 
building (i.e. minus the shops) received ventilator~ strai~ht away. 
Lanciani assumed that this change from windows to ventilators (which he 
took to be loopholes) was to be as~ociated ~ith the presumed conversion 
of the building from another use (private house) to fire station. But 
this does not follow, and there is no need to explain the change of 
design by a change of use; both the ori~inal design and the alteration 
are consistent with the builning being a fire station right from the 
start. Moreover, the ground plan does not exhibit any corresnonding 
alteration. 
(3) Some doorways were broken through walls. This is a feature which 
has not been uroperly utilised, but is clearly demonstrable because 
the broken brickwork can be se~n in these doorways, whereas original 
doorways bave clean faces. Access to the row of rooms behind the 
Augasteure can thus be shown to have been altered. 
(4) Walls have been added, demonstrable both from the straight joints, 
and also, in some instances, fr0m the presence of plaster along the joint. 
~he style of brickwork can help to date these additions. The embellishment 
of the Augusteurn is datable to Severus by the brickwork and the style of 
the mosaic. (I am most grateful to F.B.Sear for dating the mosaic.) 
(324) 
(5) The room at the ori~inal north-west corner underwent several chan~es, 
all of them clear from a superficial insp~ction. Ori~inally a shop 
within the overall limito of the fire station (lik~ the ~oom just to the 
east), its street entrance was blocked and a door broken throu~h from 
the fire station; then a latrine was insert~d. When th~ Rhop on the 
(final) corner was~incorporated, the latrine probably went out of use, 
and a doorway was broken throu~h to ~ive access to the new room. At 
some sta~e a dedication to Diadumenianus was placed in this room 
(XIV. 4393), having probably been removed f~om the courtyard (BR p.109). 
(6) The north and the south entrances were both narrowed, and then 
blocked. The blocking was done in the time of Severus, as indicated by 
the brickstamps and the style of the brickwork. The blocking of the 
south ~~te was removed by the excavators. 
(?) The two water tanks with their troughs at the east end of the 
courtyard are additions to the ori~inal plan. The nature of the 
brickwork assi~ns them to the fourth century. It is possible, therefore, 
that they had nothing to do with the buildin~ while it served as a fire 
station, though we do not have any evidence to settle this point. But 
what is certain is that, however suitable these tanks might seem to have 
been for a fire station, they are late, and at most it might be argued 
that they could have renlaced earlier tanks. But late in the life of 
Ostia it b~came co~mon to insert such tanks, and the connection with tlie 
Vigiles must remain dubious. (The other tank, in the narrow courtyard, 
is datable from its brickwork to the time of S~verus, and thus was used 
by the Vi~iles.) 
(325) 
(8) There are varinus chan~es in the north-east corner, including the 
reversal of the lower portion of th~ staircase. The sequence of these 
chan~es is not clear, and some of them are probably later than the Vigiles' 
occupation of the building. 
These chan~es are comnlicated and probably reflect many phases 
in the history of the buildin~. However, ar~uin~ from the basic evidence, 
it is possible to su~gest four main phases (while allowing for minor 
alterations at other times than the main chan~es): 
(1) Hadrianic fire station, with shops at the north-west corner; duri~g 
the actual construction chan~es were made to the winctows. This building 
occupied sli~htly less than tbc total area of the block, and shops along 
the west end were added very soon after the fire station was built, still 
in the time of 3adrian. 
(2) Incorporation of the shops at the original n0~th-west corner, 
followed by insertion of a latrine. 
(3) Under Severus, the row of shops along the west end was incorporated 
into the fire station, the Augusteum was enlarged and embellished, the 
water tank in the narrow courtyard was built, and the north and south 
entrances were blocked. 
(4) The final group of chc~~es, which need not all have been contemporary 
with each othe~, are all late, and possibly unconnected with the use of 
the building as a fire station. Th~ include the constructicn of the two 
tanks at the east end of the courtyard, and the construction of the 
blocking walls in the north-east corner of the portico. 
The four plans(Fi~s. 34,35,36,33) show these main periods. 
(326) 
This suggested development of the buildin~ differs from previous 
accounts in that it attempts to el~cidate the main phases, and also accepts 
that the original structure was a fire station. There is hardly any 
archaeolo~ical indication whs~ it ceased to be a fire station; there is 
just the ~eneral probability that the fourth-century alterations would 
not have been needed if it were still a fire station and funutioning as 
before. On these ~rounds, it probably ceased to be a fire station, in 
the original sense, by around the middle of the fourth century (see 
also Appendix fr). 
The archaeolo~ical evidence for the enlar~e~ent u~der Severus 
finds good confirmation in the inscriptions (XIV.4381 and 4387) which 
record the rebuildin~ in A.D.206. Simple renairs would have been explicable 
by the passing of seventy or ei~hty years since the station was built. 
The enlaraement must be related to the evidence that in A.D.2Q5 the corps 
of Vigiles was doubled in size (see 5.2.1). After 205 the vexillation 
consisted of four centuries, two of them based in thi~ castra, the other 
two being at Portus, with around 300 men in each (see 4.29). Before 205, 
the number at Ostia must have been around 150. This doubling in the 
demand for accomodation exnlains why the shops were taken over. 
The Au~usteum was enlar~ed and made more splendid by Severus, 
but it always pr0vided a focal point. It held the imperial dedications, 
which overflowed into the c0urtyard. The only one missin~ from the series 
is that to Hadrian, which nrobably occunied a central position but was 
renlaced by one to Seve~us when he rebuilt the station. The mosaic portrays 
(327) 
sacrificial scenes annropriate to the location. 
There is little e~idence for the specific functions of the other 
rooms. The majority - ~nd certainly those on the upper Iloors - must have 
housed the men. Some rooms Must have been offices. The rooms on the 
ground floor, bein~ fitted with ventilators, would appear most likely to 
have been storerooms and eouipment rooms. The fact that the stairs were 
not fitted with ~amps, as were those in store buildings (Rickman 1971,82), 
indicates that their main traffic was peonle. BR (109f.) raises th3 
question whether a fire· en~ine was kept in the room immediately north of 
the Au~usteum, and seems· to decide a~ainst the idea. Certainly he is right 
to note that the ~rooves in the threshold are cut, not worn, and in this 
respect they are typical of many Ostian thresholds with ~rooves (i.e. 
drains); but the auestion is really hased on a false notion of what D. 
Roman fire engine (i.e. pump) was like. The ~umps could have been kept 
anywhere, since they were portable. 
One ouestion which cannot be answered at the moment is how the 
buildin~ which we can see is related to earlier buildin~s on the same 
site. Althou~h there is a fairly hi~h de~ree of symmetry in the 
:astra, it should be observed that the rooms do in fact vary in size, 
those alan~ the north side bein~ somewhat deeper than those along the 
south side. Also, the two latrines anpear to be using separate drains, 
that for the north-western latrine (the one ~hich was inserted) being 
(328) 
approximately 1 metre less deep than th~ one for the south-eastern. 
Given plenty of resources and plenty of expertise, this building would 
repay excavation, provided that th~ scale of operations was big 
enough. At the moment, therefore, we muRt be cautious of drawing 
conclusions about this building. Although we have to gener~lise fr0m 
it in discussit':'g the nature of castra vi,g-ilum (see 6.6.5-6.7 ) it is 
important to bear in mind that many of the details cannot be known 
at the present time and to confine the diecussion to the points which 
have been established. Fortunately, these are the major ones. 
6. 4.1 
A briLf description of the castra at Portus is given by Lanciani 
(1868,188). The buildinr, is identified by the discc•rory of five 
inscriptions wh~ch refer to the Vi~iles (XIV.6,13,14,15 and 231). 
The last of these, XIV.231, is of some interest because it is dated to 
A.D.386 and is dedicated to two centurions of t~e Second and Seventh 
Cohorts respectively; its contribution to our understanding of the 
late history of the Vil!;iles is considered in Appendix II. XIV .15, 
described by Dessau as "Vix recte descripta", has as ita third line 
EA CASTRA VI 
which may notwithstandin~ be expanded to ?] CASTRA VI [gilum • 
In the first line, the c~gncmen of L.Valerius [~-- should not be 
restored as [Frontinus], since he is described as a centurion of the 
Fifth Cohort, whereas the L.Valerius Frontinus on XIV.6 and 13 is a 
centurion of the Second Cchort. 
6.4.2 
After giving the texts of these inscriptions, Lanciani writes 
as follows: 
(329) 
"QUASI TUTTE LE INSCRIZIONI TESTE mentovate si estrassero dalle 
ruine di un considerevole edificio diviso in celle e spettante 
all' epoca de~li Antonini. In esso pertanto non dubiterei 
\ 
riconoscere la stazione dei vi~ili, molto piu che vi si rinvenne 
altresi una grandissima tavola lusoria, solito passatempo dei 
soldati, e ~i cui fu trovato un esemplare anche nella stazione 
militare ostiense, anche essa divisa in celle all' uso dei castri. 
' La stazione dei viP,ili in Porto, se e vera la mia congettura, 
Q 
trovereb~esi sulla sponda destradella fossa T~iana, fra la 
cittadella (ora Episcopio) e le mura della citt~." 
This building is shown on the plan (Tav.LXVIIII ) in Mon.Inst.8, 1868, 
from which Figure37 has been extracted. Lanciani's description appears 
to imply something rather more than is shown on the plan, and it is 
possible that he saw more than the plan records. His dating of the 
building ~akes it later than the Ostian castra by a few years. 
With the castra at Ostia and at Portus, the evidence for the 
date of the original construction is good and clear (Hadrianic and 
Antonine respectively: 6.3.4; 6.4.2). In Rome itself, we have seen 
that the excubitorium in Region XIV as a structure is Hadrianic though 
the evidence for the Vi~iles' occupation belongs tn the third century 
(6.2.7). Only two of the castra provide any indication of the dates 
of their construction. The Fifth Cohort built two aediculae in 111 
and 113 of which the dedications survive (VI.222 - actually of 156 but 
recordine the original construction in 111 -and VI.221, of 113). 
Th~se aediculae are dedicated to the genii of two centuries, and such 
constructions are consistent with fitting out a new caRtra. The 
Fourth Cohort also built an aedicula, to the genius of a century, 
(330) 
this time dedicated in 130 (VI.219; BR. plate I). In view of the fact 
that at Ostia the vexillation had by this time received special 
accomodation, it is likely that this dedication followed the construction 
of the castra by a few years. Certainly these three dedications give 
a terminus ante quem for the constructior;, of the castra, though 
probably not long before. The probability is that the construction 
of the castra in Rome should be ascribed to Trajan, even though the 
work may have been completed under Hadrian. 
Before the reign of Trajan, the Vi~iles were probably in 
lodgings, just as the Praetorians had been at first (they were 
?rovided with their own barracks by Tiberius: Suet. !f£• 37). Dio 
(55.26), referring to his own time, says that the Vigiles had 
II ; ) " "I II i th t d bt IE'X1 £V ''!l rroAEt , ll'.ean ng e cas ra, no ou • 
6. 6 .. i 
e 
We have now rev~~ed the archaeological evidence for the caGtr~ 
vh.:ilum. During the last half-century there has been nothing to :tdd. 
by way of archaeolo~ical discoveries, though it has been possible to 
improve the basic presentation and interpretation of the material, 
~aking account of related studies. In the discussion upon which we 
embark now the most important innovation, which virtually affects our 
understanding of the nature of castra vi~ilum, concerns sixteenth-
century antiquarianism. In a sense, there is again no new evidence. 
But certain recent antiquarian researches have provided a stiMulus to 
re-examine the sixteenth-century material, and the result is virtually 
a new set of basic material. 
(331) 
In considering the castra of the Fifth Cohort (6.2.5), brief 
mention was made of the alleged description of the castra, written by 
Ligorio, the sixteenth-century antiquarian, and it was suggested that 
this description should really be referred to Nero's Macellum Ma~num 
(Rainbird and Sear, 1972). No more needed to be said about it in the 
context of the ~ocation of, and the archaeological remains of, the 
castra of the Fifth Cohort. Briefly, in our paper we said that Ligorio 
wrote a description of what he thought to be the castra vi~ilum 
though he was mistaken and confused the castra with the Macellum Mag~. 
In examining this confusion, the experiment was tried of seeing how 
far a rational explanation was adequate for what is otherwise to be 
attributed to Ligerian mendacity and imagination. This section which 
follows now shows the result of that experiment; the conclusion is 
that the experiment was fruitful, an~ that we can add significantly 
to our knowledge of castra vi~ilum. M0reover the result is favourable 
to Ligorio, and to his aims and methods; and this coincides with other 
recent studies of Ligorio, which will be noted in due course. 
There are two versions of the description. The Italian ori~inal 
is in Cod. Taur. V f. 127-128, and a later Latin version is in Cod. Vat. 
!!at• 9141 f.143. De Rossi (1858,pp.268 n.2 and 291-194), and Httlsen 
(1907,412), have established that the authors were respectively 
Ligorio and H~stein. For convenience, both texts are given below, the 
Latin one differing sli~htly from the Italian. 
"Castro Celirnontana de' soldati Vi~ili fu in Roma nel monte Celio 
di 1A degli acquedotti dell'acqua Claudi~, fra l'hospitale del 
Salvatore in Laterano et il monasterio cii S. Steffano, ai. confini 
delli castri pere~rini, nel cui luogo ho~gidl vi sono le vigne di 
M. tippo et di Uberto Strozzi gentiluomini Mantovani, i quali per 
piantare esse vigne hanno spianto le ravine di esso Castro, 
(332) 
allo~~iamento dei soldati che la citta di nctte guardavano, dove 
havemo veduti alcuni vesti~gi della pianta de'fondamenti ch'erano 
· sotto delle ravine scassandosi il luogo. Et si sono veduti i 
luoghi che haveva di quattro torrioni quadrati, uno per an~olo del 
Castro et per ouattro lati fra esse torri erano quattro stanze 
larghe XX piedi e lon~he XLVI et a destra cinque stanze di XV piedi 
larghe et longhe XX et a sinistra altre cinque stanze simili et 
cost per tutti quattro i lati erano l'altre a destra et a sinistra 
della altre grandi simili di quarantasei piedi, et le torri 
fianche~giavano essi lati delle sale et camere. Nel mezzo dell'area 
era un tempietto d'ordine Corinthio con i capitelli di marmo 
bianco: come ancora le spire o vogliamo dire Basi et i piani di 
terra, et l'epistilio et le corone del marmo lunense in forma di 
fuori di rotonda· periptero,di colonne porfiritiche et di dentro 
era ottagono con 'due porte, una al meridie et 1' altra al 
settentrione, et in ogni an~olo era una colonna di porfido et in 
ogni lato le sue cella o nicchi; quattro quadrati e quattro di 
mezzo circqlo et nelli nicchi quadri erano le dette entrature, et 
il vano di dentro fu di piedi e fianchi o mura di cinque piedi, et 
le colonne di dentro di esso ottagono ~rosse oncie XIII, et quelle 
del periptero di fuori oncie XV. Il periptero largo piedi VIII, 
secondo rnostravano le miserande ravine, tra le quali fu trovato 
questa fragmento delle inscrittioni, che vi erano di doi Tempi, 
sotto del principato del Gran Traiano Augusto et di Hadriano, dove 
si fa menzione dell'Aedicula, et di alcuni Uffitiali de'Vigili et 
del Genio a cui fu dedicate il tempietto inchiuso nella sua 
piazza con le dette stanze, e torrioni. I muri dei tramezzi dei 
alberghi erano grossi doi piedi e quello della torre piedi quattro 
con scale di dentro J~ ~ontare nelle parti di sopra. Et cosl fu 
l'albergo della cinque cohorti o Compagnie nel Celimontano Castro, 
perch~ nell'Esouilie ne fu un altra pure a di nostri stato desolate 
et spianato. 
"Castrum Caelimontanum vigilum fuit Romae in Coelio monte ultra 
aquaeductum aouae Claudiae, inter hospitale Salvatoris in Laterano, 
et monasterium S. Stephani contiguum fere castris peregrinorum, 
quo loco hoc tempore est vinea Lippi et Uberti Strozziorum, 
nobilium Han tuanor•1m, qui vine am consi turi complanarun t rudera 
(333) 
hujus castri vigilum Romanorum. In iis observavi veRtigia quaedam 
fundamentorum et cubiculorum, et perspexi stationem illam habuisse 
quatuor turreR sive castella in extremiR angulis. Et quatuor 
latere inter turres illas sin~ula quatuor habebant conclavia, lata 
pedes XX, longa pedes XLVI, et a parte dexera quinque erant 
cubicula l~ta pedes X7, longa XX, et alia quinque similia a parte 
sinistra a~que ita a ouatuor lateribus erant alia cubicula a 
dextris et sinistris quadra~inta se;: pedum. Turres ~espondebant 
lateribus cubiculorum et camerarum; in media area erat aedicula 
operis Corinthii cum enistyliis marmorius candidi, cum spiris, 
coronia, aliisque ornamentis ex marmore Lunensi; cingebatur 
periptero rotunda columnarum purpuriticarum, interius autem erat 
octan~ula, et duas habebat portas, alteram obversam septentrioni, 
alteram meridie~. Singuli anguli suam habebant columnam 
porfyreticam, et ·singula latera su~s cellulas (nicchii vulgo), 
quatuor quadrata forma, et alia quatuor semicirculari. Et in 
cellulis ouadratis arant portae; spacium internum erat XXX 
pedum, latera sive muri nedum V, et columnae interiores hujus 
octagoni erant uciciarum XIII. Exterioris autem peripteri 
columnae erant uniciarum XV, latitude peripteri pedum VIII, 
quantum ex rniserandis illis ruinis cognosci potuit, in quibus 
haec reperta fuit inscript.io, quae ad Traiani et Hadriani tempera 
pertinet, et aediculae hujus, ejusque genii rnerninit et aliquot 
officia vigilum commemorat; parieten inter cubicula crassi erant 
pedes II, muri autem turrium pedes IV, et in turribus scalae 
erant, quae ducehant ad cubicula suneriora. H~ec statio habebat 
quinq~e cohortes vigilum. Sirnilis statio nostra tempestate 
detecta et deiecta fuit in Exquiliis. Inscriptio extat apud· 
Manuciurn et Gruterum. 
I must here ~ecord my great debt to Frank Sear, who studied these 
descriptions and from them produced the plan which I give as Figure 38 
(also published in our paper as Figure 1), The basic point which we 
mak~ is that the plan is clearly of a macellum (meat and fish market), 
and that, from its close resemblance to the illustrations on Nero's 
coins of the Macellum Au~usti, this macellum is to be identified_ as 
Nero's macellum, while from its location, on the Caelian Hill, this 
is in turn to be identified as the Macellum Ma~num. There are also 
some points of detail which are uncertain; for example, the towers at 
the corners might have protruded, and we might also have to reckon 
with the possibility of alterations and additions; for example, the 
internal colum~s of the tholos might be additions. But these 
questions are best left for a full architectural study of the plan. 
It is Ligorio's confusion which interests us now. 
In our paper, we refer only briefly to a possible explanation 
for the confusion. We say (p.45): 
"To confuse a market with a statio vi~ilum would not have been 
difficult, and, knowi.ng that there was a statio yigilum on the Caelian, 
Ligorio probably did no more than misreport the findspot of CIL. Vl~ 
222, and produce a false identification." 
That is really the conclusion of the discussion which follows now. 
6.6.2 
Let us first review the facts at our disposal. The castra of 
the Fifth Cohort was situated near, and probably under, the church of 
S. Maria in Domnica (Figure 29). Manutius describes VI.222, as 
discovered "In monte Caelio, ad D. Stephani, prope Navicellam", but 
we do not know whether this refers precisely tc the Villa Mattei, or 
more generally to that area; but, even if it was found outside the 
castra, it cannot have been found far from ito Certainly it is an 
i~,lausible description for the area to the east of S. Stephana 
Rotondo. Ligorio himself knew of the existence of this inscription from 
Manutius, but he doeo not write as if he had been present at its 
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discovery. Next, the description of the remains of the grounds in 
the later Villa Fonesca may be interpreted as that of Nero's Macellum 
Magnum. This much is plausible. Vlhat is less plausible, though it 
cannot be proved for certain that it is untrue, is Ligorio's statement 
that VI.222 was found in the tholes of his building. Probably it 
was not until t~e discovery of VI.221 in 1735, in the grounds of the 
Villa Mattei near the church of s. Maria in Domnica, that it became 
possible to locate the castra of the Fifth Cohort precisely where we 
know it to have been. Next, we know that Ligorio believed that the 
castra peregrina, lyinp; both according to him and also in fact west 
of the Macellum Ma~num, consisted of two squarish courtyards, 
surrounded by rows of rooms (see Figure 39 , a copy of Ligorio' s plan). 
There is a tholes (i.e. s. Stephana Rotondo) in the centre of the 
eastern courtyard with something distantly resembling a military 
headquarters buildin~ in the centre of the western one. This latter 
would have lain below the church of S. Maria, and since that church 
was not repaired in the sixteenth century it would appear impossible 
for Ligorio to have know11what lay underneath it. Moreover, the later 
archaeological discoveries near the church raise difficulties over 
how such a headquarters building would have fitted in: did it l0ok 
out onto walls? It is best to take this much of that plan as 
imaginative reconstructiv~. For our present purpose, what matters is 
that Ligorio was thinking in terms of large courtyard buildings in 
that general area, and the resemblance to the "macellum" plan is 
obvious. 
There is no reason to doubt that Ligorio's description of the 
remains in the later Villa Fonseca is substantially accurate. The 
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interestin~ ~uestion now is why he decided that they were the remains 
of a castra vi~ilum. The crucial piece of evidence is the final 
sentence of the It~lian text, and the penultimate sentence in the Latin: 
\ 11 Et cos~ fu l'alberg_, delle cinque cohorti o Compagnie nel 
Celimontano Castra, perch~ nell' Esquilie ne fu un altra pure a dl 
nostri stato desolate et spianato." 
"And such was the lodging of the five cohorts or Companies in the 
Celian Camp, because anoiher of th~m, in our own time, on the 
Esquiline had be~n uncovered and levelled." 
11Similis statio nostra tempestate detecta et deiecta fuit in 
Exquiliis." 
"A similar station in our own time had been dif'covert-d and levelled 
on the Esquiline." 
The implication of this is thRt it was the resemblance between the 
remains on the Esquiline and those on the Celio which was crucial for 
the identification. It thus turns on th~ identification of the 
remains on the Esquiline. 
Once more we can use evidence of genuine aut~~nt~city. We have 
already seen (6.2.2) that the base set up by the Second Cohort (VI.1059) 
was discovered in 1550 and that Ligorio knew of its existence. He had 
thus already become acquainted with a properly-identified castra 
vigilum, thotigh no description of it has come do~n from him. 
Evidently, what he saw on the Celio resembled this castra sufficiently 
closely for him to note a resemblance, and probably VI.2~2, which 
records repairs to an aedicula, was found sufficiently close to the 
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site for him to have assumed that it came (ori~inally, anyway) from 
the tholos which he saw. Certainly parts of his description of the 
tholos are verbally similar to th~ wording of VI.222, and this would 
be a natural use of one piece of evidence to complement another, the 
archaeological remains being 11miserande !'ov·ine". 
;. 
We are thus led to the interesting conclusion that Ligorio was 
confused becaus~ a castra vi~ilum (on the Esquiline) and a macellurn 
(on the Celio) reRembled each other fairly closely. This i6 the 
confusion which is extremely useful to us when we consider the nature 
of castra vi~ilum (below, 6.6.5). But before we leave Ligorio and 
the sixteenth century, we should note briefly how our implied 
ass~ssment of his work fits in with other studies. 
'Ligoriana' has, indeed, become a term of abuse, and Ligorio has 
fared particularly badly at the hands of Hommsen in the field of 
epigraphy (especially CIL.VI, p.LIII col.1). It is, therefore, ~orth 
emphasing that in using his description of the remains on the Celio 
ovt 
we have tried to work~what he actually saw, re~ardless of how he 
interpreted his information. In fact, he appears from this study as 
a thoughtful and, probably, an accurate observer. There is no reason 
to suppose that he has jeliberately sought to mislead posterity over 
these particular remains. This assessment of his work finds 
confirmation from another study of Ligorio's antiquarian int~rests, 
this tirne in the field of art history. 
Good illustrations of Ligorio's methods are given by Mandowsky 
and Mitchell (1963), editin~ his drawings in the Neapolitan manuscript 
XIII.B.7. On the first pag~ of the manuscript Ligorio explains his 
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system of diacritical si~ns, intended to d~~cribe the actual state 
of the inscriptions. With sculpture also Ligorio indicated in many 
cases what remai~ed of the statue, so that it is possible to see how 
much he has restored in the drawin~; and examnles are cited of 
striking confirmation of the accuracy of the record of the drawings. 
On Li~orio's pfovenences, Mandowsky and Mitchell conclude (p.44): 
''On the evidence of our manuscript, then we can say this. In no 
instance can a location of Ligorio's be proved definitely false. 
In some cases his word is clearly corroborated by other witnesses; 
and in many cases his statements are so circumstantial that they 
deserve credit. In short, even where Ligorio is the sole 
authority for the provenance or even existence of a monument, his 
word -prima facie -deserves credit." 
This conclusion takes account of the mistakes which Ligori0 
made in reconstructing some of the statues, anc implies that (even 
in Ligorio) a mistake in reconstruction need not imply a mistake in 
basic obs~rv~tion. He is certainly found not to have been gratuitously 
lying. 
In the ~ase of the building on the Celio, we have seen that 
there is reason to doubt tb2 findspot of VI.222, but there is every 
reason to accept Li~orio's description of the building. Although it 
is true that it will take much more work to rehabilit~te Ligorio, these 
two studies do su~gest that Ligorio deserves syMpathetic study. What 
emerges is that Ligorio r~sembled the other antiquarians of his day 
in wishing to recreate classical antiquity in all its fullness, even 
if this entailed the supplP.menting of inadequate information or 
material with material drawn from elsewhere or actually invented to 
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illustrate some point. It is Gometimes true that the modern historian 
cannot distinguish between the fact and the fiction of antiquarians 
of that period, but the distinction between fact and fiction was 
clear to them, a.nd obscurity in their expression does not imply 
obscurity of intention. It is salutary to approach these antiquarians 
with sympathy, ~nd, in the case of Ligorio, to note how many of his 
hundreds of inscriptions were in fact correct, and how many of his 
other pieces of information were also correct. With the building on 
the Celio, we have an instance of good archaeological observation. 
6.6.5 
We may now return frorn our Lip;orian digression, having advanced 
the argument an important 8tage. From Li~orio's confusion between the 
(genuine) castra vigilum on the Esquiline and the building which he 
saw on the c~lio (identifiable as the Macellum Magnum) of which ~e 
has left a description, we can say that the cae~ra vi~ilum on the 
Es~uiline was a large courtyard building, easily confused with a 
macellum. In comparison with this generalisation, the information 
available from excavations of castra vi~ilum in Rome is extremely 
scrappy. 
Using this generali~ation, w~ can further observe that the castra 
at Ostia, a lar~e courtyard building which again could be confused 
without too much difficulty with a macellum, must also hnve resembled 
the castra in Rome itself. There may well have been some differences 
of scale: a vexillation of 150 or 300 men should not have needed as 
much space as a cohort of 500 or 1,000 men; and it may be that there 
were other differences, ior example, in accomodation for offices. But 
any differences should not obscure the broad similarity. 
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The similarity between the builrtin~s of Ostia and those of 
Rome itself has often been observed, and this much might also have 
been expected of these castra. Our study of Ligorio's confusion 
provides a specific ~round for assertin~ this similarity. This is 
a new departure. 
The first analysia of the relationship of the castra vigilum 
at Ostia to other types o~ buildin~ was that of Calza (1941). He 
grouped it with the Casa· di Diana (fig.40), the Casa delle Muse 
(fig.41), the Casa del Serapide (fig.42), the Casa degli Aurighi 
(fig.43) and the H~rrea Epagathiana (fig.44); all of these Ostian 
buildings consisted ~f tabernae and apartments arranged around 
courtyards. Calza may be criticised for relying too much on plans 
in grouping the buildin~s, and paying too little attention to 
function. And he mi~ht have reached different conclusions if he 
had noted that the castra vi~ilum is larger and has a much greater 
greater proportion of courtyard than the others in the group. Some 
of the Ostian horrea are better parall~ls in this respect, e.g. the 
Piccolo Mercato (fig.45). 
Bo~thius (1960) retained Calza's ~rouping (making it his 
type IV), but put it in the context of the utilitarian architecture 
of large courtyard buildings (p.134): 
"In connection with the unbroken le~acy from the later Roman 
Empire to medieval life, we should also mention the predilection 
for peristyles and porticoes, and we should reme~ber that 
peristyles aere not always parts of palaces. It is more important, 
no doubt, f~r their ctevelopment in medieval times that they were 
at least as typically part of utilitarian architecture: of 
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warehouses, of barracks like the Caserma dei Vigili in Ostia, 
of market places like the Piccolo Mercato, the Horrea di 
Hortensius in Ostia, and Eumachia's building in the Forum at 
Pompei, and of Hellenistic hotels like the caravansary of 
Kassope in Epeiros with its court measuring 14.~ by 11.7 
meters, flanked by porticoes [JHS lxxiii, 1953,120]. 11 
The basic theme is very simple, and capable of application to a 
wide range of functions. Varied needs were answered in a similar 
way, and tenements which happened to include such a "utilitarian" 
function shared the luxury of an inner court with peristyles (p.159). 
The most recent study, that of Packer (1971), criticises 
Calza's classification for being too simple (p.5), and instead 
classifies building-s by "the use made of their ground floors'' (po6). 
This is broadly in line with Boethius' approach, and Packer approves 
of Boethius' application of the notion of "megastructures" to the 
combinations of rooms, often covering an entire block or more. 
It is unfortunate that Packer does not depart in any essential 
from the opinions of Lanciani and Vaglieri regarding the castra 
vigilum itself, despite his detailed examination of the building 
and observation of points of detail (pp~23,24,25,33,40). 
He seems basically to regard the castra vi~ilum as a large 
apartment block, and at the one point where he seems about to 
examine the function of the buildinp; simply says: "As the barracks 
of the city police [sic], thP Caserma dei Vigili forms a rather 
special case" (n.17). He does not say precisely what constitutes 
the special case and spell out which this implied for the 
arcnitecture. At the very least, he might have suggested what the 
courtyard was intended for: as "police", would the Vil';iles have 
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needed one? Packer estimates that the number of occupants was over 
100 (p.71, n.34), an estimate based on the plan alone. He could 
have referred to BR, who ~ives the figure 600;. the number suggested 
above ( at 4.29.8) is two centuries, i.e. 150 raised to 300. 
300 men would have occupied the building in its enlarged state. 
Packer's figure is thus a considerable under-estimate. The Caserma 
dei Vi~ili was not a typical apartment block. Even if the architecture 
were not distinctive, the number of occupants must have been. 
One very good point made by Packer is that the building just 
to the east of the castra vi~ilum is very si~ilar (p.18; my fig.46). 
In fact, this building resembles the Ostian castra vi~ilum more 
closely than does any other building yet uncovered. This makes the 
lack of records of its excavation particularly tragic; it can only 
be hoped that it has not been completely excavated. Its existence 
serves to remind us that the castra vigilum is not unique in all 
respects. 
When we review the available models, we can see that the 
-
designer of the Ostian fire station, and probably also of the ones 
in Rome, had such a wide range as to provide virtual freedom ann 
very little need to develop a radically new desi~n. The time of 
Trajan is sug~csted as the most probable period for the provision 
of castra vi~ilum, and the plans of the buildings which follow show 
the sort of models available around that time (the plan~ show 
buildin~s or phases of buildings existin~ at that time)o 
The courtyard is an essential feature, used for drills and. 
parades. The Aug~t~um at the end provides the ceremonial focus. 
In functional terms we ha~e the e~uivalent of the palaestra. The 
basic palaestra theme is shown simply in the hellenistic ~ymnasium 
of Miletus (fig.4?). (The distinction between 'palaestra' and 
·~ymnasiurn' is not for discussion here: there was confusion in the 
ancient world as well as the modern.) Later development of the 
gymnasium as a cultural centre, with lecture rooms, led to the 
addition of exedrae, such as ar(incorporated in the B?.ths of Titus 
in Rome, and reach their most elaborate form in the ~ymnasia of Asia 
Minor, for example, in the Harbour Baths of Ephesus, where they 
merit the title 'Marmorsaal'. Such buildings were used by the 
paramilitary youth or~anisations. 
The plan of macella is similar, thou~h much of the space in 
the courtyard is taken up with the thol~ (or tholoi at Lepcis). 
The macellum at Pozzuoli has a shrine at one end (fig.48), and the 
incorporation of the shrine into the portico is found in Rome also, 
in Vespasian's Temple of Peace. The macellum at Pompei, though less 
regular in its plan, also has a cella, at the end, which housed two 
statues. It is clear why Ligorio could confuse a macellum and a 
castra vi~ilum, particularly since the church of Santo Stefano 
Roton~o lay in the centre of one of his presumed courts of the 
castra pere~rina and could remind him of a macellum tholos. 
Military buildings also provide points of similarity. There 
is a degree of r~semblance between the courtyard with peristyle, hall 
and five rooms of the typical auxiliary PrinciPia (e.g. Housesteads, 
fig.49), and the courtyard with perttyle, row of three large rooms, 
ahd row of five smaller rooms of the castra vi~ilum. The praetorium 
of the Third Legion at Lambaesis (fig.50) shows the same them~ 
though on a lar~er scale. The similarities are not, however, close 
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enough to demonstrate that the castra vigilum is simnly an adoption 
or adaptation of a normal principia. 
The House of the Vestals (fig.51) shows an interestin~ 
combination of dwellin~ and ceremonial rooms, courtyArd and garden, 
the result of intermittent chan~es. 
Among more formal buildin~s, the Ludus Magnus (fig.52) 
shows how the functions of dwellin~ and of amphitheatre were united: 
rooms arran~ed around the perimeter of a ractan~le with a small 
amphitheatre occupy~n~ the place of a courtyard. This is the only 
identified example (other than castra vir>:ilum) of anythin,!l;' like a 
purpose-built residential ~ymnasium. It shows how flexible an 
approach was possible. The House of the Gladiators at Pompei 
(fig.53) seems to have been adapted to this use, but the building 
itself does not show any special alterations made necessary by the 
provision of dwellin~ accommodation in a gymnasium. 
The si~nificant point is that the designer of castra vi~i~um 
had the benefit of various models which in important respects were 
not so dissimilar. It is not surprising that resemblances can be 
Beet\. An army officer could have found the ~round plan of the castra 
vigilum reminiscent of a principia, but this is not to argue for a 
military model. The value o~ the discussions by Calza, Boethius and 
Packer is that they relate the castra visZ'ilum to civilian buildin~Ss 
of the larger, "utilitarian" type. The courtyard was an essential 
fe3ture of a fire station, hence the result.It was not inevitable 
that a residential Q;ymnasium should be planned in this way, but it 
was very natural. Given the courtyard and the size of the building, 
the derivation from a domus becn~es a red herrin~ • 
. , 
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6.7.4 
The real test of this discussion of castra vi~ilum will be 
whether future discoveries fit the pattern of "residential ~ymnasia": 
buildin~s with storerooms on the ~round floor and dwellingrooms 
above, and with a prominent courtyard focussing on an Augusteum 
or cella. 
For the moment, we have pro~ress€d quite some way beyond BR, 
who does not discuss castra vi~ilum as a type of building. When 
sufficient survives· of a building, it appears possible to decide 
whether it is a castra vi~ilum or not, even in the absence of 
epigraphic evidence; though the mere plan (such as is used in the 
Severan Marble Plan) might need confirmation from elsewhere. In 
relation to the ouestion, how far the Vi~iles were military and 
how far they were civilian, the answer to be derived from the fire 
stations is that they were paramilitary. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CITY OF ROME 
7.1.1 
One of the nfost interesting things about a fire brigade is the way 
in which it both reflects and responds to its environmento We have looked 
/ 
at the JL.-i.9.ik~ in terms of their personnel and ma~eriel, and it is necessary 
now to look at their environment, the City of Rome and its e~ffsho::Jts, 
Ostia and Portus. By looking at the context of their operations, we are 
able to see why they were able to function as they did, and to see how 
far a particular mode of operations was forced on them by circumstances 
beyond their control. 
To a large extent, this chapter is informed by a comparative 
study of firefighting, in the sense that the questions ~hich are raissd are 
the sort of questions which arise in any st~dy or analysis of firefighting. 
On the other hand, actual comparisons are kept to a minimum, because it 
is felt that in this study the evidence should stand on its CJWn feet in the 
interests of clarity. Also, once the material can be presented in this way, 
then it will be easier to produce valid comparisons. 
7.1.3 
' We start by examining the evidence for fires and fir~ risks, and 
then go on to look at the resources and potentials which the City offered 
for fi.refighting. It will emerge that the V.iJli~ were a peculiar reflection 
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of peculiar circumstances, and that the distinctive features of their 
operations arose from factors which were beyond their control and not 
directly connected with firefightingo 
7.2.1 
It would be ~deal if we could examine our literary, epigraphic 
and archaeological data and draw up tables showing the number of fires 
of different sorts, the causes of the fires, and the circumstances which 
made them spread. Unfortunately, this type of investigation is diffic~lt 
enough evan with present-day fires, chiefly because fire is prone to 
destroy the evidence. Moreover, although in a general sense practically 
every fire which occurs could have been anticipated even if not actually 
prevented, it remains an absorbing problem why ordinary fittings, 
furnishings and equipment become, on occasion, very bad risks; and we 
therefore run into the difficult problem of dnalysing the fires which did 
not occur. Compared with the number of sources of heat, there appear to 
be comparatively few fires (though the actual number of fires is, ~f course~ 
very large); what is really interesting is the way in which particular 
circumstances become dangerous. 
7.2.2 
Our best evidence for the nature of the fires in Rome is literary, 
and among the historians Dio is the most useful to us. Within the period 
which he covers, practically every fire which was important is recorded 
by Dio, and in some cases his reporting is like that of an eye-witness: 
he thus preserves some of the important detailse But there is the 
difficulty with fires in Rome that it is not always possible to be sure 
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that two or mare accounts refer to the same fire when it is suspected 
that they might; and for this reason it is all too easy to put down 
several separate fires as a single conflagration. Except in the case 
of single monuments, where signs of burning can be tied to pa~ticular 
known phases, there is little to be gained from archaeological evidence, 
and certainly burnt layers are not known over sufficiently wide areas to 
enable us to deduce anything of the nature of particular fires (see Appendix 
IV). Inscriptions can be useful for telling us the date of burning of a 
building and of its repair, and sometimes it may be deduced that a 
particular burning formed part of a wider conflagration which is 
attested in the literary saurces. 
7.2.3 
There have been several studies of fires in Rome, mainly devoted 
to determining the extent of each fire and the buildings affected. For 
the period of the ~tl~' that of W~rner (1906) is of first importance= 
and it incorporates the results of the earlier main studies; though with 
the publication of the dictionary by Platner and Ashby (1929~ it is now 
easier to refer to Canter (1932), who incorporates Werner's work in his 
own paper. The fire of A.D. 64, of course, has a literature of its own, 
of which just one single paper stands out (Hulsen, 1909). 
------- ------~-
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7.3.1 
The evidence for fires is better for the Empi~e than for the 
Republic, though in each case it takes the s3me pattern. For the 
Republic, 15 fires are recorded, of which 7 were widespread conflagrations. 
These fires were concentrated along the Tiber and in the region of the 
forum. For the Empire, 44 fires, all important, are recorded with 
good authority. The distribution of fires under the Empire is as follows 
(the total number appears to be more than 44 because the occurrence of 
a fire in edch region is counted separately even though a single 
conflagration could affect more than one region): 
Num~lir _q_f fires_I.ecorded 
l 0 
11 0 
111 2 
lV 4 
v 1 
Vl 2 
Vll - 1 
Vlll 14 
lX 9 
X 8 
Xl 3 
Xll 2 
Xlll 2 
XlV 0 
Werner (p.47) observed that the majority of fires are recorded 
with reference to public buildings, and left it an open question how many 
other buildings were involved. Dio (66.24.3), listing the public buildings 
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affected by the fire in A.o.so, hoped that from the list of buildings 
which he gives the reader may estimate how many others were affected, 
and in the absence of any numerical or alphabetic system for addresses 
the most common way to indicate the extent of a fire was to name the 
public buildings involved. In addition, repairs to burned public 
buildings were likeiy to remain in the records, and in some cases an 
inscription on the building itself would give the information. There 
is only one figure for the number of buildings destroyed in any fire, 
that which is given for the fire under Antoninus Pius (SoH.A. Pii 9.1): 
-
~~umpstt~ Otherwise, we have just the figures for the numbers of 
Regions destroyed or partly affected by the fire of AoD.64 (Tae. ~ 
15.40): 
3 Regions completely destroyed 
7 Regions largely destroyed 
4 Regions intact 
7.3 .2 
Canter gives the following analysis of public buildings which we 
know to have been affected more than once, covering both the Republic and 
the Empire (p.279): 
Temple of Vesta 5 times 
Regia 4 n 
Theatre of Pompey 4 n 
Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus 3 n 
Basilica Iulia 3 n 
Basilica Aemilia 3 n 
Theatre of Marcellus 2 n 
Pantheon 2 n 
Colosseum 2 n [&£: ? 3] 
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To these could be added the Circus Maximus, which was a major risk because 
of the timber used in the upper parts of its construction and because 
of the buildings round about it. It was burned in 31 B.C. and A.D. 36, 
and the fire of 64 started in l~~~ on the Palatine side (Tac.~.15.38); 
it was burned again in the reign of Domitian. Trajan repaired it in 
stone, and no more rires are recorded in it; but it did subsequently 
collapse twice, in the reigns of Pius and Diocletian, and we are entitled 
to wonder whether the zeal for fire protection led to structural weakness. 
A comparatively high proportion of attested fires are recorded as 
actually starting in a public building. In contrast with only 10 alleged 
cases of arson in the total of 59 attested fires (a proportior, which 
modern estim~tes would find rather small if the statistics were valid), 
the following list, taken from Canter (p.280), shows 30 instances of 
public buildings struck by lightning: 
Temple uf Jupiter Capitolinus 
Colosseum 
Temple of Quirinus 
Temple of Salus 
Temple of Ceres 
Pantheon 
Domus Augusti 
Atrium Publicum 
Many temples 
(e.g. of Juno Lucina, 
Spes, 
Ops 
Penates Dei 
Pi etas 
Pax 
Luna 
Jupiter Victor) 
3 times 
3 II 
2 II 
2 II 
2 II 
1 timP 
1 II 
1 fl 
1 fl 
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The rea~nis clearly the height of the buildings and the timber 
construction of the roofs, and, in the case of the Colosseum, the use of 
timber fittings and of AWnings at the highest level. Very often these 
buildings will have attracted lightning to themselves, the temples in 
particular often being designer to stand out above the other buildings 
(cf. Vitruvius 1.7.~). 
7.3.4 
Although Dio records important details which concern firefighting, 
he does not tell us as much abbut the actual fires. On this topic, he is 
best on causes, though we have to be as C8reful with Dio as we do with 
modern alleged causes of ·fires. In addition to r8cording lightning 
strikes and alleged cases of arson (often in common with other writers), 
he tells us of the only fire recorded as having started in a private 
dwelling (73.24.1: A.D. 192) and that, interestingly, at night (the time 
when, but for the ~gi~~' most fires would have got out of hand). He 
also records what might appear to be a fantastic account of a fire in 
12 B.C. (55.29.8), in which the Hut of Romulus was said to have been set 
ablaze by crows which dropped upon it burning meat from an altar. 
Although it is generally true that wild animal~ and birds will try to 
avoid fire, we should not dismiss the story out of hand. Werner (p.l3) 
refers it to Dio 1 s own superstition and comments: "Sed haec leviora". But 
it is not difficult to think of a situation which is in itself plausible 
and which could produce the sort of account retailed by Dio. for example, 
it would be enough to account for the story if a spark or small piece of 
burning material from the sacrificial fire were carried up by convection 
currents or by the ordinary wind, and deposited on the roof of the Hut; 
and some onlooker, seeing crows flying in the vicinity, attributed the 
transmission of the burning material to them. It is notorious how 
people describe fires in terms of what they think ought to have happened rather 
than what they actually saw: thus a common modern confusion occurs after 
aeroplane crashes, in which no fire breaks out until the plan9 touches the 
ground but eyewitness9s claim to have seen a ball of fire in the sky. A 
similar imaginative reconstruction of the cause of a fire is given by Herodian 
in his account of the fire in A.D. 192 {1.14.2-5), for which, as we have 
see~Dio records that it started in a private dwelling. Herodian says 
that the cause was an earthquake, and, although this is not an impossible 
cause, it does seem probable that the ignorance and superstition 
attached to bad fires fixed on an earthquake b3cause this was suitably 
portentous. 
One fire which is worth looking at individually for its own 
interest is the one which was blamed on Nero, in A.D.64. The question 
whether Nero was responsible for causing the fire has remained a point of 
controversy among'modern scholars. The most monumental study, that of 
Profumo (1905), finds Nero entirely guilty. Profumo 1 s document~tion is 
impressive, but his conclusion is implausible. As HUlsen (1909,45) comments: 
"The idea of deliberately planning such an enormous conflagration, 
and of calculating the direction in which the fire must spread, 
appears too fantastic even for Nero; to start the fire in the 
immediate neighborhood of the imperial palaeo with the intention 
of destroying quarters nea~ly half a mile distant is still more 
fantastic. Any little unsuspected incident might upset the plan, 
and divert the fire from the course intended; and in fact, what really 
took place did not correspond at all to the design as conceived by 
Profumo and represented on his plan (~.2)." 
Despite a reply to this from Profumo (19J9), Hulsen's remains the better case. 
There is, moreover, a hint in Tacitus' account of the fire (which 
is more full than any others) that we have to read between the lines in 
(354) 
order to appreciate what was really happening. It was merely ~'lli 
and~~~~ that Nero had to counter (Tac. ~· 15.44); there is little 
by way of firm evidence against him in the sourcese Possibly the strongest 
suspicions are given in this passage (Ann. 15.38): 
11 Nec quisquam defenders audebat, crebris multorum minis restringere 
prohibentium, et ~uia alii palam faces iaciebant atque esse sibi 
auctorem vociferabantur 1 sive ut raptus licentius exercerent seu iussu.•• 
There are analogous accounts of later fires (though none, unfortunately, 
from the Roman period) which show how the laym~~ tends to reconstruct 
fires according to what he thinks ought to have happened rather than what 
he actually saw. Both Tatitus (Ann. 15.38) and Dio (62.17.2) refer to a 
wind which develaped and caused the fire to spread, and this wind must 
have been caused by the fire in the effect known as a "fire-storm": the 
development of convection currents which carry burning materials around 
or above the levol of the roofs so that the fire becomes self-propagating 
on a very large scale. One result would be that people would see new 
fires starting, apparently spontaneously, a little way off from the 
existing fires. Dio is quite certain of Nero's guilt, saying that he 
sent men out to start fires in different places (62o16.2), and that the 
V!.9,:i),;.~~' as '.11811 as the other troops, took part in this, for the purpose 
of plunder (62.17~1): 
t/ 
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Tacitus also refers to the use of torches, in the passage quoted above. 
Once it is recognised that there was a fire-storm, the references to 
plunder are explained, as far as the spread of the fire is concerned, and 
we are left with the interesting way in which the rumours developed. 
(355) 
Now Suetonius (~~ 39) refers to demolitions, in a passage to 
uJhich we have alr.eady referred in connection with bC!,lL~~~ (4: 12.2): 
"et quaedam horrea circa do~um Auream, quorum spatium maxims desiderabat, 
ut bellicis machinis labefacta atque inflammata sint, quod saxeo muro 
constructa erant." 
The ~las, co-ape:ating with the other troops, must have been responsible 
for these demolitions. The general sense of this passage ie that the 
~Jl.:b..~ were operating in a competent and firemanlike way, having decided 
that their only Lacourse was to create a fire ~raak in the quickest way 
possible. Clearly, they had decided which buildings and areas should b8 
abandoned. In practical terms, this means that they had put these areas 
and buildings out of bounds, and that as far as they were able they had to 
stop people going back in. This surely is what Tacitus refers to when he 
writes of the threats and the prevention of attempts to extinguish the 
fire; and Suetonius also records the prohibition on entry (Nero 38). 
--
The ·~~· in this case will have been the ~~~~ .~9i~ or the 
emperor. As for the 'fa~~·, there are several possibl8 explanations for 
these. They might have been emergency lighting, or burning materials 
which were being removed. Possibly they were ~sed in counter-burning, 
to reinforce the 2~1~~· Dr possibly they were simply figments of the 
layman's imagination. 
There is one other feature of the fire which provoked criticism, 
and this is the alleged recital by Nero on the Tower of Maecenas 
{Suetonius ~ 38) or the roof of the palace (Dio 62e18.1). It is 
entirely plausible that Nero did ascend to a hlgh look-out point, and it 
is also probable that the ~~~actus ~~~~ went with him; the latter 
may well have spent a good part of the six days and seven nights which the 
(356) 
fire lasted on the tops of high buildings. It is clear that Nero did 
all that he could by way of remedies and precautions for the future 
(see 7.6.4), and his reason for ascending was probably entirely laudable 
and practical. Looking at the accounts of the fire through modern eyes, 
there is one further point which may be inferred. It was evidently felt 
~ 
that there had not been enough ~ater: for this reason, Nero ordered that 
there should be guards to protect the water supply (Taco8nll• 15.43): 
"iam aqua privatorum licentia int~rcepta quo largior et pluribus locis 
in publicum flueret, custodes." 
Clearly something had gone wrong with the firefighting to let the 
fire get out of hand, but once it had become large and developed into a 
fire-storm no amount of water could have stopped it. It is possible that 
in the early stag8s, when the fire had just been discovered and might have 
been put out, there had been a lack of water, both in the premises and also 
in the nearby public sup~ly, and that vital minutes had been lost. For 
this, it is likely that the praefectus vigilum was blamed, unjustly. It 
is possible, therefore, there was some attempt at distraction by imputing 
blame to the staff of the curatores aguarum and that they responded by 
alleging theft of the water (as they may have reacted later on when 
frontinus' survey of the aqueducts showed that the (inaccurately) calculated 
amount of water was greater than the amount actually delivered: cf. Ashby 
1935,28,32). If there was a certain play of departmental politics, then 
it is possible that the praefectus vigilum was made responsible for part 
of least of the guarding of the aqueducts, probably during the night; 
though if it is true that private individuals were responsible for 
thefts of water, they may have been the landowners outside Rome (Ashby p.32), 
and guards will have been needed outside the City. i \ 
(357) 
Returning to the question of Nero's guilt, we should note that 
there was widespread panic, and every incentive to find a scapegoatG Even 
today, a similar process takes place after big fires, blame being imputed 
both to the firemen and also to the government. Firemen may be blamed for 
starting or for encouraging the fire when all that they have failed to do is 
; 
to prevent any damage, and their professional training and their detachment 
make them "outsiders" in a panic situation. In addition, hostile interests 
may well seek to distract justified criticism by blaming the fire authorities. 
With the fire of 64, we have also to reckon with the character of Nero 
himself, which may well have helped to create the rumours. We may contrast 
this fire with the bad on.e in A .D. E)D, in the r·eign of Titus: he a "good" 
emperor, was not blamed. Certainly Nero's measures were good and although 
it may be thought unfortunate that he resorted to the burning of Christians 
afterwards there is a good enough reason to explain why he was driven to 
this desperate step: he was, after all, being blamed for the worst fire in 
RomeRs history. Even the fact that he was blamed is some evidence for the 
devastation of the fixe; and finds a good pa~Qllel with the Great Fire of 
London in 1666 which rumour ascribed to the evil intents, among others, of 
King Charles II. 
It is, then possible to interpret the sources for the fire of 
64 in a way which is not hostile to the Vigil~ but which shuws them acting 
properly and to the best of their capability. As HUlsen saw, we have to 
star.d back a little to see the sources in their proper perspective. The 
details which we possess can be interpreted consistently and plausibly, and 
to the credit of the Vigiles. To those who object that the fire should 
never have got out of hand, the answer is that compared with medieval cities 
Rome had a very good fire record, and that this one failure should be set 
(358) 
against all the fires which did not get out of hando According to the 
estimate of the number of fires in Rome (see below, 7.5.4), this was one 
fire in eleven milliono 
The picture which we can draw from the accounts of pa~ticular 
fires is rather biassed. The majority of fires must have been in private 
dwellir1gs and have not been recorded for posterity. JuvEnal gives the 
more general picture, with fire being a constant threat and with .many of 
the inhabitants being unable to escape from thE,ir upstairs rooms (~. 3. 6-~, 
190-202): 
"nam quid tam miseru~, ·tam solum vidimus, ut non 
deterius credas horrere·incendia, lapsus 
tectorum adsiduos ac mille pericula saevae 
urbis et Augusto recitantes mense poetas?" 
"quis timet aut timuit gelida Praeneste ruinam 
aut positis nemorosa interiuga Volsiniis aut 
simplicibus Gabiis aut proni Tiburis arce? 
nos urbem colimus tenui tibicine fultam 
magna parte sui: nam sic labentibus obstat 
vilicus, et veteris rimae cum texit hiatum, 
securos pendente iubet dormire ruina. 
vivendum est illic ubi nulla incendia, nulli 
nocte~tuso iam poscit aquam, iam frivola transfert 
Ucalegon, tabulata tibi iam tertia fumant: 
tu nescis; nam si gradibus trepidatur ab imis, 
ultimus ardebit quem tegula sola tuetur 
a pluvia, molles ubi reddunt ova columbae." 
We possess a certain amount of evidence concerning both fires and building 
history which helps to fill in this more gener~l picture; then it will be 
interesting to speculate how many fires there were per day. 
(359) 
7.3.7 
There was a tremendous number of naked flames in ancient Rome; 
Spano (1920) has shown that lamps were placed in considerablg numbers in 
practically any position in order to obtain adequate light. There were also 
many braziers and chafing-bowls, in the virtual absence of built-in ovens. 
It was difficult to make fire. Morgan (1890) reviews the evidence for the 
methods used for producing sparks: wood on wood, stone on stone, and iron 
on stone (this latter possibly the least common of these three: Morgan p. 38), 
as well as the rays of the sun. All the first ~hree methods, which were 
the ones in common use, take time: Blackstone (1957,25) records that in the 
nineteenth century, although one might be fortunate and make fire in 
two minutes, half" an hour was not uncommon; and by that time the equipment 
had been made more convenient. There was thus a strong incentive to keep 
fire burning all the time, probably in the form of charcoal, and secondly, 
when the fire did go out, to carry burning material from a neighbour. Mor~an 
also notes (p .. 19 n.1) the sale of fire, "ignis emendus", in Juvenal (~. 1,134) 
Then too fire was carried by those attend~ng banquets (Juv. ~ 3. 2~-253): 
''Noi\1\E' viJec.. ivc, ... +o t:.d-Kbvf+vv- sfc-rl-vlc. <iv""o ~ - ·-
·centum conviuag, sequitur sua quemque culina. 
Corbulo vix ferret tot vasa ingentia, tot re9 
inposi tas capi ti, quas recto vertiCj3 portat 
servulu~ infelix et cursu ventilat ignem." 
All of these practices put dwelling places at risk. The practice of 
carrying fire is particularly dangerous, and was commonly forbidden in 
medieval cities. 
7.3.8 
In general the dwellings lacked chimneys, and all heat had to go 
out through the doors and windows. The result of such an arrangement is 
well known, that the heat ascends, collects under the eaves, and can 
eventually lead to firing of the roof. Hence Vitruvius expressed the wish 
(360) 
that larchwood could be got to Rome more easily (2.9.16): 
11 Cuius materies (larchwood] si esset facultas adportationibus ad urbem, 
maximae haberentur utllitates, et si non in omne, carte tabulae in 
subgrundiis circum insulas, si essent ex ea conlocatae, ab traiectionibus 
incendiorum aedificia pericl!l~ liberarentur, quod ea neque flammam nee 
carbonem possunt recipere nee facers per se. 11 
Such an arrangement could work for only a limited period before the 
larchwood decomposed. But it can only have been used rarely, if at 
all, because of the expense. Vitruvius also unwittingly indicated how 
easily heat could sp~ead, when discussing the problem of dirty plaster 
(7.3.4): 
"Semper enim album opus propter superbiam candoris non modo ex propriis 
sed etiam alienis aedificiis concipit fumum." 
Where smoke travelled, heat and sparks could also travel. 
The risks which would today be classified as industrial were 
spread fairly evenly throughout the City. Generally the workshops occupied 
the ground floors of the insulae, providing frequent sources of heat below 
the living quarters. Many of the specialist concentrations, for example 
those which constituted the vicus cornicular~; vicus lorarius, vicus 
. sandalar~ and vicus ~ateriarius (Moretti 1958), would have been similar 
\ 
to each other in point of fire risk, and need not be distinguished here. 
Bakeries, which were a special risk because or the ovens a11J the dust, 
are given the following distribution in the Notitia Urbis: 
Region 1 II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV 
Bakeries 20 15 16 15 15 16 16 20 20 20 16 75 20 23 
Allowing for posslble corruption in these figures, there does not seem to 
/ 
be any evidence that bakers worked in concentrations; this risk would therefore 
have been evenly spread through the City. It does not follQw, however, that 
industrial risks were given special attention, at least in law. But in 
the absence of special provisions from the law codes, where special 
regulations would surely be found if they existed, we can assume that the 
VigiJle~ will have given special attention to the workshops, exercising 
their right to beat those who kept their fires n8gligently (Dig. 1.15. 3-4). 
It will, of course, Mave been greatly to their advantage that these 
risks were at street rlEvBlo They were also helped by the small size of 
most of these establishments. This remained a constant factor throughout 
the existence of the Vigiles. 
Even such advantages as the Vigiles could find in the nature of 
the industries were not due at all to awareness of fire risks. Loane 
(1938,155f.) finds the explanations for their characteristics in social and 
economic factors: 
"A conside~tion of the Marble Plan and of the few remains of tenement 
houses at Rome has also failed to show essential changes in 
industrial and commercial quarters. Although the need of expensive 
equipment and of specially tr9ined artisans fostered manufacturies of 
some size for baking, fulling, and the production of silver plate and 
luxury furniture, only in the case of brickmaking did large numbers of 
workmen appear. Yet even here the unit of five or six men was basal. 
The conditions that resulted in lack of m3nufacturing on a-large sc9le 
in the city included not only the absence of metals or fuels nearby, 
or labor-saving machinery, and of patents to protect trade secrets, 
but also the Roman law on partnerships, which hindered the concentration 
of capital and industry, and especially the lack of respect that prevailed 
in ancient society for the success won from commerce and trade." 
Sush attitudes brought benefits for fire protection, so long as the Vigiles 
could catch the fires early. This they clearly aimed to do. 
There ~ere two other categories of fire which must have been 
fairly common though we do not hear so much about themo These were in ships 
and on derelict properties. A very bad ship fire occured in A.D. 62, when 
one hundred corn ships were destroyed in an:accidental fire ( 1 fortuitu~ igni~1 : 
Tac • .8!m 15.18); but the large number of ships, and particularly those 
carrying cargoes of grain and timber, must have provided fairly frequent 
calls upon the Vigiles (for numbers of ships, see Rickman 1971,11). The 
cohorts along the Tiber (i.e. I,IV, and VII) will have become more specialised in 
ship fires than the others. Ship fires must also have been a feature of the 
duties of Ostia and Portu.s, though there is no evidence that Cohorts I,IV 
and VII provided a major proportion of the vexillations (see 4.2~7). 
7.3.11 
About fires in derelict properties there is little to say, other 
that such properties seem to attract the attention of tramps, squatters and 
amateur arsonisGs, and that the continual collapses and fires in Rome will 
have ensured a steady renewal of dereliction. The fire in A.D. 64 left areas 
derelict. for some years (see, for example, Suet, Vesp. 8.5: "Deformis .!!!:~ 
veteribus incendiis ~ ruinis ~; vacuas areas occupare ~ aedificare ~ 
£gssessores cessarent ~Eumgue permisit"; and VI. 826). How much such areas 
added to the work of the Vigiles it is impossible to say. 
7.3.12 
0 
r 
There -~~~--one ful~her type of risk, which was non-structural but 
was none the less important. This was the lighting used at festivals and 
games. Caligula seems to have been the first to light the whole of the 
City at night (Suet. Caligula 18.2), if Suetonius does not exaggerate, 
and the use of lighting on a large scale for celebrations continued long 
afterwards. That this was a serious fire risk is shown in the edict for 
the Secular Games of A.D. 204, which has a special provision for 
firefighting and fire watching (VI.32327, lines 21 and 22): 
11 admonemus Quirit[es d] ominos urbano[s et eos quoq] ue qui mercede habitant 
in noctibu[s feiiarum illarum ut una cum mili] 1 tibus nostris 
circumeuntibus[reg ]ionum tutelam diligenter admistrent [.§..!.£ CIL ] 
There is thus not a little irony in the need for the emperor, through his 
fire brigade, tu lessen the fire risk brought about by the imperial way of 
life. There is also an interesting irony in the celebrations on the 
1st of March. This was the traditional New Year's Day, and some of the 
ceremonies connected with this continued into the imperial period. One 
of them was the rekindling of domestic fires from the freshly-kindled 
sacred fire of Vesta on that date (this ceremony being different from the Vestalia, 
held on the 9th of June, which in the imperial period was largely a food 
and bakery festival). 1 March was also the start of the official year used 
by the Vigiles, followinu military precedent (see 5.2.8), and it. 
must often have been a good induction for the recent recruits, newly milites 
facti, to put out the fires caused by the mass carrying of fire around the 
City. The evidence for this ceremony is Solinus 1.35: 
"Romani initio annum decem mensibus computabant, a Martio auspicentes adeo 
ut eius die prima de aris Vestalibus ignes accenderent" 
He uses the past tense, so perhaps the ceremony became obsolete, even though 
the rekindling of the fire of Vesta continued and also the fires in houses 
were re-lit (Ovid Fasti 3.143-144). But even this latter will have increased 
the risk as neighbours borrowed fire from each other to take the tedium 
and effort out of the ritual. 
(364) 
7.4.1 
The one characteristic shared by practically all fires is that 
they start small and only become big if the circumstances are right. 
In Rome, the circumstances were right. The principal factors were 
the overcrowding and the type of building construction. ThB fact of 
overcrowding is well-established and there is little to say in detail; 
it m~y be noted that overcrowding in a tenement block "enormously 
increases the risk" (Manual 4, p. 61), and the more people there are 
in a block the ~arder it is to get them out bo,fore the fire reaches 
them. The evidence for building construction is quite informative. 
The main points of inte~est from the firefighting point of view are 
the materials and the way in which they were used, and the chief 
materials to be examined are timber, brick and stone. 
7.4.2 
Our assessment of the contribution of the use of timber to fire 
risks in Rome must depend at least as much on our estimate of the amount 
of jerry-building as on assulllPtions about the innate properties of 
timber. The Manual (4, p.4) describes timbe~ as follows: 
"Wood will normally burn readily, and its use can make a building 
\/tU:lnerable to fire. It is obvious, fer 'example, that when a 
domestic building with boarded floors, wooden joists and wooden 
roof catches fire, and is not extinguished, the floors and roof 
generally burn out, while the brick walls remain standing. On the 
other hand, thick baulks of timber have quite good fire-resisting 
properties, ·and heavy timber heams, though severely charred, are 
often found in place after a fire which would have rapidly caused 
the collapse of unprotected steelwork. 
In general, the fire resistance of timber depends on two 
factors its thickness and the design and workmanship in its 
construction. Wood is a poor conductor of heat, and this characteristic, 
combined with its tendency to form a protective skin of charcoal en 
surfaces exposed to a fire, results in the outside wood protecting 
the inner from the heat of the flames. This.protective skin of 
charcoal, moreover, tends to smoulder slowly, rather than to burn, 
thus further reducing the rate of combustion. The use of thick 
wooden floors for certain types of building has been common in America 
for many years, and is known as "slow burning mill construction 11 • 
Though the various types of wood, such as oak, fir, mahogany, 
ash, elm, etc., burn at slightly different rates, this factor is of 
less importance than the tightness and rigidity of the joints and 
the quality of the workmanshi~. Tongued and grooved boarding will 
withsta~d fire considerably longer tha~ butt-jointed boarding, 
because the heat and flames cannot pass through the cracks between 
adjacgnt boards. 11 
On half-tirnbered houses, the Ma~ observes (4, p.61): 
"The upper floor beams are often cantilevered out from the face of 
the building so that each floor projects over the one below. The 
weight of each fl~or is thus balanced see-ssw by the weight of the 
wall. Contrary to expectation, these cantilevered walls are 
surprisingly ~table in a fire and complete collapses are infrequent, 
but the brick nagging may come away. Although the heavy oak posts 
and beams are very fire resistant, and even the smaller oak floor 
beams and boarding are often nore resistant than modern softwood 
floorinu, the many concealed spaces, the labyrinthine passages and 
the considerable alterations and additions carried out through 
the centtJries make them extremely vulnerable and fire usually spreads 
with great speed. 11 
The fire resistance of a timber beam or post depends chiefly on its cress 
section: the bigger the better (Manual 4, pp.3l and 34). 
7.4.3 
There is no doubt of the small effect of fire on fired clay bricks 
(Manu~l 4, p.4): 
"Apart from a certain amount of spalling (flaking off under the 
influence of heat), clay bricks, as might be expected, are little 
affected by fire" 
Stone may be inferior to brick (i£i£., p.5): 
"Stone is, in generaJ, a good heat insulator, but is inferior to brick 
when subjected t:J continuous heat, owing to its tendency to spall or 
split into pieces, especially when water is suddenly appliedo 
(366) 
Stonework should always be watched for signs of cracking when it is 
necessary to work beneath or near it." 
The strongest stone walls are those with the fewest and tl1e thinnest 
joints (ibid.pcl6), and in a fire the best stone wall will be the one 
which is in a general sense ~311-built. Indeed, 
11 Provided ••• that a stone wall is well built, its fire resistance 
may be considered as~ substantially the same as that of a similar 
thickness af solid brick." (Manual 4, p.l7) 
A solid brick wall faced with stone may behave like a solid brick or 
stone wall, b~t if only thi~ slabs are used for facing, anj are 
inadequately fixed to the wall, they may well beco~e detached (ibid. p.ls). 
·-
A brick fa0ing may also become detached. 
The main risk in the use of brick or stone is that 0f collapse, 
normally because undue stresses have been sst up by the firs. The 
Manual (4, p.l7) lists the following com~on causes of collapse: 
---
1) burning away of floors and cross walls, leaving walls without 
side support 
2) expansion of bo.ams (especially of stee:!..) pusf1ing wall outwal.'ds 
3) disintegration of the joints by the heat 
4) collapse of support for wall, e.g. an arch, though a natural arch 
may fo~m over a large span and prevent total collapse 
5) heating and exransion of the inner face of the wall, bending it 
ouiwards 
6) the levering action of collapsing joists when built into the wall. 
All of these , except for (2), are likely to have occurred in Roman 
buildings. A collapse may bs less extensive if the struGture has 
reserves of strength beyond what it needs for stability under normal 
conditions. 
7.4.4 
The effect of fire on concrete is less predictable (~~ 4, p.6): 
"The behaviour of concrete depends, of course, largely on the time 
for which heating has continued, but also on the composition of the 
aggreg~tes. Some aggregates such as limestones behave ~ell, while 
others, including flint gravels and stones containing quartz, suffer 
relatively more damage. On the other hand, clay products such as 
broken brick remain substantially unaffected, since they have 
already been subjected to intense heat in the course of their 
manufacture~ Slag and clinker aggregates, having also been pre-
heated, possess many of the good qualities of brick." 
7.4.5 
Plaster can have good fire-resisting properties, provided that 
it is made from good materials and is carefully applied; but it is 
structurally weak, and can easily crack and fall away (f!.§.nual 4, p.5) 
It is possible for heat to travel in the space between the walls and 
the laths which support the ~laster, the space acting as a flue; from 
this point of view, it i.s better if the plaster is ap;::lied strai.ght 
to the wall. 
For the types of construction in use at the time when the Vi~les 
were established th8 books of Vitruvius are of special value. The main 
change in construction took place in the second part of the first century 
A.D. anc the first part of the second century, producing the brick-
faced concrete which is familiar in many of the surviving buildings. 
Prior to t~e use of this concrete, stone and timber were more important 
structurally, and there was still a need to use sun-dried bricks in the 
absence of any alternative. The use of sun-dried bricks was effectively 
(368) 
banned in Rome, since their structural weakness meant that walls would have 
had to be more thick than there was space for (Vitruvius 2.8.17 - 18: see 
below, 7.6.3). The books of Vitruvius also give us some insight into 
the way in which a good Roman architect approached the problem of fire. 
A good account of the historical position of Vitruvius, and of his attitudes 
to old and new mateiials, is given by Boethius (1939)e Vitruvius 
describes the constructions in use around 25 B.C. 
Cost was one over-riding consideration for the architect, since he 
could not build more expensively than his client wished, particularly if 
the really suitable materials had to be transported some considerable 
distance (1.2.8; 5,6,7; 6.8.9). For the same reason, economies might be 
made in the care devoted to different parts of a building (6.6.8): 
"Namque de tegulis aut tignis aut asseribus mutandis non est eadem cura 
quemadmodum de his [the foundations], quod ea, quamvis sunt vitiosa, 
faciliter mutantur." 
This economy in the area of the roof ignores that fact that roofs need 
special care because they constitute one of the more serious fire risks, 
something which Vitruvius knew (2.9.16). 
What Vitruvius says about fire shows a good knowledge of ,the properties 
of different materialso He understood the danger of wattle walls (2.8.20)~ 
"Craticii vero velim quidem ne inventi essent; quantum enim celeritate 
et loci laxamento prosunt, tanto maiori et communi sunt calamltati, quod 
ad incendia uti faces sunt parati." 
He knBw how different types of stone behaved in fires, some of them being 
dangerous because they disintegrated with the heat. (2.7.2-3). And, in 
connection with a siege engine (10.14.3), he advised against the use of pine 
and alder because they were flammable and brittle. 
Yet, as we have seen, he was willing to economise over roofs. Again, 
despite his criticism of wattle walls, he recommends a light construction 
for an extra partition to be used where a wall was damp {7.4.1): 
11 Sin autem aliqui paries perpetuos habuerit ~mores, paululum ab eo recedatur 
et struatur alter tenuis distans ab eo quantum res patietur, et inter 
duos parietes canalis ducatur inferior 
" • • • 
Not merely has ha introduced a constructjon which was probably flammable, 
but he has also created a flue by which heat could travel, possibly over 
considerable distances, and probably undetected. The light partition need 
not itself catch fire for there to be a risk: the build up of heat could be 
at the ceiling, and the partition could smoulder for a long time before a fire 
was noticed (Manual 4, p.21). And thirdly, what he recommends for the protection 
of roofs again concentrates on materials. He suggested that larchwood boards 
be placed around the eaves (2.9.16, quoted above, at 7.3.8). He seems to 
have in mind the spread of fire from one building to another ( 11 traiectionibus 
incendiorum 11 ), and not to have been aware of the danger caused by the lack of 
chimneys. This danger arose from the formation of pyrophoric carbon, caused 
by the continous attacks from heat which ~ose from the windows and doors, and 
it resulted in areas of timber which were at all -times ready to catch fire 
extremely easily and even, if the circumstances were righ~, tc catch fire 
spontaneously. The larchwood might have been successful in directing this 
heat away from the eaves, but Vitruvius did not envisage this as its function. 
(370) 
These indications, slight though they are, suggest that Vitruvius 
was less aware of the way in which heat behaves. When he writes about 
siege engines he is careful to include precautions against fire, yet he does 
not show the same care when he writes about buildings. Probably there was 
not a great deal that could have been done except to use different materials, 
and at thattime the two materials which produced the greatest improvement in 
fire protection for Roman buildings, concrete and fired brick, were still 
new and comparatively untried. Indeed, the only way which Vitruvius knew 
for testing fired brick was to use it on a root, and if it withstood climatic 
changes then it could be safely used in a wall (2.9.18). It was possible 
technically to use the ~aterials current in Vitruvius' time in such a way 
as to reducethe risk of fire, but the hope of improved materials and the 
need for economy combined to inhibit experiment. The special designs for 
buildin~ entirely o~ timber which behave well in fires, such as are found, 
for example, in North America, represent a spesial sophistication encouraged 
by the local conditions (r1otably the lack of alternative materials), and 
they would not have been consonant with the conditions in ancient Rome~ 
Paradoxically, however, some of Vitruvius' recommendations would 
incidentally have improved fire protection in buildings, since a building that 
is in general sense well-built will tend to behave well in a fire. This is 
hec8use, whether the building itself or the contents are on fire, the heat 
will produce weaknesses of which the seriousness will depend on the method 
of construction and the ability of the building to withstand extra stresses. 
Ti1is may be seen in his instructions for making a floor for upstairs rooms, 
using layers of rubble, concrete, opus signinum and marble or mosaic (7.1.2-3). 
All this had to be laid on a timber base. He describes carefully how 
(371) 
to support this timber base so as to prevent cracking if it were to sag. For 
outdoor floors of this type, he recommends the use of a double layer of wood, 
with the planks of the upper layer running at right angles to those of the 
lower layer (7.1.5). In a fire, this type of floor would not transmit heat 
very quickly, and tl1e heat could build up underneath. However, the amount 
of timber needed to"support the weight of the floor would be sufficient to last 
for two or three hours in a fire, giving a good reserve of safety. Moreover, 
by using a double layer of timber the fire-resisting quality of the floor 
would be greatly improved, because it would take much longer to burn through. 
Of course, when the end did come, it would be sudden, and firemen would have 
to be wary of a sudden collapse. It is likely that the method of supporting 
the timber, so as to avoid cracking, would mean that when the floor collapsed 
it would have room to move within its seating, and would not lever the walls 
and thus make them ~ollapse also (one of the common dangers when a floor 
collapses). 
7.4.7 
About half a century after the establishment of the Vigils!, the 
techniques for using concrete had improved, fired brick was becoming more 
reliable, and the use of brick-faced concrete was becoming normal. This 
concrete consisted of mortarandaggregate faced with brick (or stone in 
the early stages of its developm9nt). It was essentially monolithic: the 
facing helped during the actual construction of a building, but structurally 
Ward-Perkins emphasises its "relative unimportance" (197q247). 
Practically the whcle construction was pre-fired: bricks, tiles, and 
the pozzolana (volcanic sand) used in the mortar. It was thus incapable of 
being ingited. Moreover, being monolithic, it lacked gaps such as occur in 
(372) 
timber construction through which heat could be transmitted. And finally, 
being strong under tension, it had reserve~ of strength which tended to 
make it behave well if a fire should break out. The thickness of many Roman 
vaults ensured that a tremendous amount of spalling uould have to take place 
before the vault became dangerous. In these ways, it approached close to 
beirig a fireman's ideal material. 
7o4o8 
The destruction of much of Rome in the fire of A.D.64 provided an 
opportunity for retuilding in an improved manner. Yet it is worthy of note 
that althcugh Nero made good arrangements and regulations for the rebuilding 
(see below, 7.6.4) he did not reccmmend the use of fired brick. Boethius 
(1932,87f) even suggests that the type of building which he did recommend, 
with stone at the corners and timber permitted only in specified areas, was 
at least a ce~cury old. It is probable that the brick lliorks at this time could 
not have coped with the sudden demand for brick such as there could have been 
in 64; though this does not necessarily answer Boethius' question why the use 
of brick did not develop widely under Nero (1932,88). Judging from the 
number and proportion of brick stamps, Loane (1938,102) suggested that a peak 
in the production of brick was reached in the reign of Hadrian. 
7.4.9 
Not all buildings after 64 were built to a high standard, either 
according to Nero's recommendations or in brick-faced concrete. There are 
records of collapsing buildings throughout the subsequent pe~iod (Boethius 
1960 gives evidence for this), and Packer:.(l971,77ff) makes out a good case 
(373) 
for the continued extensive use of timber and the continued construction of 
flimsy, insubstantial buildings.in Rome itself. Herodian (7.12.5) in 
particular records the extensive use of timber as late as 237, and clearly 
this continued. This is in contrast with Ostia, which was probably more 
completely rebuilt than Rome in the new materials, after the levelling 
carried out under D;mitian (Meiggs 1960,64f)o 
7.4.10 
Among buildi~gs other than insula~, temples continued to be roofed with 
timber, and fires in temples are recorded throughout the period; while the 
construction of horrea (itorehouses and granaries) shows some care for fire 
protection (on these, see Rickman 1971). 
'·-:.- -
The most important precaution was to keep them separate from other 
buildings, and, even if a good distance could not be maintained, at least 
to avoid sharing a common wall (Rickman, pp.78f). When the use of brick-faced 
concrete was just becoming established, it seems that the precaution was taken 
of using stone in some of the important walls (e.gD the Grandi Horrea at 
Ostia, built in the time of Claudius, had its two main side walls built sf 
tufa blocks: Rickman pp. 47 and 80), though by the time of Trajan faced 
concrete was considered to be reliable. The n8ed for small storage 
compartments meant that the storeroo~s were small and largely independent 
of each other, and the risk of fire spreading from one to another must have 
been slight. Roofs were probably of wood, but the lack of heat ascending from 
below and the covering of tiles will have ensured that there was little chance 
of them burning except in a fierce conflagration. From the fireman's point 
of view, the disadvantage of these horrea was the limited access from the 
outside, and the number of locked doors inside. The system for locking the 
(374) 
doors was efficient (Rickman, pp.32-34, 55f, figs.4,5,6 and 14), and it may 
well have been normal for the Vig~ to fetch the keyholder rather than try 
to break in. Generally, however, there would probably not have been much 
trouble from horrea 9 and most of the activities of the Vigiles in connection 
with them will probably have been to ensure that other buildings did not set 
them on fireo Outbreaks of spontaneous combustion within them will have been 
dealt with easily. Grain, being stored in sacks (Rickman pp.B,B6) . 
could have been removed without too much difficulty if the need arose. 
' 
7.4.11 
The impression which this survey of the .types of building construction 
suggests is one which would make a fireman pessimistic. Both the amount of 
flimsy building and the overcrow~ing meant that the number of outbreaks of 
fires was large, and that it continued to be large despite the change to brick-
faced concrete; and the evidence for collapsing buildings is evidence fo~ 
buildings which behaved badly in fires. Ostia was probably better than 
Rome in this resoect. Such improvement as there was in the method of 
construction L'as probably outweighed by the increase in the population, and 
at no time was Rome even reasonably safe from fire. The only type of building 
which was fairly safe was ho~, and these were designed with security 
specially in mind. Insul2~' however solid the surviving examples may seem, 
cannot have been reckoned by the Vigiles to have been safe, since they were 
so full of people. 
<375) 
The evidence thus points to a high frequency of fires in ancient 
Rome: not an unexpected conclusiono But what is needed is an estimate 
of the number of fires per day, since it is one thing to recognise that 
there was a problem, and another to see what it meant in firefighting 
terms. The preceding analysis of the fires and the fire risks enables 
us to make scme estimates, and below are two estimates by firemen 
followed by my own. 
1) Estimate based on kno~ledge of the ancient buildings, the large 
number of naked flam~s, and a guess at the extent of ancient 1fire 
awareness' (taken to be similar to modern 'fire awareness' in Rome): 
100 fires daily, concentration in evening and early 
night, slight concentration in autumn 
2 of these becoming very important 
2) Estimate based on knowledge of medie~al buildings similar to those 
of ancient Rome, ~he probable extent of R~ms, and the large number 
of naked flames: 
20 large fir8s daily 
2 of these being very bad 
3) Estimate based en prcbable extent of ancient Rome, comparison with 
fire rate of modern cities with population in range i to 2 million, 
comparison with fire rate of modern citiss with similar types of buildings: 
50 to 150 attendances daily, mainly at night 
up to 4 large fires at once 
(376) 
These three estimates take different factors into account, and 
to some extent they are expressed in different termso 1) and 2) are 
fairly close to each othero 2) is not as different as it might appear 
at first sight, since it is expressed in terms derived from modern 
firefighting. Behind it ljes a guess that up to 4 fires out of 5 are 
not bad enough for a modern brigade to be summoned, but that 20 fire 
calls of the modern type may represent 100 actual fires; and of modern 
fire calls, 10% may be reckoned to devalop into serious fires. In other 
words, 2), like the other estimates, indicates around 100 fires daily. 
Putting these estimates together, the follo~1~ng may be suggested as the 
average daily fire rate in ancient Rome: 
100 fires daily needing the ettention cf the Viqil~~ 
20 of these becoming large 
2 of these becoming very serious 
In addition there ~dll have been an un~nown number of 'interventions' 
- -
by the Vigiles. 
This estimate is put for~ard as an average, and it is probably 
best to take it as an average for the whole of the existence of the 
Viqiles. Probably the rate was higher before the extensive use of concrete ---·~--
and brick, but against improvements in the risks we have to set the 
extension of the City and the increase in population. The system of 
aqueducts probably kept pace with the expansion, and the increase in the 
size of the fire brigade in AeD.205 cennot but have been beneficial. 
(377) 
It is hoped that this estimate will convey something of the 
problem which faced the .¥j..,9~.. Although it is based on the most 
general impressions, there is a remarkable consistency in the three 
estimates on which it is based. It means that over the three to four 
centuries of the Vigiles 8 existence, they will have tackled over 
ll,ooo,ooo fireso 
7.5.1 
So far we have examined the fire risks c;s they actually were, 
and have left on one side the matter of fire regulationso This was 
deliberate, not because the regulations ~Jere ineffective, but because 
they were Just one factor leading to the effect which we have examined 
directly. They w~re, none the less, very important, and were as 
effective as the praefectus vigiltlm and the other authorities made 
them. 
We look first at building regulations (remainder of 7o6), then 
-
look in the next section at the laws concerned specifically 
with firefighting (espo 7o7o5-7; 7.7.10) 
7.6 .. 2 
The topic of building regulations is one ~1hich becomes more and 
more difficult the more one goes into it .. - Not merely are the records 
of the laws incomplete, but in addition it is often difficult to relate 
them to the archaeological evidence, and to see how far they were 
actually followed: the outline of building history in section 7.4 strongly 
(378) 
suggests that often they were disregarded. In the main they concern 
the stability of buildings and the rights of neighbours, but there are 
a small number which are specifically concerned with fire prevention, 
and in addition some of the others do show a concern for safety from 
fire in providing that buildings should have certain reserves of 
strength. Because of the difficulties, it is proposed to keep this 
discussion very brief, so that it might serve as a basis for further 
work. 
7e6o3 
The earliest buil.ding regulations are found in the Twelve Tables, 
and concern the tacking-on of structures (6.8: tiqnum iunctum): party 
walls (i~e• walls between properties: 7.~; the space to be allowed when 
placing a fence, wall,building, ditch, well, olive or fig, or other tree 
near to a boundary (7~2: see note on this, F.,LRoA.2 vol.I, p.4B); and the 
width of roads (8 feet when straight, 16 feet on curves: 7.6). The 
next explicit ~efarence to building laws seems to be in Vitruvius 
(l.lolD), where he refers to the regulations concerning eaves-drips, 
drains and Jights (though without saying what these were), and he further 
(2.8.17) explains the re£ulations concerning the thickness of walls: 
although party walls were restricted to a thickness of 1! feet, other 
walls were not, but lack cf space provided an incentive to keep them down 
to 1! feet also; sun-dried brick in a wall of that thickness could not 
support more than one storey, and so stone pillars, walls of fired brick, 
and walls of rubble (~~ caementicium}were used to give a greater height, 
the floors being of wood (contignationibus). Outside the City of Rome, it 
was permitted to use sun-dried bricks, since space was not so restricted 
(2.~.18). ~ithin the City, the lack of space led to a ban on sun-dried bricks: 
(379) 
"Quoniam ergo explicate ratio est, quid ita in urbe propter 
necessitatem angustiarum non patiuntur esse latericios parietes, 
cum extra urbe opus erit .his uti, sine vitiis ad vetustatem 7 sic 
erit faciendumeoo 11 
Within a few yea~s from the time that Vitruvius was writing (c. 25 s.c.), 
Augustus set a limit to the heights of buildings at 70 feet (Strabo 5.3.7), 
possibly the first regulation of this kind, though earlier Rutilius had 
spoken ''De modo aedificiorum" and Augustus claimed this as a prece~ent 
-- -
(Suet.~· 89), Strabo also records that this restriction was intended 
to prevent collapses, and that it only applied to new buildings and 
buildings on the public.streets. In setting down this regulation just 
after, but separate from, the institution of the Vigiles, Strabo implies 
that the praef~~ vigilum did not have to enforce the building 
regulations, and, in confirmation of this, such a responsibility is not 
given to him in the passage where it surely umuld have been, Dio. 1.15.3. 
About three centuries earlier, the use of shingles had come almost to an 
end (Pliny !:!,.Ji.l6.15.36), and it is probable that this u1as brcught about 
by regulation. Otherwise, that seems to be all the extant regulations 
down to the time of Augustus. They corrected the worst features, but 
still left large areas of risk. 
The fire of A.D.64 provoked quite extensive regulations concerned 
specifically with fire. Tacitus (Ann.l5.43) records that the new buildings 
-
had frontages of specified dimensions and alignment, with broad streets 
and more space; the height was limited, and porticoes were built along 
th~ facades. Nero offered to provide these latter at his own expense, 
and their function is said to have been to protect the fronts of the 
buildings: 
----- -- --~- ---- .. . ----- ·- - ~ --------.. -·- ·-..;;;· - -------·-;;_-- -----------. ~~-...-.~----------..,...,"T~ 
"additisque porticibus, quae frontem insularum protegerent". 
Nero also specified that certain parts of the buildings were to be of 
Gabian and Alban stone, since these stones behaved well in fireso 
Boethius (l932~87f.), as we have seen, considers that this type of 
construction u!as over a century old, and evidently it was u1ell tried 
and reliableo Firefighting equipment was to be kept in the dwellings, 
and party walls (i.e. shared structural walls) were banned. Suetonius, 
dividing his account of the fire between the "good" and the "bad" 
sections of the biography, records the damage in the latter (Nero 38) 
-
and the regulations in .the ·former (l:!.!ll:.!2, 16). He gives fewer details, 
referring to the porticoes which Nero built at his own expense: 
11 Formam aedificiorum urbis novam excogitavit et ut ante insulas ac 
domos porticus essEnt, de quarum solariis incendia arcerentur; easque 
sumptu suo sxstruxito" 
Suetonius says that the porticoes were intended for firefighting, to 
givo acce~s, that is, to firemen, and they would be useful both for 
access up the outside cf the burning building itself and also for 
access to a building across the street; they could provide a position 
from which to operate pumps and so gain in height; and they would l:e 
useful for carrying out rescues and for enabling the inhabitants to 
esbape. Tacitus is equally plausible, when he writes as though the 
porticoes were to act as a screen across the fronts of the buildings. 
Depending on their construction, they could have served to protect the 
buildings from radiant heat from a fire across the road, and it may well 
be that the buildings which were to be given this protection were still 
largely built in timber, and probably the porticoes were added to 
buildings which were left intact by the fire or needing only slight 
repairs; In this case, they will have been of special benefit to those 
who were too poor to afford the new type of house. The value of porticoes 
will have been similar to the value of balconies, as seen, for example, 
in Fi~ure 1, which shows the use of balconies both for firefighting 
and for carrying out rescues, and for affordin~ access to every part of 
a lar~e building without the use of lon~ ladders. At Ostia some of the 
insulae have small balconies, which are too narrow to have been functional 
in the normal w~y and which do not always correspond to the floor levels 
within the buildin~ (Ward-Perkins 1970,p.569,n.11). While recognising 
that such balconies form a decorative feature, for example in the 
Campanian villa at Sette Bassi (Ward-Perkins, p.333), it is also probable 
that they represent a more economica~ version, in brick, of Nero's 
porticoes. Subsequently, balconies were built (or, continued to be 
built) in timber, and themselves created a fire risk (Herodian 7.12.5, 
fire in A.D.237). 
Somewhat similar in point of fire risk were maeniana. These 
are describe1 as follows (Paul. ex Fest. p.134 Mull.): 
11Maeniana appellata sunt a Maenio censore, qui primus in Foro ultra 
columnas tigna projecit, ouo ampliarentur superiora spectacula." 
Structurally, these closely resembled a portico. There was an old ban 
on maeniana, which was re-implemented in A.D.367-8 by Praetextatus, 
praefectus urbi (Amm. 27.9.9): 
11 Namque et Maeniana sustulit, fabricari Romae priscie quoque 
vetita legibus." 
(382) 
In A.D.423, however, the maeniana had returned, with regulations 
concerning their spacing: they were only to be permitted if 10 feet 
of clear space intervened between opposing maeniana, or 15 feet if they 
faced public horrea (C.Just. 8.10.11). 
7.,6.5 
These regulations concerning spacing form part of a series of laws, 
all late, which are designed to protect public buildings, particularly horrea~ 
Under the TwelvE Tables, buildings were not to approach nearer to a boundary 
than 2 feet, so that in theory 4 feet should have interuened between 
buildings on different properties (7.2;F.I.R.A. 2 vol.i.p.4B). This rule 
was clearly ignored, and also the laws ~ tigno iuncto remained substantially 
unaltered (Dig. 47.3.1-2), and were more concerned with conve,-,ience and 
with rights than with structural safety. The proper separation of 
private buildings remained a matter for individual judgment, and the 
tendency was for great blocks to be built (insulae), with roads surrounding 
them. Public buildings received better treatment from the law, though 
it is not until the fourth century that su8h laws became more numerous 
(and repetitive). In A.D. 329, it was enacted that buildings within 
100 feet of public horrea were to be removed, and the whole of the 
property of the builders was to be confiscated (C.Th.l5.1.4); the reason 
given for this regulation is said to have been recent experi8nce of 
fires in buildings up against the horrea. The penalty refers to future 
building, and does not seem retrospective; probably this was the first 
occasion on which a regulation to protect horrea in this way had been 
made. In .. A.D. 398 another law (f•.lt!.•l5.1.38) ordered the removal of 
all private buildings from around public horrea so that they should be 
surrounded with a clear space ".!dl ~ .EE.,incipio fuerant fabricate". By 
this time, it had become accepted that public horrea we.r:B surrounded by fire-
breaks, and the construction of new ones must sometimes have entailed the 
demolition of private buildings. Public buildings in general were protected 
by a law of A.D.383 (f.Ih.l5.1.22), which forbade the encroachment of private 
buildings upon any forum or public place, and in 406 a further law enacted 
that (at Constantinopie) 15 feet were to intervene between private and 
public buildings (£.Ih.l5.1.46). This regulation is reflected in the 
restriction on maeniana quoted above. Temples were included in the public 
buildings protected by these laws, but, even before 383, p~ivate buildings 
had been cleared away from temples, by Praetextatus in 367-8 (Amm.27.9.10): 
11 et discrevit ab aedibus sacris privatorum parietes, eisdem inverecunde 
conexos". 
There was also a b3n on private building in the Campus Martius, which was 
increasingly ignored under the Empire (Platner and Ashby, 1929, s.v. ,p.93). 
In the case of ~emples, piety was also a major factor, in addition to the 
risk from fire. The late date of the regulations which concern horrea 
raises the question whether the abolition of the Vigiles at an unknown date 
in the fourth century (Appendix 1f) helped to create a serious fire problem, 
which hit at the food supply. (For other late building regulations which 
concern spacing, not necessarily applicable to Rome, see, e.g • .&.•!.!:!.•15.1.39, 
45,46,47.) 
7.6.6 
After Augustus, there was just one further attempt to reg~late the 
height of buildings. The regulation was introduced by Trajar., who was 
concerned at the expensive collapses of buildings and the dangers of fire, 
and set the limit at 60 feet for dwellings (Aur.Vict.Epit. 13.12-13): 
(384) 
''Eo tempore multo perniciosius quam sub Nerva Tiberis inundavit magna 
clade aedium proximarum; et terrae motus gravis per provincias multas 
atroxque pestilentia 'amesque et incendia facta sunt. Quibus omnibus 
Traianus per exquisita remedia plurimum opitulatus est, statuens, ne 
domorum altitude sexaginta superaret pedGs ob ruinas faciles et sumptus, 
si quando talia contingerent, exitiosos." 
This limit of 60 fee~ would allow buildings to rise to four or five stories 
above the ground, though it is probable that the rear of the building could 
rise higher; also, if it applied in the same way as Augustus' restriction 
of height, it did not rule out the possibility of areas of buildings off the 
main streets which were much higher. 
For the general import of these regulations, we have ~o note the 
gaps which the modern eye may discover, and also note the evidence for how 
buildings were actually built. Apart from the regulations concerning the 
spacing of private buildings near to public buildings, and the restrictions 
on height, there was very little to regulate the nature of private buildings 
(including the numerous insulae, tenement blocks). It is not clear whether 
Nero's instructions concerning the use of stone and timber remained in 
force when many of the new buildings came to be built in brick-faced concrete, 
and it is probable that throughout the period there were buildings which were 
not built to the highest possible standards; in addition, ~her~ will always 
have been a residue of older building which created a riske There was no 
limit imposed by law on the maximum size of a building, and it was only 
the practice of using fairly small rooms in the tenements which prevented 
the risks from being really bad. On the engineering side, we have seen 
that V·i truvius knew the properties of the various materials and type of 
construction fairly well, but that special fire-resisting devices such as 
smoke doors were not thought of; again, the practice of lighting rooms 
from the outside meant that normally a building would not be more than two 
rooms thick and that firefighting was consequently easiero It was also of 
assistance to firemen if the staircases opened out onto balconies or 
porticoes above ground level, since this would have kept them fairly 
free from smokeo 
The problem which remained is very like the modern one: that 
cost was a major restriction, that professional knowledge and skill did 
not spread far enough, and that it was not practicable either to make 
very strict laws or to enforce the existing laws completely. The 
praefe12,tus vigilum must have been frustr·ated by building laws and practices, 
he was not concerned with the enforcement of the building regulations, and 
there was nothing which corresponded to the modern fire certificateo The 
prefect would, however, give advice according to his inclination and 
experience, and Nero's regulations,which stand out for their quality and 
practical sense, have the stamp of a fireman's experience. The porticoes, 
in particular, provided a solution to a perpetual problem which firemen 
face, that of access to a building. Also, the instruction to keep 
firefighting equipment in the houses shows good sense, but this, like the 
power to flog careless people· (Dig. 1.15.3-4), does not rea]Jy amount to 
gny more than first-aid for fires that have already broken out. Since the 
praefectus viqilum was not directly concerned with the enforcement of building 
regulations, his duties in fire pr3vention were far less than those now 
carried out by a Fire Prevention Officer. 
(386) 
7.6.8 
It must be admitted that probably the laws were made as powerful as 
was practicable, and in some ways the situation in ancient Rome is paralleled 
by the situation in Hong Kong at the present time. There, the authorities 
admit that the standard of building of some of the tenements is not as 
high as is desirable, but that since the alternative to some people losing 
their lives in fires is for a far greater number to die in the streets, the 
lower standard of housing is acceptable. In law, in fact, the Q£aefectus 
vig!lum was served as well as was practicable by tt1e building regulations. 
It was greatly to his benefit that the change to brick-faced construction 
came when it did, and that.the standard of new building thus improved. 
The other laws with which he was concerned included special 
provisions relating to fire, and in order to assess his potential 
effectiveness we turn now to these other laws. 
7.7.1 
It is generally known that the praefectus vigilum had functions 
other than firefighting. What is less clearly established is the balance 
between the firefighting and the non-firefighting functions. The situation 
i~ further complicated by the fact that, when set down or. the page, there 
is a far greater bulk of legal evidence for the non-firefighting functions 
than for the firefighting. Mommsen (l887,II,l057) observed that under 
the Republic night duties and a police functio~ ~ere united with each 
other, and seems to leave it simply as a matter of following precedent that 
the ViB}le2 seem to have combined the two roles. BR does not go deeply into 
the question, but he does seem to believe that the non-firefighting functions 
were responsible for a rise in the standing of the prefect (ppo3D-4D). 
There are two aspects which have to be distinguished here: the extent of 
the powers concerned with firefighting, and the extent to whicl1 the 
set of powers and responsibilities formed a coherent wholeo We should not 
lose sight of tha fact that the patrols CErried with them axes and buckets, 
which implies that f'irefighting lltas their primary functiono How far, then, 
did the prefect have jurisdictions which bore no close relation to the 
main duties of the men, and how should we explain the range of jurisdictions 
which he carried? 
7.7.2 
The legal formulations of the prefect's powers and responsibiliti3s 
may be identified either because they actually name the prefect 02 else 
because they are to.be found in one of the books "~oFFicio _Qraefecti vigilum" 
of either Paulus or Ulpian. In the interests of clarity, a collection of 
the legal texts is given below (believed to be complete), including also 
some of the laws ~elating to arson with which the prefect must have been 
concerned and the inscription VI.266, which records the judgments of three 
praafecti viailum in a case concerning the use-of a fountain. These are 
followed by summaries which are intended to show the range of the prefect's 
functions though without actually being a statement of the prefect's duties 
such as would satisfy a lawyer: indeed, the significance of some of these 
passages is much disputed. 
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7.7.3 
1.15: 
A 3. Paulus libro singulari de officio praefecti vigilum 
nam salbtem rai ~ublicae tueri nulli magis eredidit eonvanire 
nee alium suffieera ei rei, quam Caesarem. itaque septem 
cohortes opportunis loeis constituit, ut bihas regiones urbis 
unaquaeque eohors tueatur, praepositis gis tribunis at super 
o•:~nes s;:Jectabili viro qui praefectus vigilum alpellatur. 
cogniscit praef~ctus vigilum deinoendiariis gffractoribus 
furibus raptoribus receptatoribus, nisi si qua tam atrox 
tamque famosa persona sit, ut praefecto urbi remittatur. 
et quia plerurnque incendia culpa fiunt inhabitantiurn, aiJt 
fustibus castigat eos qui negligentius ignem habuerunt, aut 
severa interlocutione comminatus fustiurn castigationem remittit. 
effracturae fiunt plerumque in insulis in horr8isque, ubi 
homines pretiosissi~arn partem fortunarum suarum reponunt, cum 
vel cella diffringitur vel armarium vel area: et custodes 
plcrurnque puniuntur, et ita divus Antoninus Erucio Claro rescripsit. 
ait en~m posse eum horrais effractis quaestionem habere de 
servis custodibus, licet i~ illus ipsius imperatoris porti 
esset. sciendum est autem praefectum vigilum per totam 
noctem vigilare debere et ccerrare calciatum cum hamis et 
dolabris, ut curam adhibeant omhes inquilinos admonere, ne 
neglegentia aliqua ineendii casus oriatur. praeterea ut 
aquam unusquisque inquilinus in cenaculo habeat, iubetur 
monera. adversus capsarios quoque, qui mereede servanda 
in balineis vestimenta suscipiunt, iudex etiL constitutus, ut, 
si quid in servandis vestimentis fraudulenter admiserint, 
ipse eognoseat. 
~ 4. Ulpianus libra singulari de officio praefecti urbi 
im~eratores Severus et Antoninus Iunio Rufino praefecto 
vigilum ita rescripserunt: 'insularios et eos, qui neglegenter 
ignes apud se habuerint, pates fustibus vel flagellis eaedi 
iubere: eos autem, qui dolo fecisse incendium convincentur, 
ad fabium Cilonem praefectum amicum nostrum remittes: 
fugitivos conquirare eosque dominis reddere debes'. 
£ 1. Ulpian~s libra prima ad edictum 
in publicuQ deduci intelleguntur qui magistratibus municipalibus 
traditi sun~ vsl publicis ministeriis. diligens custodia etiam 
vincire permittit. tamdiu autem custodiuntur, qua~diu ad 
praefectum vigilum val ad praeside~ deducantur. eorumque 
nomina et notae et cuius se quis esse dicat ad magistratus 
deferantur, ut facilius adgnosci et percipi fugitivi possint 
(notae aute~ verba etiam cicatrices continentur): idem iuris 
est, sj haec in scriptis publica vel in aedes proponas. 
D 15.Pomponius libra~ vicensimo secunda ad Sabinum 
cum servus tuus in suspicionem furti Attio venisset, dedisti 
eum in quaestionem sub ea causa, ut, si id repertu~ in eo non 
esset, redderetur tibi: is eum tradioit praefecto vigilum quasi 
in facinore deprehensum: praefectus vigilum eum summa supplicio 
adfecit. ages cum Attic dare eum tibi oportere, quia et ante 
mortem dare tibi eum oportuerit. Labeo ait posse etiam ad 
exhibendum agi, quoniam fecerit quo minus exhiberet. sed 
Proculus dare oportere ita ait, si fecesses eius hominem, quo 
casu ad exhibendum agere te non posse: sed si tuus mansisset, 
etiam furti te acturum cum eo, quia re aliena ita sit usus, 
ut sciret se invito domino uti aut dominum si sciret prohibiturum 
esse. 
1• 12.Hermogenianus libra secunda iuris epitomarum 
sed et si quilibet extraneus ignem iniecerit, damni locati 
iudicio habebitur ratio. 
[ 56.Paulus libro singulari de officio praefecti vigilum 
cum domini horreorum insularumque desiderant diu non apparentibus 
nee eius temporis pensiones exsolventib~s conductoribus aperire 
et ea quae ibi sunt describers, a publicis personis quorum 
interest audiendi sunt. tempus autem in huiusmodi ra biennii 
I 
debet observari. 
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20.2 1..1J. .9!!ibJL~ ~~ P..~ ~ hyeot!J.~ tam~ £2.1J.ksh~:s_ 
G 9o Paulus libra singulari de officio praefecti vigilum 
est differentia obligatorun propter pensionem et eorum, 
quae ex conventions manifestari pignoris nomine tenentur, 
quod manumittere mancipia obligata pignori non possumus, 
inhabitantes autem manumittimus, scilicet antequam pensionis 
nomine percludamur: tunc enim pignoris nomine retenta 
mancipia non liberabimus: et derisus Nerva iuris consultus, 
qui per fenestram monstraverat servos detentos ob pensionem 
liberari posse. 
47.2 Q~ f.td!.li.~ 
~ 57. Iulianus Libra vicensimo secunda digestorum 
qui furem deducit ad praefectum vigilibus vel ad praesidem, 
existimandus est elegisse viam, qua rem persequeretur: et 
si negotium ibi termiJiatum et damnato fura recepta est pecunia 
sublata in simplum videtur furti quaestio sublata, maxime si 
non solum rem furtivam fur restituere iussus fuerit, sed 
amplius aliquid in eum iudex constituerit. sed et si nihil 
amplius quam furtivam rem restituere iussus fuerit, ipso, quod in 
pariculum maioris poenae deductus est fur, intellegendum est 
quae&tionem furti sublatam esse. 
47.17 ~ ~s~~~ £c!!.rl~<E.i~ 
I 1. Ulpianus libra octavo de officio proconsulis 
fures nocturni extra ordinem audiendi sunt et causa cognita 
puniendi, dummodo sciamus in poena eorum operis publici 
temporarii modum no~ egrediendum. idem et in balneariis 
furibus. sed si tela se fures defendunt vel effractores vel 
ceteri his similes nee quemquam percusserunt, metalli poena 
vel honestiores relegationis adficiendi erunt. 
2. Marcianus libro secunda iudiciorum publicorum 
sed si interdiu furtum fecerunt, ad ius ordinarium remittendi 
sunt. 
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47.18 ~ .~fr<il2."tO..rib~ ~t .~ato_s_:ijlu~ 
K 1. Ulpianus libro octavo de officio proconsulis 
L 
Saturninus etiam probat in eos, qui de careers eruperunt sive 
effractis foribus sive conspiratione cum ceteris, qui in eadem 
custodia 2rant, ca~i~e puniendos animadvertendum quod si 
per neglegentiam custodum evaserunt, levius puniendos. 
sed enim divus Marcus effractorem e~uitem Romanum, qui effracto 
perforatoque pariete pecuniam abstulerat, quinquennio abstinere 
iussit provincia Africa, unde erat, et urbe et Italia. 
oport~bit autem aeq~e et in effractores et in ceteros supra 
scriptos causa cognita statui, prout admissum suggerit, dummodo 
n~ quis in plebeio operis publici poenam vel in honestiore 
relegationis excedat. 
M 2. Paulus libra singulari de officio ~raefecti vigilum 
inter effractores varie animadvertitur. atrociore2 enim sunt 
nocturni effractores, et ideo hi fustibus caesi in metallum dari 
solent: diurni vero effractores post fustium castigationem in 
opus perpetuum vel temporarium dandi sunt • 
.§.~ent~ £.1l£,~tae £.ci'd.l12. _t_:r;_ibuta~ 
I.VIA (F .I .R.Jl .• ii, r.326): Da f.~ 
N fugitivi, qui a domino non agnosc~ntur, per officium 
praefecti vigilum distrahuntur. 
V.XX (F.I.R.I\. ii, p.4D6): De i!J.E.~nd.:i_~riis 
Q 1. 
p 2. 
3. 
4. 
incendiarii, qui in oppido praedandi causa faciunt, 
capite puniuntur. 
qui casam aut villam inimicitiarum gratia incenderunt, 
humiliores in metallum aut in opus publicum damnantur, 
honestiores in insulam relegantur. 
fort~ita incendia, quae casu venti ferente vel incuria 
ignem supponentis ad usque vicini agros evadunt, si ex eo 
seges vel vinea vel olivae vel fructiferi arbores concrementur, 
datum damnum aestimatione sarciatur. 
commissum vero servorum si domino videatur, noxae deditione 
sarci tur. 
s 
T 
C.J. 
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messium sane per dolum incensores, vinearum olivarumve 
aut in metallum humiliores damnantur, aut honestiores in 
insulam relegantur. 
1.43 De officio praefecti vigilum 
Imppp. Valentinianus Theodosius et Arcadius AAA. Nebridio p.v. 
praefecti vigilum huius urbis nihil de capitalibus causes sua 
auctoritate statuere debent, sed si quid huiusmodi evenerit, 
culmim tuae potestatis referre, ut de memoratis causis 
celsiore sententia iudicetur. 
[ a, 385-389 J 
U Vl.266 
Herculi sacrum posuit I P. Clodius Fortunatus q(uin)-
q(uennalis) perpetuus huius loci. I 
Interlocutiones I Aeli Floriani, Herenni Modestini et Faltoni 
Restutiani praef(ectorum) vigil(um) p(erfectissimorum) 
v(irorum). 
Florianus d(ixit): Quantum ad formam a me datam perti net, 
-..J 
quoniam me convenis, de hoc inprimis tractandumlest~ Ita 
interlocotum me scio esse hesterna I dis: docere partem 
diversam oportere hoc I ex sacra auctioritate descenders, 
ut pensionesl non dependerentur. · Et respondit se quibus 1-
sumque rationibus posse ostendere • hoc I ex sacra auctori tate 
observari. Et hodie hocldicit: ex eo tempore, inquit, ex 
quo Augustuslrem.publicam obtinere coepit, usque in hodierJ-
num [num] quam haec loca pensiones pensitasse. I 
Et infra Florianus d(ixit): Vidi locum dedicatum imaginibus 
sacris. 
Et alia capite. I Modestinus d(ixit): Si quid est iudicatum, 
habet suam auctoritatem, si est, ut dixi, iudicatum. I 
Interim aput me nullae probationes exhif[be]ntur, quibus 
doceantur fullones in pen I [sione] m iu[r ]e conveniri. 
Et alia capite. I R[est]it[utia]nus c(um) c(onsilio) c(ollocutus) 
d(ixi t): Mani festum est, quid I iudicav [erintJ p(erfectissimi) 
··v(iri). Nam Florianus partibus I suis diligentissime functus 
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est, qui, cum in I rem praesentem venisset, locum inspexi t 
et universis indiciis examinatis sentenjtiam de eo loco, 
de quo cum maxi me I qu[a] eri tur, protuli t; a qua provoca[ tum J 
non est .. 
Et infra Hesti tutianus d(ixi t): I Modestinus quoque secutus res f 
a Floriano iudicatas pensiones exigi probibuit. 
Et infra Resti tutionus d(ixit): Illut servabi tur I fontanis, 
quod obtinueruntlaput suos iudices et quod habuefrunt in 
hodiernum sine pensions. I 
Ex Alexandre Aug.II et Marcello II cos[= A.D.226] litigatum 
est in I Peregrina et Aemiliano c~b. ~ A.D.244] dies ••• 
Adiect~n examplo b: 
Actum II!I idus Mar(tias) ann(i), [q]uo victoriam percepimus. 
V Qi~.47.9: De incendio ruina ~~~sagio ~ ~ expu~ata 
1-3 deals with property salvaged or stolen after ship fires (not discussed 
below because the legal aspects would take us far from the theme of 
this thesis, though its existence is worth noting). 
7.7.4 
£ltefighti~and fire prevention 
Each of the seven cohorts had to look after two Regions (A). The ££aefectus 
vigilum could beat or flog th0se who kept their fires negligently (A,B), or 
could remit this punishment after a severe reprimand and threat of punishment 
(A)o He had to remain on we~ch all night and go out on patrol wearing 
boots and equipped with buckets and axes (A). He had to advise all tenants 
to take care to prevent an outbreak of fire through negligence (~)o He 
also had to advise every tenant to keep some water upstairs (A). 
IQ.cendiaries 
The praefec~ vigilum held trials of incendiaries (A,B). Those convicted of 
malicious arson had to be sent on to the £raefectus ~ (B). 
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In general: those who started fires for the purpose of looting were executed (D); 
those who burned a cottage or villa out of enmity were, if 
humiliores, sentenced to the mines or public works, or, if honesti~, 
relegated to an island (P); 
in the case of accidental fires which damaged a neighbour's 
crops or trees, there was no punishment but compensation was payable (Q); 
a court had to decide the amount of damage to rented property if 
a stranger threw fire in (E); 
if a slave caused a fire, he Gould be handed over for punishment 
if his owner agreed (R); 
malicious arson of the harvest, whether of vines or olives, was 
punished by sentencing to the mines for humiliores or relegation to an 
island for honestiores (s). 
Thieves (fures) 
The praefectus vigilum held trials of thieves (A,D,H). There was (probably) 
a distinct procedure used by the praefectus vigilum and by £Saesides (H)o He 
could execute a slave for theft (D: where the particular dispute concerned the 
return to the owner of the body of a slave 8Xeouted for theft). Nocturnal 
theft was worse (I and J), and carried heavi0r penalties provided that punish-
ment did not exceed temporary public work (I). A thief who defended himself 
with a weapon but without actually striking anyone was punished by sentencing 
to the mines if humilior or by relegation to an island if GG~estior (I). Theft 
from the baths was treated in the same way as ordinary theft (I; cf. A). The 
praefectus vigilum held trials of capsarii who were paid to look after clothing 
in the baths and who abused their trust (A). 
~~s (raptore~ 
The praefectus vigilum held trials of robbers (A). 
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~~kers (effractores): (both breakers-in to property, and breakers-out of jail) 
The praefectus vigi!_~ held trials of housebreakers (A)o He could torture the 
slave guards of horrea, even those of the emperor (A)o 
In general: the death penalty was prescribed for those who broke out of prison 
though the punishment was lighter if the guards had been negligent (K); 
housebreaking with theft should not be punished with worse 
punishments than public work for hu~iliores or relegation for honestiores (L); 
housebreaking by night was worse than by day, and the former was 
punished by beating and sending to the mines, the latter by beating followed 
by lifelong or temporary work (M); 
unsuccessful use of a weapon by a housebreaker was treated in the 
same way as for a thief (I). 
~ivers (rec~~£.~ 
The £raefectus vigilum held trials of receivers (A). 
Runaway slaves 
The praefectus vigilum had to search for runaway slaves and retur~ them to their 
owners (B)o Runaway slaves had to be kept under guard, bound if necessary, until 
they were taken to the praefectus vigilu~ or the praeses and their descriptions 
published (c). Runaway slaves who were not claimed by their owners were sold 
by the officials of the praefectus vigilum (N). 
Otif~~ul ti~ tenants 
If, after two years of absence of tenants and non-payment of rents, the owners 
of horrea and insulae wished to go 5.n and make an inventory, their case had to 
be considered by the relevant public officials (ieee including the praefectus 
vigilunV (F). 
(396) 
Pledged slaves 
[ In some unspecified way the praefectus Vigilum seems to have been concerned 
with] the difference hetween slaves pledged on account of rents and slaves held 
in lieu of a manifest security (G)e 
In general: the praefectus vigilum could not try capital cases, but had to 
refer them to the praef~ ~ (A, T) e 
7.7.5 
It has been put to me in discussion that the powers which the praefectus 
vigilum possessed for the purposes of firefighting were fairly restricted, 
amounting to no more than the right of entry (deduced from Petronius Sat. 78) 
and the right to flog (explicitly recorded in the Digest). BR (pp. 30-40), as 
we have noted, is not specially clear on this point. There are two considerations 
which help us to gauge the practical implications of the prefect's known powers. 
First and foremost, on the practical side he was responsible for the nightly 
fire patrols, and had initially 3,500 men under him, later ?,ooo. Secondly, 
he had a legal responsibility to protect the community from fire, and it will be 
noted that each cchort was required to protect two Regions. Thus both the scale 
of his operations and the wide responsibility which he carried point to the 
probability that the prefect had as much power as he needed. There is not a 
precise definition of everything that he might need to do for the purposes of 
firefighting, instead he is given power generally to do whatever he thought necessary, 
In this light, th8 particular mention of the power to flog or beat is made 
simply because there had to be provision for the prefect to act in a situation 
when the law had not actually been broken: it was not an offence to look aftP.r 
a fire negligently, nor was it an offence to ignore the advice of the prefect 
(Nero's requirement that firefighting equipment be kept upstairs might not have 
had the force of law); and it enabled a situation to be dealt with easily 
which could have provoked a lot of difficulty if something more formal like a 
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trial had to be held. 
In fact, the general terms of reference are very similar to those laid 
down by the Fire SRrvices Act, 1947, which governs the modern British arrangements 
for firefighting. T~ese are of considerable relevance here because they are 
the formulation of powers which fire officers generally feel to be wide 
and adequate for their operationso Section 30 of the Act is the part which 
corresponds most ~losely to Dig. 1.15.3, and sub-section (1) seuout the 
powers and responsiblities as follows; 
"(1) Any member of a fire brigade maintained in pursuance of this Act who is 
on duty, any member of any other fire brigade who is acting in pursuance of 
any arrangements made under this Act, or any constable, may enter and if 
necessary break into any premises or place in which a fire has or is reasonably 
believed to have broken out, or any premises or place which it is necessary 
to enteE for the purposes of extinguishing a fire or of protecting the premises 
or place from acts done for firefighting purposes, without the consent of the 
owner or occupier thereof, and may do all such things as he may deem necessary 
for extinguishing the fire or for protecting fr~m fire, or from acts done as 
aforesaid, any such premises or place or for rescuing any person or property 
therein." 
Here, the special grant of the right to force an entry is accorded to prevent 
the act being criminal, but otherwise the powers and the duties are set out in 
very general terms: it would be hard to deduce any firefighting techniques from 
this section. Other sub-sections of Section 30 deal with wilful obstruction of 
the fire brigade (2), the use of equipment and the obtaining and use of water 
(3), the use of a public water supply and relations with the water undertaker 
(4), and relations with the police in the matter of traffic control (5). 
These latter three sub-sections are to regulate actions which involve other 
legally established arrangementsf and reflect a particular social situation. 
Even the part of the Act which sets out the responsibilities of fire authorities 
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(sub-section (1) of Section 1) does so in general terms, and in fact singles 
out, in paragraphs (b) to (f), those particular responsibilities which impinge 
on other statutory arrangements. Sub-section (1) reads as follows: 
''It shall be the duty of every fire authority in Great Britain to make 
provision for fire-fighting purposes, and in particular every fire 
authority shall s~cure -
(a) the services for their area of such a fire brigade and such equipment 
as may be necessary to meet efficiently all normal requirements; 
(b) the efficient training of the members of the fire brigade; 
(c) efficient arrangements for dealing with calls for the assistance of 
the fire brigade in. case of fire and for summoning members of the 
fire brigade; 
(d) efficient arrangements for obtaining, by inspection or otherwise, 
information required for fire-fighting purposes with respect to the 
character of the buildings and other property in the area of the 
fire authority, the available water supplies and the means of access 
thereto, and other material local circumstances; 
(e) efficient arrangements for ensuring that reasonable steps are taken 
to prevent or mitigate damage to prcperty resulting from measures 
taken in dealin~ with fires in the area of the fire authority; 
(f) efficient arrangements for the giving, when requested, of advice in 
respect of buildings and other property in the area of the fire 
authority as to fire prevention, restricting the spread of fires, 
and means of escape in case of fire." 
There are two other specific provisions which are of importance for 
firefighting. One relates to the supply of water (Section 13): "A fire 
authority shall take all reasonable measures for ensuring the provision of 
an adequate supply of~ater, and for securing that it will be available for 
use, in case of fire." and under Section 14 it is provided that the fire 
authority may have to pay for the arrangements which it requires. 
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The other relates to ~hat may appear to be a minor matter, the 
indication of the position of a hydrant by a notice or distinguishing 
mark [Section 14, (3) (a)] ; this paragraph is useful in dealing uith 
members of the public who object to having notices or marker-posts 
fixed on their property, and possibly it has to quoted more often than 
the other provisions. 
Only one section of the Act refers to equipment at all 
specifically. This reads as follows [30, (2)] "At any fire the 
senior fire brigade officer present shall have the sole charge and 
control of all operations for the extinction of the fire, including 
the fixing of the positions of fire engines and apparatus, the 
attacr.ing of hose to any water pipes or the use of any water supply, 
and the selection of the parts of the premises, object or place where 
the fire is, or of adjoining premises, objects or places, against which 
the water is to be directed." Significantly, hoses are mentioned, 
being vital for taking water where it is neEded; and this helps to 
emphasise the importance cf the duty of the J2!'aefectus v£_gilum to take 
buckets on the patrols (Dioo 1.15.3). 
We can thus see that this formulation of a set of powers which 
fire officers feel to be very wide and to give full scope fo~ firefighting 
is quite brief and lacking in technical detail. We need not expect wide 
powers necessarily to have an extensive legal formulation, and reference 
to the 1947 Act illustrates the sort of situation which seems to h~ve 
obtained in Rome. In fact, by saying little the legal authorities 
conferred great powers. In firefighting, the Efaefe~tus vigilum must have 
been all-powerful. 
(400) 
7.7.7 
Such powers are appropriate for ~hat was always regarded as a vital 
area of law. In the Twelve Tables (8.10) there is the following provision 
concerning arson (DiQo 47.9.9): 
••Qui ae~es acervumve frumenti iuxta domum positum combusserit, vinctus 
verberatus igni neca~i iubetur, si modo sciens prudensque id commiserit. 
Si vera casu, id est neglegentia, aut noxiam sarcire iubetur aut, si 
minus idoneus sit, levius castigatur. appellations autem aedium omnes 
species aedificii continentur. 11 
Meriting the death sentence, malicious arson is the only offence other than 
killing for which the early law distinguished between deliberate and 
unintentional performance of the act (for killing: 8.24). 
7.7.8 
The non-fi~efighting functions, which it has become customary to 
refer to as 'police functions', are a very mixed collection. Mommsen 
(1887,11,1058) suggested that the prefect's jurisdiction started off criminal, 
and that civil ce9es were added when they were near-criminal. Jolowicz 
(1952,347) says that the prefect 11 tried criminal cases of minor importance 
and appears ·in third century to have obtain~d a civil jurisdiction in some 
cases 11 • · The precise development of the jurisdiction is outside my comoetence, 
but it is of interest to see whether the various powers had any characteristic 
in common. 
A striking characteristic which belongs to most of them is that they 
can cover noctL•rnal offences, in some cases the penalties being higher for 
offences if they were committed at night. As such, they would fall naturally 
to the praefectu! viqilum, who was the only official operating at night. Within 
(401) 
this nocturnal category we may reckon the provision concerned with defecting 
tenants, since the actual flitting is likely to have tak~n place during the 
hours of darkness and in addition the patrols will have been able to check 
on security and to spot suspicious changoso The powers which related to 
incendiaries and which covered looting will have been exercisable at any 
time, though it ii possible that one additional reason for giving the prefect 
jurisdiction covering both day and night was to cover offences committed at 
dusk, when it would not have been practical for the prefect's function to 
have been closbly defined according to the hour. Runaway slaves are also 
more likely to have been noticed at night, but in this case we may suspect a 
special, departmental, interest of the prefect, since he had the disposal of 
the runaway slaves if they were not claimed; and he would have been able to 
recruit them for the service in the Vig}les if they seemed suitable. 
The j~risdiction which was being exorcised in the case concerning the 
fountain (U) offers some interesting problems. The inscription is a little 
too allusive to make.sense on its own, and the ~ase does not have any obvious 
connection with any of the other legally-attested powers. The judgments were 
clearly that rents were not to be exacted for the use of a particular fountain, 
but it does not follow from this that the prefects here were exercising their 
powers concerned with locatio and conductio. Mommsen in his note in CIL 
(on VI.266) observ~s: "Denique qui fiat, ut praefecti vi~jlu~ de eiusmodi lite 
iudicarint, omnium maxime obscurum est." He points out that the prefect's 
right to the use of a~y water supply (inferred, as not specifically attested) 
would r.ot necessarily give him a jurisdiction such as this seems to be (and 
which might·more naturally belong to the curatores aquarum), and offers his 
suggestion that the fountain in question was within the precincts of a fire 
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station (an excubitorium, there being no statio in that particular area). 
This solution was offered in the absence of an alternative, though Mommsen 
was right not to have thought in terms of a special supply of water for 
firefightingo But there is one other way in which the prefects could have 
become involved in the water supply, and that is in the supervision of the 
aqueducts to prevE-nt the unauthorised abstraction of water. After the fire 
in A.Do 64 Nero provided that guards ~ere to prevent the depletion of the 
water supply, so that there always be a maximum quantity available for 
firefighting (Tac. Ann. 15.43: see 7.3.5). Since unauthorised diversion of 
the water supply (other than by the staff of the curatores aguarum) would 
probably have, taken place at night, and since the praefectus vigi~ should 
have had a good knowledge of the distribution of the system, the Vigilcs 
would have been suitable for some at least of the surveillance of the supplyo 
In suggesting that the prefect's jurisdiction in this case arose from the 
duties of the Vigiles, WE are not going beyond the letter of the evidence 
(particularly as it is ~ot known who the custodes were to be), though it 
has to be admitted that there is no evidence that would clinch the argument. 
But this solution is preferable to that which Mommsen offers, since it is 
implausible that a collegium, whether of fontani or of fullones, should have 
functioned within a fire station. 
The other striking characteristic of the prefect's jurisdictions is 
that they were all concerned with the protection of property. As such, they 
fit in very well with his firefighting function. 
(403) 
7.7.9 
It is worthy of note that the QEaefectus vigil1,T did not have the 
right to use capital punishment, and for the serious offences he had to 
send convicted persons to the praefectus l!£!2.i. The reason f:J:: this is 
that the praefectus .vigil~ was not a magistrate. In this respect he was 
in the same position as the praefectus annonae (Dig. 1.2.33): 
••nam praefectus annonae et vigilum non sunt magistratus, sed extra 
ordinem utilitstis causa constituti sunt., 11 
The praefectus ~lum exercised powers in Rome which in the provinces 
were exercised by the pr~eses (H) or the proconsul or praeses (N:cf. Paulus 
I. VIA .4). 
7 .. 7.10 
For the purposes of firefighting, the praefect~s vigilum occupied a 
position which is the envy of modern firemen, who show particular interest 
in the right to flog. Although it is difficult to be precise, it does 
seem that his position was stronger in law than that of the modern British 
fireman, and is possibly more analogous to the situation in Germany, where, 
although the law is somewhat complicated, to have a fire is treated as a 
crime, and a fire is attended by special police investigators. We should 
expect a fair amount of improvisation and individual treatment in the 
operations of the Vigiles, and, except for the special case of capital 
punishment for malicious arson, it is hard to see any way in which the 
prefect could exceed his firefighting powers. He was not a man to be 
trifled with. 
(404) 
7.8.1 
The strong position of the nr8efecf;us .Yl:.3D.'Jfll is a natural 
extension of the high level of concern shown for the ravages of fireo 
Under the Republic~ the efforts of the various magistrates char9ed 
with the extinction of fires were supplemented by assistance from the 
ccnsuls (Cico lu Pisonem, 2.26): 
"Ecquod in hac urbe maius umquam fuit incendium cui non consul subvenit?" 
This high level of interest was maintained under the Empire, and it 
extended to several problems arising from firesG 
7.8.2 
The establishment of the Vigiles by Augustu~ in AoDo6 was 
itself an imperial interVEntion of the utmost importance, and one which 
derived its effectiveness largely from its im~erial backing. Paulus 
records that Augustus believed that only i:G could deal ~!ith the 
problem of fire (Dig. l.15o3): 
11 Nam salutem rei publicae tueti nulli magis credidit convenire 
nee alium sufficere ei rei quam Caesarem." 
Acccrding to Dio (55.26) Augustus set up the corps as a short-term 
measurej and he thus left himself the option of disbanding them if the 
experiment was not successful, Their success, however, l~d to their 
retention, and so what Augustus had probably hoped for came about. 
His close interest in_the corps is shown by the status of the chief 
officer, a praefec]y2 being the smperor's own representative. 
7.8 .. 3 
One of the two acts of public generosity which Suetonius 
credits to Tiberius was to compensate the owners of insulae on the 
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Celio which had been burned (]i£.48). According to Suetonius Tiberius 
himself then had the name of the Celio changer:! to 'mons August,usV, 
while Tacitus records that the Senate ordered the change because a 
statue of the emperor had survived the fire intact (auu.4.64). This 
was in A.D427o Tiberius 1 other recorded intervention in fire matters 
. 
(though not the other act of generosity recorded by Suetonius) was 
to provide 100 million sesterces in compensation for the owners of 
houses which were burned in a bad fire on the Aventine in A.D.36 (Tac. 
&m .. 6.45; Dio !::JB.26.S). Livia also in·ter\liened at fires, to the 
annoyance of Tiberius (Suet.Tib .. ~O); she is seid to have encouraged 
-
the people and soldiers in person, and to have made a habit of this 
while Augustus tuas alive. (The incident to which Suetonius refers belongs 
probably to A.D.l6: Werner 1906,15). 
Caligula also helped many people a?te.r fires (Suet.Sl,ol6), 
and in A.D.38 interaened in person (Dio 59.~o4), helping the •soldiers• 
(i"~V o-re~IILv-rwv) to extinguish the fire anu assisting the victims .. 
Suetonius records that Claudius (before he was emperor) had his 
house rebuilt by Tiberius after the Senate had decreed that it would 
pay for the rebuilding after a fire (Claudo6): 
"Senatus_quoque ••• censuit et max ut domus ei, qua~ !ncendio 
amiserat, publica.impensa restitueretur o o •. Quod decretum abolitum 
est~ •• Tiberio •• 4 damnum liberAlitats sua resarturam pollicente." 
Werner (pp.l4f) supposes that this was the fire which destroyed Caligula 1 s 
house in A.D. 41, a short while after Caligula 1 s death (Suet.~.59), 
but this is chronologically impossible. Similar assistance had been 
rendered to Augustus as emperor by the veterans, decuries and tribes, and 
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by individuals, after his palace had been burned (AoDo3), and 
Augustus had taken care not to accept from any individual more than 
he could afford c.nd in any case not more than 1 denarius (Suet., ~o57) 
. . 
He then opened the whole of the palace to the public (Dio 55 0 12.5), 
part of it having been open since 13 BoCo (Dio 54.27.3). Claudius 
. 
played a rather unusual part i~ firefighting when he took action to 
supplemer;t the official manpower in AeDo54 (Suet.ClaudolB). Having 
brought his own slaves into action to help the 'milit~•, he then had 
the magistrates summon the people to help from all over Rome, and 
rewarded them with mone_y according to their efforts. This could have 
been the fire 2t which Aorippina assisted (Werner p.lB; Dio 61.33.12 = 
.-
Zonaras~ll.ll). 
The fire uhich provoked the most far-reaching imperial 
intervention was that of A.D.64o We have seen that is is possible to 
divine some of the firefighting realities from the tendentious accounts 
of Tacitus, S~Gtonius and Dio (see7.3.~, and we have further statements 
as to the public relief provided by Nero. His first move seems to have 
been the pr:""Vision of temporary accommodation (•subitaria aedificia') 
in the Campus Martius, in the buildings of.Agrippa (also in the Campus 
Martius), and in his own garden, provision of the necessities of life 
from Ostia and neighbourir.g towns, and e reduction in the price of 
grain (Tac.-Ann,l5o39). The overall costs of rehabilitation were 
shared by a large part of the Empire (Ann.l5.45): 
"Interea conferendis pecuniis pervastata Italia, provinciae eversae, 
sociique populi et quae civitatium liberae vocantur." 
Dio (62ol8.5) says that Nero collected money from provinces and 
communities by compulsion, using the fire as a pretext, and making the 
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contributions appear to be voluntary; one need not be biassed 
against Nero to recognise that there could havs been some justifiable 
resentment at this special treatment for the capitalo 
For the rebuilding, the streets were replanned on a more 
open scale, and w!th open spaces to act as fire breaks? the methods 
of building were improved (see 7o6o~' and Nero offered to clear the 
debris at his own expense, removing it to the marshes of Ostia in 
the empty grain ships as they went downstream; he also offered 
rewards to people who completed their rebuilding within a prescribed 
period. He offered to ~ay for porticoes a~ross the fronts of buildings 
(see 7. 6.4), and ordered that water be kept ready for fire fighting. 
All these measures are listed at Annals 15.43. Probably some sites 
remained vacant after this fire and formed part of the subject of 
Vespasian's regulations that anyone might occupy sites left vacant after 
fires and build on them if the owners did not do so (Suet. ~...:,8). 
However, both 8U~ own knowledge of the street plan of Rome and also the 
complaint that the streets uJBre now too open and unsheltered (Tac•.&ul• 
15.43) show that the replanning was largely successful. 
After the Vitellians had burned the Capitol~in AoD.69, 
Vespasian symbolically stqrtec the work of reconstruction (Suet.Vesp.B): 
"Ipse restitutionem Capitolii adgressus ruderibus purgandis manus 
primus admovit ac suo colla quaedam extulit." 
We hear of only one more direct imperial intervention in 
firefighting, by Commodus at the bad fire in AoDol92, when he came in 
from the outskirts of the City and encouraged the firefighters (Dio 73.24.3). 
(408) 
There are, of course 9 very many instances of imperial assistance 
and interest in rebuildin~ after fires, attested in the majority of 
cases e~i~raphically but in ouite a few cases in the literary 
n 
sources. Werner ~ives m~ examples, and they need not be rehearsed 
here. What is wortry of note is the 
• 0 
intervened in some~the mere symbolic 
way in which the emperor 
and spectacular cases. We 
have already noted VeRpasian's part in the restoration of the 
Capitol. Domitian, too, initiated the efforts to restore the 
library on the Palatine, which had been burned (A.D.88-91), as 
recorded by Suetonius (Dom.20): 
11Liberalia studia.imperii initio ne~lexit, auanquam bibliothecas 
incendio absumptas impensissime reparare curasset, examplaribus 
undique petitis missi~que Alexandream qui describerent 
emendarentque. 11 
After the fire in A.D.80 we hear of another type of symbolic start 
to rebuilding (of the Capitol a~ain), this time in the Acta of the 
Fratres Arvales (Henzen, 1874, p.CVI): 
"VII Idut;! D.::cembres in Capitolio in aedem Opis sacerdotes 
convcnerunt ad vota numcupanda ad restitutionem et dedicationem 
Capitoli ab imp(eratore) T(ito) Cae·sare Vespasiano Aug(usto)." 
The use of imperial titles (e.g. Antoniniana, Gord~ae) is the 
only attested method of honourin~ the corps of Vi~iles (BR pp.64f. 
gives references), and this may have been a more or less routine 
practice of the third c~ntury. Individual vigiles were not decorated 
(Maxfield 197?.,!,107), not being in a fi~hting unit, and in general 
lackinr, ingenuitas. Promotion could be a reward (Maxfield ibid.123), 
but there were few openings in the Vi~iles. Rome appears not to have 
been greatly concerned to honour its firemen. 
(409) 
7.9.1 
BR describes the Republican arrangements for firefighting as 
"insufficient and somewhat haphazard" (pol9), and it is impossible to 
disagree. In his outline of them (ppolBf), he shows that in addition 
to the regular magistrates who took on firefighting duties from time 
to time there was a special board of triumviri nocturni. According to 
Valerius Maximus (B.lo ~~o 6 and 5), one of these was convicted 
"quia vigilias neglegentius circumierat". 
and a whole board was condemned because 
"ad incendium in sacra via ortum extinguendum tardius venerant". 
The term '~iai~i2e 1 implies night duty, and 'circumire' implies patrols, 
and, for as long as the board lasted, there will have been night patrols 
such as the Vigjles carried out, though with only a fraction of the 
manpower. In this we can see the essence of the Vi£iles 1 own mode of 
operation. 
7.9.2 
Although BR seems to imply (p.22) t!1at the corps of Vigiles as 
far as possible was founded on Republican ~recedents, he also says (p.95): 
"The vi~w has cbnstantly been held that the Roman Vigiles were modelled 
by Augustus on the fire brigade of Alexandria" 
' / and refers to Strabo (17 .1.12) for a VV(TE{'IVC>.) O"Tf..LijfOj et .'Uexandria 
(p.95 n.4). There is no other evidence for this official. Fraser 
(1972,I,97f) points out that Strabo tells us very little, and comments: 
"The importance assigned to the Night General is certainly surprising. 
If, as might be supposed, he was head of the City Watch, it is curious 
that his duties should, to judge by his title, have been confined to 
th'e night. The prominence assigned to the office by Strabo is perhaps 
to be explained by his acquaintance with the Roman Q_raefectus viqilum, 
the commander of the Vi_gile~, who was probably modelled on the 
Alexandrian institution". 
( 410) 
There were similar officials in other cities (Fraser, 1972,II 
" p.lBO n.34): a VUKToG"T(J.i,~O.S, possibly at Oxyrhynchus, in the second 
century A.D., and another at Hermoupolis, attested in A.D.390; also 
I 
at Tralles and Ptolemais, both of Roman date. A VIJK"THfc(e)\05 is 
attested in the fifth-century sourc~s for Antioch (Liebeschuetz 1972, 
124). Probably all these officials had their origins in the pre-Roman 
arrangements. The post at Alexandria, according to Strabo, went back 
to the time of the kings (17.lol2): 
' ~tr I ~~V ~d-.1r1A~wv ( Qt..\ ) I II ~ex.J.' 
In the absence of any direct evidence that the Vig,iles were modelled on 
the arrangements at Alexa~dria, we must look at other possible precedents 
before committing ourselves. 
AccorGing to the currently accepted view (e.g. Sherwin-White 
1966, 607-610; Jones 1940, 215) there were no organised corps in the 
eastern part of the empire for firefighting. Although this does broadly 
seem to be true,it is perhaps worth remembering that the existence of the 
night-prefects ought to imply at least a cmall number of men under them 
even though these men have left absolutely no trace. Probably the prefects 
had very small staffs, and had to rely on the populace when there was 
any extensive need for manpower. In addition, it was pocsible for them 
to rely on the army, when it was available. There is very little evidence 
for the use of the army in civilian firefighting, though once attested 
it may be reckoned to have been not uncommon. 
( 411) 
Safrai (1971,226) records the following incident from a 
divergent Talmudic ruling "dating approximately from the time of the 
destruction of~the Temple": 
"A fire broke out on the Sabbath in the yard of Rabbi Joseph ben Simai 
of Sikhin and the garrison of the castra of Sepphoris came to put it 
out, but he would not permit them and a cloud came dawn and extinguished 
it. And the sages said that there was no need (to prohibit th8m): 
nevertheless at the end of the Sabbath he sent a sela' r = 4 denarii J 
to each of them and 50 dinars to their Hipparchus." 
Safrai goes on to suggest that ben SimaJ was close to Roman government 
circles (p.227), but this need not have been the main reason for the 
turn-out. The Life of Polycarp by Pionius attests both the provision 
of equipment by the city of Smyrna and also a special interest of the 
Jews in firefighting (28: Lightfoot 1885, 1042 and 1083): 
"And another mir~cle also was wrought by his hands as follows. When 
all the people in the city had gone to sl8ep and it was near midnight, 
and the bakers were making bread, it happened that fire'falling on the 
faggots near at hand set the shop in flames, and spreading thence got 
hold of a very considerable part of the cjty~ But when the people 
had run together and there was much shouting and confusion, the 
" ~e~'1f~ ordered the equipment which was prepared for this purpose 
to be brought up. So the pumps and watar and every contrivance were 
brought. The Jews also came down under pretence of being able to 
extinguish it, since they always present themselves uninvited at a 
fire: for they assert that conflagrations cannot possibly be stopped 
in any other way but by their presence. This is an a~L~fice of theirs 
to plunder the property in the houses. As the city was then in 
/ danger, the crTecl;"[,fo.S said: 
'Sirs • • • you see that it is of no use, because the wind is 
contrary; and when our only hope was in the Jews we have failed 
even in this. What do I advise? • • • Send for Polycarp '" 
There is a lacuna in the text, but the next section (29) shows that 
Polycarp was successful, since he was called in again because of his 
success. Ostensibly the incident should have taken place in the second 
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century AoD., but there is some doubt as to the date of the Life, and 
Lightfoot concludes (1885, 1013): "It has no other value than as 
representing the opinions and practices of the latter half of the 
fourth centuryo" Be this as it may, the non-miraculous parts of the 
incident must have been repeated time and again in the eastern citieso 
It may be wondered ~ow often the equipment which was provided proved 
useless owing to the lack of trained personnelo 
The same sort of situation is at~ested in Pliny's correspondence 
with Trajan (fe.. 10.33: Pliny to Trajan; 10.34: Trajan's reply). Here, 
Pliny, as governor of Bithynia, suggests that after a bad fire in 
Nicomedia it n1ight be useful to arrange for a collegium of fabri to 
be established to act as a fire briga~e, consisting of no more than 
150 men. Trajan replied that there was enough disorder in the cities 
already, and chat the inhabitants should help at fires and keep 
firefighting equipment in their houses. The threat to local government 
was uppermost in Trajan's mind, anu outweighRd his assessment of the 
dangers from fire. Sherwin-\J(hi te tries to f.ind a practical j LJsti fication 
for Trajan's attitude, commenting (on l£..10.3·4.2): 
"Trajan's preference for private enterprise is not so silly as it 
sounds. The close buildings and crowded streets of the ancient city 
must have made it difficult to bring fire-brigades into action. 
Concentration on house-brigades and dispersal of inst~Wffients might 
be more effective than centralization." 
Fro~ the technical point of view, a firemen might feel that even in the 
difficult conditions of the eastern cities th8 use of a well-run brigade 
was far better than any number of untrained, unprepared and panicky 
inhabitants; and it may be wondered how the provision of private equipment 
would have helped with the fire which aroused Pliny's concern. In the 
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conditions of the eastern cities, a fireman planning for reliable protection 
against fire would probably tend to count all the inhabitants as unreliable. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the conditions in Rome were any better; taking 
into account the size of Rome and the number of people, we may feel sure that 
Rome's difficulties were far worse, and yet the Vigiles could function. It 
is better to take Trajan 1 s reply at its face value, and his recommendation of 
private preparations against fire should be seen as a pis aller and a tossing off 
of responsibility onto the inhabitants. Perhaps the best ggneral statement of 
the situation in the east is that where there were already existing arrange-
ments they could continue in force, but that no new bodies were allowed to form. 
7.9.4 
The solution which Pliny proposed for Nicomedia was one which was 
commonly used in th8 west, where collegia of fabri, centonarii and dendrophori 
served as fire brigades. These were respectively builders, blanket-makers 
and providers of heavy transport (see de Ruggiero, e.vv). 
Their use in firefighting is attested in the first place by the 
evidence of Pliny, and secondly by a brief statement by Symmachus in a letter 
to Valentinian, in which he lists the functions of the various corporations 
(~.14.3): 
" •• per alios fortuita arcentur incendia." 
This probably refers to the period when the Vigiles no longer existed in their 
old fo~m (see Appendix fl), but is none the less evidence for the use of 
collegia, in general. Sherwin-White sets out tha legal position of these collegia 
in his commentary on the correspondence between Pliny and Trajan (1966, 
607-610), and to the references which he gives may be added Dobson (l966,67f) 
on the praefecti fabrum in the municipalities. It is Glear that these collegia, 
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acting singly, in pairs, or all together, would have been capable of effecting 
rescues~ and could also have had a chance of being able to extinguish fires 
(see ~.25.5 )o It was probably their firefighting function which led to them being 
known as the II~ collegia" and the 11 collegii!. erincipalia".. The .e.raefectus 
fabrum in a municipality was probably expected to take charge at fires. 
The brigades based on the collegia correspond closely to the modern 
part-time volunteer brigades. It is probable that the constitutions of the 
collegia provided an organisation suitable for firefighting, with the centuria~, 
decuriae, centuriones, optiones and erincipales lending a military appearance, 
and for this reason these brigades also resemble the former police-brigades 
of Britain in having a certain degree of organisation and discipline available 
at very short notice. There may also have been small bodies of regular fire-
fighters in the citi~s which had their own local praefecti vigilum (BR 114), 
though nothing is known of these. It would appear .that the west should have 
been better protected against fire than the east, simply because some sort of 
organisation was permitted; how successful they actually were must be left to 
conjecture, and no doubt there were wide var~ations in quality. Possibly the 
fact that they were allowed to continue in existence is some measure of their 
success. 
7.9.5 
Otherwise, both in the east and in the west, all the firefighting 
arrangements were milita=y. Before the Vigiles sent a vexillation to Ostia 
this port was protected by one of the Urban Cohorts (Suet.Claud.25), as was 
Puteoli, though it is less likely that the Vigiles sent a vexillation there. 
X.l767 and 1768 suggest that vigiles had their home at Puteoli, but this is not 
evidence for a vexillation. We have seen that there ~ere vexillations at Ostia 
( 415) 
and Portus from the time of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius respectively (6.5.1), 
detached from the Vigiles stationed in Rome. And it is probable that in Rome 
itself, the Vigiles were assisted uJhen necessary by the Praetorianse 
7~9.!_6 
The fact remains that only Rome and her two ports were protected by a 
full-time professional brigade, and this is a reflection both of the greater 
fire risks and also of the position of Rome as the capital, with greater 
resources and with greater checks in case the fire brigade should prove violent 
or disloyal. 
7.9.7 
So far as it is possible to find preceden~for the operat~ons of the 
Vigiles, they may seem to lie with the a:rm y rather than with the arrangements 
at Alexandria. fire was used as an offensive and defensive weapon, and the 
manual of Aeneas Tacticus, written in the middle of the fourth century B.C. 
to describe various devices for use when under siega, sets out a range of 
techniques which are seen in use in later writings, notably by Caesar. Such 
techniques were standard, and at their first ~ppearance in Aeneas' manual 
they seem already f~lly developed. 
Since military firefighting is a subject which tends tu b9 forgotten, 
it may be useful to note the passages from Aeneas which illustrate the 
techniques in use as early as the fourth century (historical sources show some 
of them in use even earlier), and to remember that this manual and others 
based upon it served as a guide to Roman generals. They are as follows: 
28.,6-7 
( 416) 
Nor again should a leader inconsiderately go out at night with a 
crowd, because at such times some of the conspirators are forming 
plots, some within, some without. the city, wishing to lure one out 
with deceptions such as beacon-torches, setting fire to a dockyards 
or gymnasium, or a public temple, or some building on account of 
which a crowd of men - and influential men too - might rush out. 
And Iphiades of Abydus on the Hellespcnt, in his capture of Parium, 
among other preparations for scaling the wall by night, secretly 
prepared wagons filled with brush and brambles and sent them to the 
wall (thg gates being ·already closed), as though they were wagons ~f 
the Parians, which after their arrival were parked near the gates 
from fear of the enemy. At a suitable moment they were to set fire 
to the wagons, sb that the gates might catch fire, and when the 
citizens of Parium had gone to put out the flames he himself might 
enter at another point. 
32.1 Against the approaches of the enemy you must take the following 
measures with engines or with infantry. In the first place, against 
32.8-12 
objects raised hig hsr · than ihe wall • • • • • • • • one must set 
sm6king materials that will send up a great smudge from beneath, and 
must kindle those which will rouse as great a blaze as possible ••• 
furthermore, against the large enginEs on which many troops are 
moved up, and from which missiles are shot, and especially catapults 
and slings, and incendiary arrows against the thatched roofs -
against all these, I say, those in the city must,. in the first place, 
secretly dig beneath where the engine is to be applied, so that the 
wheels of the engines may sink and fall into the Axcsvations. Then, 
on the inside, you must build a defence·of baskets of sand and of 
stones from what you have nearby, which will overtop the engine and 
render the missiles of the enemy useless. At the same time you must 
spread out from the inside of the wall thick curtains or sails as a 
protection from the oncoming shafts, which will stop the missiles 
that fall over the wall, so that they ~ill be easy to gather up and 
none will fall to the ground. The same must be done at any other 
33.1-4 
34.1-2 
( 417) 
part of the wall where the missiles might come over and injure or 
wound the helpers and passers-by. And at whatever part of the wall 
by bringing up a pent-house a portion of the wall can be dug through 
or broken down, there counter-preparation must be madee To forestall 
the piercing of the wall a large fire should be built, and to provide 
against a breach of the wall a trench must be dug inside, so that the 
enemy may Qot entero At the same time you should build a counter-
rampart where the breach is being made, before the wall collapses, 
if you cannot otherwise stop the enemy. 
You mus~ pour pitch and cast tow and bUlphur on the pent-houses that 
have been brought up, and then a fagot fastened to a cord must be let 
down in flames upon the pent-house. And such things as these, held out 
from the walls, are hurled at the engines as they are being movad up, 
by which the latter are to be set on fire. Let sticks be prepareG 
shaped like pestles but much larger, and into the ends of each stick 
drive sharp irons, larger and smaller, and around the other parts of 
the stick, above and below, separately, place powerful combustibles. 
In appearance it should be like bolts of lightning as drawn by artfsts. 
Let this be dropped upon the engine as it is being pushed up, fashioned 
so as to stick into it, and so that the fire will last after the 
stick has been made fast. Then if there are any wooden towers, or if 
a part of the wall is of wood, covers of felt or raw hide must be 
provided to protect the parapet so that they cannot be ignited by the 
enemy. If the gate is set on fire you must bring up wood and tt.:;:ow it 
on to make as large a fire as possible, until a trench can be dug 
inside and a counter~defence be quickly built from the materials you 
have at hand, and if you have none, then by taking them from tbe nearest 
houses. 
If the enemy tries to set anything on fire with a powerful incendiary 
equipment you must put out the fire with vinegar, for then it cannot 
easily be ignited again, or rather it should be smeared beforehand with 
birdlime [reading '~5er' ], for this does not catch fire. Those who put 
out the fire from places above it must have a protection for the face, 
so that they will be less molested when the flame darts toward them. 
(418) 
35. And fire itself which is to be powerful and quite inextinguishable is 
to be prepared as follows. Pitch, sulphur, tow, granulated 
frankincense, and pine sawdust in sacks you should ignite and bring up 
if you wish to set any of the enemy's works on fire. 
37.l & 3 Those who are constructing mines are to be prevented in the following 
manner. (3) But if you have no chance to build a stone wall you 
should bring up logs and rubbish 0 • • and if the mines at any point 
open into the moat, there you should dump the wood and set fire to the 
rubbish and cover the rest over in order that the smoke may penetrate 
the opening and injure those in the m~ne. It is even possible that 
many of these may be killed by the smoke. 
We have already looked at most of these techniques in connection with 
the Vigiles, and have suggested that some of them were not applicable in Rome. 
It is striking that the understanding of fire which we find in the pages of 
Aeneas gees well beyond the mere 'tactics' of firefighting. The t~es of 
buildings which, he writes, may be fired in order to draw out the inhabitants -
dockyArd, gymnasium, te8ple - are precisely those which were difficult to 
treat on account of their co~bustible contents, materials and height: and the 
experience in the City of Rome was similar - witness the bad fires involving 
public buildings 'JJhicrtuere difficult to extinguish. .£\gain, the use of fire such 
as he describes imply an ability to control it and the confidence that co~es from 
experience. This experience the Romans inherited and developed, so that the 
~.:hgil..~ had plenty to build on. Moreover, aside from the questi,on of techniques, 
the Romans sometimes exercised a strictness in fire matters ltlhich shows a deter-
mination to have fire recognised as a very powerful weapon, whether offensive 
or defensive. Thus the following punishments were meted out when fires had not 
been kept under control: 
"When Aurelius' line of works was burned and his camp captured, Cotta had 
him scourged with rods and ordered him to be reduced to the ranks and to 
perform the tasks of a common soldier" 
(Front.Strat.4.1.31) 
-·~ 
( 419) 
"When fire had been set to his li~e of works by the enemy, Marcus Antonius 
decimated the soldiers of two cohorts of those who we~e on the works, and 
punished the centurions of each cohort. Besides this, he dismissed the 
commanding officer in disgrace, and ordered the r8st of the legion to 
be put on barley rations." 
(Froni- • .§.irat. 4.1.37) 
Against this background, the operations of the Vigiles are seen to have been 
selective, choosing the techniques which would suit the conditions in Roma, 
and utilising those features of military firefighting and organisation which 
would be of real benefit. Even the night patrols of the tresviri nocturni 
were surely the fruit of military experience. 
To return more directly to the question of any influence that Alexandria 
might have had on the Vigiles, it is probable that in both Alexandria and 
Rome the problem was not one of producing a new technical solution to the 
problem of fire but of choosing a solution Ghnt would be acceptable and 
effectivee The Greekss like the Romans, had a background of military 
experience to draw on, and the principles of firefighting - speed and wateP -
were known as well by them as by the Romans. But they did not possess a 
monopoly of knowledge about fire extinction, and the question whether the 
Romans were directly indebted to the Greeks in this respect has little relevance, 
probably, after the third century B.c., if not earlier. The scale of the 
RE~ublican arrangements in Rome is not unlike that in the Greek cities. The 
one feature of the Vigil~s which is distinctive is the sheer scale. No other 
city enjoyed such protection from trained and numercws firemen. For this, there 
was no civilian precedent; only the army could have provided inspiration for 
the basic type of organisation. The application of such an organisation to 
firefighting was the creation of Augustus himself, and it may be argued that 
only the imperial power could bring an organisation like the Vigiles into being. 
Thus we do not need to turn to Alexandria: Rome itself created the Vigiles. 
(420) 
7.1Dol 
In discussing the evidence for fire stations (6ol.2) it was noted that 
Augustus did not necessarily station the cohorts of Vig~ in the same 
places as their predecessors, and the ~~ and ~~cubitor~ were, when 
eventually provided, also situated according to nBeds and not according to 
mere precedento Figure Z6 shows the locations of the four castra and the 
one ~xcubitoriurn which have been identified archaeologically. These 
identifications are consistent with the distribution of the cohorbB Vi~~ 
given in the ~~ Urbis, and it is possible wlthout too much difficul~y 
to determine which Region was paired with which Region so that each cohort 
could look after two Regions (Dig. 1.15.3). 
The castra wer~ distributed as follows: 
Cohort I 
Cohort II 
Cohort III 
Cohort IV 
Cohort V 
Cohort VI 
Cohort VII 
Region VII 
Region V 
Region VI 
Region XII 
Region II 
Region VIII 
Region XIV 
7.10.2 
Region VII ~could only have been paired with Region IX, since the other 
adjoining Regions contained castra. Hence VI could only have gone with IV, 
and III with v. Until the fourth century Region XIV was not linked by 
bridge to Region XIII, so that these cannot have formed a pair and XIV must 
have gone with XI. Thus XII and XIII form a pair, I and II form a pair, and 
VIII and X form a pair. 
(421) 
There were 14 excubitoris (~~ Urbis, Nordh 1949, 105)~ but the 
~~ does not assign them to Regions, giving them simply in the summaryo 
It is, therefore, a hypothetical possibility that there were 2 excubitoria 
in each of the Regions which lacked castra; but against this is the fact 
. 
that the one identified excubitorium is in Region XIV, which is known to have 
had its own castrao 
The fire stations were therefore distributed as follows: 
Cohort Regions 
with castra + ~c~bitor~ with excubitorium 
I VII IX 
II v III 
III VI IV 
IV XII XIII 
v II I 
VI VIII X 
VII XIV XI 
This is shown in the diagram, Figure 26. 
For the purposes of firefighting, two implications of this distribution 
are of interest: the number of stations, and their relation to the fire risks. 
Even in the absence of a detailed map of the fire risks it is possible to 
divine the thinking behind this distribution. 
(422) 
The number of ~~ra (as opposed to non-residential stations) is 
basically related to the number of cohorts likely to be needed at any 
one time, both for patrols and for actual firefighting; the number of 
~~ubitoria is related to the needs of the patrols to supplement the 
castra in respect of first-3id firefighting equipment which was not 
. 
carried by the patrols but which might be needed quickly. The location of 
both cast~ and excubitoria is a reflection of the distribution of fire 
risks., 
7.10.6 
It has been suggest~d that the patrols were based on the century and 
that the cohort was the basic unit for firefighting, other than first-aid 
(4: 2 /.J esp- I 0 ) ., Now that we have produced estimates of the number of 
fires and 'interventions' ( 7.5.~ it is possible to see how the number of 
cohorts was determined. Fer an average of 20 largish fires per day, 2 of 
them being serious, it would have been necessary to plan the brigade so 
that it would be capable of fighting several fires simultaneously. In 
planning for reinforaements, it would also have been necessary to ensure 
that no area ~as left unprotected. if a fire should break out there while 
the cohort was reinforcing elsewhereo The number of cohorts should 
therefore have been slightly greater than the number of large fires which 
might normally occur simulte~~oualy. Normally no more than 2 of these 
fires might require reinforcements, though reinforcements might be needed 
if 2 largish fires which did not themselves require more than a cohort broke 
out in one Region or one pair of Regions., If the patrols did their job 
effectively, the likelihood of several fires becoming large at the same time 
was diminished, and the patrols were concentrated at night, the most 
dangerous time; for this reason, it was probably expected that there would 
not be a concentration of large fires within a very short period. These 
(423) 
considerations do not lead to a precise and definite number, but they 
du imply that one might reasonably have expected to plan for up to 
four largish fires at once (see 7.5ol-2)o Given that sort of number, 
it is just a matter of administrative convenience that seven was the 
number of cohorts that was chosen to fit conveniently into the fourteen 
Regions., 
There is one piece of evidence which confirms that this was the 
line of approach. According to Pa~lus (Digo 1~15e2), Augustus set up 
the fire brigade "&u~ibus ,!;!.0,£ ~ incendiis exortis 11 ; he must have had 
in mind not merely the ne.eds of patrolling but also of firefighting on 
a largish scale. For patrolling, there was not a definite number of 
me~ and cohorts which would suffice: a greater number could always be 
used; but for firefighting it was possible to estimate in terms of 
manpower and the number of cohorts simply b8sause the number and frequency 
of fires was already known. 
7.10 .. 7. 
On the distribution of fire risks throughout the City, there is 
little to say other than that although there were variations in the uses 
to which the various areas were put = residential, warehousing, temples, 
other public buildings, open spaces - the effect on fire risks was to 
spread them fairly evenly. A season of storms mig~produce more lightning 
strikes on temples, a cold spell might produce more fires starting from 
portable heater~, or a festival might produce a number of fires from the 
careless use of torches: but all such specialities would add up to a 
fairly even spread throughout the year and throughout the City. Although 
each type of land use produced its own special problems, the fires, once 
(~2~) 
they broke out, all needed speedy treatment, and, no matter what type 
of premises a fire started in, the dangers if it got out of hand were 
equally bado For this reason, it was sensible to spread the cohorts 
evenly through the Regionsp with one Cohort for two Regions, and it may 
be surmised that the excubi~ were spaced fairly evenly between the 
~~tra and between adjacEnt excubito~ia. This is also justifiable for 
ease of patrolling, and avoidance of undue walkingo 
7.10.8 
All detailed messages must have been taken by runners or men on 
horseback ( ~.20). In the case of calls for reinforcements, it is 
pDobable that audible signals were used and that the reinforcements 
could turn out before a runner hnd arrived. There must have been a 
system for turning out to specified points, and there may well have been 
intermediate points between the fire stations where the men had to assemb!a 
to receive more detailed informatione If we assume th8t trumpets and 
similar instruments were used, it is possible to estimate the shortest 
time needed for reinforcements to arriveo The well-known Captain Shaw, who 
was also notorious among firemen for his hard discipline and strict 
training, reckoned that runners could meet the following performance 
figures (Blackstone 1957, 157): 
t mile in just over 3 minutes 
1 mile in 8 minutes 
1! miles in 15 minuteso 
These refer to firemen in London,and they will have taken the quickest 
routes between points though these will have involved many corners and 
turns. The same sort of figures should have applied to Roman fi~emen, 
(425) 
though the reinforcements will have travelled a little more slQwly than 
the runnerso In travelling time, they mean that each castra was within 
about 8 minutes of the adjoining ones, that there will have been a 
~~ or ~cubitor~ within about 3 minutes, and that no more than 
about 10 minutes need hava elapsed for the arrival of the 1 home' cohort 
and 20 minutes for the arrival of a reinforcing cohnrt from a different 
~stra. In the absence of motorised transport it is unlikely that 
cohorts or centuries were moved around in order to fill in gaps as other 
units went out to fires, and it would have been unusual to hava more 
than about three cohorts at a single fire, as this would have left too 
big an area unprotectedo There is no reason, however, why there should 
not have been up to 1,000 men at many of the large fires. The majority 
of these will have been engaged in bucket-chains and protecting buildings 
near to the one which was burningo 
7ol0.9 
The most striking feature of the distritution of fire stations in 
ancient Rome is that the problem of distancB was not a big one; Rome was 
small enough not to create travelling probl8ms9 Given, in addition, the 
large amount of manpower for firefighting, it becomes clear that the 
siting of fire stations was less critical then in later cities, where 
economies of money and manpower had to be exercisedo Braid~ood (1830,15f.) 
expressed a preference for the stations to be on tops of hills so that the 
firemen could arrive mo~e quickly and with less effort at a fire, and we 
may add a further justification for the use of the top of a hill that it 
made fire-watching easiero It may not be an accident that three of the 
four identified castra in Rome were on higher ground (the exception being 
the castra of the First Cohort in Region VII), with the Fourth Cohort neap 
(426) 
the top of the Little Aventine, the Fifth near the top of the Celian, 
and the Third near the top of a more gradual slopeo 
7.10.10 
Before we leave the Regions, we may perh2ps be permitted a brief 
digression, to consider the relationship between the seven are~s into 
which the !~giles divided Rome and the seven ecclesiastical regions 
which were established in the middle of the third century A.D. 
We have seen that the fourteen civil regions of Augustus existed 
before the Vigiles. The number fourteen was prabably connected with the 
distribution of the population and with administrative convenience. 
Seven, the number of cohorts of ~iailes, was probably the number nearest 
to the ideal number of firefighting units which would fit conveniently 
into the fourteen regions (7olD.6). 
Later, traditionally in the middle of the third century, the 
Church established the seven ecclesiastical regions which were later to 
provide the sole administrative framework for the City~ The relation 
between the fourteen civil regions and the seven ecclesiastical regions 
has been much debated, and still needs considerable clarificationo 
The basic discussion is that of De Rossi (1877, 514-518), though for 
his broader conclusions we have to turn to his Piante (1879,78f). 
Here he states: 
"Le regioni ecclesiastiche non corrispondevano coi limiti delle 
regioni civilio Ho cercato se alcuna attinenza avessero colla 
distribuzione.settenaria delle coorti dei vigili: ne anche con questa 
conviene la divisions settemplice della primitiva Roma cristiana." 
(427) 
This is despite the fact that he produced the following approximate 
equations in his earlier studj: 
R e g i o n s 
Ecclesiastical 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
VI 
VII 
Civil 
XII, XIII 
II, VIII 
III, V 
IV,V! 
VII, part of IX 
most of IX 
XIV 
It is clear that the ci~il regions in these equations are more or less 
grouped in the pairs which the ~lgiles used. We can improve on De Rossi, 
and assign civil regions I and X to ecclesiastical region II, since 
they intervene between civil regionsrr and VIIIo This means that 
ecclesiastical region II consisted simply of two of the Vigiles' pairs 
of regions. Civil region XIV became an ecclesiastical region on its 
own, and XI had to be redistributed; Testini (1958·, 157)puts it into 
ecclesiastical region II. The reason why civil region IX formed one 
ecclesiastical region on its own may be the increase in population under 
the Empire in the Campus Martius (Platner-Ashby 1929, 93, sov. Campus 
Martius). 
The differences in the divisions of Rome for the Vigiles and for 
the Church may reflect changes in the distribution of the population 
over the three centuries separating themo What is interesting is that 
there is any correspondence at all. As early as the seventeenth century 
the hope had been expressed by Leibnitz that the seven divisions of Rome 
of the Vigiles might be able to throw light on the ecclesiastical regions 
(428) 
(Fabretti 1699, 265f). Probably they throw mutual light on each other. 
There were already seven deacons in Rome in the middle of the third 
century (Eusebius H.E. 6.43.11) and there were to be seven ecclesiastical 
regions. According to the h~ Pontifi~ (Duchesne 1886, p.l48: XXI 
FABIANUS, A.D. 236-250), Fabianus "regiones dividit diacon.ibus _ll fecit 
.ill subdiaconos _gui ill .!l.S!.taT'iis inminerent" c In his note on this 
passage, Duchesne followed De Rossi in supposing that this division into 
seven did not correspond with that of the V,igiles, and his commentary 
at this point is thus not clear. The natural sense is that Fabianus 
distributed the already-existing civil regions among the deacons to 
make the ecclesiastical regions. Beyond this point we enter the region 
of speculation. Possibly the Church and the Vigiles had bofuto suit 
I 
their divisions to the distribution of population, and so produced 
similar results. Prissibly the arrangements for the Vigiles gave rise 
to similar arrangements for other branches of the civil administration, 
and the Church did no more than follow the existing civil arrangements. 
Possibly somethi~~ cf both was involved: we need not follow Vielliard 
(1959, p.54 n.2) in assuming that these must be alternatives. The precise 
details are not clear; but more than mere chance coincidence is involved. 
We come now to the most important material resource which Rome 
offered for firefighting: water. As Braidwood observed (1866, 149): 
"The supply of water is the most vital part of any exertions tc!.llards 
extinguishing fire." 
Thri majority of fires - ancient and mode~n - can be put out with water, 
and because of its cooling effect water remains, even today, far ahead 
of any possible alternatives. 
(429) 
?oll.2 
Our knowledge of the water supply of ancient Rome is limited by the 
fact that the only ancient data concerning the quantities carried by the 
various aqueducts, given by Frontinus, is in terms of quinariaeo The 
~~naria was in fact a measure of cross-section (applied both to the 
aqueducts themselves and to the distribution pipes), whereas the minimum 
additional piece of information which we need is the velocity of the 
water. For the purposes of this study of the Vigiles, we do not need to 
know the precise amount of water which w~s brought into Romeo Our method 
will be to work out an underestimate of the quantity, so that we can 
be fairly sure that the Vigiles will not have had to face a worse situation. 
This will then help to indicate their minimum possible effectiveness, while 
creating confidence that for most of the time they could have been rather 
more effectiveo 
The best estimates for the input of water into Rome are those 
given by Ashby (1935, 30ff). These are bac,ed on Di Fenizio 1 s c2lculation 
that 1 ,!lll~ = 0.48 li tres per second (4lo5. cubic metres per 24 hours), 
and by a small amount of comparative data Ashby shows that this equation 
gives the right sort of resulto Herschel (1899), himself a water 
engineer, emphasised that the £LYinaria could actually cover a wide range 
of values when all the factors governing the quantities of water were 
taken into acccunt, and suggested that the best velue for the guinaria 
was 5,000 - 6,000 u.s. gallons per hour ! 2,000 - 3,000 (ppo212f.) 
This estimate, which is about half that used by Ashby, was based on 
BlumenstihlVs readings {of about 1869) for the springs which supplied 
three of the aq~educts (~~Fci§, ~rgo, and flaud}.~), divided by the 
( 430) 
numbers of .9,!;1,;!-.Qariae given by Frontinus.. Allowance is made in the 
calculations which follow for the lower readings used by Herschel. 
7 .. 11.4 
When the ~.91-l~ were established, in A.D.6, water was being 
delivered to Rome as follows (the first three columns are taken from 
Ashby, and the fourth column expresses the data in a form which can be 
compared with relevant modern data)e 
Aqua Quinariae Gall./seco Gall/minute 
Appia 1,825 193 11,580 
Anio Vetus 4,398 464 27,840 
Marcia 4,690 495 29,700 
Tepula * 445 47 2,820 
Iulia 1,206 127 7,620 
Virgo 2,504 264 15,840 
* The agca, gll tapped the springs of the ~..!:§ .lz.P.!:l~" By the time that 
Frontinus l:!as writing, the Tepula was fed entirely from other aqueducts 
(Frontinue ~.68), and to produce an underestimate for the preceding 
period it has been ignored in the calculations. The data (from Ashby, 
p.30 n .. 3) have been included ~ere just to show that the Tepula was only 
a small supply. 
By the end of the reign of Nero the following had been added: 
Aqua 
Claudia 
Anio Novus 
Quinariae 
4,607 
4,738 
Gall./sec 
486 
500 
Gallo/min 
29,160 
30,000 
(431) 
The supply was further increased in 109 and 226 by the addition of 
the aguae Traiana: and Alexandriana. There are no surviving ancient 
figures for these (both of them post-dating Frontinus), but Ashby 
suggests that the two Papal aqueducts which in a sense are their 
equivalents - one by virtue of tapping the same springs, the other by 
following the same course very closely - may give some indication of 
their deliveries. The figures are respectively: 
Acqua Paola (agua Traiana) 118,127 cubic metres per 24 hours 
Acqua Felice (agua Alexandriana) 21,633 cubic metres per 24 hours 
These correspond to 18,227 and 3,330 gall./minute respectively: the 
latter appears too small ·to be a plausible estimate for the agua 
Alexandrina, and indeed it does have a rather large channel for so small 
a quantity of water (Ashby p.30). 
All the supplies so far mentioned were suitable for drinking. In 
addition, there was the agua Alsietina,constructed in 2 B.C. to feed the 
Naumachia. This was kept separate from the other supplies on account of 
its unwholesomeness, and probably was not distributed generally even in 
emergencies. It is ignored in this study, having been very small: 392 
guinariae, 41 gaJ.l./sec., or 2,460 gall./minute. 
The following figures, based on the above calculatiQns, show how 
I 
much water was being delivered into Rome at the periods mentioned: 
Before A.D.6 92,580 g.p.m. 
End of Nero's reign 151,740 g.p.tn. 
After l!J9 169,967 g.p.m. 
After 226 173,297 g.p.rr. 
(432) 
7.11.5 
In order to see the Vi~iles in the worst possible situation they 
are ever likely to have encountered, let us now modity Ashby's figureso 
First, in view of Herschel's estimate (which is based on actual readings), 
let us halve the quantities indicated by Ashby. Secondly, piling 
disaster on disaster, let us assume that owing to leaks, repairs, etc., 
only half that amount of water was reaching the City. Thirdly, just to 
ensure that our underestimate really is an underestimate, let us further 
halve the quanti~y available to the Vigils~, i~ case they only had accass 
to this proportion of the water because some went straight to premises 
without being easily tapped. We have, therefore, to divide Ashby's totals 
by B. This gives, along with the reasonable estimates, the following 
underestimates: 
Before A.D.6. 11,573 gop.m. 
End of Nero's reign 18,968 gop.m. 
After 109 21,246 gop.m. 
After 226 21,662 g.p.m. 
These allow for the 29% of the total number of guin~~ which were deliver~d 
outside the City itself (Frontinus ~· 78), the actual quantity represelited 
not being even approximately capable of determination. 
7.11.6 
For firefighting, these estimates and underestimates (even the 
sm~llest)show that there was more than enough water available from the 
aqueducts. The significance of these figures is brought out clearly if 
we consider what they imply in terms of modern firefighting. A modern 
fire puffip, such as is fitted to many modern fire engines, has a capacity 
of 500 g.p.m. Our worst estimate for the earliest period, 11,573 g~p.m., 
implies a quantity sufficient to supply 23 modern fire pumps. This rose 
to (at least) 43. Taking Ashby's estimates as more reasonable, the number 
(433) 
of pumps which could have been supplied started at 185, and rose to 346. 
In many cities today just one of these pumps is adequate or more than 
adequate for the majority of fires; and only ra~ely does one need more 
than 6. Except, therefore, for the very largest conflagrations, such as 
might have taxed the resources of any city at any time, including the 
present day, the City of Rome had more than enough water available from 
artificial sources for firefighting, and could even have supplied enough 
water for several medium or large fires. The Tiber might have made the 
total quantities twice as big. It is therefors clear that the quantity 
of water was not a limitation on firefighting at all. Indeed, as. we 
shall see, the Vigiles are almost unique in having more water available 
than they could have possibly used. As Morris (1939, 128) commented, 
11 A fireman's usual grouse is that he hasn't enough water". 
7.11.7 
But more than mer9 quantity of water is needed: it has to be 
available at the fire. Since the seventeenth century hoses have been in 
common use, both for relaying water over long distances and for directing 
water 'from the pump to near the fire itself. "The Romans did not possess 
hoses ( 4~8 ). Nor were there any fire hydrants or special fire mains, 
contrary to a common modern opinion (e.g. BR p.39). The two pieces of 
evidence cited to support this opinion are, first, the lead pipes bearing 
the stamps of cohortes vigilum (BR p.9D), and secondly, the brief report of 
a lawsuit recorded on VI.266. But these lead pipes are nothing other 
than a normal water supply marked with the name of the destination 
(i.e. a fire station, in this case); while the lawsuit, whatever 
the precise significance (see 7.7.8), did not concern a special water 
supply for firefighting. There was no distribution of water 
(434) 
other than the distribution among the normal uses. 
7.11.8 
In cities where the water supply is under prE~sure it is sometimes 
possible to take a jet of water straight from the mainso The height 
which water from a burst main can reach is some indication 0f the energy 
involved. The sup~ly in Rome, however, was not at a high pressure; in 
fact, every effort was made to avoid high pressures (Ashby 35-37). In 
the ·absence of hoses, moreove~, even the head pressure of the aqueducts 
could not be directly utilised. Even a method of distributing water 
which was used in many English towns - letting water run along the streets 
to wherever it was required and digging holes to make temporary reservoirs -
could not have been used in Rome owing to the presence of the many ducts 
below the pavements; for these would have collected and diverted the 
water. There was thus no alternative for the Vigiles but to carry water 
to where it was needed~ 
7.11.9 
We can now see how these limitations of distribution affected the 
actual firefighting. If we imagine the Vigiles equipped with modern pumps 
capable of pumping 500 g.p.m. but without hoses, we can make a rough 
estimate of the manpower required to keep one of these pumps supplied. 
Over a longish period men in.a bucket chain could probably keep~water 
passing at about 40 g.p.m., with each man covering about 2 metres. In 
order to deliver 500 g.p.m., therefore, there will need to be about 12 
separate bucket chains. Thus, over a distance of 2 metres between the source 
of the water and the pump, 12 men will be needed; over 10 metres, 60 
men will be needed; ov5r 100 metres, 600 men will be needed; and to relay 
water over 1 kilometer, 6,000 men will be needed. All this is just for 
one modern pump. Turning the figures round, one cohort of 500 men could 
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keep up with this pump over a distance of about 42 metreso The value 
of this comparison is to emphasise the value of hoses. For our study 
of the Vigiles there a~e two very important implications: that, as with 
other equipment~ what the Vigiles lacked in hoses~ they had to make up 
for in men; and that as far &s possible they will have had to use 
sources of water which were available very close to their fires. 
Obviously, the maximum possible capacity of their pumps was partly limited 
by these problems of distribution. 
7.11.10 
Frontinus gives the number of castella served by each of the 
aqueducts and gives the Regions which each aqueduct supplied; ~e does!•not, 
however, tell us how many castella were situated in each Region, nor how 
many quinariae went to each Region. Lanciani (1880, 577-580) attempted 
various tables to show how the water was distributed both physically around 
Rome and also per capita of the population; but Lanciani has to use too 
many unknown factors, and in addition there are textual difficulties 
over some of Frontinus' numbers. We can avoid some of the difficulties 
if we work with averages, for the area served by each castellum and the 
quantity of water supplied by each castellum.- It is probable that the 
number of castella increased proportionately with the capacity of the 
aqueducts, and that we shall not be far out if we assume, for our estimates, 
that a castellum in the time of Augustus had the same c=pqcity as one 
under Trajan. Frontinus tells us that (in his own time) there were 
altogether 247 castell~ within the City (Agu.78); from the totals estimated 
above (7.11.4) we can determine the average quantity for ea~h castellume 
We have to divide the 151,740 g.p.m. (the total input just before 
109, ~he period to which Frontinus refers) among 247 castella. This gives 
614 g.p.m. for the reasonable estimate. For our worst estimate, the quantity 
is one eighth of this, i.e. 77 g.p.m. 
(436) 
7.11.11 
In estimating the area served by each castellL!.!!!, we have to make 
two assumptions. First 9 we have to use a figure to ropresent the area 
of the City; and, since we do not know precisely the limits of the 
inhabited area at any period, we shall use an exaggerated estimate: 
a square of 6,000 metres, which should enclosR thG City at any period. 
Secondly, we shall have to assume that the water was distributed as 
evenly as the table below suggests. This table is based on Frontinus, 
but avoids the textual difficulties by not using precise figures, 
simply indicating with a cross the Regions served by each aqueduct. 
Region No. of 
Aqua 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 g 10 11 12 13 14 Regions 
Appia X X X X X X X 7 
Anio Vetus X X x.: X X X X X X 9 
Marcia X X X X X X X X X X 10 
Tepula X X X X 4 
Iulia X X X X X X X 7 
Virgo X X X 3 
Alsietina (x) (1) 
Claudia X X X X X X X X X X X x X X 14 
Anio Novus X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 14 
No. of 
aqueducts 
per Region 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 4 3 4 3 6(7) 68(69) 
The Alsietina was never distributed; the Anio Vetus, though kept separate 
from the other s~pplies, was distributed. This table shows that no Region 
was badly served though there might appear to have been a slight concentration 
towards the centre of the City. Also, as Lanciani noted (i880,578), the 
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isolated hills such as the Celio and the Aventine were served by fewer 
aqueducts, and there were also occasional pockets with inadequate supplies 
"(a~~ cf. Ma~'tial 9., 18 .. 5f) o It is possible that the outer areas of the 
City were l8SS well oerved than the inner, and this would imply that the 
areas of predominantly public and daytime resort were better served than 
the outskirts. In the estimates which l1!e are making o.f the availability 
of water, it is hoped that by taking an exaggerated figure for the area 
of the City we shall obtain a minimum average for each castellum, which 
would be bettered at the least in the central areas and possibly also in the 
outskirts• Assuming, then, that the square of 6,000 metres is to be 
divided among 247 castella, on average each castellum should serve 
approximately 145,300 square metres, equiJalent roughly to a square of 
side 380 metres. This average implies that there l!.rould be a castellum 
available within about 190 metres to 270 metres. 
7 .. 11 .. 12 
The freqr18n~y of the distribution of the castella has been selected 
because we can make an estimate of the quantity available from them. It is 
true, however, that very often there will have been other points much 
nearer to a fire than the castella, such as public fountains,baths, 
sometimes even private supplies, for example, to which the Vigiles will 
have had ready access.. But, Jika the Vigiles themselves, we must confine our 
basic deductions about the availability of water to what is reasonably certain 
and reliable, and work out a procedure which would be applicable to the 
majority of fires, though with the obvious provision that the basic 
procedure should be improved on in individual caseso 
In our estimates, then, we find that the Vi~ile~ could reasonably 
have expected to find a minimum quantity of water of about 77 g.p.m. 
within about 270 metres, and in optimum conditions, about 614 g.p.m. 
within 190 metres. Thes8 figures are significant, because they can be 
related to firefighting needs. They help to indicate some of the basic 
principles upon which the Vi~il~ operated and the reasons for the use 
of these principles. 
7.11.13 
In order to deliver our lowest estimats of 77 g.p.m., about 2 men 
will be required for every 2 metres, and over 190 metres this would 
require about 190 men. Until A.D. 205 this loJould have been equivalent 
to more than one century, and leaves out of account the men n.eeded to 
perform duties at the actual fire, in the return bucket-chain, and 
distributing water between however many pumps were in use. Although it 
would be possible to produce further estimates, the point should be clear 
that lack of hoses was a major limiting factor, which could only to some 
extent be overcome by the use of large numbe~8 uf men, summoned as 
reinforcements. Since the pumps that survive are unlikely to have delivered 
more than 5 g.p.m. (+.b.IO), one bucket chain could have SIJpplied up to 16 
such pumps, and correspondingly fewer if larger ones were used. Allowing 
for the return bucket chain and the men distributing the water, about 
360 men could have been required to deliver our lowest estimate from our 
minimum estimated distance. It is clear that the Tiber would have been 
too distant from the majority of fires to be of any use. These estimates, 
however impreciBa, highlight the problem: the Vigiles had to find a 
balance between tha quantity of water which might be needed, and the 
quantity of water which was reliably available. 
(439) 
7 .ll.l4 
They found a twofold solution, the patrols. First, these actively 
sought out fires, to catch them while they were still small and capable of 
extinction with only small quantities of water. Secondly, the patrols u!ere 
equipped with portable first-aid equipment, especially axes and buckets. The 
potential value of such a system cannot be exaggerated, yet the scale on which 
the Romans implemented it is unique. The patrols whici1 were used under the 
Republic can only have been on a small scale, and possibly some of the German 
city brigades ca,,,e nearest to the scale of ope:::-ations of the Roman pat:rols 
(these, it is interesting to note, were military brigades). The nearest true 
analogy with the jLigiles ,. system is the modern sprinkler system, in which, 
entirely automatically and independently of people, sensors detect a fire and 
di~ect water onto it while is is still small. The reductions in insurance 
premiums for premises equipped with sprinklers are ample proof of their 
effectiveness. 
7 .. llol5 
The patrols should not, however, be regarded as substitutes fo~ a bette= 
system. They utilised two important resources which were available in tha City 
of Rome, ample manpower and the water supply. -Neither of these owed its existence 
to the needs of firefighting, and their use for firefighting did not deplete 
the resources of the Cityo In this sense, the economic cost of the Vigiles was 
ne9ligible and the gains were positive. The cost of equipping the Vigiles 
with hoses (an anachronistic modern notion) would have been great, and if it had 
involved a diminution of the patrol cover the effect on firefighting would have 
bden bad. Moreover, it is worth emphasising, large numbers of men would stiJl 
have been needed even if there had been hoses: for a certain amount of human 
energy is needed to convey any given quantity of water over any given distance, 
whether hoses are used, or buckets. What distinguishes the Roman system is the 
patrol system, and it is to their credit that they made this use of their 
resources. 
(44o) 
7.11.16 
It will be clear that our more realistic average for the quantity 
of water available at each £~Stellum, 614 g.p.m., implies that much of 
the water could not be got onto a fire even if it was very cJ.oseo For 
most fires, it will hava been best for the Vigi1es to take water from the 
nearest available points, and in well-run houses there will also have 
been emergency supplies of water aB required by law (rae~ 15.43; of. 
Dig 33.7.12.18). In this way, speed will have removed the need for large 
quantities of water. But for large fires, p2~ticulary those requiring 
the use of many pumps, it will have been necessary for all the water to 
have been taken dirGct from the castel~. This is because a depletion of 
the water at the castellum will have reduced supplies all down the line, 
so that after a certain point drinking fountains and the like will have 
dried up. A nimilar problem arises with the modern mains, though in that 
case what would happen is that by drawing water from a hydrant pumps 
could suck the whole system empty, so that precautions have to be takeno 
For the Romans, the problem would arise when a fire had reached an 
advanced stage, and it would suddenly increase the need for manpower. 
This again provided an incentive for them to extinguish fires before they 
became large. 
7.11.17 
Not merely was there tnis incentive to keep the fires below the 
level at which pumps were required: it was also an incentive to keep the 
pumps themselves fairly small. Considerations of manpower will have 
restricted the size of pumps to what could reasonably be expected to 
be supplied with water. Given the deduction that the nearest supplies of 
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water will have been used as much as possible, and observing that the 
quantities at each of these will havE been considerably less than those 
available from the _£§Stella, the pumps cannot normally have been much bigger 
than those operated in more recent times by a pumping team of 4 men. Our 
study of fire pumps (4 b.IO) showed that the largest size for the Roman 
pumps deducible from literary and archaeological evidence is that which 
we called ''medium", a conclusion which finds striking confirmation in 
our study of the water supply. Clearly the capacity of the pumps matched 
the combined capacity of the water supply, and of the manpower. 
7.11.18 
The value of this discussion has been to emphasise the value of 
the patrols. The conclusion remains valid even if·we greatly alter some of 
the variables. It is doubtful whether the Vigiles could have used as much 
water as was often available, particularly as the supply was increased 
from time to time, and this frust~ation must be one peculiar to 
the fire brigade of the City of Rome. 
7.11.19 
Later brigades used large numbers of men as pumpers, but these 
were normally casual labourers. The ~giles actually kept all their 
equivalent of pumpers - the man who formed the bucket cha.:...1s - on the 
books. The reason for this difference is that the Vig~ needed large 
numbors of men for patrols in order - paradoxically - to avoid the need 
to use large quantities of water. It was really a failure of the system 
if these men needed to form bucket chains on a large scale. This unique 
circumstance is explicable because water was available from a large 
number of points, and the patrols made it possible to extinguish the 
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majority of fires using small-scale, first-aid equipment. Without the water 
supply such as Rome provided, the chief justification for the mode of operation 
of the Vigiles would not have existed. Nor, probably, would the ~giles. 
(443) 
CHAPTER 8 
ASSESSMENT 
8.1.1 
The only hypothesis which unites all the evidence relating 
to the Vigiles is that they were a fire brigade. Any other 
functions were incidental. The evidence shows us how they 
operated, and the scale of their patrols makes the Vi~iles a 
unique fire brigade. 
Anyone accustomed to modern fire brigades would have found 
the Vigiles strange, and often inconvenient. A passing patrol 
could interrupt one's domestic activities if they suspected there 
was a fire or, even, merely the risk of a fire. During the day, 
it was assumed that anyone could see if a fire was startin~ and 
put it out. ~t night, the Vigiles would tend to arrive without 
being summoned, while the occupants of the burnin~ premises were 
asleep or absent. At a fire, you could very rapidly have at 
least eighty men in attendance, and the number could rise very 
soon to five hundred or a thousand. The Vigiles would have 
attended many of the f1~e& to which a modern brigade would not 
be summoned. Only a small proportion of their firefighting was 
originated by a call for help. 
Methods of extinction were basic but effective. Speed and 
water were the basic principles, and the combination of the patrols 
with the distribution of large quantities of water throughout the 
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City meant that the Vigiles could operate without the advantage of 
modern pumps and hoses. More than any other fire brigade, the Vigiles 
used ample manpower to compensate for the simplicity of the 
equipment. By catching fires while they were small, the need for 
elaborate rescue eauipment was avoidedo 
8.1.3 
The prefect and the sub-prefect stand slightly apart from the 
main activities of the Vigiles. Althoug;~ the prefect was responsibl~ 
for the overall operations of the corps, he had other functions 
which must have occupied a major oart of his time. The jurisdictions 
given to the prefect meant that he had to spend much of his time in 
court. Only the major fires could have demanded his attendance in 
person. The sub-prefect must have done much of the top-level 
administrative work of the corps. 
It follows that the functions of the prefect and of the corps 
do not coincide completely. The notion that the list of the 
prefect's jurisdictions is also a list of the interests of the 
corps has bedevilled study of the Vigiles, and it is without 
foundation. It was only when the prefect was acting as the chief 
fire officer that their respective functions coincided. The Vigiles 
were not a police force. 
8.2.1 
The fire which destroyed much of Rome in A.D.64 has often 
been taken as proof that the Vigiles were ineffective. But although 
something did go wrong oc that occasion, reasonable estimates sug~est 
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that this was just one fire in at least eleven million. Indeed, 
when we compare imperial Rome with medieval cities, it seems 
surprising that Rome nid not suffer several such fires. 
8.2.2 
Given that in a city the size of Rome there were around 3,500 
men on patrol at night, and that this number was increased to 7 9 000, 
it is difficult to see how the Vigiles could have been ineffective. 
Where it was appropriate, the Vi~iles op~rated in a military manner, 
and with Huch numbers of men even the most minimal attempt to avoid 
chaos must have ensured effective cover. 
8.2.3 
A further pointer to the success of the Vi~iles is that ~hey 
were judged to be worth continuin~ when Augustus established the 
corps on an experimental basis, and that they continued for at least 
three hu~dred years. In a world which placed extensive restrictions 
on fire brigades, the Vigiles were u~ique. It is possible that the 
Vigiles themselves, or some of their prefects, reinforced the 
knowledge that fire brigades and other organisations could be 
seditious, but if this is the case it simply emphasises that they 
were felt to be useful. 
8.2.4 
The loss of around 8% of the men each year for reasons other 
than normal mortality is a testament to the rigour of the duties, and 
provides a further indication that the Vigiles operated efficiently. 
The firemen in Rome had t~ work hard all the time they were out on 
duty, and when they we1•e in the fire stations they were either asleep 
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or standing by as reinforcements. This is in sharp contrast with the 
common complaint of the nineteenth-century fireman, that even when 
nothing was happening he was confined to the fira station. 
The most important factor governing the day-to-day efficiency 
of the Vigiles must have baen the quality of the individunl officers 
and men. In the absence of direct evidence, the most we can say is 
that the higher we estimate the effectiveness of the Vigiles the be~ter 
must the quality of the men have been. 
The system provided opportunities for individualB to develop 
their abilities, and there was no barrier to prevent a technician or 
nco. from serving for many years. Centurions could also spend many 
years in the Vigiles. There was not a great deal of scope for 
promotion as a specialist fireman, a~d if a man was good in a 
particular post he would tend to stay there. The ordinary rankers 
had to work hard during their six years of service, and most of them 
left at the end of six years. A few stayed on; we do not know what 
distinguislied these men. The tribunes and centurions could have had 
experience of firefighting in their military service prior to 
joining the Vigiles; but they must have relied heavily on the nco's, 
particularly the optiones, and on the technicians. 
8.}.3 
The material resource which enabled the Vigiles to function at 
all was the water supply. The aoueducts brou~ht intc Rome more water 
than the Vigiles could use, and more than a modern bri~ade would 
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require at most fires. The distribution system made the water available 
for any fire. Without it, the patrols would have been lar~ely uselesso 
The availability of l~~~e numbers of men was also a prerequisite. 
Without the resources of later technology, manpower was needed by way 
of compensation. The normal period of six years of service meant that 
the men could be worked hard and replaced regularly. 
Despite the short period of service, the Vigiles were or~anised 
as military units, and the officers were More soldiers than firemeno 
What distinguishes the Vi~iles from other fire brigades in the classical 
world is that only they were or~anised in this way, and the difference 
is one of numbers. The Republican arran~ernents for firefighting were 
typical of the hellenistic period: a small band of men directed by a 
city official. The imperial arrangements in Rome imported the large-
scale application o~ a military technique, tite patrol. 
8.4.1 
It would be easy to assume that Augustus and the Vigiles were 
highly sophisticated in fire matters. We can see which arrangements 
could have assisted their firefighting, even if this result was merely 
incidental to the Roman intention or even unforeseen by the Romans. 
Firefighting prowess would have been an advantage to those seeking 
promotion, but tt did not automatically bring promotion. The centurions 
and tribunes would have been more useful with firefi~hting experience 
than without, but many other thin~s would have had to be equal before 
such experience became crucial in selecting men to enter or stay in the 
Vigiles. 
(448) 
8.4.2 
The ancient understanding of fire was basic but not extensive. 
The only extensive accounts of how to tackle fireR were probably 
military manuals, such as that of Aeneas Tacticus. ThP.re was nothin~ 
like the modern knowled~e of the physics and chemistry of combustion. 
However, the value of speed and water was well-known to the Greeks 
and Romans. For reasons connected with the nature of fire, speed and 
water are still the chief weapons a~ainst fire. 
8. 4. 3 
When Au~ustus wa~ faced with the problem of several fires 
occurring at one time, he could see that there was water distributed 
around the City. In fact, one of the schemes of the Catilinarian 
conspirators had been to cut the aaueducts in order to hinder the 
firefighting when they set fire to Rome (Plut.Cic.xviii.2): 
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The aqueducts were a resource which was under-used. His solution 
was to add manpower on a huge scale, to add the element of speed to 
the water. The result was a fire brigade which was uniaue and 
effective. It would not have fitted into modern conditions. But, 
like the larger brigades of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
it was capable of extin~uishin~ any fire if it was caught early 
enough; and because of the patrols it was more capable than the 
later bri~ades of reaching a fire while it was small. 
Our answer to the question whether we would have welcomed the 
Vigiles i.f our house had been on fire is "Yes". 
(449) 
APPENDIX I 
EXTINGUISHING FIRE 
[The chapter bearing this title in the Manual (Part 1, Chapter 2) is here 
reproduced in its entirety. It provides a good, concise account of tte 
principles of fire extinction, applicable to the problems of any fire 
brigade.] 
In the previous chapter [Manual 1, Chapter 1], the chemical ~eactions 
which produce fire were d~ribed from the scientific viewpoint. It is 
now proposed to relate this knowledge to the subject of fire extinction, 
and to refer to the various methods at present employed. 
It has b~eu shown that ihree factors are essential to combustion~ 
namely: 
(a) The presence of a fuel, or combustible substance. 
(b) The pr~sence of oxygen (usually as air) or other supporter of 
combustion. 
(c) The attainment and maintenance of a certain minimum temperature. 
Fire extinction, in principle, consists in the limitation of one or 
more of these fectors, and methods of fire extinction may therefore be 
conveniently classified under the following headings: 
1. Starvation, or the limitation of fuel. 
2. Smothering, or the limitation of oxygen. 
3. Cooling, or the limitation of temperature. 
In practice, specific methods of fire extinction often embody more 
than one of these principles, but it will be convenient to consider them 
according to the main principle involvtd. 
1. STARVATION 
This method is ~pplied in three ways: -
(a) By removing combustible material from the neighbourhood of the fire. 
Examples of this are, the drainage of burning oil tanks; the working 
out of c~rgo at a shi~ fire; the demolition of buildings to create 
a fire stop; the cutting of trenches in peat, heath and forest fires; 
counter-burnin~ in forest fires, etc. 
(b) By removin~ the fire from the neip;hbourhood of corr!~ustible material, 
as, for inst~nc~, ~ulling anart a burning haystack or a thatched roof. 
(c) By subdividing- the burning- material, when the smaller fires produced 
may be left to burn out or to be exting'uished easily by other means. 
A typical example is the emulsification of the surface of burning oil, 
whilst the beating of a heath fire owes much of its effectiveness 
to this. 
2. SMOTHERING 
(a) By Reducing the Oxygen Content 
If the oxygen content of the atmosphere in the imr11ediate nei~hbourhood 
of burning material can be sufficiently reduced, combustion will cease. 
The general procedure in methods of this type is to prevent or i~pede the 
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access of fresh air to the seat of the fire, and allow the combustion 
to reduce the oxy~en content in the confined atmosphere until it 
extinguishes itself. This principle is, of course, ineffective where, 
as in the case of cellul~id, the burning material contains within 
itself, in a chemically combined form, the oxygen it requireo for 
combustion. 
The principle of smothering i~ employed on a small scale in 
snuffing a candle, and, on a large scale, in capping a turning oil 
well; two processes which are precisely analogous. The battening down 
of a ship's hold when a fire breaks out below decks will often hold the 
flames in check until port is reached. 
Small fires, such as those involving a person's clothin~, can be 
smothered with a rug, blanket, etc., while the use of sand or earth 
on small fires is a further instance of the same principle. 
An import1:u1 t 
the use of foam. 
which, in so far 
tends to prevent 
practical application of the smothering method 
This forms over the burning material a viscous 
as it is complete, limits the supply of air and 
the formation of inflammable vapour. 
is 
coating 
also 
Another method of smothering is by the application of ~ cloud of 
finely divided particles of dry powder, usually sodium bicarbonate, J ..it 1 
from a pressurised extinp;uiRher. Research has been1into this method 11" rv+ '"f, 
at~d it is not certain that the action is solely related to smothering. 
Carbonates will absorb heat and when they are finely divided, as is the 
powder, their specific h~at is v~ry much gr~ater. It may, therefore, be 
more accurate to say that the powder has a cooling effect in addition 
to its smothering effect. 
A recent devel~pment in the smothering method has been the diRcovery 
of a powdered compound for use on metal fires, ~·&· uranium, plut~nium, 
sodium, potassium, thorium and ma~nesium. This powder, ternary eutecti£ 
chloriQe, is applied by means of a gas cartridge ~ressuriRed ext~ngui~her. 
As the fusing temperature of the powder is in th~ region of 1076 F~ 
(580°C.) it is intended that it shall form a crust over the burning metal 
and thus exclude the oxygen in the air. 
Another class of smothering a~ent may be described as temporary 
in its blanketing effect. Thus the vi~urous discharge of an inert gas 
or vapour in the immediate .vicinity of the fire may so reduce the oxyg-en 
content of the atmosphere for the time being that combustion cannot be 
maintained. Carbon dioxide and chlorobromomethane are familiar examples 
of this. With fires of any magnitude, however, the convection currents 
set up are sufficiently powerful to dissipate the inert atmos~here formed 
by the application of a gas blanket before the extinguishing action can 
take effect. The application of certain of these media in the form of a 
liquid which is then vaporised by the fire, thus forming the required inert 
atmosphere, is more likely to prove effective, particularly as a cooling 
effect is also operative. (See Section 3, "Cooling") 
(b) By Excess of Oxygen 
The methods of fire extinction so far mentioned in the present 
section depend on reducing the oxygen content of the supporting atmosphere 
until the upper limit of combustion is exceeded. It is possible in 
certain cases to employ-the reverse process, that is to pass so much air 
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across the burnie~ material that the lower limit of combustion is 
traversed and burning ceases through a local deficiency of fuel 
(or excess of oxygen). It is well known that a certain draught is 
essential to rapid combustion, but when th~ most suitable rate of air 
supply is exceeded combustion is impeded, and, in the limit, totally 
inhibited. Thus, while a ~entle application of the bellows to a coal 
fire will facilitate burnin~, the apnlication of the same drau~ht to 
a candle will extin~uish it. It is by the application of this principle 
that oil well fires are extinguishe1 by the blast from exploding 
dynamite. Such techniques do, of course, also involve to a consid~rable 
extent the cooling principle treated in the next section. 
3. COOLING 
If the rate at which heat is generated by combustion is less than 
the rate at which it is dissipated through various agencies, the 
combustion cannot persist. In applying this principle to fire extinction 
the first step is to accelerate the speed ~ith which heat is removed 
from the fire, thus reducing the temperature of the burning mass and as 
a consequen~e the rate at which heat is produced. In due course the rate 
at which heat is lost from the fire exceeds the rate of heat production 
and the fire dies away~ 
The application of a jet or spray of water to a fire is invariably 
based on this sia~nle but funrlamental principle. There are many variations: 
another example is the emulsification of the surface of oil by means cf 
the emulsifying type of sprinkler head producing an oil-in-water or 
water-in-oil emulsion. Another. method of coolin~ which has been adopted 
for oil tanks employs the air agit~tion principle. In this air is 
introduced at the bottom of a tank and the bubbles of cold air, risi~g 
through the oil. carry cool oil from the bottom of the tank up to tne 
heated layer at the ton. The production of inflammable vapour is thus 
decreased until the point is reached where the fire dies out through 
lack of fu'!l. 
The cooling principle in fire extinction is the one most commonly 
employed, forminrr as it does the basis of the application of water and 
other liquids to burning materials. The extinguishing medium operates 
by absorbing heat from the fire, as a consequence of which it may undergo 
one or more of the following chan~es: 
(a) Its temperature is raised; 
(b) It is converted to the vapour state; 
(c) It is decomposed; 
(d) It reacts chemically with the burning material. 
It is clearly desirable that the auantity of heat required to 
produce any or all of these chan~es in a ~iven quantity of an 
extin";'uishin~ ;nedium should be as high as possible. That is to say, 
referring specifically to the above headings, that the following values 
should be as high as possible: 
{i) The amount 0f heat absoroed for any ~iven increase in temperature 
(the thermal capacity}. 
(ii) The amount of heat required to vaporise a unit weight of the 
extinguishing medium (the latent heat of vaporisation}. 
(iii) The amount of heat reauired to cause the decomposition of a unit 
weight of the extin~uishing medium (the heat of decomposition}. 
(iv) The amount of hent reouired to cause a unit weight of the 
extin~uishin~ medium to react chemically with the burning material 
(the heat of reaction). 
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The action of water depends predominantly on (i) and (ii), the latter 
bein~ by far the more important. Thus it takes about six times as much 
heat to convert a certain amount of water ~t its boilin~ point into 
steam as is required to raise the temnerature of the same amount of water 
from the usual atmospheric value to its boiling ~oint. In the interest of 
efficiency, then, it is clearly desirable that water should be Bpplied to 
~ fire in the li~uid condition and in such a way that as much as possible 
is converted intn steam. The smotherinR effect of the steam produced at 
the seat of fire is thought to play a oart in &ssisting the extinguishing 
process. In all firefightin~ operations where water is in us~ it should 
be the aim to ensure that toP- proportion of water which escapes from the 
building in linuid form to that which is unplied should be as low as 
possible. When the heat of a fire is considerable, as in its early stages, 
the steam formed will not be visible, but as the temper&ture falls the 
steam "rill condense above the fire. This is widely recop;nised by 
experienced fire officers as a sign that a fire is being brought under 
control. 
On a basis of thermal capacity and latent heat of vanorisation, 
water is an excallent fire extin~uisher, since both figures are high. 
This fact, combined with its availability in lar~e quantity, makes it by 
far the most useful fire extin~uisher for ~eneral purposes. The principle 
of decomposition probably has little applicat:i..on, as wA.ter iR fairly 
stable except at very high temperatures. Certain substances(~·~·· 
carbonates) absorb heat ·in this way (see the reference to dry powder 
extinguishers under Section 2, "Smothering"). Water is not usually 
effective in absorbin~ much heat by reacting with the burning substance. 
Some extin~uiRhin~ media may in certain circumstances prove dan~erous in 
this connection, their reaction with the burning substance resulting in 
the evolution rather than the absorption of heat. Moreover, the reaction 
may result in the production of a substance which is itself combustible, 
thus adding fuel to the fire. The action of water on burning magnesium 
exemplifies both these effects, Rince it reacts with the metal exothermically 
Ci·!·• producin~ heat) with the formation of hydro~en, which is readily 
ignited. In the case of other media the r~action products may be 
undesirable in other senses, as in the caF• of carbon tetrachloride, which 
under certain conditions may evolve phosgeue, a highly poisonous gas. 
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APPENDIX II 
THE END OF THE VIGILES 
It is w~ll-established that the Vigiles chan~ed from 
a firefighting corps into a small number of officials. The 
praefectus vi~ilum became a purely judicial official, and the 
post of tribunus vi~ilum became a sinecure for retired principes 
(senior judicial officials) of ma~istri militum. Firefi~hting 
in Rome, as in Constant.inople, was carried on by colihe~r,ia, 
though each clty had a praefectus vi~ilum. In Constantinople 
this post was superseded by ~hat of praetor plebis (populi) in 
A.D.535; t~e one in Rome just fades out of history. These 
changes are set out by Jones (1964, pp.691-695, & vol.III, 
p.215 n.16). Evidence for the continued existence of officers/ 
officials is not evidence for the continued existence of the corps. 
The late evidence which Jones cites is consistent in not 
indicating that any official was spe~ifically charged with 
firefi~hting. There is, however, one very late piece of evidence 
which sug~ests that the praetores populi mi~ht have been involved. 
This is the scholion on Julian's epitome of Just. Nov.xiii (xxiii). 
The relevant parts of the epitome and the scholion are as follows: 
"Sin a.utem incendium in urbe fuerit factum, interesse praetoree 
oportet, vicenos secum habentes milites et tricenos matricarias." 
''Matricarii dir:untur illi, quos videmus ad incendia currentes, 
et portantes spongias cum ferramentis, et alia ferramenta, 
per qua~ Pcssint de pariete in parietem transire, et ita 
incendium extin~uere." 
{The scholion is quoted by Du Can~e, s.v. MATRICARII.) Jones 
interprets Nov.xiii to mean that the praetors 3ttended fires in 
order to prevent looting. The evidence of the scholion is not a 
(454) 
complete refutation, as the scholiast mi~ht have been wron~. 
But he does provide a little evidence for later technioues of 
firefi~hting - more suitable for rescues than extinction. 
A sin~le political mistake - to support Maxentius -
led to the abolition of the Praetorian Guard in A.D.312 
(Durr,y 1939; 393f). No such event is recorded for the Vi~ileB, 
and, apart from political mistakes, it is unlikely that the 
Vi~iles would have been completely abolished. To have left 
Rome without arran~ements for putting out fires would have put 
it in an inferior position to many of the provincial cities. 
A decision to abolish the corps must have entailed the provision 
of alternative arran~ements, probably utilisin~ the Vi~iles 1 
lar~e stock of equinment. 
VI.3744:31075 seems to fef~cct some such transitional 
arran~ement. Th& text is: 
DESCRIPTIO FER 
QVAE IN COHORTE 
CL MAMERTINO E 
coss 
MATRONAE CVM CARPENTIS 
SIFON 
FALC 
VNC· 
B 
The first five lines may be expanded: 
DESCRIPTIO FER[iarum] I QVAE IN COHORTE [?] I CL(audio) 
MAMERTINO E[t Nevitta] j CO(n)S(ulibu)S I MATRONAE CVM 
CARPENTIS 
The last four lines have been expanded in two ways. The earlier 
readin~ (VI.3744: De Rossi) ~ave the letter 'I' after the 'N' in 
"SIFON", ~ivin~ the expansion 11SIFONI[bus] 11 , the name of 
equipment. The later reading (VI.31075: HUlsen) took the letter 
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to be 'A', which produces the expansion 11 SIFONA[riia]n, the 
name of a technician. My own readin~ of this letter is 'I', 
and the last four lines are accordingly taken to be the names 
of eauipment: siphones, falces, unc(in)i, and probably ballistae. 
It is odd for firefi~htin~ equipment to be in the hands of 
matronae (this matter will not be nuraued here), but eaually 
it is odd for it to be out of the hanna of the Vi~iles or co~egia. 
Was it merely household enuipment brou~ht out for a parade? 
If so, what was the cohort mentioned on the inscription? 
In the Notitia Urbis Romae, the Vigiles are ment~oned 
as "cohort such-and-such" in seven out of the fourteen Rell;ions, 
i.e. in the Region which contained their caetra. The castra as 
such are not mentioned. The fourteen excubitoria are included 
en bloc in the lists at the end of the Notitia. In his edition 
of the Notitia (1949), Nordh discusses the various thorny problema 
associated with it, and establishes that we cannot use the 
appearance of an item in the lists for the purposes of dating 
either the coming into existence or the caasing to exist of that 
item. In any case, the Praetorians are mentioned, and they ceased 
to exist in 312. The Notitia includes in its lists many features 
(e.~. bui~din~a) which had a topographical si~nificance, being 
used to identify Places where we would use a number and street 
name. It is possible that the cohorts of Vigiles had this sort of 
significance, and that the matronae were in the ar~a covered by 
the cohort. (The close relationship between the Vigiles' divisions 
of Rome and the ecclesiastical Regions will be recalled.) 
The eauipment listed probably was connected with the 
Vigiles. If the corps were allowed to run down (e.g. by ceasing 
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to recruit), it would have been practical for the officers and 
other key men to remain, together with the eauipment for as long 
as it lasted. This would enable the colle~ia to work themselves 
in, and would explain the aPpearance of equipment without the 
corps. The appearance of two centurions, of the Second and 
Seventh Cohorts, at Portus in A.D.386 suP,~ests that the premises 
of the Vigiles re@ained occupied by them or their successors. 
The "multinlex auxilium" which attended a fire in Rome in A.D.363 
(Amm.23.3.3) may have included the last of the vi~ilea, working 
with the colleP,ia. 
If we seek an occasion for the decision to run down the 
corps, in accordance with this hypothesis, the transfer of the 
imperial seat to Constan~inople provides a suitable one. The 
ViP,iles in Rome were very much a feature of imperial life. 
Constantinople seems to have been P,iven arrangements typical of 
western cities other than Rome. Rome was leit to fight its 
fires with a stock of eauinment, a skeleton staff of ex-vigiles, 
and gre~t reliance on ita collegia. 
A parallel for this suggested end of the Vigiles may 
be found in the apparent running-down of the Urban Cohorts. 
Late in Constantine'& ~ei~n these were under the command of one 
tribune, who also had char~e of the Forum Suarium (VI.1156=D.722). 
As Jones comments (p.693), these were probably paper cohorts. 
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APPENDIX III 
TABLES OF SURVIITII.L RATES AND HETHOD OF CALCULATION 
Use has been mad~ of the Model Life-T4bles published by the 
United Nation (1955). The purpose of these is 11 to establish, as 
far as possible, relative~y simple patterns of changes in mortality 
rates in different age groups during the transition from high to 
low mortality levels. The ultimate aim is ~hiefly to facilitate 
mortality estimates for countries and regions of the world in which 
no adequate mortality statistics have so far been developed" (p.1). 
The report constructs 40 models, in which the mortality rates 
are expressed both as life expectatioas at birth and also as mortalities 
per 1,000 for each 5-year age group. The advantage of working in 
terms of mortality per 1,000 for each age group (the "life-table 
concept'') is that this gives a much cle~rer indication of the 
mortality risks ia a population than the crude death rate. For 
example, ~population with a large number of old people might have 
the same crude death rate as a population with a large number of 
children, whereas the life-table analysis would di~tinguish the 
two populations clearly. 
For the key index the report selected the rate of infant 
mortality, supplemented by the mortality rate for the first quinquennium 
of 'life, because it is in this period that the greatest variations 
are apparent between the various levels of mortality. We are not, 
however, bound to use this key iadex: we may use other portions of 
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the tables, as explain~d on page 1: "In modern nations improvements 
in conditions of living and standards of health are reflected in 
gradual shifting of mortality from earlier to later periods of life -
a postponement of premature d~aths - which brings th~ actual pattern 
of mortality closer to the ideal. Relative to their earlier levels 
the risks of mortality during infancy and childhood P-re reduced most 
substantially, but smaller relative improvements are also made during 
maturity and even at later ages. Thus the curve describing mortality 
risks by age sinks to a lower level, but its shap~ is not fundamentally 
affected. Quite generally, the relationships between the mortality 
rates of adjacent groups retain a notable consistency at all levelR 
of general mortality." Figure 54 is a copy of Figure 9 from the 
report, which shows how the curves which describe some of the Mod~le 
are all of the same pattern. In particular, it shows that a change 
in the level of mortality affects all the age groups in the same way 
(i.e. if the life expectation at birth goes up or down, the lif~ 
expectation for all the age ~roups will go up cr down by a related 
amount). Thus, if we possess data for one portion of the age scale 
in any population we can predict mortality rates of other portions 
0 
by selecting the most app1priate Model. The lower the age group 
of our data the more accurate will be the predictions. 
The age groups in which we shall be specially interested lie 
about midway between the optimum group from the point of view of 
discussing mortality and the worst group, and start around the age of 
20. We must therefore consider the caution ~iven by the report on 
page 21 concerning the accuracy of the Models: "Finer variations in 
the pattern, as well as peculiarities that may occur in individual 
populations, are necessarily glossed over." 
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The curves which describe the Models are to some extent disturbed 
both hy the method of construction and also by irregularities in the 
basic data. In the more advanced countries there are accurate records 
of the number of births aod infant deaths, while in less developed 
countries these figures are often inaccurute and tend to underestimate 
the rate of mortality in the first few years of life (pp.3f.). 
The worst mortality rate noted in the renort (though not utilised) 
is in fact an unofficial one, worked out by Davis (1951) for India 
in the period 1911-1921. For this period the estimated life 
expectation at birth is only 19.42 years (male) and 20.91 (female), 
and the population increased by only 0.0~~. which is negli~ible. 
It is, ind~ed, unlikely that any population could maintain its numbers 
if its average life expectation at birth is much less than 20 (p.2). 
Despite this, the lowest life ~xpectation at birth described in the 
tables (Model 40 and page 16) is 18.8 ~ears, though it is not clea~ 
whether this is inte~ded to repreRent a declining population (as 
Davis' data for a barely increasing population might be taken to 
imply). Moreover, for some of the higher age groups the theoreti=al 
predictions diverge slightly from the actual observation (p.21). 
The middle portion~ of the a~e scales, in which we are chiefly 
interested, are not subject to the latter diverg~nce, and in addition 
these portions 6how least variation between the various Models. This 
would be a disadvantage if we had to extrapolate from the middle 
portions to the extreme portions, but in our particular application 
of these tables we work the other way round, since the data by which 
we select an appropriate Model covers periods of 20 and 25 years 
starting from agee of 15, 20, 25 and 30, and the prediction which we 
make is for a mere 6-year period starting from age 20. We have a 
(460) 
further advantage in that, however inaccurate our calculations 
concerning mortality, there is no possibility of the errore adding 
up to give anything approachin~ the annu~l loss of approximately 1~~ 
which we have to explain in the case of the Vigil~s. Nor could any 
errors in calculating this loss of 1~~ accumulate negatively to approach 
anywhere near the figures derived from the mortality tables. It is 
therefore possible to use the results to indicate approximately how 
far normal mortality is likely to have accounted for some of the losses 
from the Vi~iles, and to indicate how far other factors must have been 
operating. We can thus use the tables meaningfully, and the caution 
concerning the accuracy of the tables does not invalidate either the 
method or the r~sults. 
In view of Hopkins (1966, 263) it was not considered worthwhile 
to use the Models which imply a life expectation at birth of much above 
30 years. On the other hand, since Brunt (1971, 133) suggests that the 
free population of Republican Italy failed to reproduce itself, it was 
considered wo~thwhile (and correct, as it turned out) to use all the 
Models right down to no. 40, which describes the life expectation at 
birth of a population which probably is just maintaining itself. Since 
we are now concerned with legionaries and firemen, females are ignored. 
The tahle which follows is the relevant portion of the male 
life-table ''Male life-table mortality rates for the specified age 
intervals in forty theoretical models" (U.N. Table 7). The choice 
of Models has been explained. The choice of age groups was determined 
by the range of ages likely to be encountered among legionaries and 
vigiles, with most men being recruited between the ages of 15 and 30 
and serving, in the case of legionaries, up to 25 years (i.e. to age 54). 
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Model Mortality rate for specified 
tage group 
No. 15,..19 20-24 25-29 30-'S4 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 
29 410 08 56.37 61.32 68.12 78.63 96.00 118.68 145.18 
30 43.84 59.71 65.40 73.16 84.91 103.79 127.86 157.40 
31 46.42 62.58 69.24 78.03 91.15 1'i1.66 137.29 167.54 
32 49.02 65.39 75.07 82.95 97.48 119.68 146.97 177.89 
I 51.62 
68.15 33 76.89 87.88 103.91 127.87 156.89 188.45 
34 54.42 71.30 80.95 93.17 110.87 136.79 167.42 199.76 I 35 57.24 74.41 85.02 98.59 148.17 146.24 478.65 211.79 
36 60.03 77.43 89.03 103.96 125.44 155.69 189.89 223.72 
37 62.80 80.37 92.94 109.28 132.75 163.30 201.27 235-'77 
38 65.55 82.23 96.80 114.66 140.23 175.26 213.46 248.16 
39 68.20 85.94 100.50 119.80 14·7. 47 184.97 224.81 260.22 
40 70.82 88.54 104.08 124.85 154.65 194.65 236.36 272.00 
For convenience both in calculating and in use, the above 
mortality rates are converted to show 9 in the table below, the rates 
of survival per 1,000 for each age group. 
[ I Surviv&l r·&te for eper;ified age group 
1 Model I 
! Nc. I 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 
I 29 I 958.92 943.63 938.68 931.88 921.37 904.00 881.32 852.82 
30 956.19 94o.29 934.60 926.84 915.09 896.21 872.14 842.60 
31 953.38 937.42 930.76 921.97 908.85 888.34 862.71 832.46 
32 1950.98 934.61 926.93 917.06 902.52 880.32 853.03 822.11 
33 I 948.38 931.85 923.11 912.12 896.09 872.13 843.11 811.55 
34 1 945•58 928.70 919.05 906.83 889.13 863.21 832.58 8oo.24 
35 I 942.76 925.59 914.98 901.41 881e83 853.76 821.35 788.21 
36 939-97 922.57 910.97 896.04 874.56 844.31 840.11 776.28 
37 937.20 919.20 907.06 890.72 867.25 834.70 798.73 764.23 
38 934.45 916.77 903.20 885.34 859.77 824.74 786.84 751.84 
39 931.80 914.06 899.50 880.20 852.53 815.03 775.19 739.78 
4o 929.18 911.46 895.92 875.15 845.35 805.35 763.64 728.00 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
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From this table of survival rates, it is possible to calculate 
the percentages of men who survive after 20 and 25 years from each 
of the ages 15, 20, 25 and 30. Each of the survival rates may be 
regarded as a decimal fraction of the number of men existing at the 
start of each 5-year interval (i.e. unity). Thus we multiply the 
fractions by eacn other to cover the desired period of overall 
survival, and then to convert the result to a per~entage we multiply 
by 100. For example, to calculate the overall percentage of men 
surviving over 20 years starting at age 20 in Model 29, the 
calculation is: 
0.94363 X 0.93868 X 0.93188 X 0.92137 X 100 = 76.052% • 
The two tables below show the calculated survival rates ove1· 
periods of 20 acd 25 years respectively, starting from each of the 
ages 15, 20, 25 and 30. 
Model Percenta~e survival rate over 20 years from specified age 
No. 15 20 25 30 
. 
29 79.1~2 76.052 72.858 68.406 
30 77.882 74.534 71.04o 66.293 
I 
31 76.709 73.111 69.283 64.217 
32 75.552 71.702 67.537 62.153 
33 74.410 70.308 65.802 60.099 
34 73.188 63.819 63.966 54.947 
35 71.970 67.319 62.024 55.677 
36 70.786 65.860 t-0.273 53.600 
37 69.634 64.437 58.486 51.501 
38 68.503 63.028 56.701 49.396 
39 67.434 61.697 55.013 47.410 
40 66.403 60.412 53.379 45.498 
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Model Percentage survival rate over 25 years f::-om specified ag-e 
No. 15 20 25 30 
29 72.928 68.751 64.212 58.338 
30 71.269 66.798 61.957 55.858 
31 69.717 64.947 59-771 53~458 
32 ~8 .187 63.121 57.611 51.096 
33 66.678 61.317 55.478 48.774 
34 65.073 59. 4o5 53.257 46.372 
35 63. 466 57.474 50.944 43.885 
36 61.906 55.606 48.828 41.608 I 
37 60.390 53.785 46.715 39o359 
38 58.897 51.982 44.615 37.138 
39 5'1.490 50.285 42.646 35.073 
40 56.134" 48.653 40.763 33.123 
It should be emphasised that these two sets of survival rates 
will be valid for any population for which the Models are 
appropriate. 'l'i1ese reRul ts are implicit in the basic life-table 
mortality rates. 
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APPENDIX IV 
THE VALUE OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR FIRES 
Burnt layers and burnt objects are commonly found in the coursa 
of archaeological excavations, and they may occasionally provide 
evidence for the type and extent of a fire. Only rarely is it possible 
to ascertain the cause of a fire. This is difficult enough even when 
it is ponsible to examine the debris of a contemporary fire, since fire 
tends to destroy evidence. However, it is sometimes possible to deduce 
from archaeological evidence why the fire spread in a particular way, 
and to see what circumstances made a particular situation dangerous, 
once a fire had broken out. 
Much pGinstaking collation of material enabled Dunning (1945) 
to describe two major fires in Roman London. On~ of them is datable 
by burnt ~:Samian pottery to the period of Claudius-N"ero, and may be 
correlated with the burning by Boudicca in A.D.61, which is attested 
historically. The other is assignable to the decade £•A.D.120-130. 
Dunning's Figure 3 shows the approximate extent of the fire of 61. 
The correlation between the area indicated and the area indicated for 
the early town by Italia~ an~ early Gaulish sigillata and Claudian and 
earlier coins is such as to suggest that the main area of the town was 
sacked. For the fire of 120-130, Dunning's Figure 7 shows the area 
of burning, a minimum extent of about 65 acres. He comments (p.59): 
"The spreading out of the sites from west to east suggests that 
the fire started in the western part of the area and the flames 
then spread eastwards, fanned by a prevailing west or south-west 
wind." 
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This conclusion might be true, but the actual evidence does not warrant 
it. It is well-kn0wn that a fire can change its direction of spread, 
for example, if the wind changes, and we should not overlook the 
possibility of a fire creating its own wind (the 'fire-storm' effect); 
so that the prevailing wind is not the only possible explanation. 
His comment that ~he evidence for the burning of the Forum and 
Basilica at this time is inconclusive is valid, but it may be 
wondered, from the number of burnings attested for the Basilica, 
whether this blilding was burned dovm so regularly that it is unlike1y 
to have escaped in a major conflagration. Perhaps a slight under-
estimate of the frequency of fires lies bP.hind Dunning's discuss"ion 
of the cause of the fire (p.60). He reaches the conclusion that the 
fire appears to have been accidental, apparently because "no adequate 
historic~l context can be proposed for it 11 • He alRo says {p.60,n.4): 
"The sugg<~otion that the London fire may have been connected \'lith 
the unAettled state of the province about this time is perhaps 
worth mentioning, even if only to be dismissed." 
It would have been interesting to see hie comments if there had been 
evidence for military operations in the London area at that date: 
statistically, the fire should still have been accidental. Dunning's 
paper illustrates well the way in which the evidence for major fires 
has to be extensive and detailed: but that, despite thie, it is possible 
to draw only very general conclusions. 
The period 1 timber building at Boxmoor (Neal 1370) provided 
an interesting qu~stion for the archa~ological fire investigator. 
Nea~ describes the fire thus (p.159): 
"Destruction of the building was by fire, since large slabs of 
fallen burnt daub and painted plaster were found over the floors. 
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Many of the sleeper-beams and wall-frames survived in the form 
of charcoal. The wall-frames, which were joined with notched 
tenons (pl. XIII ~), provide useful evidence for the construction 
of the superstructure, which appears to have had a ceiling-height 
of at least 7 ft. 6 ins. The building may have been cleared and 
deliberately set on fir~ as a means of demolishing the structure 
to make way for the masonry house, as all floors were barren of 
finds." 
The absence of objects is the sort of detail which can be important 
in identifying a deliherat~ firing, though it should be observed that 
in this particular case a kitchen area with pottery was not identified, 
and it may well be that there had been combuetible objects which left 
no detectable trace in-the excavated area. Now, although we must not 
assume that people will have actP.d reasonably, it is worth noting that 
burning is not necessarily a good method of clearing a site; and, in 
this case, what was left on the site was no more and no less than the 
bulk which would have been produced by simply pulling down the house, 
less the roof. This might have been fired to remove 'it. Otherwise, 
the building was nnt completely destroyed, ~nd we should reckon with 
the possibility of an accidental fire, pcssibly in an unoccupied 
building. There is no intention to raise quibbles over Neal's 
interpretation; but it does seem that the evidence is not sufficient 
to suggest the cause of the fire. Otherwise, his observations are 
useful and he raises relevant questions. 
The problem of the use of fire as a means of destruction has 
been discussed by Col. Gordon (1935) in connection with his own 
experiences in firing Wazir huts during the winter of 1919-1920. 
He discusses the effectiveness of fire and the sword as a means of 
destroying a village, and comments (p.149): 
"I have learned by experience that the casual application of a 
(467) 
torch will not necessarily set fire to anythingo 11 
This does, yet again, exphasise that the circumstances have to be 
right for a fire to take hold, and that a variety of circumstances 
will often result in a source of heat remaining only potentially 
dangerous. In the case of Wazir huts with mud roofs and rubble walls, 
it was necessary ~o use explosive to break the timber supports so 
that the huts were effectively destroyed. Mere burning was not 
enough, as roofs could easily be repaired. Gordon also draws attention 
to the more genP.ral social factors involved in destruction of 
communities (p.152): 
"It was the collapse of civiltzation under the impact of barbarism, 
the extinction of good administration causing canals to silt up, 
communications and trade to disappear and cities to fall into ruin, 
that produced famine, chaos and devastation to a far greater d~gree 
than Fire and the Sword." 
The social context of a fire is very important. 
An interesting case of bad planning leading to a fire was 
discovered at Corbridge on Site XX (Ri~hmond and Gillam, 1955,235-238). 
In the early Antonine period an oven or furnace and a wooden hut were 
built very close to each other, and in due course the hut burned down 
(p.238): 
"The burning here is isolated. There can be no doubt of the story. 
The folk who placed a furnace in the 8-foot gap between the back 
of the rampart and a wooden shed reaped the reward of their 
carelessness when the shed was burnt down and completely destroyed. 
Its smouldering ruins were covered in sand, not so~n enough to 
save it, but ~oon enough to prevent the fire from spreading to 
other buildin~s in the fort." 
Probably water was applied initially, or else the building was pulled 
down. Earlier in the same report, an interesting detail of another 
(468) 
fire is noted (po221). Soon after A.D.98 a building burned down, and 
"The fierce fire by which it was destroyed was particularly marked 
in a minor partition which seems to have been exclusively of timber, 
the second to the south." 
Vitruvius described a type nf partition which would burn well (?.4.1), 
though he also commented on the high flammability of other partitions 
(2.8e20)o Architects, like the army, had their lapses. 
These examples of ar.chaeologically-attested fires indicate some 
of the possibilities for interpretation. For conflagrations, it is 
necessary to have a lar~e amount of detailed evidence, as at Corbridge, 
before anything approaching validity can be achieved in the conclusions. 
In the case of the City of Rome, such evidence does not exist, despite 
the large amount that the years of casual and small-scale digging have 
managed to produce. The scale of the City makes great demands on the 
evidence, and in the case of Rome there does exist other evidence, in 
the form of literary and epigraphic records, which is capable of 
generalisation, and telling us some of the general aspects of fire 
hazards in Rome. It is true that, compared with the number of 
buildings and of fires that there must have been, the amount of this 
evidence appears small; but it is far more informative than the 
evidence available for other cities which may include literary references 
but is mainly archaeological. Moreover, the narratii~ descriptions of 
the fire of A.D.64 have their nearest parallels in the modern period. 
Jones (1968), mainly interested in the economic aspects of conflagrations 
in poet-medieval southern England, concentrates on social factors, and 
achieves interesting and valid conclusions without the use of archaeology 
oth~r than inspection of surviving buildings. 
(469) 
For the purposes of this thesis, archaeological evidence for 
fires in Rome has not been used, frequ~ntly though it appears in the 
excavation reports. It is possible that a lot of detailed work might 
prove successful in relatine this evidence to fires attested more 
precisely by written recordso For the present, however, the large 
amount of evidenc~ from excavations which were inadequate in various 
ways has been left on one side. It is especi~lly important, with a 
subject like fire, to use evidence of reasonably certain validityo 
( 470) 
ADDENDUM TO 6.3.7 
The second (1973) edition of Mei~~s (1960) notes on pa~es 582 
and 583 the discovery of a Domitianic building below the 
Ostian castra vil'!,'ilum (1<," Zevi in Not. §..£.· 1970, n.7). A 
fra~mentary inscription, probably concernin~ Trajan and 
probably set up by the seven cohorts of Vi~iles~ was found 
below the mosaic. Another inscription was found, possibly 
concernin~ Hadrian in the earlier part of his rei~n. Meiggs 
comments: "It seems that here too [i.e. as well as the Baths 
of Neptune] Hadrian waA followinl'!,' where Domitian had led, and 
such little evidence as is available is at least compatible 
with the adoption of the Domitianic plan by Hadrian's builderS~." 
It remains a senarate nuestion whether Domitian built a 
fire station. I have not had an opportunity to examine the 
evidence myself. 
kDDENDUM TO 7.6.8 
The Hong Kong authorities have recently taken steps to improve 
the basic services (e.~. electricity), and there is no doubt 
that this will improve the fire standard of the tenements. 
The de~ree of tmnrovement in such a congested environment 
remains to be seen. 
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